EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF

KOREAN STUDIES

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About the British Association for Korean Studies

The British Association for Korean Studies (BAKS) was founded in 1987 as a forum to host conferences and workshops on Korean Studies around the UK. At such events, papers have been presented on a wide range of subjects including archaeology, art, economics, literature, politics, and society. BAKS continues to hold annual conferences, sometimes in partnership with her sister organisations, The British Association for Chinese Studies (BACS) and The British Association for Japanese Studies (BAJS).

Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies (BAKS Papers) was founded in 1991 to publish the editorially approved transactions of the then annual conferences of the Association. The journal for several years actively solicited submissions from outside the conferences as well. Fifteen volumes were published, the final two issues digitally.

Initially the quality of *BAKS Papers* was maintained by an internal editorial board and the editor. Since Volume 14 (2012), *BAKS Papers* became a fully peer-reviewed journal. There was established an external editorial board of 20 international scholars covering a range of areas within the humanities and the social sciences. The Editorial Board is under the leadership of the Editor. There are prescribed rules for the examination of submissions and regulations for writers making a submission. Just under half of the submissions (including external submissions) were rejected for publication in Volume 15 (2013).

Since its inception in the late 1980s, the *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* has focussed on modern and contemporary Korea but has not neglected traditional culture and history. For example, Volume 5 (1994) was a special issue devoted to archaeology and material culture. The journal has published other special issues, such as Volume 6, which focused on 'Nationality and Nationalism in East Asia', reflecting the Association's broader interests in contemporary East Asia, and Volume 14 (2012), which focussed on British witnesses to the social, cultural, political and economic changes in late twentieth-century Korea.

About the *European Journal of Korean Studies*

At the General Meeting for The British Association for Korean Studies in London on 9 September 2016, the Association decided to re-launch *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* (BAKS Papers) as the *European Journal of Korean Studies*.

The new name better reflects the existing breadth of the editorial board as well as the extensive range of submissions that result from expanded offerings on Korean Studies across the European continent, including Great Britain. Using our experience gained in publishing the *BAKS Papers* over the last 25 years, we are delighted to relaunch the publication as a Europe-wide journal dedicated to Korean Studies.

BAKS Papers has been blind, peer-reviewed since volume 15, and the *European Journal of Korean Studies* will carry on being blind, peer-reviewed. The new *Journal* will be published twice a year, rather than just annually. It is the only English-language journal in Europe devoted to the broad field of Korean Studies, and we hope that it will become the show-case journal for the outstanding work on Korea being done in Europe.

First published in 1991 and originally available in printed format, *Papers of the British Association for Korean Studies* (informally known as *BAKS Papers*) is now available on-line through the Association's website. Articles are indexed with SCOPUS and SSCI. Volumes 1–16 are available for download, as future issues of the *European Journal of Korean Studies* will be as well. Since Volume 17 (1) the *European Journal of Korean Studies* is available again in print. The *Journal* is free to BAKS members and those who want copies can access them on www.ejks.org.uk or contact Robert Winstanley-Chesters: treasurer@baks.org.uk

Editors

James Lewis, Editor in Chief
Robert Winstanley-Chesters, Managing Editor

Editor's Note

The year 2021 has been as challenging as 2020, but here in Oxford and Leeds, we are now settling down "to live with Covid" for the foreseeable future. In the universities, in-person teaching and supervision will begin again in the next month. We also look forward to attending our first in-person events for some time, such as the Association for Korean Studies in Europe conference in La Rochelle, France, in late October 2021, where we hope to have a presence and hope the event goes well. Perhaps you are reading this note in the autumn sunshine on the banks of the Pertuis d'Antioche.

In spite of 2021's challenges, we are happy to bring you another bumper issue of the *European Journal of Korean Studies*, and we are very happy that so many continue to choose us as the destination for their writing and research. Andreas Schirmer of Palacký University in the Czech Republic leads out this issue with a paper on the question of sequence in sentence structure when it comes to translating Korean literature. We have two papers on Korean cinema, one from Álvaro Trigo of the University of Salamanca, who considers the re-interpretation of the Japanese colonial period through a pair of biopics and another from Gábor Sebö of Korea University (RIKS), who writes on cinematic versions of *Ch'unhyangjŏn* from either side of the divided peninsula. Timothy Lim (California State University, Los Angeles) and Changzoo Song (University of Auckland) explore challenges presented by the Chinese Korean diaspora (Chosŏnjok) to hierarchies of national identity in South Korea. We have two papers that delve into the diplomatic history of the late Chosŏn era, firstly Sangpil Jin of the University of Edinburgh, who considers Korea's problematic and challenging circumstances in the lead up to the Russo-Japanese war of 1904–1905, and secondly from Daria Grishina of the Academy of Korean Studies who writes on Korean-Russian relationships and interactions around the Kŏmundo or Port Hamilton incident. Myengsoo Seo of Hankyong National University provides a rare exploration of Korean architectural history at its intersection with modernity. Finally, Alexander Kim of Vladivostok State University of Economics and Service, together with colleagues Mariia Surzhik and Alexei Mamychev, provide a fascinating Research Note on Korean experiences of deportation to Uzbekistan in 1937, which serves as an interesting

historical counterpoint to the article from Matteo Fumagalli on our last issue exploring the lives of Koryo saram in Kyrgyzstan.

The second half of this issue boasts an intriguing special section, guest edited by Farrah Sheikh of SOAS, University of London, titled "Encounters and Exchanges between Korea and the Islamicate Past & Present" in which four authors consider interactions and connections between Korea and Muslims and Islamic practices and ways of life. Farrah Sheikh herself offers a rich and deeply grounded feminist ethnography of converts to Islam in Korea and the challenges female converts face in being Muslim and belonging to Korea. Nur Yasar of Hanyang University reveals the stereotyping of halal food in South Korea and the challenges faced in accessing halal and Muslim foodways on the Korean peninsula, both for Koreans and Muslim visitors. Kyungsoo Lee of Hankuk University of Foreign Studies provides a very timely paper exploring Islamophobia in South Korean online discourse and the spread and exchange of fake news and internet rumour. Finally JinHan Jeong of Dankook University provides a research note with the deepest of historical frames, examining the presentation and production of Silla in the writings of Medieval Muslim travel writing and geographic guides, where Korea becomes a heaven on earth and a paradise for Muslims in addition to having extensive amounts of gold.

As is traditional with the *European Journal of Korean Studies* we also have book reviews; this time only two: one from Sunhong Kim of the University of Michigan on Katherine In-Young Lee's *Dynamic Korea and Rhythmic Form* and Mark Caprio's review of the third volume of Andreas Schirmer's unique and revealing series *Koreans and Central Europeans: Informal Contacts up to 1950*. The third volume is entitled *Central Europeans in Korea: Alice Schalek, Alma Karlin, Fritz Hansgirg, and Many Others*.

We hope that our readership remain safe in the pandemic, and we hope readers will themselves be interested in submitting their research and writing to our journal. If you are considering submitting a manuscript, please read our revised style and submissions guidelines at the back of this issue, or online at www.ejks.org.uk. As always we are most grateful to the Academy of Korean Studies, which awarded the *Journal* a Scholarly Publication grant (AKS-2021-P11) to defray production costs. If it were not for this generous support, we would not be able to produce the *Journal*.

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The Drama in the Sentence: Sequence as a Crucial Challenge for Literary Translation from and to Korean[1]

ANDREAS SCHIRMER   Palacký University Olomouc[2]

Abstract

In translation, carefully-crafted sentences are exposed to myriad dangers. This is because translators tend to prioritize syntactical fidelity at the expense of *sequence*, that is, the order of elements insofar as this relates to calculated progression, gradual disclosure of information, and cumulative development of meaning. But if sequence is turned around for the sake of fluency (conforming to the target language's ostensibly "natural" word order), the reader's experience changes as well. Through a set of examples drawn from English translations of Korean fiction, this article demonstrates that the common disregard for sequence is tantamount to a neglect of drama and suspense, of narrative perspectivation, of rhetorical sophistication and cognitive effect. But we also see that by favoring functional equivalence over imitation of grammatical dependencies, it is perfectly possible to allow the reader to process all information at a pace that is analogous to that of the original. Our findings provide insights that are of significance for other language pairings as well.

Keywords: Korean-English literary translation, literariness, functional equivalence, narrative development, cognitive effect, rhetoric

Introduction

In South Korea, translation issues regularly catch the attention of the general public, resulting in extensive debates on the merits (or lack thereof), of a given translation within a multitude of digital forums and the broader print media.[3] The considerable and perhaps surprising interest in such matters can partly be explained by the huge distance, in terms of linguistic and cultural differences, that translations from Western languages must bridge; but it can also be attributed to a cultural climate in which Koreans themselves believe that they have to go the extra mile in order to keep pace and stay in tune with the rest of the world.

As a result, the possibility that Koreans are encumbered with poor or misleading translations of important Western texts is an object of significant public concern. Indeed, it struck a familiar (and unwelcome) note to the Korean public when it was reported that, of the forty languages into which Kazuo Ishiguro's novel *The Remains of the Day* had been translated, only the Korean translation had failed to render the title correctly. "Nama innŭn nanal" (남아 있는 나날 The Remaining Days) fundamentally altered the meaning.

However, the often-heated debates that Koreans conduct about specific translations usually focus exclusively on allegedly poor word-choice, with matters of syntax being largely sidelined. Scholarly analyses of specific translations and academic interventions into translation critique, for their part, do sometimes sport sections explicitly devoted to style and syntax; however, the issues discussed there are often, again, ultimately reducible to disputes over the *mot juste*. The rare cases when aspects of syntax are touched on relate to those misunderstandings of meaning that stem from misjudgements in regard to textual cohesion, for example when the original topicalization is not carried through. In general, syntax is only conceived of as the set of principles that govern the structure of a sentence, not as the calculated architecture of words by means of which a sentence is the product of the artistic labor of an author.[4]

At most, the discussion borrows from contrastive linguistics, juxtaposing the syntax of the source text with what is considered to be the inevitable corresponding word order in Korean (or the other way around), when converting the grammatical relations of the original into an equivalent in the target language. Elsewhere, the discussion is devoted to matters of "style" that seem to be detached from content.[5]

What seems totally absent from view is what I term sequence: that is, the narrative order in which the text unfolds, be it on the level of the sentence alone. Clearly, the appeal of literary texts is inextricable from sequence so conceived, that is, the order of disclosure (what is told first, what next, and so on)—whether this concerns the overall big picture or only one meaningful detail from within.

At both the macro and the micro level (that is, on the level of the text as a whole and on that of the specific paragraph or sentence), this ordering is central to the rhetorical impact of a text and to the concrete reading experience it engenders—the way in which its meaning actually unfolds to and for the reader.

The purpose of this article is to demonstrate that, when it comes to translations between Korean and English (in both directions), the elision of sequence—and the translatorial logic on which such an elision is based—should be reconsidered, and that sequence should be given a greater priority in the practice of translation than has usually been the case. Doing so can allow Korean-English translations to conserve far more of the significant and powerful rhetorical effects of the original texts than has generally been considered possible, or indeed valuable. This is not to suggest that sequence should automatically and in every case become the dominant priority; this article does not propose a universal law to be applied in every case, but rather presents an appeal for translators' attention to the effects of sequence in carefully-orchestrated literary texts, and serious reflection on whether these effects could not be retained more often without making unjustifiable sacrifices.

1. The literary text as gradual revelation

In broad terms, what I call "sequence" here is the order of presentation within a text. It is no doubt uncontroversial to state that skilled authors carefully calculate the order in which their narrators convey events, often diverging markedly from the *fabula*'s chronology. Some information may be provided up front, anticipating what is to come, while other crucial details may be withheld. Storytelling involves consecutive discursive presentation; the order in which we encounter the various elements of a story has significant bearing on its effects. Menakhem [Menachem] Perry, seminal scholar of the dynamics of the literary text, characterizes this progressive presentation of the text as a cumulation that is both a successive concretisation and a continuous (re)adjustment:

> The literary text, like any verbal text, is received by the reader through a process of 'concretization.' Its verbal elements appear one after another, and its semantic complexes (e.g., scenes, ideas, characters, plot, value-judgments) build up 'cumulatively,' through adjustments and readjustments. That a literary text cannot yield its information all at once is not just an unfortunate consequence of the linear character of language. Literary texts may effectively utilize the fact that their material is grasped successively; this is at times a central factor in determining their meanings.[6]

In other words, order shapes meaning. This seems to be accepted wisdom, yet what is often overlooked is how this basic principle of "gradual revelation"[7] applies not

only to narration as a whole but also to its smaller constitutive units—as we can see when a novel's sentences are ingeniously constructed in terms of what is said first, next, and last. It follows, then, that if we want to render a carefully crafted sentence well in literary translation, we must heed the processes of "concretization" and cumulative build-up taking place within this sentence; that is to say, we must attend to sequence.

We could perhaps just as well call this "word order," but doing so would lend itself to misinterpretation; after all, "word order" is commonly associated with grammatically prescribed patterns. By substituting the term "sequence," it should be clear that what is at stake is the way that the arrangement of a sentence's constituents contributes to shaping the gradual and progressive unfolding of the text. Indeed, it is precisely the inflated attention given to the grammatical dimension of word order in translation that often results, as will be shown in the case studies that are at the heart of this article, in a failure to register the powerful effects of sequence.

Nevertheless, although sequence clearly plays an important role in the construction of rhetorically-ambitious texts of all kinds, the idea that translators should assign it a high value at the level of the individual sentence conflicts with the more customary idea that translating between distant languages—such as, in the present case, Korean and English—inevitably requires inversion, acts of changing and rearranging the order of the phrase's elements, in order to produce clear or fluent prose in the target language. Justifications invoked for this routine practice include differences in grammar and the truism that rhetorical sensibilities are not universal. The way in which these justifications—as, for example: "Each linguistic community has preferred ways of organizing its various types of discourse"[8]—are deployed with regard to Korean and English in particular will be discussed in detail further below, and their limitations demonstrated.

The conventional disregard for sequence comes at a heavy cost; that is, to the detriment of rhetorical effect and thus ultimately also of meaning (this pertains beyond literature, of course, to the translation of any rhetorically ambitious utterance). To summarize this point, I borrow—and could not agree more with—the following insightful maxim from Jutta Muschard, the result of her close reading of English novels in German translation:

> The sequence of information given within an utterance is of considerable importance and by no means incidental (…). Non-preservation of this important feature detracts from relevance.[9]

Note that Muschard's understanding of "relevance" refers to the type of cognitive processing effort required when understanding a text.

2. Grammatically correct, rhetorically incorrect

The extent to which the perceived need to adapt word order to what is considered congenial and "natural" to the target-language community hampers an adequate rendering of rhetorical or dramatic effect in translation can be observed in Korean translations of texts that are notably informed by classical ideas about the production of rhetorical or dramatic effect. The habitual mistake that is made in such cases concerns the climax or punchline, which we will refer to here as the *pointe* of the sentence. When in the original the *pointe* is disclosed only at the very end of the sentence, in an obviously well-calculated way, then in translation any shifting of this decisive element for an earlier appearance should be a no-go. However, looking at Korean translations of famous English-language texts, we encounter precisely this unfortunate practice all the time. For example, Martin Luther King's famous speech "I Have a Dream"—a powerful and modern-classic example of the art of rhetoric—contains this sentence:

> But one hundred years later, we must face the tragic fact that the Negro is still not free.[10]

In a Korean anthology of landmark speeches and texts by "36 Celebrities," this is translated as follows:

> 그러나 1백년이 지난 오늘날 우리는 흑인들이 아직고 자유스럽지 못하다는 비극적인 사실에 직면해 있읍니다.[11]

In the original, the emphatic *pointe* is disclosed in the very last words: "not free." Peculiarly, the Korean translation does not concern itself with this, but anticipates the *pointe* in the middle of the sentence (as highlighted above). The translator obviously valued the (taken-for-granted), "natural" word order of Korean more highly than the faithful conveyance of dramatic effect. The anthology from which this example is taken harbors many similar instances of poor translatorial choices, faithfully emulating the syntactic structure of the original at the expense of conveying the rhetorical effect:

> As a publisher, I am acutely aware of the many disputes between the media and their critics.
> 신문발행인으로서, 필자는 보도매체와 그 비평가들 간의 여러 논쟁을 잘 알고 있다.[12]

> The reading public has learned how to consume even the greatest fiction as if it were a can of soup.
> 아무리 훌륭한 소설이라도 일반 독서대중들은 그것이 마치 하나의 수프 통조림인 양 소비해 버리는 방법을 배워왔다.[13]

This shifting of the *pointe* from its rightful and logical final position is certainly not an accident occurring in this anthology alone, but is widespread or even ubiquitous. Consider the following text-book style aphorism:

The purpose of art is to lay bare the questions which have been hidden by the answers.

예술은 해답으로 가리워진 질문들을 드러내는 것을 목적으로 한다.[14]

Even in books—and recent ones, at that—specifically designed to teach Koreans advanced translation skills (from English into Korean), the deliberate order of the original often gets overruled.

One advantage of marriage, it seems to me, is that when you fall out of love with him, or he falls out of love with you, it keeps you together until you maybe fall in again.

내가 보기에, 결혼의 이점은 당신이 그를 사랑하지 않을 때나 그가 당신을 사랑하지 않을 때도, 혹시 서로가 다시 사랑할 때를 위해 함께 있게 한다.[15]

The function of a genius is not to give answers, but to pose new questions which time and mediocrity can resolve.

천재가 할 일은 새로운 대답을 하는 것이 아니라, 시간이 지난 뒤에 평범한 사람도 풀 수 있는 새로운 문제를 제기하는 것이다.[16]

Finally, there is perhaps no better demonstration of the utter disregard for sequence in translations from English to Korean than the following case. Here, even though the explicit intention of the original text is to illustrate a particular rule regarding the way a sentence should be arranged, the Korean rendering still does not prioritize the replication of said arrangement over the maintenance of grammatical fidelity. The result is that the translation actively undermines the ostensible purpose of the example: namely, to show that the most emphatic word of a sentence should appear at the end. In order to illustrate this rule, two different versions of "the same" sentence are presented one after the other, the first intended to show the common shortcoming while the second, by contrast, shows the recommended approach:

Humanity has hardly advanced in <u>fortitude</u> since that time, though it has advanced in many other ways.

인류는 그 이래로 용기에 있어서는 거의 발전이 없었다. 비록 다른 많은 면에서는 발전을 했지만. (Literally:) As for humanity, since that time: fortitude-wise almost no development took place. Even though [humanity] in many other respects developed indeed.

Humanity since that time, has advanced in many other ways, but it has hardly advanced in <u>fortitude</u>.

인류는 그 이래로 다른 여러 면에서 발전을 이루었지만 용기에 있어서는 거의 발전이 없었다. (Literally:) As for humanity, since that time, in many other respects development was achieved, but nonetheless in terms of fortitude almost no development took place.[17]

This is taken from of a bilingual Korean-English edition of *The Elements of Style*, the most well-known and widely-used English-language guide to writing style and composition. At a single glance we can see that, curiously, the Korean translation of the "correct" example stands in performative contradiction to what the example is supposed to illustrate. Though the order of the two adversative clauses is indeed changed, the emphatic word itself is only moved further toward the end of the sentence, but not to the very end. The conceptual barrier against sacrificing grammatical structure is apparently so powerful that the translator felt forced to offer a solution that does not actually show the rule being successfully applied, even when the English sentence is to be found shoulder to shoulder with the translation.

It is evident in all these examples that the habits of inversion and rearrangement are so ingrained in Korean-English translation that they are simply not questioned, even when, as in the last case, indifference to the sequence of the original results in a translation in which the speech (the example) disavows and overrides the speech-comment (the introduction to the example). In the following, we will consider the linguistic basis for the conventional wisdom that purportedly justifies these habits, and consider its limits.

3. Habitual inversion

The apparent necessity of inversion when rendering Korean into English, and vice versa, ultimately has its linguistic base in what is called "directionality" or "branching direction."[18] This directionality is said to be "progressive" in English and "regressive" in Korean.[19] We also encounter the idea that Korean is "regressive" in the widespread belief of learners of Korean that Koreans themselves "listen to the end" before they begin (quasi-regressively) to make sense of what is said. This belief seems to be behind the common Korean saying "Han'guk mal ŭn kkŭt kkaji tŭrŏ pwaya handa 한국말은 끝까지 들어봐야 한다," i.e., "in Korean you have to listen until the very end." As we will see in the following, the situation is, in fact, not so clear cut.

Framing directionality in terms of the distinction between progressive and regressive languages is problematic because of its connotations—isn't one bound to progress when speaking, in any language?[20] To avoid this issue, we can substitute a different set of terms for the same distinction: rather than "progressive and regressive," languages can be classified as "head-initial" or "head-final." English is usually considered to be a largely "head-initial" language, whereas Japanese is often, along with Korean, pointed to as the antithesis, i.e., consistently "head-final."[21] Head-final means that, in terms of sequence within the sentence, the grammatical

"head" comes only after the parts (complements, modifiers) that depend from (i.e., upon) this head. If we take for example the Korean phrase *Madang ŭl naon amt'ak* 마당을 나온 암탉, the title of a bestselling book by Hwang Sŏn-mi,[22] we can recognize the final word *amt'ak* (the hen) as the "head" of the phrase, whereas the initial words *Madang ŭl naon* (the yard [accusative marker] having left) are dependent; they are mere appendages joined to the head (the hen). Since the hen is the head and comes last, this is a "head-final" structure. Any conventional translation from Korean into English, however, would tend to invert this and start with the head, putting the hen up front: *The hen who left the farm*. For the native speaker of English this might feel like reinstating a natural order, putting correctly on its feet something that was originally standing uncomfortably on its head, topsy-turvy. On the other hand, the Korean speaker might resent that English forces the title to balance on its head, when it had been standing perfectly fine on its feet.[23]

The fundamental difference between head-initial and head-final construction has vast implications for translation between languages on opposite sides of this dichotomy. Thus, translating between Korean and English usually means constant, seemingly unconditional inversion. Even the simplest phrases are routinely turned upside down: "ch'aek ŭl ilkta 책을 읽다" becomes "to read a book."[24] Taking a broader view, the fundamental issues at stake here concern not only trans-lation, but language learning as such: the automatization of sequential inversion is widely considered fundamental to language acquisition, particularly in cases where the language in question is very different to the native one in its funda-mental structure. Thus, according to some gurus who promise to fix Koreans' notorious difficulties with English, one simple trick is to speak or write in an inverse way, contrary to one's native intuition: "Kŏkkuro mal hamyŏn yŏn'gŏ ka toenda 거꾸로 말하면 영어가 된다," i.e., "Talk the other way around [Talk upside down] and it becomes English."[25]

It follows, then, that any argument for the importance of preserving sequence in translation between languages as distant as Korean and English must contend with a common sense that considers inversion the most natural and logical thing to do. Appealing to supposedly rigid, "natural" differences in the structuring of the two languages, this common sense insists that the pursuit of fluency is incom-patible with a concern for sequence. Thus, though it may be relatively easy to make a convincing case for the importance of sequence in theoretical terms, many would still, even on conceding this, consider it impossible to put it into practice. Nevertheless, there is a long (if marginal) history of arguments for giving greater attention to sequence in translatorial practice, which emphasises the need to exploit more fully the often-unheralded flexibility of the target language, against claims of supposedly unyielding constraints.

4. Demanding the preservation of sequence:
A marginal history

Discussions about particular translations are usually dominated by quarrels about the *mot juste*, the right word. By contrast, the idea that sequence is a major aspect to be considered by the translator seems—though not new at all—to remain on the margins, enjoying little more than precarious outsider status. While disputes over *word choice* are standard fare, a debate over *word order* is unusual, and always threatened to be cut short by the erroneous commonplace that if things are just arranged in a different order, then the content will still be the same—and, above all, by the notorious, simplistic refutation pointing to purportedly inevitable target-language constraints.[26]

In anticipation of this latter argument, the demand for greater fidelity to sequence, if it is raised at all, has to go hand in hand with an insistence on the hidden potential of the target language: even those languages that ostensibly impose the most rigid constraints on word order command some means that will allow them to reproduce the sequence of the source language, if necessary. Indeed, it will be demonstrated below that both Korean and English possess a wider range of possibilities than are usually considered (particularly when appeals are made to supposedly "natural" forms of expression).

Among the prominent advocates of sequence as a major factor in translation we find some famous German classical philologists of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries:[27]

> Almost always I discovered that, whenever I digressed from Cicero's word order, the speech lost much of its vigor; whereby I concluded that this [Cicero's] sequence was simply natural, and that Cicero would not have ordered his words very differently even if he had happened to be German.[28]

> The basic error [...] is sticking to the arbitrary current state of one's own language instead of allowing one's own language to be shifted, forcefully, by the foreign language. He [the translator] should broaden and deepen his own language through the foreign [language]. Usually, people have no idea the degree to which this is possible, the extent to which every language can transform itself.[29]

> [The translator should] keep the sequence of these ideas; just as, in his sentence, these ideas appear[ed] in front of the poet's eyes.[30]

More recently, another powerful and eloquent strand of advocacy for sequence as a major criterion was put forward by the famous German translator Burkhart Kroeber (2001). Kroeber justified his new rendering[31] of Alessandro Manzoni's already oft-translated classic novel *I Promessi Sposi* (The Betrothed), not, as would

be usual, by the previous translations' shortcomings in relation to word choice, nor by the need to update the language, but as follows:

> I am convinced that a large part of what makes the original appealing to the native reader [...] lies precisely in the way in which the sentences are constructed—and that is how thoughts are guided, how the argument is built up, how the emotional reactions of readers are channeled.[32]

> Decisive are, as far as I am concerned, not the words themselves but their order, i.e. the sequence in which they are disclosed to the reader.[33]

> The main challenge of my retranslation [new translation] was to equip the German text with more inner tension [...], i.e., exactly that *drive* which the text displays in the original and which [...] is due to the carefully calculated order of what is not just communicated to the reader but suggested, via the build-up of the sentences and the sequence of the elements that are disclosed—i.e. the narrative informations [*sic*], and these are eminently connected with syntax.[34]

These are powerful statements against "rearrangement by default" in the process of translation. Kroeber advocates attention to sequence in view of its effect on readers, considering how their perspective is manipulated by the order in which narrative information appears.

Further support for the consideration of sequence in translation can be extrapolated from Jan Firbas's theory of Functional Sentence Perspective. While Firbas concedes that "two languages may use the same word order but the effects produced need not necessarily be the same,"[35] key elements of his approach revolve around the significance of word order for information structure. Firbas's central term "communicative dynamism" calls to mind that utterances in progress are "currently ongoing" and are advancing by "perspectivizing choices," i.e., shaping the perspective of the reader successively by virtue of anticipating one thing and postponing another. This is indeed behind the original Czech term for Functional Sentence Perspective, *aktuální členění větné*, meaning "actual [that is, ongoing] division [that is, structuring, ordering, or arrangement] of the sentence." Accordingly, Firbas's seminal book opens with a long, dramatically built-up sentence by Victor Hugo, and then considers whether translations of that sentence (into English, German, and Czech) manage to do justice to "the development of the communication" in the original.[36]

Thus, Functional Sentence Perspective could be invoked as a supporting argument against the habitual rearrangement of the sentence performed in pursuit of the ideal of fluency. As the German translation studies doyen Jörn Albrecht puts it: "Especially in naturalizing, 'idiomatic' translation, the functional sentence perspective is often massively shifted. [...] 'Fidelity' in regard to the topic-comment structure of the original is usually sacrificed for the sake of a

supposed 'fluency' of the translation."[37] Albrecht obviously has in mind here language pairings like French-German, and so we can easily conceive how much more this applies to a language pairing covering a wide linguistic distance like English-Korean.

However, topic-comment structure dwells on a different (and, so to say, deeper or more hidden), dimension of word order than what is here called sequence, this latter being a comparatively simple concept identifying the dramatic, narrative or rhetorical relevance of the plain succession of elements. Effects that are dependent upon sequence include, for example, front- or end-weight, in which the opening or concluding part of a sentence are the focal point of its rhetorical impact. These, alongside a number of other effects, are well-known as devices of narrative art and craft, and do not rely on anything so complex as topic-comment structure in order to convey their intended impact; yet this makes it all the more surprising that they are commonly disregarded in the process of translation. We will consider various instances of such disregard in detail below, and show how, contrary to the deeply-entrenched belief that there is no alternative, there are in fact untapped resources in both Korean and English that would allow this be remedied.

The representation of thematic development (information flow) or "theme choices" in English-Korean translation is certainly a matter of concern in Korean translation studies because of major differences in topicalization and in the way that cohesion is produced, not least in the form of elliptical patterns in Korean that need sensitive interpretation in English.[38] Among others, Michael Halliday's Systemic Functional Linguistics is invoked here;[39] consequences for practical translation and translator education are brought into focus, and attention is turned to "textual meaning," for which these works should be commended. But it should be reiterated that, again, plain sequence as such is not considered in these studies, most likely because the routine shifts that Koreans are taught from the very outset of their foreign language studies seem too unquestionable.

Apropos of language education, this field can provide further support, from a different angle, for giving greater attention to sequence—but here too such views hold "rebel" rather than mainstream status. At least, this applies when we look at Dieter Lohmann's efforts to change the practice of Latin teaching, so that learners of Latin would be taught to follow the sequence of an utterance—instead of the usual de- and reconstruction according to the intuitive word order of the learner's own language, by which the original is turned upside down.[40] For Lohmann, this practice of inverting the original order results in Latin remaining "unnatural" for the learner, so that "comprehension" always relies on operations that transform the original text. To counter this, Lohmann proposes a way in which the Latin word order could itself come to seem "natural."[41]

Lohmann may in some ways be a pioneer but, in fact, there is a respectable tradition of explaining Latin phrases by translating them in the most literal way that the teacher (or commentator) could think of.[42]

Taken as a whole, these various strands of "dissent" form a powerful protest against the habitual tendency to rearrange sentences to fit the supposed requirements of the target language, and a compelling advocacy for awareness vis-à-vis sequence, insofar as they stress the way in which communication and comprehension proceed in a linear and cumulative fashion.

There nevertheless remains the possible objection that, in the case of Korean, the head-final structure of the language means that comprehension does not operate in quite the same way. If we return to the popular belief, mentioned above, that Korean listeners are conditioned to "listen to the end" before making sense of an utterance, this would suggest that, in the case of Korean, comprehension is not gradual and cumulative, but instead the listener is held in limbo, unable to make sense of the incoming information until the sentence is concluded. However, this conventional wisdom is misleading. In her *Course in Korean Translation*, Jieun Kiaer makes it a point to state very clearly: "native speakers of Korean do not rearrange the order of a sentence but aim to understand what is given, following the presented order. This is also what learners of Korean should be aware of. It is intuitive to build meaning as one goes on, instead of rearranging information."[43] In other words: "Although the order of structures are [sic] opposite between Korean and English, learners of Korean do not need to fear flipping over long sentences. If they understand the meanings and functions of particles, they can understand the extensive sentences easily."[44]

Kiaer deserves great merit for pointing out so clearly that Korean native speakers process the elements of a sentence in order of appearance, instead of waiting until the end for a final assessment and mental rearrangement (though learners of Korean are often led to believe that native speakers do in fact wait until the end, a belief that teachers also tend to instill). However, she does not draw the full implications of this insight, as she never asks whether—exactly because of this cognitive processing in order of appearance—the Korean "order of structures" (i.e., word order, order of constituents), should not be reflected in translation. That is, she does not consider whether this might constitute an argument for taking sequence into account when translating to and from Korean.

Any appeal for greater attention to be paid to sequence in translation, then, will rely on establishing that the purported rigidity of language structures is in fact overstated, and that both Korean and English have far more resources for varying the order of elements within a sentence than are usually deployed. The subsequent section will demonstrate this in relation to Korean, in order to further challenge the belief that attending to sequence in translation is a futile endeavor.

5. Is it possible to make Korean more flexible in terms of word order?

As discussed, Korean's rigid word order requirements are taken to stand in the way of any attempt to preserve sequence when translating from English. Indeed, the canonical word order appears to be so dominant in Korean that other options rarely come to the fore.[45] In Korean, sentences are (apparently) required to follow the order SOV (subject-object-verb): "Namja ka nokch'a rŭl masyŏtta 남자가 녹차를 마셨다," i.e., the man [nominative marker] the green tea [accusative marker] drank. Conventionally, English would be expected to transform this to SVO: "the man drank green tea." This shifting around of word order for the sake of rendering the grammatical relations correctly is such a powerful principle in translations between Korean and English that it usually overrules any concern for sequence.

In Korean informal speech, however, all six possible orders of constituents (SOV, OSV, SVO, OVS, VSO, VOS), are theoretically acceptable, even if some of these only occur occasionally. Thus, through the use of "right dislocation," in which constituent elements of a sentence are shifted from their usual position toward the end—this is, to the right—Koreans can construct sentences in everyday speech that do not end with a verb (*sŏsurŏ*, *tongsa*, or *hyŏngyongsa*) as would be canonically required, adding elements *post festum* such as (for example) objects that are dependent on the verb, or attributive specifications.[46]

> 민수를 사랑한다, 내가. Minsoo [accusative marker] love, I [nominative marker]. (OVS)
> 사랑한다, 내가 민수를. Love, I [nom. marker] Minsoo [acc. marker]. (VSO)
> 사랑한다, 민수를, 내가. Love, Minsoo [acc. marker], I [nom. marker]. (VOS)[47]

Permutation of this kind is often considered a feature of spoken rather than written language, but it is usually acknowledged, if with reluctance, that it can also be used in written Korean (including literature) to produce stylistic effects, e.g., emphasis.[48] For precisely this reason it is all the more striking that, as we have seen above, alternative constructions are so little used when it comes to the translation of aphorisms, jokes, or other kinds of rhetorically challenging text.

Illustrating this point further, we can look at examples of dislocation that make us even more aware of the potential of Korean to capitalize in playful and creative ways on (the possible effects of) non-canonical word order. In the following comedic monologue, dislocation is, in a very basic way, the decisive element on which the shtick or sketch relies:

> 아까비: 썸남이랑 주말에 여행을 갔어요. [(Female comedian:) With my crush I went on a weekend trip.]
> (오~) [Oh!]

아까비: 처음엔 집이 엄해서 안된다고 했죠. 걔가. [Initially, there was the usual line that mummy and daddy are too strict and there is no way. His.]
(하하하하…) [Hahaha …]
아까비: 여행지에 도착하니 마침 불꽃놀이 중이라 목마를 태워 줬어요. 내가. [When we arrived at the place there was a fireworks display going on and so a ride on the shoulders was given. By me (to him).]
(하하하하…) [Hahaha …]
아까비: 그리고 호숫가에서 야경을 바라보며 로맨틱하게 오리배를 탔죠. 따로. [And then, on the lake, looking at the stars, a romantic duck-boat ride was taken. Separately.]
(하하하하…) [Hahaha …][49]

This monologue, taken from the KBS Gag Concert, works with the ability of Korean to get along without a subject in many cases, if it can be inferred from context. After all, on hearing the first (long, but subject-free) sentence of each of the three jokes above, any competent listener will automatically infer a definite subject, as follows:

I [said]
He [piggybacked me]
We [took a duck-boat ride (together)]

It is on the basis of gendered expectations that the Korean listener infers these subjects. But the comedian's script adds single-word sentences (highlighted above, in grey) *after* the elliptical sentences. Thus, the audience is wrongfooted every time by "opposite," unforeseen subjects, so that the subjects that had appeared self-evident all of a sudden must be replaced. In other words, due to their habit of inferring subjects, the Korean listener only realizes that something has been omitted when these subjects are offered unexpectedly. We thus have a classic mechanic of humor at work, with an abrupt shift from a primary interpretation to a different, surprising re-interpretation:

처음엔 집이 엄해서 안된다고 했죠. 걔가.
Initially, "parents are strict and there is no way" said. He.

The first sentence is acceptable for a Korean listener even without a subject: the subject appears to be clear because this would be the cliché problem of the young woman who still lives with her parents and explains her predicament in a very coy fashion. But if we were to infer the subject, its position—at least in textbook Korean—would be before the concluding "said." At the same time, dislocation—in this case, postponing the revelation of the subject—would not be used to provide a self-evident subject (here, "I," the woman speaking), unless for the sake of emphasis. In the present case, indeed, the subject turns out not to be the one the audience surely considered self-evident, and thus the surprise and

comic effect is significant. On a technical level, this humor relies on the Korean language's capacity for significant syntactical variance, beyond its ostensible constraints in terms of word order.

Yet it should not be thought that this variability applies only in the case of humor, nor only to spoken language. In contemporary Korean literature, the role of dislocation is perhaps underestimated, but some writers obviously relish the expressiveness made possible by a sentence structure that postpones the disclosure of the grammatical object, as in this example:

> 나는 느낄 수 있었다. 시간이 흐를수록 마치 맥주가 익어가듯 조금씩 효모가 퍼져가는 부장의 숨소리를. 그리고 그 알콜 기운이 번져가는 심장의 떨림을.[50]

The published English translation renders this passage quite freely as follows:

> I could feel the effects of the alcohol. As time passed, I could hear the manager's breath gradually growing thicker, like the yeast swelling in beer as it ferments. That, and the beating of his heart as the alcohol spread through his veins.[51]

Partially, this is a typical example of rendering head-initial what was head-final in the Korean original: in the original text, the grammatical objects (breath, heartbeat) appear at the very end of their respective sentences, with only the accusative marker attached as a postposition after the noun, while all the attributes of "breath" and "heartbeat" come in front of the noun. Of course, it is next to impossible to render the sequence of the original, as can be seen in the following tentative, quasi-interlinear translation:

> I could sense [it]. With time passing, like [when] beer [is] ripening, little by little [some] yeast [was] swelling: the manager's breath sound. And, making the alcohol's spirit spread: his heart's beating.

We must not forget that the Korean original uses no such placeholder as "it," though it is given, for clarity, in this literal English translation. Thus, we have a true dislocation in the original. Note how Korean premodification greatly enhances the effect of this dislocation as the emphasized nouns appear in final position. In English it seems impossible to produce a comprehensible equivalent replicating what the original achieves here, which is twice building up to a dramatic crescendo. English could easily accommodate a short premodification, something like "this stinking and alcohol-laden breath" but, as a rule, not a long and elaborate chain of attributes put in front of the relevant noun.

Translators might be tempted to "gloss over" such dislocations, insofar as the sentences in which they appear seem to offer a relatively amenable sequence that would be straightforwardly replicable in English. Thus, we might say (if we leave the complicating matter of the many attributes out): "I could sense the [...] sound. And

the […] heartbeat." However, the seemingly congenial parallelism would be obtained surreptitiously, by disguising the rupturing effect of the dislocation in the original.

From the following example, it is again clear how inattention to the significance of dislocation in the original leads to a translation that smooths over the rupture. In an essayistic afterword to one of her short stories, the author Kim Keum-hee muses as follows:

> 생각하지 않을 수 있다면 얼마나 좋을까. 그러니까 우리가 대학에서 만난 1998년의 세상을.
> How wonderful it would be if I could stop thinking about the world we faced as university students in 1998.[52]
> (Literally: "Not thinking—being able to do that, how good would that be. I mean: We, at university, facing the 1998 world.)

Note that by "the 1998 world" the author is explicitly referring to the effects of the IMF crisis in Korea, which the subsequent sentences go on to describe: "I really do wish I could forget all about it. The factories closed and those who feared losing their jobs spilled into the streets. Wherever I went, I witnessed marching crowds, and death too: many people took their own lives."[53]

Arguably, it should have been the translator's top priority to emulate the specific impact and rhetorical effect of the Korean original's eye-catching dislocation. This is possible, and would read more or less as follows:

> *To stop thinking of it*—to be able to do this: how wonderful that would be. I mean, stop thinking about the time we met at university, the world of 1998."

If this is too radical, the following minimal solution would at least preserve the essential point:

> "How wonderful it would be if I could stop thinking of it—the world […]."

This translation might demand more from the reader, but it reflects the rhetorical impact of the Korean original, which is achieved through the deferral of elements that in conventional syntax would simply be integrated into a single, comprehensive sentence. Their postponement into subsequent clauses and sentences brings about a gradual revelation that is essential for the effect achieved.

In Korean song lyrics, we can observe even more elaborate forms of dislocation that testify further to the flexibility of Korean word order. At the same time, we see how such dislocations disappear in translation unless deliberate attention is paid to this effect (in conscious opposition to the habitual preoccupation with "fluency").

It is no coincidence that the language of Korean songwriters is full of intentional dislocation, using this device to create not only singable phrases, but also tension, suspense, and impact:

그러나 우린 알 수 있었지 [But we knew it, didn't we:]
너와 나의 둘만의 느낌 [yours and mine, both of us, our feelings][54]
[Canonical word order: 그러나 우린 너와 나의 둘만의 느낌(을) 알 수 있었지]

난 알아요 이밤이 흐르고 흐르면 [I know, after this night was over,]
누군가가 나를 떠나 버려야 한다는 [somebody had to leave me and dump me]
그 사실을 그 이유를 [This fact, the reason for it]
이제는 나도 알수가 알 수가 있어요 [now I too can understand it][55]
[In canonical word order, 난 알아요 ("I know") would be moved to the end of
the third line, otherwise no change.]

언제나 그 말은 하지 못했지 [Never this word (was I) able to say:]
오래전부터 사랑해 왔다고 [since long ago I have always loved you][56]
[Canonical word order: 오래전부터 사랑해 왔다고 그 말은 언제나 하지 못했지 ('Since
a long time I have always loved you': this word, all the time I had not been able
to say it.)]

달콤했었지 / 그 수많았던 추억 속에서 [Sweet it had been, hadn't it / (being) within
all those many memories][57]
[Canonical word order: 그 수많았던 추억 속에서 달콤했었지 (All those many
memories, (being) within them, it had been sweet, hadn't it?)]

Each of these examples postpone to the end something that in canonical Korean
grammatical order would be placed either first, or somewhere in the middle, but
not last (note that the translations given in square brackets are only meant to
aid understanding). Reminiscent of what has been observed previously, we have
here the peculiar and actually very telling effect that a line-by-line translation
into English can easily fail to convey that a dislocation occurred in the original.
Of the lyrics given above, the only case where the explanatory translation offers
a hint of a dislocation taking place in the original might be the case of: "This fact,
now I can understand it."

How difficult it can be to render a Korean dislocation to its full effect in English
translation can also be observed also in the following, again literary, example.

두려웠다. 유서처럼 배달되는 이 책들이 어느 날 그쳐버릴까봐.[58]

Literally this says: "I was afraid. [That] those (last will and) testament-like books
one day might cease." For a readable translation we might now be tempted to gloss
over the original's dislocation because the result seems just so congenial to natural
English: "I was afraid that those books which were delivered like last testaments
might one day cease [not be delivered anymore]." But again, this smoothness
would have the significant downside of obscuring the effect produced by the
non-canonical word order in the original.

The various examples above are in fact simple, as the dislocation merely
postpones an object (or, rather, delays it into the next sentence) that in textbook

grammar would have to precede the verb. But there are much more intricate cases, as in the following song lyrics:

> 그리워하고 있니 / 오래전 오늘 우리의 사랑이 / 너무나 포근했던 / 그 겨울 눈부신 하늘을
> [Do you miss (it)? / Long ago our love / (was) much too cosy / (under) this winter's dazzling heaven][59]
> (1) 그리워하고 있니 / (2) 오래전 오늘 우리의 사랑이 / (3) 너무나 포근했던 / (4) 그 겨울 눈부신 하늘을
> In conventional 'textbook' word order:
> (2) 오래전 오늘(,) 우리의 사랑이 (3) 너무나 포근했던(,) (4) 그 겨울(의) 눈부신 하늘을
> (1) (너는) 그리워하고 있니?

So, there is first the direct address with the question ("Do you miss [it]?") and only then do we learn what the implied "it" (of course, such a pronoun is absent in the Korean text) refers to. This creates tension, suspense, and curiosity. In canonical, "textbook" word order, we would first have the evocation of the past, and only then the question: "Do you miss it?" This is possible, and legitimate in its own right. But it is different from the effect that the original lyrics achieve.

We see clearly how dislocation creates substantial rhetorical effects stemming from the linear or chronological order in which we apprehend the elements of the utterance. These effects increase, of course, with the complexity of the dislocations. As we can see in the lyrics below, poetic creativity can rearrange canonical word order in many ways, going far beyond the simple postponing of an object:

> 세상을 너무나 모른다고 ["This world too much ignoring":]
> 나보고 그대는 얘기하지 [Looking at me you said (these words about me),]
> 조금은 걱정된 눈빛으로 [slightly sorrowful glances throwing at me][60]

In prosaic Korean—and thus in canonical, "textbook" word order—these lines would be whirled around:

> 그대는 조금은 걱정된 눈빛으로 나보고 세상을 너무나 모른다고 얘기하지.
> You, [with] somewhat sorrowful eyes by which [you were] looking at me [= (commenting) about me] [(said) that I] the world too much ignoring [am], [you] said.

When listening to the song, any native speaker of Korean grasps from the first line that someone blames someone else for being too unworldly, in the sense of being naïve and knowing the world too little. Korean grammar does not need to reveal a specific subject here ("you"), and it is also entirely normal that we learn only later explicitly who the object of the utterance is ("I"). Indeed, we learn these details only in the second line. A very specific pronoun (*kŭdae*) reveals that the words of the first line are said by a lover, who said this, maybe repeatedly, to the "I" of the song. And in the third line we learn that the lover said this with

a "slightly sorrowful" glance, adding a further nuance. Only then—although we may have anticipated it from the pathos of the music—do we receive confirmation that this is not merely a sigh of exasperation in some trivial argument but a real, true, and earnest concern.

To sum up, what we saw from all these examples is an arsenal of syntactic possibilities in Korean which can be used to produce a range of significant rhetorical effects. These possibilities could be put to good use, by translators from English into Korean, in the translation of any rhetorically ambitious utterance. Yet, as we have seen, such devices are rarely utilized, even in cases (crucial moments of a speech or essay, pointed aphorisms, well-timed jokes, etc.) where sequence is vitally important. At the same time, the inverse is also true, as translators of Korean into English refrain from exploiting the linguistic possibilities the target language (i.e., English) possesses, if in a concealed fashion, because sequence ranks low in their hierarchy of priorities.

6. Case studies

The following examples, taken from a wide range of sources, have been assembled by the author over more than a decade of close reading. The reader will clearly observe the pervasive inattention to sequence that characterizes published translations from Korean into English, manifesting itself consistently across a wide variety of genres. Further, it will be extensively demonstrated how the sequence of the original text, contrary to the orthodox received wisdoms that posit an incompatibility between the word order requirements of the two languages, can in fact be successfully reproduced, if translators were to give this greater attention where it is clearly merited.

6.1. Giving away the dramatic climax

> 윤교수는 이런 얘기도 해주었다. 루쉰이 일본 유학생이었을 때 일본인 선생이 참배할 것이 있다며 루쉰을 비롯한 학생들을 뒤따르게 했는데, 데리고 간 곳이 오차노미즈에 있는 공자 사당이었단다.
>
> The professor also said that when Lu Xun was a student in Japan, he had a Japanese teacher who took all of his students, including Lu Xun, to a Confucian shrine in Ochanomizu.[61]

In this first example, we can observe how, in the original sentence, sequence creates a dramatic climax that the translation—through its habitual rearranging of the sentence for a purportedly more "fluid" or "fluent" rendering—does not succeed in replicating. In the original text, the rhetorical climax comes at the end

of the sentence, which states, if we render it as literally as possible: "but where he took them, this place was a (in-Ochanomizu-located) Confucian shrine."

We get clear confirmation of the *telos* of this sentence when the narrator of the story concludes: "Lu Xun had left China in order to distance himself from premodern things that symbolized Confucianism, so this must have been a great shock to him." Hence why the carefully-crafted Korean sentence, which contains the point of the whole story, builds up tension and suspense before arriving at the shocking release: "Confucian shrine." Of course, the introduction to this little anecdote, preceding the sentence in question, had already prepared the ground: "Lu Xun was critical of Japan's aggression toward China, but after the Russo-Japanese War, people from all over Asia wanted to learn from Japan. So it was a natural choice for Lu Xun to go there to learn advanced Western medical science."

The published English translation gives away or even undermines the rhetorical goal of the original text by ignoring this perspectivation of what is an *en miniature* drama. After all, the original says, more or less:

> Professor Yun also told the following story. When Lu Xun was in Japan as a student, a Japanese teacher once said that they had to pay respects and he made Lu Xun and other students follow him; but where he led them, in Ochanomizu, was nothing other than a shrine dedicated to Confucius.

There may be other European languages that are better equipped in this regard, but English is not as limited in such cases as may be commonly thought, and it certainly possesses the linguistic tools to be flexible and to allow a version that keeps much closer to the original than the published translation chose to be, and thus closer to the original's effects.

6.2. End weight: Final impact

> 집에 돌아와 잠들기 전, 행사에 초대 받은 아홉 개 나라 혹은 소수민족의 작가들과 달리 유독 아르판을 소개할 땐 애매한 적의를 드러낸 것 같아 후회됐다.
> After I returned home and went to bed, I regretted the fact that I might have shown a little animosity towards Arpan, in contrast to the writers from the other nine countries, or rather, ethnic minority groups.[62]
> At home, before going to sleep, I regretted that in contrast to when I spoke about the other writers from nine countries and ethnic groups who had been invited to the event, I had somehow expressed a vague hostility when I told them about Arpan.[63]

This example allows us to compare two English translations which, despite making different choices with regard to specific words and syntactical relations, both adopt a process of rearranging the sequence of the original, obscuring thereby

the way the original's sequence had placed the rhetorical weight at the end of the sentence. The background to this passage is as follows: Arpan is an author from a small tribe living on the Thai-Myanmar border, and is attending an event for authors from small language communities all over the world. The narrator, a Korean author and friend of Arpan, is the moderator of the event, responsible for introducing each of the authors in turn.

If we care for the sequence by means of which the original Korean text speaks to the reader, we realize how carefully crafted a sentence this is. In terms of dramatic development, it is much stronger to have the word "regret" at the end, instead of (as in both published translations), revealing very early on that the protagonist had regrets, and then detailing what those regrets were about. This is not a question of merely presenting the same content in a different way. It is one thing to say "I greatly regret that I did X," and another to say "I did X, and this is now a source of great regret." Of course, the former could be seen as a paraphrase of the latter—but in terms of psychological effect and rhetorical impact, these are distinct utterances.

If we take sequence of the original seriously, we could arrive (for example) at the following translation:

> At home, before going to bed [it came to my mind]: With the to-the-event invited and to-nine-different-nations-or-ethnic-minorities belonging authors it had been different: just [of all things] when it came to Arpan to get introduced had I some hint of hostility shown—and this I now regretted.

Certainly, this would not suffice as a readable English translation, but it is not necessary to totally rearrange the sequence in order to obtain an acceptable result. The following would constitute a more readable translation that still attends more closely to the effects of sequence than the two published translations:

> At home, before going to bed, it dawned on me: with the other nine authors from various ethnic backgrounds it had been different—only when I introduced Arpan had I shown a hint of hostility, and this I now regretted.

Clearly, there are effects of narrative order within this single sentence that would be worth preserving, even at the cost of syntactic infidelity.

6.3. Front weight: Opening impact

내가 그 이상한 남자를 처음 만난 것은 지난해 여름, 그러니까 마른장마가 이 주 이상 계속되고 있던 7월 초순의 목요일 자정 무렵이었다.
It was last summer, around midnight on a Thursday at the beginning of July, when the dry rainy season had been dragging on for over two weeks. That was when I first encountered that strange man.[64]

In this case, we encounter the reverse scenario to the above cases of end-weight: the significance of the opening impact of a sentence. Certainly, an encounter with a "strange man" (by which the original starts), is much more captivating than some weather, date, and time information (by which the translation starts). The reader's attention is thus immediately arrested. The original order (visualized in detail by the highlighting above) can be replicated, for a first step, by the following literal translation:

> As for me, [well, it was like this:] this strange man[, I] encountered [him] last summer. The dry monsoon season had, for two weeks already, relentlessly dragged on, and it was in July's first third, a Thursday, at midnight, [anyway] around that time.

A readable translation that has the merit of following the main avenues of the original's perspectivation might then be:

> I first saw the strange man last summer. The dry monsoon season had dragged on for two weeks already; it was early July, on a Thursday, around midnight.

As can be seen from this example, trusting the sequence will often be the secret to evoking the same drama in the translation as was present in the original. The published translation, however, delays the encounter with the "strange man" into a subsequent sentence, neglecting how drama is very fundamentally determined by order of appearance.

To which extent the typical reshufflings necessitated by grammatical emulation are very often bound to impede the ongoing drama, as we can see even more succinctly in the following example:

> 유리창이 덜커덩 하는 소리에 순분은 눈을 떴다.
> Sunbun woke to the rattling of panes.[65]

By contrast to the published translation, sequence-fidelity would not only give us the logic of why the protagonist woke up, but we are also caught up differently into the story when we "relive" what happens, thanks to the narration's well-crafted sequence:

> At the rattling of panes, Sunbun woke up.

Or, even closer to the original sequence if we are willing to sacrifice grammatical fidelity:

> The panes rattled, and the noise shook Sunbun awake.

Thus, the reader follows, through the progression of the sentence, the same experience as the protagonist in the original text: first the noise, then the waking.

6.4. Order of words vs. order of ideas: sacrificing grammar for the sake of sequence

The alleged awkwardness of sequence-faithful translation usually stems from attempts, bound to fail, to keep syntax-faithfulness at the same time. But sacrificing syntax allows us to retain sequence and rhetorical effect without a detrimental impact on stylistic acceptability.[66]

> 어린시절 거짓말을 할 때마다 코가 길어지는 아이의 이야기를 읽은 적이 있다.[67]
> Back when I was a child, I once read a story about a boy whose nose grew longer every time he told a lie.[68]

This is the first sentence of "Kodok ŭi palgyŏn" (The discovery of solitude) a short story by Ŭn Hŭi-gyŏng (Eun Hee Kyung). The published translation is, in itself, admirably effective, and builds up well to culminate in a rhetorical or dramatic climax. But nevertheless, it is legitimate to ask: Would it equally be possible to follow the sequence of the Korean original? And would there be any gains if we manage to convey the "communicative dynamism" of the original, to borrow Firbas' term? In other words: Does fidelity to sequence make up for the loss of fidelity in terms of syntactical relations? As for the first question, the answer is yes, but only by means that break smooth syntactic progression:

> A childhood memory: With every lie his nose became longer—such was the fate of a boy whose story I read in those days.

A syntactical reshuffle took place here: what was originally attributive, in typically Korean premodification (*k'o ka kirŏjinŭn ai*: [its]-nose-longer-getting-child = a child whose nose got longer), becomes a main phrase (his nose became longer), and what was the main clause (*iyagi rŭl ilgŭn chŏk i itta*: I once read a/the story) becomes a relative clause (whose story I read). As for the second question, we gain the order in which the reader of the original encounters the elements of the sentence one after the other, and thereby we gain a cognitive experience on which otherwise grammatical emulation mechanisms as well as heteronomous concerns for fluency use to take their tolls. Let us be reminded that a great deal of ambitious prose does not produce the "smoothness" and "readability" that a consumerist point of view might favor. We may miss "the ease of original composition," this cherished criterion of traditional translation critique, but we definitely gain a sentence that is not trivial. Certainly, the objection might be raised that a sentence in canonical (that is: conventional, orthodox) word order should not be translated into a sentence with a non-canonical word order (i.e., conspicuous or unusual in the target language). However, if this requirement leads to the destruction of a truly meaningful and expressive sequence, it should be considered secondary.

More clearly than the previous one, the following example demonstrates the merits of syntactical transformation for the sake of sequential fidelity. Again, it is the opening sentence of a story:

어느 동물원에서 있었던 일이다. 한 말이의 수컷 공작새가 [...][69]

The published translation renders this as:

This is something that happened in a zoo. A peacock [...][70]

With more care for the original sequence, we could just as well say:

Some zoo it was, where the following happened

We witness here part of the grammatical equivalence sacrificed, so that the "zoo," the playful—and actually rather irrelevant—point of narrative departure, can appear at the start of the sentence just like in the Korean original (for that purpose, the locative was sacrificed). Starting by saying that the following anecdote happened in "some zoo" does not assign any major significance to the zoo as such. In fact, it is rather the translation that does this, while the original simply gets the story started with a rather light-hearted gesture ("it does not matter which zoo it was, but listen, hear me out, learn what happened there").

The following excerpt from a poem clearly exhibits how strong the temptation is to focus on mapping the grammatical structure of the translation onto that of the original. By contrast, adopting a more open attitude with regard to grammar allows us to foreground the powerful effects brought about by the order in which the elements of the sentence are encountered. The original text and the published English translation read as follows:

누워서 창밖을 보는 일이 전부인 사람의 심정이란
어쩔 수 없는 날씨도 있습니다
There is weather in which the heart of a person
who can do nothing but to lie down and look out the window cannot be helped.[71]

Here we can see, once again, that all the grammatical relations and dependencies are preserved, but, as usual, only at the expense of major reshuffles—and indeed, without being able to achieve, even with this rearrangement, a particularly fluent result, given that the outcome is rather convoluted relative to the standard constructions of English. We can observe the way in which the sequence of the original has been transformed by considering a literal rendering of the Korean text (offered here only for illustrative purposes):

Lying and out-of-the-window-staring, [you know,] when this is all a person can do—[well, in short,] such a mood, and [imagine that] nothing can be done about it: There is this kind of weather.

This translation, while certainly not sufficing as a readable rendering in English, nevertheless clearly displays how the published version, in order to preserve the grammatical relations, has effectively reversed the order of the original sentence: we now begin with the weather and subsequently encounter the person who can only lie and stare out of the window; only at the end do we discover that this person is beyond help, trapped in this situation by the weather.

The sequence of the original, however, begins with the concrete situation of lying down and staring out of the window, then evokes a person that can do nothing else than this, guiding our thoughts to the state of mind, the mood of such a person, and the idea that there is no remedy against it, and finally, at the very end of the sentence, we learn that we are talking about the kind of weather that would make it impossible to ward off such depression, thus being responsible for the bad mood. If we were to retain this chain of thought or images, we need to summon both a greater boldness in terms of breaking with the grammar of the original and more willingness to resort to a "paratactical" arrangement, assisted by heavy punctuation usage, something possible but relatively rare in English. Thus, we could come to something like the following:

> Lying and staring out of the window, when this is all a person can do—a mood like this, and nothing to be done about it: there is such a kind of weather.

In this rendering, we sacrifice grammatical fidelity in order to preserve the finely tuned sequence of the original, the construction of which is analogous to the nested structure of a matryoshka doll: reading consecutively, each element is "placed inside" that which succeeds it, with the concluding element (the weather) encompassing, in its turn, everything that comes before. Indeed, English would "naturally" opt for the "progressive" way of ordering these matryoshkas: There is a weather (the biggest doll), in which nothing can be done (second biggest) about the mood (third) of a person (fourth), who can do nothing (fifth) than lay down and stare of the window (sixth). The published translation, for all its success in preserving the essential meaning and the grammatical relations, does so only at the expense of breaking with this carefully constructed ordering of the original sentence.

In the following case, the translation cannot be accused of overemphasizing the emulation of syntactic structure; there are significant departures in that regard. We might even surmise that a partial concern for sequence informed some of the translatorial decisions:

> 해안촌 혹은 중국인 거리라고도 불리는 우리 동네는 겨우내 북풍이 실어나르는 탄가루로 그늘지고 거무죽죽한 공기 속에 해는 낮달처럼 희미하게 걸려 있었다.
> Our neighborhood was Seashore Village to some, while others called it Chinatown. The coal dust carried in by the winter northerlies settled over the

area like a shadow, blackening the sky and leaving the orb of the sun looking more like the moon.[72]

Now, while I do not maintain that sequence has to be our primary concern all the time and at all cost, this is a case where partial concessions are insufficient. It is only by making sequence our primary concern here that we can attain a result that delivers an equivalent impact:

> Seashore Village, or Chinese Street, as it was called, this was our village, where all winter long the north wind carried along coal dust that made for a murky and blackish sky—in which the sun, like the moon in daylight so faint, would dimly droop down.

This proposed translation takes to heart that the original sentence is not simply stylish in some diffuse way, but truly well-wrought, timing and calculating exactly the appearance of the various components. The narrator evokes the place first of all by calling it by its two very expressive names, and then walks us through the scene in a very "organic" way: All winter long / the wind is blowing / carrying coal dust / that creates a murky sky. This description is a little drama in itself, a calculated succession of information, and we are well-advised not to ignore the "communicative dynamism" here. We can see again, from this example, that it *is* possible to emulate sequence, but at the expense of equivalence in terms of syntactic structure.

6.5. Sequence as an essential element of narrative art and craft: The tracking shot mode

The preceding example has shown how a skillfully arranged sentence can lead the reader through an image step-by-step. The following dwells on the translations of sentences that, if read with awareness, can engender a quasi-cinematic experience, in which the reader is led through a series of details that cumulatively and by way of "concretization" (as Menakhem Perry might say), compose an image, a scene, or a dramatic situation. Yet again, and more tellingly, these effects of sequence can only be rendered if we are willing to dispense with the emulation of syntax.

The first example is another opening sentence of a story, and thus the difference in effect when changing its order is felt, again, all the more; after all, the elements of the scene are taken in one after the other. If their order is changed, the experience through which the image is constructed in the reader's mind will also be different. In other words, it matters how, in which sequential order, a scene unfolds in front of our mind's eye:

남자는 줄을 놓치지 않기 위해 앞사람 뒤에 바짝 붙어선 채, 아이의 손을 꼭 붙잡고 있었다.
A man was waiting in line, holding a child tightly by the hand. He was trying to stay close to the person before him so as not to lose his spot.[73]

The highlightings make clear how much the translation shuffles the original order around. The Korean original has the "man" first, who is the topic and grammatical subject. Then, if we render it as literally as possible in English, we are introduced to the "line" or queue, in which, "not to lose [his place], for that purpose," this man is "in-front-person-behind closely-pressed standing," while he, at the same time, "child's hand firmly holding was." The published English translation begins relatively well in lockstep with the original, but ends up reshuffling the elements to different effect.

Thus, the reader of the original learns first that the man, in order not to lose his place in a queue, tries to stay close to the person in front of him—and only then does the reader of the original learn that this man has a child as well, whose hand he firmly clenches. The Korean sentence is indeed carefully crafted, creating a drama within this sentence alone, leading us from the troubles of this man to keep his spot to an exacerbation of those troubles, when we learn that he is not alone in his fight, but that his effort not lose his place is doubled by his effort not to lose hold of his child. In sum, the anxiety of losing his spot is paralleled by the anxiety of losing hold of the child. And later in the story we will in fact learn that the hero is eventually induced by circumstance to give up his sick child—for whom he is unable to care appropriately, due to the mercilessness of society in this dystopian novel—for adoption.

At a superficial glance, the published English translation says exactly the same thing, but on closer inspection it clearly fails to create the same drama. By simply following the grammar instead of the sequence it does not take the sentence—which in this example is once again the especially significant opening sentence of a short story—seriously enough as a crafted piece of art. As said, we might compare this original order here to a tracking shot in a movie. In the mind's eye of the reader of the Korean original, a picture is evoked by moving from one detail to the next; the reader is, so to say, walked through the scene.

A further example might make this comparison of well-calculated sentences with a tracking shot even more convincing:

그러다 문득 주위가 조용하다 싶어 옆을 보니 주방장 아저씨가 술잔을 앞에 두고 벽에 기대 졸고 계셨다.
Then I noticed it suddenly got quiet in the restaurant, and turned to see the cook asleep with his head against the wall, his drink still sitting in front of him.[74]

Here, in the published translation, the description of the cook is turned upside down, as becomes evident when we highlight the correspondences:

술잔을 앞에 두고 <u>벽에 기대 졸고 계셨다</u>.
<u>asleep with his head against the wall</u>, his drink still sitting in front of him.

A sequence-faithful rendering can be just as stylish while being more effective:

with a drink in front of him, leaning against the wall, asleep

As in the previous example, we can liken the effect of the order of this clause to watching a tracking shot in cinema, taking things in one after another. This makes the reader a witness to what the first-person narrator perceives here, their experience proceeding parallel to that of the narrator in a definite sequence.

6.6. Sequence as a factor in creative language from many other domains

Of course, sequence matters beyond the narrow confines of literature. Advertising slogans can provide further, more succinct examples of the need to negotiate between sequence and syntax in translation; after all, slogans can display the same characteristics and thus challenges as the creative language of poetry or fiction. One of the biggest Korean coffee shop chains advertises itself with the slogan:

커피를 **사랑**하는 사람들의 커피
K'ŏp'i rŭl **sarang** hanŭn <u>saram</u> tŭl ŭi k'ŏp'i

From a conventional (grammatical, syntactical) perspective this would translate as:

Coffee for (or: by) <u>people</u> <u>who</u> **love** <u>coffee</u>

But from a sequential—and thus rhetorically motivated or "functional"—perspective, we must emulate the original's "end weight" structure, i.e., the way the original places the emphasis at the end, and might produce the following:

<u>Coffee</u>-**lov**ing <u>people</u>'s coffee

From here, we quickly arrive at a translation that successfully emulates sequence while still retaining the pointedness that an advertising slogan requires:

The coffee lovers' coffee

It is commonly said that English simply prefers to have the topic up front, an effect of its head-initiality; on this basis, moving the original's head-final "coffee" to the initial position can be presented as simply a standard maneuver that should not be questioned. But even if it takes only a very short time to read or hear the phrase, the order in which we encounter these elements matters. The slogan is geared to get across that we reach a climax with the concluding "coffee," the product made by (or for) coffee lovers.

Recalling the work of Dieter Lohmann, whose attempts to shift the practice of Latin teaching were referenced above, there can be also a pedagogical merit to a translation that preserves sequence, allowing a truly parallel reading. After all, the translation "coffee-loving people's coffee" follows the original's sequence even without any change of the grammatical relations. We do not need any contorted maneuvers to match original and translation but would have, in parallel reading, a perfect mutual transparency between original text and translation. Language teaching should make more systematic use of sequence-conscious translation.

However, more often than not, sacrifices are needed, and thus more audacity in relation to grammar. A popular radio program in Korea, meant to support the inclusion of people with disabilities, bears the title:

함께 하는 세상
Hamkke hanŭn sesang

From a conventional grammatical (syntactical) perspective this famous slogan simply means:

A world that we make together

But from a sequential perspective we must override the grammar of the sentence for the sake of a rhetorically well-motivated, "functional" translation. And in fact it is only by doing so that we manage to achieve a well-working, powerful slogan in English again:

Together we make the world

Whether in advertisement slogans, songwriter's lyrics, or scripts from TV comedians, calculated well-wrought language exists, of course, beyond the narrow margins of textbook genres of literature or belletristic writing; and so we are surrounded, via popular culture, by rich evidence to bolster the contention that sequence matters and should matter for translators. This extends, naturally, to works of screenwriters, i.e., the scripts of movies and TV dramas, with the very practical problem of arrangement and order arising in subtitling:

하긴, 뭐... 피 철철나는 남의 상처보다는
Well, they say that a thorn under one's own finger hurts more

내 손톱 밑의 가시가 더 아픈 법이야.
than the wound of another person that is causing them to bleed out.[75]

This is what the viewer sees when activating subtitles (plus the function for showing the Korean lines) while watching the Korean TV drama *Miss Hammurabi* via the streaming service VIKI. A very conventional approach would certainly come up with roughly the following translation:

> There is the law that the thorn under my finger hurts more than the wound of somebody else from which blood pours out.

Thus, we can see that the subtitling has just followed the conventional pattern, striving for syntactical equivalence and thus producing the reverse of the original in terms of sequence, a translational "roll-back" of the original. The only remarkable difference is that the relatively negligible and cumbersome opening ("there is the law") was left out for the sake of brevity, as subtitles must take into account space and (usually short) duration.

If we follow the sequence of the original, however, we get a much stronger statement, that begins with a graphic image of fatal injury and ends—let us also omit, for clarity, the summary at the very end, "that is a law of life" (the aspiration to tell a general truth is included in any aphorism's "gnomic" gist anyway)—with the little thorn. Clearly, this gives a much stronger and more memorable statement:

> Blood splashes out wildly from another person's wound, but under my fingernail is a thorn that hurts more.

In the same TV drama we encounter the following remark:

> 능력이 없는데 사람만 좋은 것도 죄야.
> It's wrong to be a good person when you're not even a successful person.[76]

A strong line that is, in terms of order (sequence), turned upside down in translation. In fact, it says: "Capability being absent: [in such a situation,] being good only as a person is a sin." The rhetorical emphasis here is clearly on "sin," because this is what this ad-hoc aphorism delivers in terms of its *pointe*. In other words, the situation of lacking capability (and thus success) is, indeed, the starting point from which the sentence sets off. Sequence is thus meaningful:

> Without success, mere human goodness amounts to just a sin.
> Without success, goodness is nothing but a sin.

These examples demonstrate once again how awareness for sequence should put the brakes on the commonly prevailing drive towards some (self-sufficient) "stylishness" in the target language. Indeed, throughout all the cases analyzed here, we have seen how habitual rearrangements are undertaken in order to map the grammatical relations given in the original onto the translation; and because these translations also aim at a heteronomous "good style," they consequently resort to reshuffling sequence all the more.

Conclusion

Inherent in all languages we find the basic principle that things have to be told one after another,[77] with relative freedom on the part of the speaker to choose what to start with, what to go on with, and how to end. This order of presentation is a crucial matter in narration. However, while we are used to paying attention to the order in which a story is told on the macro-level, it is not so common to be aware of the mini-dramas going on within individual sentences. But these mini-dramas matter. It matters how a sentence starts and how it ends, because for the reader of ingeniously crafted literature, the sequence of even a small portion of text, be it only a sentence or a clause, often entails an adventurous cognitive journey.

The purpose of this article was not to propose a universal law to be applied at all cost in every case, but to raise an objection against common practice, that is, to challenge a prevalent insensitivity regarding sequence in Korean-English translation, and to demonstrate how reversals of the original sequence can significantly disrupt the carefully-orchestrated rhetorical effects of the original text and do major harm to the cognitive experience that the writer[78] has taken care to trigger or evoke in the reader's mind. Such reshuffles are nonetheless common and routine; the habit of turning things upside down when moving from Korean to English and vice versa is too deeply ingrained. There is purportedly no alternative, but we have seen that if translators are willing to accord higher priority to sequence, and to sacrifice grammatical fidelity to this end, this pays off by an improved retention of the text's (in this case, the sentences') rhetorical, narrative, or dramatic effects, and thereby the reproduction of the impact devised by the writer.

When we look, for the wider picture, at classic debates on translation, we can relate the issues discussed in this article to the notorious disagreement over whether translations should broaden the target language's (and readers') horizons, or, conversely, whether the target language should remain unaffected by the different conventions of the source language. More openness toward the concept of enriching language via translation—"*erweitern*" (expand), as Schleiermacher famously put it, which in essence signifies foreignization—can also contribute to greater sensitivity toward the original's sequence, and encourage more daring efforts to save this sequence or, at least, let it shine through.

In principle and in general, there are Korean scholars who support this demand for expanding language, not least in view of the relatively short history of large-scale and systematic translation into vernacular Korean:

> The task of Korean translations may be called now, in some sense, not only a linguistic phenomenon, but also a pioneering of the possibilities in developing

the Korean language's expressiveness. Ideal Korean translators should be fighters for enhancing the capability of representing things and ideas in the Korean language. When this ideal is able to be realized, then the remaining duties will be (1) challenging and communicating with the Western thoughts and worlds, and (2) setting a place for an intellectual confrontation with Westerners, in both cases in the Korean language. This is directly linked with a consensus on to what extent the quality of the Korean language must be enhanced, as a language for serious literature.[79]

But it is not only the Koreans who should seek to develop their language in this regard. When Westerners translate Korean into English, we should demand that translators really exploit and even "develop" the expressive qualities of the target language, particularly when the rendering of an ambitious work of literature is at stake. This requires effort, and especially so in the case of a language (such as English) that imposes significant constraints on word order. But, to borrow the memorable words of Franz Rosenzweig, only those who "translate like a person talks who has nothing to say" will see no need to "demand something from their language."[80]

Notes

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2. Andreas Schirmer is head of the Korean section at the Department of Asian Studies at Palacký University Olomouc, Czech Republic. He coordinates a Korean studies network in Central and Eastern Europe, overseeing exchanges between sixteen institutions in ten countries. Recently, he has completed the edition of a three-volume series on *Koreans and Central Europeans* (Praesens). His current research relates to translation studies or the literary representation of contested issues. Previously, he has worked, among others, at the academy of the Literature Translation Institute of Korea. He has also published literary translations of Korean literature into German. andreas.schirmer@upol.cz
3. On "translation wars" in South Korea see Andreas Schirmer. "Aspects of the Never-Ending Translation Wars in South Korea: A Cultural Phenomenon and its Reasons." *Lebende Sprachen* 65.2 (2020): 390–410.
4. Cf. Mira Kim. "A Discourse Based Study on THEME in Korean and Textual Meaning in Translation," PhD thesis (Macquarie University, 2007); "Translation Error Analysis: A Systemic Functional Grammar Approach," in *Across Boundaries: International Perspectives on Translation Studies*, ed. Dorothy Kenny and Kyongjoo Ryou (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 2007), pp. 161–175; "Meaning-Oriented Assessment of Translations: SFL and Its Application for Formative Assessment," *Testing and Assessment in Translation and Interpreting Studies: A Call for Dialogue between Research and Practice*, ed. Claudia V. Angelelli and Holly E. Jacobson (Amsterdam: John Benjamins, 2009), pp. 123–157. For a particularly telling example, see Wook-Dong Kim's exacting critique of Deborah Smith's translation (awarded the Man Booker International Prize 2016): "The Creative English Translation of *The Vegetarian* by Han Kang," *Translation Review* 100.1 (2018): 65–80. Though Wook-Dong Kim's critique does identify a group of "errors made on the syntactic level," the errors

presented under this heading are, in fact, errors due very specifically to the translator's misjudgment of the "agent-action relationship," confusing "who does what to whom" (p. 73).

5. Cf. Han Mi-ae. "Hwang Sun-wŏn sosŏl ŭi munch'e pŏnyŏk kanŭngsŏng: 'Sonagi' rŭl chungsim ŭro," *Pŏnyŏkhak yŏn'gu* 11.1 (2010): 293–310; Pak Ok-su. "Chŏja ŭi ŭido ka pŏnyŏngmun e panyŏng toen pangsik. 'Ajossi ŭi hunjang' ŭi yŏnyŏkpon punsŏk e kŭn'gŏ," *Kyŏreŏ munhak* 50 (2013): 43–70; "Han-Yŏng munhak pŏnyŏk esŏ chujemun ŭi pŏnyŏk pangsik: Pak Wan-sŏ ŭi 'Chip pogi nŭn kŭrŏk'e kkŭnnatta' e kŭn'gŏ haesŏ," *Pigyo munhak / Comparative Literature* 62 (2014): 371–393; Ch'oe Hŭi-kyŏng. "Han-Yŏng munhak pŏnyŏk munch'e yŏn'gu: K'opŏsŭ kiban punsŏk ŭl chungsim ŭro," *Pŏnyŏkhak yŏn'gu* 17.3 (2016): 193–216; Wook-Dong Kim. "The Creative English Translation," 2018. Discussion of the "re-ordering of a sequence of sentences" does occur, but without concern for the consequences for drama, narration and rhetorical effect. Cf. Charmhun Jo. "Theme Choices in Translation and Target Readers' Reactions to Different Theme Choices," *Journal of Literature and Art Studies* 9. 12 (2019), p. 1259. Any questioning of the routine re-ordering of sequence *within* sentences is unusual. Likewise, questions such as whether fragmented sentences should be normalized are discussed (see Han, "Hwang Sun-wŏn," 2010), but this is a quite simple avenue, far from discussing sequence as I define it here.

6. Menakhem Perry. "Literary Dynamics: How the Order of a Text Creates Its Meanings (With an Analysis of Faulkner's *A Rose for Emily*)," *Poetics Today* 1.1–2 (1979), p. 35.

7. Andrew Bennett and Nicholas Royle. *An Introduction to Literature, Criticism and Theory* (London and New York: Routledge, 2004), p. 243.

8. Mona Baker. *In Other Words: A Coursebook on Translation* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), p. 112.

9. Jutta Muschard. *Relevant Translations: History, Presentation, Criticism, Application* (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 1996), p. 153. As can be seen from her use of the term "relevance," Muschard draws here on Ernst-August Gutt's *Translation and Relevance* (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991). However, Gutt himself acknowledges that his "principle of relevance" is fundamentally not new, but has, in different guises, formed part of many "guidelines of translation" for centuries (Gutt, *Translation and Relevance*, 1991, p. 188). See also Dan Sperber and Deirdre Wilson. *Relevance: Communication and Cognition* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986).

10. Martin Luther King Jr. "I Have a Dream," *36 Celebrities Say … / Segye ch'oego chisŏng 36-in i mal hanŭn 21- segi ŭi segye*, ed. Sisa Yŏngŏsa (Seoul: Sisa Yŏngŏsa, 1996), p. 4.

11. *36 Celebrities Say …*, p. 5.

12. Tom Johnson. "A publisher reflects on the freedom of the press." In *36 Celebrities Say …*, pp. 56–57.

13. W.H. Auden. "A short defense of poetry." In *36 Celebrities Say …*, pp. 82–83.

14. This excellent and oft-quoted aphorism is ascribed to James Baldwin, but seems to be only a paraphrase that has come to be considered as a quotation. The original sentence was rhetorically much less effective: "The artist cannot and must not take anything for granted, but must drive to the heart of every answer and expose the question the answer hides". Cf. James Baldwin. "The Creative Process." In *Creative America*, ed. Jerry Mason (New York: Ridge Press, 1962), pp. 17–21. Cf. also the relevant entry on quoteinvestigator.com (Accessed April 6, 2019). The Korean translation was found by this author on the website et-house. com (Accessed September 13, 2010), which has since disappeared.

15. Sŏ Kye-in. *Silchŏn yŏngŏ pŏnyŏk ŭi kisul* (Seoul: Pungnain, 2004), pp. 119–120.

16. Sŏ, *Silchŏn yŏngŏ pŏnyŏk ŭi kisul*, 2004, p. 174.

17. This is the first of two examples that William Strunk summons up to illustrate his "rule 18." Cf. Willam Strunk. *The Elements of Style / Yŏngŏ kŭlssŭgi ŭi kibon*, trans. Kim Chi-yang and Cho Sŏyŏn (Seoul: Ingan Hŭgŭk / La Comédie Humaine 2007), p. 72. The literal translations are provided by the author (A.S.) for the purposes of illustration.

18. Fundamentally, this concept may be traced back to Noam Chomsky's principles and parameters of generative linguistics.

19. For an introduction to this concept see Theresa Biberauer and Michelle Sheehan. "Theoretical Approaches to Disharmonic Word Order." In *Theoretical Approaches to Disharmonic Word Order*, ed. Theresa Biberauer and Michelle Sheehan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), pp. 1–44; cf. also Hubert Haider. "Head Directionality: In Syntax and Morphology." In *Contemporary Linguistic Parameters*, ed. Antonio Fabregas, Jaume Mateu, and Michael Putnam (Amsterdam: Bloomsbury, 2015), pp. 73–97.

20. See Richard S. Kayne's "asymmetry theory"—outlined in *The Antisymmetry of Syntax* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994)—which claims that all languages are in fact progressive and head-initial, at least at an underlying level.

21. See Hiroko Yamashita. *Processing and Producing Head-final Structures*, ed. Yuki Hirose and Jerome L. Packard (Dordrecht: Springer, 2011). See also Hwang Shin Ja Joo. "Relative Clauses, Adverbial Clauses, and Information Flow in Discourse," *Language Research* 30.4 (1994), p. 675: "Typologically, Korean is strongly head final (with a basic word order of SOV)."

22. Hwang Sŏn-mi. *Madang ŭl naon amt'ak* (P'aju: Sagyejŏl, 2002).

23. For the English version, the title was modified by the publishers to: "The hen who dreamed she could fly."

24. According to a five-part typology by Maria Polinsky, Japanese and English are extreme opposites linguistically, with Korean on the same level as Japanese (as "rigid head-final languages"), while German falls on the next level (as a "non-rigid head-final language"). Indeed, *ch'aek ŭl ilkta* becomes in German "ein Buch [a book] lesen [to read]." See Maria Polinsky. "Headedness, again," *UCLA Working Papers in Linguistics, Theories of Everything* 17 (2012), pp. 348–359.

25. This catchy formula is used by Carol J. Noh, Jeffrey J. Peterson, and Sŏn Chin-o in *Yŏngŏ ka kirŏjinŭn tan hangaji kisul: Kilge mal hagi ka modŭn yŏngŏ rŭl swipke handa / Do you know why it is easy to speak English in long sentences?* (Seoul: Old Stairs, 2011), pp. 16–17.

26. See, e.g., Alexander Fraser Tytler's often reprinted and very influential *Essay on the Principles of Translation* (first published 1791) that dismisses every translation that is "incompatible with the genius of English" (passim) and demands that translations display the ease of original composition.

27. For context, cf. *Studien zur Praxis der Übersetzung antiker Literatur: Geschichte—Analysen— Kritik*, ed. Josefine Kitzbichler and Ulrike C.A. Stephan (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2016).

28. Friedrich Carl Wolff in the preface to his translation of selected speeches by Cicero. Cf. Friedrich Carl Wolff. *Des Marcus Tullius Cicero auserlesene Reden* (Altona: Hammerich, 1805), p. vii.

29. Rudolf Pannwitz. *Die Krisis der europäischen Kultur* (Nürnberg: Hans Carl, 1917), p. 193.

30. Wolfgang Schadewaldt in his notes to his translation of Homer's *Odyssey*. Homer. *Die Odyssee*. Transl. by Wolfgang Schadewaldt (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1958), p. 323.

31. Alessandro Manzoni. *Die Brautleute*. Transl. by Burkhart Kroeber (München: Hanser, 2000).

32. Burkhart Kroeber. "Zu meiner Neuübersetzung der Promessi Sposi (On my retranslation of the *Promessi Sposi*)." In *Sprachvergleich und Übersetzungsvergleich*, ed. Jörn Albrecht and Hans-Gauger (Frankfurt a.M.: Peter Lang, 2001), pp. 419–420.

33. Kroeber, "Zu meiner Neuübersetzung," p. 417.

34. Kroeber, "Zu meiner Neuübersetzung," p. 420.

35. Jan Firbas. *Functional Sentence Perspective in Written and Spoken Communication* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 124.

36. Firbas, *Functional Sentence Perspective*, 1992, p. 5. For an example of the practical use of Firbas's framework (the concept of functional sentence perspective), for translation training, cf., e.g., Verena Jung. "Investigating Functional Sentence Perspective in

German–English Professional and Student Translations," *Across Languages and Cultures* 13.2 (2012): 263–278. Cf. also Monika Doherty. *Language Processing in Discourse: A Key to Felicitous Translation* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).

37. Jörn Albrecht. *Übersetzung und Linguistik: Grundlagen der Übersetzungsforschung II*, 2nd ed. (Tübingen: Narr, 2013), p. 130.

38. See, e.g., Pak, "Han-Yŏng munhak pŏnyŏk," 2014; Yi, "N-gram punsŏk," 2015.

39. See Kim, *A Discourse Based Study on THEME*, 2007; Kim, "Translation Error Analysis," 2007; Mira Kim and Zhi Huang, "Theme Choices in Translation and Target Readers' Reactions to Different Theme Choices," *T&I Review* 2 (2012): 79–112; Kim Tong-yŏng, Ch'oe Chin-suk, and An Tong-Hwan. "Yŏng-han pŏnyŏk t'eksŭt'ŭ e nat'ananŭn chuje kujo pigyo," *Ŏnŏ kwahak* 18.4 (2011): 21–46; Kim Chi-ŭn et al. "Yŏng-han norae pŏnyŏk sangŭi kubun mit unyuljŏk taech'ing kujo yŏn'gu," *Interpreting and Translation Studies / T'ongbŏnyŏkhak yŏn'gu* 18.3 (2014): 177–207.

40. Cf. Dieter Lohmann. "Auf Neues habe ich Lust. Über die Bedeutung der Reihenfolge für das Verstehen und Übersetzen, dargestellt an deutschen und lateinischen Text-Beispielen von Ovid bis Horaz," Presentation at a conference of teachers in Maulbronn, December 6, 2006, https://journals.ub.uniheidelberg.de/index.php/fc/article/view/38578/32240 (accessed November 30, 2020).

41. It might seem more apposite to look, in this context, at Korean readings of Classical Chinese (Literary Sinitic). However, Latin has been taught in Europe the contrastive way for centuries, with the vernacular largely enjoying a much more recognized position as a means of literary expression than was the case in Korea. Various glossing systems are proof that Koreans developed reading techniques to interpret Classical Chinese into vernacular Korean on the spot by way of syntactical transformation; also, it must have been perfectly normal, in some settings, to communicate the content of written text by intuitive free paraphrase, attuned to the audience—just like orally transmitted stories were recorded in Sinographic writing to be told again in spoken Korean. But it was not common to discuss different ways of rendering Classical Chinese in vernacular Korean; inversions in word order were just performed with unquestioned routine. In the 20th century, when translation of *hanmun* (Korean literature in Classical Chinese) finally evolved into an issue of public concern, it became customary to complain that translators do not emancipate themselves enough from a "*hanmun*-ish" style, leaving no room for the idea of original sequence being followed deliberately, for the sake of literariness. See Andreas Schirmer. "Re-invented in Translation? Korean Literature in Literary Chinese as one Epitome of Endangered Cultural Heritage," *Invented Traditions in North and South Korea*, ed. Andrew David Jackson, Codruța Sîntionean, Remco Breuker, and CedarBough Saeji (Hawai'i, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2021), pp. 176–218. For the bigger contexts see Bunkyō Kin. Literary Sinitic and East Asia: A Cultural Sphere of Vernacular Reading, translated by Ross King (Leiden: Brill, 2021); Si Nae Park. *The Korean Vernacular Story: Telling Tales of Contemporary Chosŏn in Sinographic Writing* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2020).

42. For example, "aliud iter haberent nullum" could be put as "other passage had they none," because in this sequence-faithful way the Latin phrase looks perfectly lucid. But grammarians tend to render this sentence, from Caesar's *Gallic War* (1/7), as "they had no other road." The pedagogically much more commendable version "other passage had they none" can be found as note 11 in Joseph Henry Allen's *A Shorter Preparatory Course of Latin Prose* (Boston, MA: Ginn Brothers, 1875).

43. Jieun Kiaer. *The Routledge Course in Korean Translation* (New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), p. 52.

44. Kiaer, The Routledge Course in Korean Translation, p. 57.

45. This is also reflected in many introductions to the language. Pars pro toto: "The Korean language obeys a strict grammatical constraint requiring that the sentence end with a

verb." Cf. Nam-Kil Kim. "Korean." In *The World's Major Languages*, 3rd. rev, ed. Bernard Comrie (London and New York, NY: Routledge, 2018), p. 894.

46. For relevant research, cf. Kwŏn Chae-il. "Ŏsun," *Saegugŏ saenghwal* 16.1 (2006): 193–202; Hee-Don Ahn and Sungeun Cho. "Notes on Two Types of Fragments," *Linguistic Research* 28 (2011): 19–35; Heejeong Ko. "Two Ways to the Right: A Hybrid Approach to Right Dislocation in Korean," *Language Research* 51 (2015): 3–40; Lee Jeong-Shik (Yi Chŏng-sik). "Kugŏ ujŏnwi yoso wa chogakku," *Saengsŏng munpŏp yŏn'gu* 26.2 (2016): 115–141; Park Bum-Sik and Sei-Rang Oh. "On the Island-(In)Sensitivity in the Right-Dislocation Construction in Korean," *Ŏnŏ kwahak yŏn'gu* / *Journal for Linguistic Science* 83 (2017): 135–153.

47. Ch'oe Chae-hŭi. *Han'gugŏ munpŏmnon* (Seoul: T'aehaksa, 2004), pp. 6–7.

48. Cf. Ch'oe, *Han'gugŏ munpŏmnon*, p. 6.

49. Kaegŭ k'onsŏt'ŭ (Gag Concert), 1 December 2018, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M92maZhcFLA [starting at 0:40]) (accessed 15 May 2019).

50. Pak Min-gyu. "Komawŏ, kwayŏn nŏguriya." In *K'asŭt'era* (P'aju: Munhak tongne, 2005), p. 61.

51. Park Min-gyu. "Raccoon World," translated by Jenny Wang Medina, *Azalea: Journal of Korean Literature & Culture* 1, p. 211.

52. Example taken from Kim Kŭm-hŭi (Kim Keum-hee). *Ch'esŭ ŭi modŭn kŏt* / *Everything about Chess*, translated by Jeon Miseli Kim (Seoul: Asia, 2016), p. 84 and p. 87.

53. Kim Keum-hee, *Ch'esŭ ŭi modŭn kŏt* / *Everything about Chess*, p. 87.

54. Pŏnnimdŭl [But Nim Dul]: *Tul man ŭi nŭkkim* (1986).

55. Sŏt'aeji wa Aidŭl: *Nan arayo* (1992).

56. Sin Hae-ch'ŏl [Shin Hae-shul], N.EX.T: *Inhyŏng ŭi kisa* (1992).

57. Nami: *Na ŭi sŭlp'ŭn inyŏn* (1985).

58. Kim Sŏng-jung. "Sangsok." In *Sangsok oe: Che 63-hoe Hyŏndae Munhaksang susang sosŏlchip*, edited by Hyŏndae Munhak (Seoul: Hyŏndae Munhak, 2017), p. 16.

59. Kang Su-ji: *Honja man ŭi kyŏul* (1995). The tentative translation given here is meant to reflect sequence. With grammar as the leading criterion, the rendering should be along the lines of: "Do you miss it, that winter's dazzling heaven [of those days] when, long ago, our love was much too cosy."

60. Tŭlgukhwa: *Kŭgŏt man i nae sesang* (1985).

61. Example taken from Sin Kyŏng-suk. *Ŏdisŏn'ga na rŭl ch'annŭn chŏnhwa pel i ulligo* (Seoul: Munhak tongne, 2010), pp. 182–183; Kyung-Sook Shin. *I'll Be Right There*. Translated by Sora Kim-Russell (New York, NY: Other Press, 2013), p. 157.

62. Example taken from Pak Hyŏng-sŏ (Park Hyoung-su). *Arŭp'an* / *Arpan*. Translated by Sora Kim-Russell (Seoul: Asia, 2014), p. 18 and pp. 19–21.

63. Park Hyoung-su. "Arpan," translated by Sophie Bowman and Sollee Bae, *Acta Koreana* 17.2 (2014), p. 698.

64. Example taken from Yi Ki-ho (Lee Ki-ho). *Kwŏn Sun-ch'an kwa ch'akhan saramdŭl* / *Kwon Sun-chan and nice people*, translated by Stella Kim (Seoul: Asia, 2015), pp. 8–9.

65. Example taken from Hong Hŭi-dam (Hong Hee-dam). *Kitpal* / *The Flag*, translated by Jeon Seung-hee (Seoul: Asia, 2013), pp. 8–9.

66. This insight is certainly not new. Cf., e.g,: "In poetry (…) the position assigned to an entity, action, or concept within a line of verse has important implications for the overall meaning, text pattern, and poetic effect. Accordingly, efforts are made to preserve the same order of participants in translation, which often results in the assignment of new syntactic roles and in the restructuring of the entire clause, as in passivisation" (Nada Grošelj. "Belletristic Translation into English: What Price the Same Order of Words?" *English Language and Literature Studies in the Context of European Language Diversity* 2.1–2 (2005), p. 256).

67. Ŭn Hŭigyŏng. *Arŭmdaum i na rŭl myŏlsi handa* (P'aju: Ch'angbi, 2007), p. 40.

68. Eun, Hee Kyung (Ŭn Hŭigyŏng). "The Discovery of Solitude," translated by Jae Won Chung. In *Beauty Looks Down on Me*, translated by Yoonjin Park, Craig Bott, Sora Kim-Russell, and Jae Won Chung (Champaign, IL: Dalkey Archive Press, 2017), p. 39.

69. Example taken from Sin Kyŏng-suk (Shin Kyung-sook). *P'unggŭm i ittŏn chari / The place where the harmonium was*, translated by Agnita Tennant (Seoul: Asia 2012), p. 8.

70. Shin, *P'unggŭm i ittŏn chari / The place where the harmonium was*, p. 9.

71. Example taken from Kim Hyŏn (Kim Hyun). *Kim Hyŏn sisŏn / Poems*, translated by Seung-hee Jeon (P'aju: Asia 2018), pp. 38–39.

72. Example taken from O Chŏng-hŭi (Oh Jung-hee). *Chunggugin kŏri / Chinatown,* translated by Bruce und Ju-chan Fulton (Seoul: Asia 2012), pp. 12–13. In a previous translation by the same team, the wording is slightly different, but not significantly so in regard to sequence. Cf. *Korea Journal* 30.1 (1990), p. 50.

73. Example taken from Ch'ŏn Myŏng-gwan (Cheon Myeong-kwan). *T'oegŭn / Homecoming*, translated by Jeon Miseli (Seoul: Asia, 2008), pp. 8–9.

74. Example taken from Kim Ae-ran. *Ŏdi ro kago sip'ŏsin'gayo / Where would you like to go?*, translated by Jamie Chang (Seoul: Asia, 2016), p. 54 and p. 53.

75. *Miss Hammurabi*, episode 2, 1:00:34–38.

76. *Miss Hammurabi*, episode 7, 21:36.

77. It is precisely this condition that, in the science fiction movie *Arrival* (2016), distinguishes human languages from the non-linear language of the visiting ultra-intelligent aliens, who communicate in written statements that are produced all at once.

78. Note that any talk of "the author," or "the writer" here is, of course, used merely as a *façon de parler*, and not meant to support any "intentionalism" or "resurrection of the author." Supposing that effects of the text are deliberate ones can be a good heuristic; it has nothing to do here with making an appeal, in earnest, to the author's explicit intentions for the text. In other words, the postulate of "the author's intention" is seen here as regulative constraint, guarding against wild misunderstandings and defending the guiding idea—without which all philology and also the whole investigation here would lose its basis—that one can distinguish legitimate and "good" readings from less valid or even erroneous, or baseless, or inappropriate interpretations. This is not the place to discuss the underlying matters further, however.

79. Pae Su-ch'an. "Sŏyang munhŏn Han'gugŏ pŏnyok ŭi naeryŏk kwa kwaje," *Susahak* 24 (2015), p. 145.

80. Franz Rosenzweig. *Fünfundzwanzig Hymnen und Gedichte. Deutsch und Hebräisch*. Vol. 1 of *Sprachdenken im Übersetzen* (Franz Rosenzweig: Der Mensch und sein Werk. Gesammelte Schriften IV), edited by Rafael N. Rosenzweig (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983), p. 3.

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Contemporary Re-Interpretations of the Colonial Past Through the Biopics of Two Koreans: Park Kyŏng-Wŏn and Kim Sin-Rak

ÁLVARO TRIGO   Associate Professor, University of Salamanca

Abstract

In the past few years, the South Korean film industry has released a growing number of Korean movies set in the colonial period. This essay focuses on how these films deal with the painful memory of occupation. More specifically, the analysis will be centered on two biopics with narratives that differ from what could be argued to be the mainstream portrayals of the colonial period, which tend to depict the struggle of Korean freedom-fighters under Japanese rule. Moreover, this essay reflects on the meaning of reinterpreting the past through cinema.

Keywords: Korean cinema, biopic, identity, colonial Korea, politics of memory, Zainichi

Introduction

In recent years, a growing number of Korean movies set in different historical periods have been released within the frame of the so-called *Hallyu* 한류, or Korean wave, phenomenon. These movies set in the past belong to a wide range of genres, though they are classified as *sagŭk* 사극, or historical drama, in Korea. For example, on the one hand, it is possible to find epic action movies such as

Myŏngnyang 명량 (*The Admiral Roaring Currents*, 2014), that recounts Yi Sunsin's naval victories against the Japanese during the Imjin War (1592–1598) and makes use of impressive special effects. On the other hand, there have been humorous approaches to important military conflicts of the past, such as in *Hwangsanbŏl* 황산벌 (*Once Upon a Time in a Battlefield*, 2003) and its sequel *P'yŏngyangsŏng* 평양성 (*Battlefield Heroes*, 2011) dealing with the Battle of Hwangsanbŏl between the Kingdoms of Silla and Paekche and the war between the Kingdoms of Silla and Koguryŏ respectively.

Among these historical films it is also common to find representations or references to the most traumatic historical experiences that have beset the Korean nation in the recent past, such as Japanese colonial rule. As noted by Frances Gateward, recent historical cinema has usually concentrated on three distinct periods: the colonial period (1910–1945), the period from the outbreak of the Korean War until the ceasefire signed between the UN, North Korea, and the PRC (1950–1953), and the struggles of the Korean population under dictatorial regimes until the democratization of the country.[1]

This paper analyzes the narratives of two historical films, *Ch'ŏngyŏn* 청연 (*Blue Swallow*, 2005) and *Yŏktosan* 역도산 (*Rikidōzan a hero extraordinaire*, 2004). Both movies are based on historical characters and have been selected because they share specific characteristics in their representation of the colonial period. Moreover, their narratives differ from the approach on the period taken by most South Korean cinematic productions set during the Japanese occupation. More specifically, this paper will examine how these two movies try to contest the predominant representation of the colonial period, as seen in most other productions, within the space of reinterpretation and remembering. In that sense, the goal of this study is not merely to point out a series of differences and commonalities, but rather to reflect on the relationship between these two movies and the concept of memory and the meaning of these narratives within the context of contemporary Korean cinema.

There is no doubt that the colonial period remains one of the most painful episodes within the collective memory of the national history. It is possible to differentiate two main reasons for that: the first one is related to the direct threat to Korean identity that Japanese rule constituted and the second one is related to the concept of memory. The threat to Korean identity became more obvious in the last phase of the occupation, a period from the late 1930s to the defeat of the Japanese in 1945. During those years, the Japanese tried to accelerate the assimilation process of Koreans as subjects of the Empire, promulgating new regulations directed at the eradication of Korean culture and identity.[2] In particular, the measures regarding the use of the Japanese language, the forced adoption of

Japanese names as a replacement for Korean names, and the mandatory partic-ipation of students and government employees in Shinto ceremonies (a foreign religion to Koreans), are clear representatives of Japanese efforts to eradicate Korean identity.

This sort of painful historical experience had an impact on how Korean identity is understood today, and in fact some authors regard historical foreign aggressions as a component of the so-called *han* 한 (恨),[3] a term intrinsically linked to Korean identity and to the development of Korean nationalism. *Han* refers to a collective feeling of "unresolved resentment," "bitter feeling," or "hatred" unique to Koreans and thus difficult to translate into other languages. Its counterpart is *chŏng* 정 (情) which is defined by dictionaries as "affection" or "tender feelings," but once again *chŏng* transcends translations and refers to an emotion that binds people who suffer from the same *han*.[4] The concept of *han* has been widely circulated and debated, and though several scholars dismiss it as an outdated construct with colonial origins, it continues to be portrayed as a root aspect of Korean culture by academics, artists, writers, and critics.[5]

In relation to the concept of memory it is important to note that only a few decades have passed since the end of the colonial period. This relative temporal proximity is directly related to its impact in the memory of Koreans. Firstly, it is important to distinguish between the different types of memory. As defined by Polit, it is possible to argue the existence of three different types of memory: individual memory, communication memory, and cultural memory. Individual memory refers to memory based on our own personal experience or what we lived personally. Communication memory is the memory that connects, as a rule, three generations, and it is the memory of verbally transmitted memories. As there are still survivors that lived under colonial rule, they and their relatives constitute the living individual and communication memories of a traumatic period that left many open wounds, which still hinder the normalization of relations between Korea and Japan. Finally, cultural memory (often referred to as "collective memory," a term coined by the French philosopher and sociol-ogist Maurice Halbwachs) is the shared pool of memories of a social group of variable size. It serves specific needs of social groups and it should not be mistaken with "historical truth," though it could not exist without history.[6] From an emotional point of view, cultural memory differs from "historical truth" insofar as unambiguous conclusions and heroes are sought. Deeds are good or bad and the heroes are saint or scoundrels.[7]

In fact, among the Korean movies set in the colonial era there is a trend to approach the subject from a nationalist perspective, offering a dualist narrative of Japanese oppressors versus Korean freedom fighters or perpetrators versus

victims that appeals to cultural memory. Recent examples of this tendency can be found in movies such as *Modŏn poi* 모던보이 (*Modern Boy*, 2008), *Amsal* 암살 (*Assassination*, 2015), *Tŏkhye Ongju* 덕혜옹주 (*The Last Princess*, 2016), *Milchŏng* 밀정 (*The Age of Shadows*, 2016) and *Kunhamdo* 군함도 (*The Battleship Island*, 2017). In movies like these the audience will generally find Koreans who struggle to regain the independence of their country against evil Japanese army officers. Among these, *The Last Princess* is remarkable because of its portrayal of princess Tŏkhye as an eloquent freedom fighter symbolizing the culmination of an embracing process of the royal history of Korea by popular media that contrasts with the negative attitude towards the Korean royal family in the early postwar discourse.[8] Even though the dynasty was largely criticized for its corruption and inability to protect the nation's independence, the reconciliation of popular media with this dark past is consistent with the restoration of royal dignity and the use of its cultural legacy by the tourism industry in South Korea.

Sometimes film directors add slight shades to this form of the predominant narrative, for example in *Assassination* it is possible to find an interesting Japanese secondary character who is aiding Koreans in their fight for independence. In the biopic *Pak Yŏl* 박열 (*Anarchist in the colony*, 2017) based on the life of independence activist Pak Yŏl, it is also possible to find a Japanese character (Fumiko Kaneko) who sympathizes with oppressed Koreans, but its narrative falls into the same nationalist dynamic. In relation to how Japanese are portrayed in Korean movies about the colonial period, we should note *Chokpo* 족보 (*The Genealogy*, 1973) by the internationally acclaimed South Korean film director Im Kwŏnt'aek. The main character of this movie is a Japanese man with a sensibility and love for Korean art who is ordered to notify a Korean family with a deep history that they are required to change their names into Japanese names according to the new colonial government policy. Despite being a public servant who works for the colonial government he is presented as a human who feels troubled about fulfilling his mission, which makes the character unusual, because in other movies the Japanese are mostly depicted as evil and part of the colonial machinery. This different attitude can already be perceived from the first scenes of the movie when he receives his orders and tries to question his superior, stating that the change of name should be voluntary and not imposed, but his speech is quickly interrupted by the officer.[9]

However, this paper will focus on two specific contemporary portrayals of Koreans who lived during the colonial period. As already mentioned above, in movies set during this period, most Koreans are represented as either freedom fighters or traitors who collaborated with the Japanese, allowing no chance for a middle ground in this polarization. Despite this, it is possible to find less common

narratives that portray the colonial period through a different approach, such as *Ch'ŏngyŏn* 청연 (*Blue Swallow*, 2005) and *Yŏktosan* 역도산 (*Rikidōzan a hero extraordinaire*, 2004). These two biopics shift away from more typical film narratives of the Korean struggle for independence and present the audience with the stories of two individuals pursuing their professional careers and goals within the hostile frame of being colonized subjects.

The biopic as a vehicle of memory in Korea

The *Oxford Dictionary of Film Studies* defines the biopic as a film that tells the story of a real person, often a monarch, political leader, or artist.[10] This means that biopics are movies that reinterpret the individual memory of a prominent character of the past. This fact often imbues them with a sense of legitimacy that producers sometimes present in the form of a disclaimer stating that their product is "based on a real story." That shows that there is an intention towards historical accuracy from the producer's side, and in fact when a biopic's portrayal loses that intention it is categorized as "biofantasy." For example, the portrayal of Yi Sunsin in *Myŏngnyang* (*The Admiral: Roaring Currents*, 2014) would arguably fall in this last category for its exaggerated fighting scenes. As pointed out by Kim, the intensity and violence of the naval battles at Myŏngnyang were considerably embellished and the Japanese enemies remain mostly unconvincing caricatures with over-dressed and over-decorated generals who draw their swords at the slightest offense.[11] To some extent, it could be argued in defense that such deviations from "historical fact" are part of the dramatic license of movie makers. However, the intense weight of the nationalistic narrative in this movie does not offer a new evaluation of the admiral's figure to the audience. Kim further examines the historical construction of the figure of Yi Sunsin himself, exposing the superficial representation of the admiral and referring the reader indirectly to a fundamental question: What was the real admiral's story? As much as biopics try to approach "historical truth," they cannot escape the fact of being new versions of a lost memory, or in other words, mere reinterpretations made by their producers.

Biopics rarely use individual memory as a source and rely on written materials as most of them are produced after the death of the historical figure. In the introduction to his book, Custen asserts that biopics create a view of history based on the cosmology of the film industry.[12] Even though biopics intend to narrate the story of a historical character, the role or producers is determinant in the ways the historical figure's life will be presented to the audience. Given the room for exploration provided by the genre it comes as no surprise that the relationship between biopics and national identity has been the subject of numerous studies.

In Hollywood, biopics enjoyed their peak of popularity from the 1930s to the 1950s, subsequently fading away to a minor form from the 1960s. During those decades, major American studios produced around three hundred biopics.[13] During the 1970s, while not entirely vanishing, the biopic nevertheless saw its significance on the big screen wane. Over the past few decades, it has reemerged with prominent auteurs such as Martin Scorsese, even though it has not regained the popularity it enjoyed as a genre prior to World War II.[14]

The Korean film industry was no exception to this trend as it started to produce biopics based on national heroes after liberation in 1945. During the 1940s, a series of biopics portraying anticolonial resistance politics against colonial oppression were filmed, but biographical films set in the precolonial and colonial eras would reach their pinnacle of success and popularity during the late 1950s.[15] Many of those films present examples of dramatized heroic tales of anticolonial nationalists. There were biopics on historical figures such as Min Yŏnghwan (1861–1905), Ryu Kwansun (1902–20), Yun Ponggil (1908–32), and An Chunggŭn (1879–1910). Among them, the historical figures of Ryu Kwansun, a female student activist of the March 1st Movement of 1919, and An Chunggŭn, a young nationalist who assassinated Japanese statesman Ito Hirobumi in 1909 as a protest against the Japan–Korea Protectorate Treaty of 1905, are well known to any Korean and integrated as national heroes into the history of Korea. As Jinsoo An points out:

> The repeated dramatization of select political figures hence served not only the biopics' didactic and memorial functions but also the continuity and predominance of the nationalist historical discourse in the making of Korea's national cinema in the 1940s and '50s.[16]

Thus, these examples do not intend to explain the historical development of biopic as a genre in South Korea, but rather exemplify in which ways biopics often complemented the national historical discourse with the intention of fostering a selective memory in their audience. Whether this intention responds to a political agenda or just to the cosmovision of movie makers depends on the product. It is also important to emphasize that biopics do not consist only of portrayals of national heroes, but also include other kinds of remarkable characters, such as musicians, writers, and others.

In what is probably his most famous work, *Imagined Communities*, Benedict Anderson wrote the following:

> As with modern persons, so it is with nations. Awareness of being embedded in secular, serial time, with all its implications of continuity, yet of 'forgetting' the experience of this continuity—product of the ruptures of the late eighteenth century—engenders the need for a narrative of identity' […] Yet between narratives of person and nation there is a central difference of emplotment.

> In the secular story of the 'person' there is a beginning and an end. She emerges from parental genes and social circumstances onto a brief historical stage, there to play a role until her death ... Nations, however, have no clearly identifiable births, and their deaths, if they ever happen, are never natural. Because there is no Originator, the nation's biography can not be written evangelically, 'down time,' through a long pro-creative chain of begettings. The only alternative is to fashion it 'up time'—towards Peking Man, Java Man, King Arthur, wherever the lamp of archaeology casts its fitful gleam.[17]

Biopics, as artificial renderings of lost individual memories share a common characteristic with national history. Both are narrated through a selective process in which specific events or episodes are emphasized at the expense of others. In the case of nations, their histories seek to build the nation's narrative and foster a sense of national identity, among others. As a spectacle for the masses, the impact of cinematic representations in the audiences and its relations with nationalism have been the subject of academic scholarship. For example, *Colonialism and Nationalism in Asian Cinema* edited by Wimal Dissanayake discusses how Japanese imperialism made use of cinema in Korea and other colonized territories for propaganda purposes. On a broader perspective, *Cinema and Nation* (2000) edited by Mackenzie and Hjort approaches the ways in which film production and reception are shaped by ideas of national belonging and the influence of globalization on the concept of national cinema. The next section analyzes the ways in which the two selected biopics construct their narratives and the unique place these two films hold within the array of Korean movies set during the colonial period.

Blue Swallow and the controversy of collaborationism

The heroine of *Chŏngyŏn* (*Blue Swallow*, Chong-ch'an Yun, 2005) is a strong female character with a life goal who suffers the double challenge of being a woman and a colonized subject. However, this fact does not necessarily transform her into an independence fighter, as is common in other movies. On the contrary, the irreconcilability between her personal aspirations and a part of her identity that cannot be changed leads to a more complex relation and reflection on the meaning of being Korean. The movie presents to the audience the fictionalized story of Pak Kyŏng-wŏn (1901–1933) who together with Kwŏn Kiok (1901–1988) and Yi Chŏng-hǔi (1910–?) was one of the first female Korean aviators.[18]

The film was released a year before Martin Scorsese released *The Aviator*, a biopic that portrays the life of Howard Hughes (1905–1976) and set in a similar temporal framework. Pak lived during a time in which the concept of modern woman *sinyŏsŏng* 신여성 was in vogue, as particular sectors of the Korean

intellectuals recognized the importance of providing women with a modern education, although there was a strong reaction against it by conservatives prompting a social debate about gender roles. During the Chosŏn dynasty, under a rigid neo-Confucian state, women had been confined to the domestic sphere without participating in public affairs. However, from the beginning of the twentieth century, as more women accessed education and came in contact with international feminism, women became more active within civil society, such as publishing women's magazines that present women's views on gender. The brief articles that appeared at that time in the press evince the pride of young Korean women for Pak achieving such a challenging goal. Within this context a woman like Pak could represent a symbol of women's liberation, but the fact that she flew for the Japanese always obscured her personal achievements as an aviator.

The movie opens with a scene of a young Pak Kyŏng-wŏn smiling at the arrival of Japanese soldiers in 1910. From this point, the audience is aware of her lifelong dream of flying like a bird. In fact, she even appears running in the fields after a plane that is flying low due to a technical problem. The scene portrays her as coming from a humble farming background and having a dispute with her father because of her desire to attend school against his will. Even though Pak Kyŏng-wŏn indeed came from a farming background, her parents were actually relatively wealthy and concerned about her education. However, the audience is warned about potential dramatic license by the director, since the movie includes the following disclaimer: "it is also to be noticed that the characters and incidents in this film are partly modified and dramatized as occasion demands."[19]

The next scene shows Pak enrolling in the *Tachikawa Flight School* while she is working as a taxi driver in Japan to pay the tuition fees. Before that, it is known that she attended *Sinmyong Higher Common School* and then she studied silk and hemp-reeling techniques at Yokohama's *Kasahara Industrial Arts School*. When she returned to Korea in 1920, she already dreamed of becoming a pilot, and she was working as a nurse with hopes of saving enough money to accomplish this dream.[20] After that, she got a chance to enroll in the *Kabata Driving School* in Tokyo as a step in preparing herself for flying lessons, and she used her license to work as a taxi driver, as shown in the movie. Finally, she enrolled in the *Tachikawa Flight School* in 1925, being one of six female students out of a group of 33. In 1928, she earned her level two aviator license, which was a significant accomplishment for the time, especially considering her status as a Korean woman during the colonial period. She took part in many aviation competitions, winning all the female events. After graduation, Pak flew several promotional flights with the final goal of a flight to Europe or America. One of her lifelong dreams was to fly to Korea, a wish that may have been inspired by An Ch'ang-nam's triumphant

Pak Kyŏng-wŏn on her plane.
Source: https://ppss.kr/archives/55571

homecoming flight to Korea in 1922. An was the first Korean male aviator and was cheered by the crowd at his arrival at Yŏŭido (Yeouido) airport. The newspaper *Tonga Ilbo* 동아일보 had raised funds to purchase a plane so that he could fly to Korea.[21] On 7 August 1933, Pak Kyŏng-wŏn died attempting to accomplish her dream during her first trip to Korea, crashing her plane into Mt. Kurotake in Japan only fifty minutes after taking off due to bad climatic conditions. This last flight and other exhibitions performed by Pak are impressively portrayed in the movie, making use of special effects. The movie's title refers to her beloved Salmson 2A2 biplane,[22] the latest model at the time and the aircraft used for her last trip.

Even before its release, the movie drew criticism, because it was discovered by netizens that Pak Kyŏng-wŏn was not the first Korean female aviator. Kwŏn Kiok apparently became a pilot before her, serving in the Chinese army against Japan. This fact forced the director to change the promotional campaign of the movie.[23] However, this alone would not have exerted a negative impact on the public reception of the movie sufficient to justify its failure in the box office. One of the main problems may have been the perception of the main character as a collaborator and traitor by part of the Korean audience. She did not just fly for the Japanese, but allegedly carried on a scandalous affair with Koizumi Matajirō, the minister of posts and telecommunications and grandfather of Koizumi Junichiro, a former prime minister of Japan.[24] At the time, rumors appeared in

the Japanese press, and before the movie's release different articles based on them and criticizing the movie were published under titles such as "Who would glorify the cheer-girl of Japanese imperialism?"[25] At the time, Koizumi Matajirō was a powerful and wealthy man who supervised the civil aviation business. His favor made it possible for Pak to acquire her aircraft,[26] but the nature of the relation between them remains obscure.

The film ignored these existing items of gossip and presented us with a fiction-alized version of Pak having a love story with Han Ji-Hyŏk, a Korean who serves in the Japanese army. When the character is first presented, he speaks to Pak in Japanese, and she seems to have a negative perception of him until she discovers that he is Korean as well, a characteristic that makes romance possible between the two and seems an attempt by the director to hint to the audience that Pak despises the Japanese colonizers. The addition of this Korean lover also plays an essential role to strengthen Pak's connection with Korea, as most of the movie's dialogue is in Japanese. However, the rumors about the historical Pak's affair with Koizumi raised controversies and some netizens even called for a boycott and suggested that such a movie should not be released in Korea considering her involvement in pro-Japanese activities and propaganda flights.[27] The situation prompted the director and actors to try to defend the character and Jong-chan Yun alleged: "I just wanted to show a tragedy of a woman who had to choose her dream over her country."[28] According to his own words, the director wanted to focus on her story rather than depicting the nation's struggle for freedom, such as frequently seen in other movies.

However, the historiography of collaboration, as defined by Koen de Ceuster, has a significant impact in the reception of this kind of re-interpretation or repre-sentation of the colonial past. After the liberation of Korea in 1945, the demands of justice against the collaborators were far from satisfied,[29] ensuring that the issue would remain unsolved in the popular Korean historical consciousness. For example, of 682 cases of collaboration opened during Rhee's presidency, 559 were passed to prosecutors and only 38 were taken to court. Finally, 12 collaborators were imprisoned, 5 suspended and one sentenced to death, although this last sentence was never carried out.[30] In addition to this, as described by Carter Eckert:

> Nationalist paradigms have so dominated intellectual life in Korea that they have obfuscated, subsumed, or obliterated virtually all other possible modes of historical interpretation. Whatever the topic—social groups and classes, political or cultural movements, governments or other institutions, individual figures, novels, poems, films, scholarship, even ideas themselves—all have been screened through a myopic nationalist lens that is as a judgmental as it is pervasive.[31]

What Eckert points out brings us back to the concepts of national identity and *han*. As stated before, the concept of *han* is controversial in its definition, but if we accept foreign aggression of Korea as one of the sociopolitical sources of *han* that sparks this deep-rooted "sadness," "bitterness," or "longing" as described by different scholars, it is possible to shed light on why cultural products dealing with Korea's traumatic past are unavoidably scrutinized through a nationalist point of view and can be perceived as an offense to a shared memory when they deviate from the mainstream discourse.

This is one of the main reasons the biopic of Pak Kyŏng-wŏn could not escape the sterile debate on collaborationism. The deviations from what constitutes "historical truth" are not uncommon and often forgiven by the audience when they emphasize a national hero, as happened with Yi Sunsin in *Roaring Currents*. However, Pak's background as a collaborator arguably led to the scrutiny of netizens due to the open wound it constitutes. Analyzing the character from a nationalist prism, it is easy to label the actual Pak as a collaborator if compared to other aviators, such as An Ch'ang-nam and Kwŏn Kiok, who took an active role in the fight for independence. But the question often leads to a dead end as the collaboration concept itself is subjective and dynamic. For example, it is known that Pak did not want to change her name to a Japanese name as other pro-Japanese Koreans did. Apparently, she was proud of being Korean, and it is also well known that she dreamed about a homecoming flight. However, living within the colonial context, she found herself involved in consolation propaganda flights, agreeing on them rather than giving up her dream of becoming a pilot. For that reason, regardless of where Pak's sympathies may have lain, her ties with collaboration and the rumors about her personal life made her an impossible heroine for part of the audience.

There is a very significant scene in the movie when she visits her boyfriend in prison before he is sentenced to death by the Japanese:

> Han Ji-Hyŏk: How about the flight preparations?
> Pak Kyŏng-wŏn: They'll let me fly only if I follow the Foreign Minister.
> Han Ji-Hyŏk: Follow what?
> Pak Kyŏng-wŏn: A consolatory flight for Japan's army in Manchuria with the Japanese flag. I don't know …
> Han Ji-Hyŏk: Worried about people calling you a traitor? But Korea hasn't done anything for you. Go … there is no other way
> Pak Kyŏng-wŏn: I'm so angry …[32]

This scene represents the troubled feelings Pak would have felt at the thought of being close to achieving one of her life goals and only being able to do it under propagandistic conditions and using the Japanese flag. An essential point is raised here. As an individual, why should Pak become a fighter for the independence of

Korea? What did the nation do for her? This scene can be interpreted as the desire of the director to stress the human dimension of the character. Should she renounce her lifelong dream because of nationalism? Would that be selfish if she did not?

The scene represents the peak of a narration that has been unfolding throughout the movie. The audience has been presented with different scenes that depict the hardships and abuses suffered by a Korean woman within the Japanese colonial system. From the scenes in which Pak is discriminated against because of her ethnicity and a Japanese female pilot is chosen to represent her school in tournaments, despite Pak's superior skills, to the scenes in which she and her boyfriend are tortured because of their suspected ties with a Korean journalist who attacks Japanese officers before committing suicide. Those scenes suggest that the director is not trying to represent a colorful "kitsch" colonial period that does not fairly address the difficulties and suffering undergone by Koreans. Indeed, surviving within the colonial context often implied following colonial rule. Refusing to take part could lead to an arrest and the hygienic conditions in prisons were bad enough for prisoners to contract mortal diseases. As Sanha points out in his review of the movie, people should not forget that even though freedom fighters' examples are valuable for the national history there were still many Koreans who had to carry on with their lives in the hostile colonial context. Thus, dismissing Pak's achievements as a female aviator and tagging her as a "cheer-girl of imperialism" might be a "cruel dogmatism for future generations,"[33] which also reflects the importance of popular culture portrayals that escape the predominant black and white narratives.

However, the audience can feel betrayal as the potential feelings of Pak are appropriated by the producers to send a political message. From the perspective of memory the biopic contains a reconstruction of Pak's life, but a reconstruction from the director's memory. This does not just refer to the fictionalized elements of the narrative, but also to how the narration is presented itself and the strategies it follows. For example, the troubled feelings of Pak with her national identity are largely based on assumptions by the producers rather than facts or real memories. For example, there are scenes in which Pak's dream of flying to Korea is represented. After winning an important tournament for her school, Pak states in a press conference her desire of "flying home." This kind of scene, together with scenes that portray the discrimination she suffered, prepare the audience for the climax scene in which the debt owed to the nation is questioned. As much as Pak might not feel in debt to her country, in the movie she still hates being used by the Japanese for a consolation flight because, from their side, having an ethnic Korean pilot do the trip was a perfect move to show that she became a successful woman within the colonial system without acknowledging her suffering.

That said, *Blue Swallow* was perhaps a representation of the colonial past that not many people among the audience were able to enjoy, and still it was necessary. Unlike Kwŏn Kiok who is said to have dreamed about "bombing the palace of the Japanese emperor,"[34] Pak Kyŏng-wŏn might not be the hero that Korean nationalism requires, but she can be a character who can help to reconcile Koreans with their troubled past from a more human perspective.

Rikidōzan: From Japanese hero, to ethnic Korean, and finally transnational figure

Let us now turn to analyze the biopic of a Korean ethnic wrestler who developed his career in Japan as, among other elements, its main character questions nationalism in a very similar way to the heroine of *Blue Swallow*. *Yŏkdosan* 역도산, directed by Song Hae-sŏng (*Rikidōzan, A hero extraordinary*, 2004) presents the life of a wrestler known by his artistic name, Rikidōzan (1924–1963). He was born to an impoverished family in modern-day South Hamgyŏng Province under the name of Kim Sin Rak.[35] The movie is a South Korean-Japanese co-production starring Korean and Japanese actors. The leading role was interpreted by Sŏl Kyŏnggu, who gained 20 kilograms for the role and had to put an extra effort in attending language tutoring since 97% of the movie lines were in Japanese.[36] This decision makes sense as producers may have tried to prioritize the Japanese audience, taking into consideration that Rikidōzan became quite a popular figure in postwar Japan. However, this is a double-edged strategy, since it also posed the risk of causing a rejection of the film by South Koreans due to the language of the movie dialogue.

Since the film is told in the form of a flashback, a typical narrative device in biopics, it comes as no surprise that the film opens with a scene of the incident that put an end to Rikidōzan's life. Rikidōzan was stabbed by a yakuza member after a dispute. Complications with his wound caused his death a few days later in 1963, though the official cause reported was an overdose of medicine. The film then flashes back to his youth. Rikidōzan started his fighting career at a young age practicing traditional Korean wrestling *ssirŭm* 씨름, and due to his success, a sumo promoter offered him a debut. Even though his parents were against it and tried to marry him off to force him to stay, Rikidōzan was ambitious and ran away from home to Japan.[37] At that time, he adopted the name of Mitsuhiro Momota, taking the family name of the Japanese farmer who gave him shelter in Nagasaki. However, after ten years of pursuing a sumo career he decided to leave sumo, partly because of the discrimination he faced for being of Korean origin:

> He endured the brutal dawn to dusk regime of a sumo trainee, which included the practice-ring beatings with a bamboo cane to correct bad form and the unpleasant requirement of ministering to the needs of the senior wrestlers in the group bath and toilet. He also bore the occasional whispered taunts of "garlic breath" a patronizing reference to the Korean preference for hot, spicy food, from supervisors who knew of his background.[38]

This aspect of his youthful years is well depicted in the movie through the first scenes that show him being beaten by his sumo colleagues. It is significant, because it shows the audience the struggle of a Korean to succeed in a sport which was not just dominated by Japanese, but also regarded as the national sport and a symbol of the Japanese nation itself. As a Korean, he lost hope of rising to the grade of Yokozuna, the top rank among sumo players. After abandoning his sumo career, at some point he had a fight with an American who would become his friend and introduce him to pro wrestling, a discipline in which he became a pioneer in Japan. He spent some time in the United States training himself as pro-wrestler before returning to Japan.

It is important to emphasize the historical context of the time. Only a few years before Rikidōzan started pro-wrestling, Japan had suffered the humiliation of defeat and American occupation at the end of the Second World War. At the same time, the 1950s were a decade in which televisions started to appear in Japanese homes. In this context, Rikidōzan became a Japanese hero and, ironically, a symbol of Japanese masculinity and national pride.[39] His role in the ring was of a redemptive nature, because many times he would fight and win against oversized western wrestlers who represented the United States and were depicted as treacherous. Moreover Rikidōzan's signature moves were his famous karate chops. Pro-wrestling matches are more a sort of spectacle than real combat and

Rikidōzan using his signature movement.
Source: http://blog.daum.net/css53/1504

Rikidōzan mastered the art of playing with the dramatic momentum. He would pretend to be losing against an opponent, only to finally reverse the situation using his karate chops.

Interestingly, while a considerable portion of his audience in Japan was unaware of Rikidōzan's Korean origin, in the Korean peninsula he was perceived as a genuinely Korean hero. Rikidōzan was sent on a tour in 1963 to Seoul in an effort to improve relations between the two countries and he was received as a Korean.[40] He also had ties with North Korea, where he had a daughter, and he would be featured in some of their comics as a national hero who moved to Japan, because he was the victim of an alleged blackmail by Japanese policemen.[41] In 1995, as part of the celebration of the 50th anniversary of Japan's defeat in World War II, North Korea published Rikidōzan's biography entitled *I am Korean*, which was translated into English and sold in Pyongyang International Airport's departure lounge along with a bottle of liquor for foreign consumption called the "Rikidōzan Drink."[42] Due to his North Korean origin, his figure was used for propagandistic purposes, and the obsession regarding his personage led North Korean leader Kim Il-sung to build a tomb for him even though he was buried in Japan. However, this notion of Rikidōzan as a Korean ethnic hero is challenged in North Korean writer Kwang Kwi-mi's short story "A tale of music." In the story, the main character, a trumpeter, feels disappointed after meeting the fighter and tells his brother "I thought he was Korean. But he was just another Japanese."[43] Despite fighting in Japan, Rikidōzan did not talk openly about his Korean roots, yet he was still regarded as a hero in both Koreas and was well received on the peninsula. At the time, he became a historical figure whose memory has been instrumentalized and contested by three countries. Due to his rise in popularity, Rikidōzan had to hide his Korean origin to avoid losing his followers and income. His connection with his Korean roots is depicted in the movie through his conversations with Myŏngil, a fellow Korean friend who owns a barbecue restaurant in Japan. His friend tells him that he has signed the repatriation papers to North Korea and suggests Rikidōzan confess his ethnic background. As pointed out by Hwang, here the movie refers to the historical moment in which more than 700,000 Zainichi Koreans[44] emigrated to North Korea from Japan between 1959 and 1961.[45] The conflict between his identity and his career reaches its peak in a significant scene of the movie when he answers to Myŏngil:

> What did Korea do for me? Surely if I had stayed at home, I would have died as cannon fodder. My only choice would have been whether the bullet that would blow up my head was American, Russian, or something like that. Perhaps, I wouldn't even have that choice. Japan, Korea? What difference does it make? I am Rikidōzan and I belong to the world.[46]

The similarity to the scene mentioned above in *Blue Swallow* is striking. Once again, here it is possible to find a question that has been denied in the mainstream narratives of movies dealing with the colonial past: "What did the nation do for me?" It is a thorny question for a movie as Korean modern nationalism emerged mainly in opposition to Japanese rule and its strong development is related to a traumatic period during which the Japanese tried to erase the Korean identity through assimilation policies. The parallel between the two main characters' dilemmas is clear, but there are significant differences as well. For example, as Rikidōzan lived into the 1960s, movie producers make a reference to the Korean War (1950–1953). As Yunmi Hwang suggests, the fact that Rikidōzan is resistant to the idea of revealing his ethnic origin and even wants to erase his association with his homeland is related to how South Korean producers carefully treated his relationship with the North, since a different scene could have been seen as an implicit endorsement of the North Korean state.[47] Conveniently for the movie narrative and as pointed out by Andreas Niehaus, "Rikidōzan has gone from being quintessentially Japanese, to a North Korean resident of Japan, a North Korean, a South Korean and now he finally makes his way back to Japan, this time as a man of the world, a model for a new Japan."[48] This notion of Rikidōzan transcending nationality and becoming a citizen of the world seeks to avoid the potential conflict about his true origins. When the movie was released in Japan, Sony Pictures had a (no longer available) website that provided information about Rikidōzan's life, where he was presented as a model for contemporary Japanese: "He transcended nationality and became a citizen of the world. His life gives hope and courage to us, who live as Japanese."[49] The Japanese version also included a disclaimer stating that it was not historically accurate.

Emphasizing Rikidōzan as an international figure was a strategy of instrumentalizing his memory to appeal to both audiences in Korea and Japan, even though the movie did not perform well in the box offices. At the same time, perhaps unintentionally, as it happened with *Blue Swallow*, this specific powerful scene offers the audience a more human approach to the colonial past where the suffering of the nation remains on a secondary level and the viewers are shown the struggles of two Koreans to succeed in their careers in a discriminating and often hostile environment. It raises the question whether characters such as Pak Kyŏng-wŏn or Kim Sin-rak (Rikidōzan) did or did not have the right of pursuing their careers instead of going into exile and becoming independence fighters. It also reminds us that most Koreans at that time had to carry on with their lives under an oppressive and discriminating system imposed by the colonizers. Thus, the usual narrative of freedom fighters versus Japanese is not present, but the suffering experienced by both characters as victims of an unfair system is

represented in both movies. There is little doubt that both Pak and Kim lived uncommon and exceptional lives during a traumatic historical moment. Both movies portray them as ambitious characters who put great effort in pursuing their careers despite the political context. In that sense, while Pak Kyŏng-wŏn cannot escape the ghost of collaboration, Kim Sin-rak's portrayal did not raise the same controversies, perhaps due to the fact that both his fame and career developed during the postwar period. However, as already mentioned, the movie was a failure from the economic point of view. In her research, Hwang quotes different Japanese reviews published at the time of its release that provide valuable hints about why the movie had such a poor reception in Japan. Among others, Rikidōzan's portrayal was perceived as "serious and tragic" and a Japanese website stated that the film "shatters the glorious image of a hero of our time" and instead presents a man "filled with a deep sadness for not having a home or a place to return."[50]

Conclusions

In the era of mass media and globalization the potential of cinema to influence popular understandings of the past is significant. Moreover, as argued by Alison Lansberg, cinema as one of the new technologies of mass consumption that can create a shared "prosthetic memory."[51] The two biopics—*Blue Swallow* and *Rikidōzan*—cannot be interpreted as mere recollections of the lives of two remarkable figures, but rather as products that use specific strategies to send a message to their audience.

Once individual and communication memories fade away, our societies are left with collective memory. This is a dynamic kind of memory constantly being reshaped. In that sense, the two biopics differ from other movies set in the same historical period in their challenge to the predominant nationalist narrative. By stepping away from nationalistic portrayals of the period, they approach the audience with a more personal and human dimension of what occupation meant for Korean individuals rather than entering the field of independence struggle. Their value resides primarily in that they do not try to define historical figures in binary terms within a nationalist history of heroes and traitors.

However, regarding the concept of memory, it is essential to emphasize that these movies do not reproduce "historical truth." Even though they can be categorized as biopics and not biofantasies for their fairly accurate representation of historical facts, on the field of emotions they become entirely products of their directors, their particular cosmovision, and the message they intend to send the audience.

As is often the case in such experiments that take a step away from the mainstream discourse, both movies had a very limited impact on audiences, since they performed poorly in the box office, despite their considerable budgets. In the case of *Blue Swallow*, according to the Internet Movie Data Base (IMDB) it was displayed on 164 screens with a profit of $2,711,016 and was watched by 496,061 viewers.[52] However, according to the IMDB, its estimated budget was 8,000,000,000₩, which far exceeded its profits. On the other hand, *Rikidōzan* was shown on 223 screens with a profit of $5,656,543 and a total of 1,018,382 admissions, which again, is far from its eight-million-dollar estimated budget. These numbers may have prevented other directors from pursuing similar endeavors in recent years. While there were several factors in these performances that escape the scope of this analysis, it is possible to conclude that their representations of the historical characters did not satisfy the audiences. In the case of *Blue Swallow*, it may be related to how its main characters became involved in the collaboration controversies even before the movie was released. As for *Rikidōzan*, the irony of a Japanese postwar hero who turned out to be ethnic Korean could attract neither the attention of the nostalgic followers of his wrestling shows nor the younger generations.

If we take into consideration the South Korean audience, it is also important to note that both movies present an extensive use of Japanese language in their dialogues, which could have alienated potential viewers and led to a loss of interest. In the case of *Rikidōzan*, it seems that the double strategy of trying to attract his fans in Japan by producing the movie almost entirely in Japanese and, at the same time, trying to attract a South Korean audience by introducing elements about his Korean origins—both these strategies ultimately failed.

Despite their box office failures, these two movies are remarkable for contesting the space of colonial reinterpretation held by the predominant nationalist discourse that represents the period as a dichotomy of good versus evil or Koreans versus Japanese. They offer the audience a glimpse of two Koreans struggling for their individual freedom, Pak looking for it in the skies and Kim fighting for it in the ring. They dealt with their Korean identity in different ways, Pak accepting it and Kim hiding his roots from his public. In that sense they remind the viewer of the Zainichi portrayed by Kim Saryang in his novella "Into the Light."

Both representations put forward interesting questions related to nationalism: Are they to blame as traitors, because they are following their dreams or careers instead of fighting for the nation's freedom? In the interest of putting forward this question, movie makers instrumentalize the memory of both historical figures imbuing them with their views. As a positive outcome, in my view, both movies

are providing to the audience important questions to reflect on that can poten-
tially break the dichotomy of good versus evil that prevails in the perception of
this period. However, it is also important to note that any reconstruction of the
lives of the historical figures will be destined to become just one reconstruction
among the infinite possibilities of remembering them. From my perspective, this
was a risky move within a mainstream trend that demands national heroes in
movies set during colonial times. Even if the audience could have understood
the personal reasons of both characters, their troubled relationships with their
national identity prevent them from becoming the kind of heroes who would
have drawn a greater degree of sympathy. Perhaps this is yet another reason for
their failure in the box office, together with the fact that South Korean society is
still in the process of settling the traumas of the colonial past and coming to terms
with its heritage.

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Challenging the "Hierarchy of Nationhood": Diasporic Entitlement and the Case of Korean Chinese (Chosŏnjok) in South Korea[1]

TIMOTHY C. LIM   California State University, Los Angeles[2]
CHANGZOO SONG   University of Auckland[3]

Abstract

With about 7.5 million people, the Korean diaspora is concentrated in China, Japan, North America, and the former Soviet Union. Since the 1990s, many ethnic Koreans have been "returning" to South Korea, their putative ethnic homeland. Significantly, their treatment by the state has been unequal: On issues of residency and employment rights, ethnic Koreans from China (Chosŏnjok) and the former Soviet Union were relegated to second-class status compared to those from North America. This inequality is encapsulated in the phrase, used by a number of scholars, the "hierarchy of nationhood." Surprisingly, perhaps, the Chosŏnjok community challenged this unequal treatment by asserting rights based on colonial victimhood, ethnic sameness, and cultural authenticity. While such expressions of *entitlement* are not unusual among marginalized diasporic groups, the Chosŏnjok achieved something remarkable, namely, they succeeded in gaining political and economic rights initially denied by the Korean state. Simply put, they successfully challenged the hierarchy of nationhood. Using a discursive institutional framework, we endeavor to explain how and why entitlement claims by the Chosŏnjok were effective. More specifically, we argue that the struggle by Chosŏnjok to overturn the hierarchy of nationhood had little to nothing to do with a coercive, dyadic power struggle against the Korean state, but was instead

a fundamentally discursive struggle, which itself is a product or reflection of discursive agency, both on the part of Chosŏnjok but also, crucially, on the part of their key allies—religious leaders and civic organizations—in South Korea.

Keywords: Chosŏnjok (Korean Chinese); hierarchical nationhood; discursive institutionalism; ethnonational entitlement; diaspora politics

Introduction

The seven-and-half million-strong Korean diaspora is concentrated in China, North America, Japan, and the former Soviet Union. Since the late-1980s, many ethnic Koreans have been "returning" to South Korea, their putative ethnic homeland. Significantly, the treatment of the Korean diaspora based on where they are from, by the South Korean state, has not been equal to all. Particularly on issues of residency and employment rights, ethnic Koreans from China and the former Soviet Union were, for some time, relegated to second-class status, from a legal-institutional perspective, compared to those from North America. This inequality is encapsulated in the phrase, used by a number of scholars, the "hierarchy of nationhood," which we examine in more detail below. Surprisingly, perhaps, the Chosŏnjok (조선족) or Korean-Chinese community (for the remainder of this paper, we will use both terms interchangeably) challenged the unequal treatment imposed on them by the South Korean state; they did so by asserting rights based on ethnic sameness, their struggle for Korean independence, colonial victimhood, and cultural authenticity. While such expressions of *entitlement* are not unusual among marginalized diasporic groups, the Korean-Chinese community achieved something remarkable, namely, they succeeded in gaining employment, residency, and political rights initially denied to them by the South Korean state. Indeed, *in practical terms* (albeit not necessarily in principle), they have effectively overturned the "hierarchy of nationhood." That is, while the Chosŏnjok have not quite achieved legal-institutional parity with their diasporic brethren, they now dominate a privileged visa category—i.e., Overseas Koreans status—from which they were once thoroughly and intentionally excluded. Indeed, at least some parts of the Chosŏnjok community have declared "victory" in their struggle for equal treatment. Consider, on this point, the view of the *Tongbuk-A Shinmun* (동북아신문), a leading voice of the Korean-Chinese community in South Korea. In an editorial in September 2019, Kang Sŏng-bong wrote, "the discriminatory elements of the treatment of Korean Chinese and CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] Koreans has disappeared."[4]

On the surface, these changes are very hard to explain. After all, Korean Chinese were, at the time (beginning in the 1990s), foreign nationals: they were citizens of China. Moreover, nearly all were born in China and seldom had been outside the borders of their own region, still less traveled to South Korea. Nor did their arrival in South Korea go smoothly; in important ways, their presence was barely tolerated and often fraught. While the situation has improved over the decades, Korean Chinese still suffer from societal discrimination and are seen, by many mainstream South Koreans, as "poor cousins," interlopers, and potential threats. The negative, stereotyped image of Korean Chinese was highlighted in the 2017 movie, *Midnight Runners* (*Ch'ŏngnyŏn Kyŏngch'al* 청년경찰), which depicted Chosŏnjok, critics from the community charged, as "poor, vicious criminals" whose control of Taerim-dong, a district in Seoul with a large Korean-Chinese population, as "a dangerous area where even police have lost control."[5] Their treatment by mainstream society is neatly and bluntly summed up by a 67-year old Korean Chinese who stated, in 2018, "South Koreans treat us like foreigners. Worse, they treat us like dogs!"[6]

Clearly, in 2021, tensions remain between the Korean-Chinese community and mainstream South Korean society. Yet, while these tensions are important, the focus of our paper is on the legal-institutional process that initially relegated the Chosŏnjok community to the bottom (or near-bottom) of the hierarchy of nationhood but was then effectively challenged "from below." More specifically, our focus is on the struggle by the community to reshape that process in a manner that reflects its most pressing concerns. Understanding how a disadvantaged and seemingly powerless community could wage an effective struggle—particularly against a powerful state—requires a somewhat unconventional, although certainly not novel, framework of analysis. Our argument revolves around just such a framework, which has been dubbed discursive institutionalism.[7] Although we will discuss core elements of our approach as we proceed, we understand the need for some preliminary discussion at the outset. Thus, to begin, and most generally, we put ideas and discourse—the latter of which can be simply defined as the "exchange of ideas"[8]—at the center of analysis. We argue that ideas and discourse are not only consequential but also causal, which is to say they are "irreducible causes of political action."[9]

While there is nothing theoretically groundbreaking here, it is a necessary corrective in the context of research on politics and policy in South Korea, which has long had a strong state-centric bias. The popularity of the state-centric paradigm, to a large degree, reflects the legacy and continuing influence of the literature on the developmental state in East Asia generally and in South Korea specifically. This literature, in broad terms, portrays the state as a largely unitary

actor, insulated from social forces, doggedly pursuing its own developmental goals and interests, the latter of which are centered on maximizing economic growth and technological advancement. Importantly, state-centric accounts are not limited to industrial or strictly economic policy but have also been applied to the immigration and nationality regimes[10] and to multiculturalism and diaspora policy.[11] Indeed, underlying the "hierarchy of nationhood" argument is the assumption that "naked" power relations determine the state's unequal treatment of different communities of ethnic Koreans. In this perspective, those with economic power (e.g., Korean Americans) are given greater privileges in return for the material benefits they will presumably bring to the South Korean economy; those with little to no economic power (e.g., Chosŏnjok), by contrast, must simply accept their position at the bottom of the hierarchy; they take what they are given and nothing more.[12]

Our approach does not dismiss the significance of state power and interests, but we argue that the process leading to institutional change should not be understood, as is often but usually tacitly the case, as a dyadic power struggle or as a struggle between opposing forces, where one side must literally "overpower" the other side either to prevent change or bring about change. In cases where the power differential is not overly wide, the two sides are presumed to negotiate and compromise. As we will discuss, the struggle by Chosŏnjok to overturn the hierarchy of nationhood had little or nothing to do with a coercive, dyadic power struggle, but was instead a fundamentally discursive struggle, which itself is a product or reflection of discursive agency. Discursive agency—another key element of our argument—refers to the capacity of actors, to put it very simply, to accept or reject ideas and to persuade others to do the same (and vice versa). In this respect, actors or "discursive agents" (i.e., real, thinking and speaking people whose ideas and discourse directly shape, reproduce, or reshape institutions) are able to "consciously chang[e] … their institutions—for better or for worse—through deliberation, contestation, as well as consensus-building around ideas."[13] While our approach is micro-foundational, we should add, we understand that people are not free-floating entities who can do anything and everything they want at any time; they are, instead, connected to or embedded in existing institutional arrangements and relationships of social power that both constrain and enable their (discursive) agency. In post-authoritarian South Korea, democratic institutions, including an independent judiciary, and the character of state-society relations have played decisive roles. It is important to understand, though, that democratic institutions are also, ultimately, a product of shared ideas and discourse.

With the foregoing in mind, our paper has three parts. First, we provide a brief descriptive overview of the initial stage of immigration by the Chosŏnjok

to South Korea. Second, we describe the origins and character of the Korean-Chinese entitlement claims and also address the question, "Do entitlement claims reflect an integral element of Chosŏnjok identity or are they simply rhetorical and strategic tools?" Our answer, at the most general level, is simple: the entitlement claims made by Korean Chinese cannot be reduced to a binary, either-or calculation. There are instrumental elements, but there are also deeply held affective elements integral to their identity as a people. At the same time, there are crucial processual and contextual dimensions (e.g., Cold War political dynamics; China's ethnic minorities policy; South Korea's legal-institutional treatment of the Korean diaspora), that shape both the externally and self-defined, as well as "strategic" or instrumental conceptions, of identity. Third, we explain how and why entitlement claims by the Korean Chinese have been effective in bringing about significant institutional change in South Korea. Using the discursive institutional framework just discussed, we argue that the ethno-racial foundations of South Korea's multifaceted nation-building discourse has created a particularly receptive institutional environment for the Korean-Chinese entitlement claims of membership in the South Korean nation-state. A receptive environment, however, is not enough. In this regard, our framework also highlights the centrality of discursive agency, both on the part of Korean Chinese but also, crucially, on the part of their key allies—religious leaders and civic organizations—in South Korea.

Chosŏnjok Immigration to South Korea in the 1990s

The details of the Chosŏnjok arrival in South Korea have been thoroughly examined elsewhere, so we will only provide a barebones sketch here.[14] This said, the ramp up in "ethnic return migration" was clearly connected to the winding down and subsequent end of the Cold War and South Korea's effort to develop stronger relations with North Korea, which entailed building ties with China and the Soviet Union based on South Korea's *Nordpolitik* policy.[15] A by-product of this policy was an opening up of travel between South Korea and China, in particular. While the opening of once-closed borders was obviously a necessary step for increased cross-border migration between the two countries, an equally and likely more important factor was rising demand within South Korea primarily for low-wage, non-professional labor combined with limited job opportunities for Chosŏnjok in China. There was, it is important to add, also an affective desire by many Chosŏnjok to return to their ethnic homeland, an opportunity that had been completely denied to them for their entire lives. The process of return migration began in the late-1980s and continued to increase over the years. From 1991 to 2000, the number of Chosŏnjok immigrants to South Korea went from around

18,000 to almost 78,000, with the large majority—even those with strong educational backgrounds (Chosŏnjok have the highest levels of educational achievement among all groups in China)[16]—engaged in labor either as undocumented workers or as low-paid "industrial trainees."[17] Notwithstanding their status as irregular workers stuck in "difficult, dirty, and dangerous" manual labor jobs (dubbed "3-D jobs"), the appeal of working in South Korea was unmistakable. As Song puts it, "The relative economic backwardness in peripheral north-east China, where Chosŏnjok are concentrated, pushed them to seek employment opportunities in South Korea, where wages were substantially higher …"[18]

Importantly, in the early stages of Chosŏnjok migration to South Korea, there was a high expectation of mutual kinship on both sides. In welcoming a group of Chosŏnjok writers, for example, one South Korean author declared, "This [South Korea] is your homeland, which you should have been living in as owners together with us … [indeed] you are still owners of this land."[19] Unfortunately, the high expectation of mutual kinship was quickly dashed. Pervasive mistreatment and abuse at the hands of South Korean employers caused a deep sense of humiliation among many Korean Chinese.[20] The abuse was so bad that, at one point in 1996, the South Korean government produced a booklet that, among other things, had to explicitly advise employers not to beat their workers.[21] This sense of humiliation, Hyejin Kim notes, was punctuated by a brutal incident onboard a South Korean fishing ship, the Pescamar, in which six Chosŏnjok immigrants—after enduring "cruel discrimination" and physical harassment—murdered seven South Korean and three Indonesian seamen.[22] Regardless of the heinous nature of the crime, many Korean Chinese laid the blame primarily on the South Korean government, which, they argued, instituted unfair and inhumane policies that created the conditions that bred fratricidal violence.

The upshot is this: the first decade plus of significant migration to South Korea by Korean Chinese did not, in general, produce good feelings, trust, and kinship; if anything, it did just the opposite. Even without physical abuse and workplace violence, serious tension and conflict were bound to develop. After all, the (institutional) relegation of the vast majority of Korean Chinese not only to 3-D jobs, but also to "illegal foreign worker" status in their putative homeland, embedded a highly exploitative and unequal relationship. It unequivocally demonstrated that, irrespective of "shared blood" and cultural ties, Chosŏnjok were, in the eyes of the South Korean state (and society), merely a source of cheap and disposable labor—not long-lost kin who were entitled to warm and welcoming treatment. The predictable backlash by Korean Chinese to their situation provoked even harder pushback by South Koreans. One useful example of this is provided by Kim Dae-joong, the editor-in-chief (in the 1990s) of South Korea's influential, and

strongly conservative, *Chosun Ilbo* (조선일보). In an editorial, Kim wrote that he once advocated accepting every Chosŏnjok and paying them the same as South Korean workers, but then changed his mind. The reason, according to Kim, was that South Koreans were "getting slapped in the face [by Korean Chinese] even though we're helping them;" he also asserted that they were "backstabbing, dangerous, and completely untrustworthy."[23]

In spite of the development of ill will, on both sides, as we will examine in depth in a subsequent section, Korean Chinese were ultimately able to bring about major improvements to their legal-institutional treatment and status within South Korea. This did not happen "naturally" or without a "fight." Before getting to details of this struggle, though, it is important to address the question of Chosŏnjok identity.

The Cultivation of a Korean Ethno-national Identity in China

The story of Chosŏnjok identity is complicated. It is very clear, though, that Koreans in China, over multiple generations, cultivated a strong and resilient ethnocultural identity based not only on blood but also on national sacrifice—as heroic anti-Japanese fighters and as victims of oppression—and on cultural purity. This immediately suggests that Chosŏnjok identity is not merely a strategic tool but is instead a deeply rooted national and historical identity that has persisted over several tumultuous periods, including Japan's imperial expansion, the internecine civil war in China, the Cultural Revolution, and the Cold War. China's ascent to a global capitalist power marks another tumultuous period, but one that has, in an important respect, tended to weaken Chosŏnjok identity, especially in more recent years among the younger generation.

For the second and third generation Korean Chinese (mostly born from the 1930s to the 1980s), the sense of Chosŏnjok identity—as opposed to a generic Korean identity—was formed and facilitated by a variety of factors and circumstances. One particularly important factor, in the post-colonial era, was the relative autonomy and space, both physical and cultural, the Chosŏnjok community enjoyed after the establishment of the People's Republic of China (PRC). The physical and cultural space the Chosŏnjok experienced was largely the product, following the establishment of the PRC, of an ideological commitment to self-determination of ethnic minority rights. This led to the early establishment of autonomous regions.[24] In these "autonomous regions," China's officially recognized minority groups could take responsibility for local self-government and administration, using their own languages and people.[25] While China's treatment of the country's many ethnic minority groups has shifted over the decades—the Cultural Revolution

(1966–1976) was a particularly dangerous time for national minorities—the idea and practice of ethnic regional autonomy has remained a fairly consistent feature of Chinese politics. As Barry Sautman notes, however, "[e]thnic regional autonomy is mainly cultural."[26]

For the purposes of our argument, this cultural autonomy is key as it provided the framework for the Chosŏnjok to voluntarily maintain and develop a distinct ethnocultural identity even within the confines of an illiberal authoritarian political system dominated by a different ethnicity, namely, Han (漢) Chinese. Thus, until the early 1990s, most Chosŏnjok were able to live their lives largely isolated from Han Chinese society. As Choi writes, they resided in "Chosŏnjok villages in northeast China … [and] communicated using the Korean language." Moreover, Choi continues, "they maintained their cultural traditions, distinguishing them from those of the Chinese."[27] Of particular note was the fact that, again until the 1990s, most Korean Chinese were educated in ethnic Korean schools. According to one source, about 85 percent of all Korean-Chinese students attended Korean schools in 1990. That same year, the number of Korean schools in the Yanbian Autonomous Prefecture was 1,286 (1,106 elementary, 155 middle, and 25 high schools).[28] Korean Chinese also established, in 1949, one of the first universities located in an ethnic minority region within China, Yanbian (연변 Yŏnbyŏn) University. From its establishment, the university's primary mission has been educating ethnic Koreans in the region and, by all accounts, it achieved its goal with over 100,000 graduates by 2009.[29]

Korean schools, not surprisingly, played a key role in developing and culti-vating a Korean identity among the Chosŏnjok. A big part of this was simply because the primary language of instruction was Korean. As Choi puts it, "In speaking their language [in schools], Chosŏnjok effectively preserved their own identity, culture, and tradition in the middle of an assimilative Han culture."[30] Writing two decades earlier, another scholar, Nam Il Sung, was even more assertive: "The Korean language itself is the very content of national culture."[31] More generally, Park notes, that given the heavy concentration of Chosŏnjok in Korean schools, the "schools naturally played an important role in maintaining a sense of Chosŏnjok ethnicity."[32] In this regard, there were also conscious efforts to instill a strong ethnocultural identity among students. Children were taught, for example, the history of their people's long struggle against the Japanese—a history that has also been memorialized in some 300 monuments (of anti-Japanese fighters), spread throughout the Yanbian region. In this history, patriotism toward their homeland of Korea was emphasized.

Outside of the educational system, Korean Chinese also devoted considerable effort to maintaining their identity through the publication of Korean-language

newspapers and magazines. In 2000, there were at least 12 different Chosŏnjok newspapers and 21 magazines published in the Korean language.[33] Even in 2020, it is not difficult to find articles that focus on the colonial period and especially on the suffering endured by the Chosŏnjok. An article from the *Yŏnbyŏn Ilbo* (연변일보) on 13 June 2020 is representative. Part of a long-running series called "Heroes of Our Nation," the article discusses the plight of a Chosŏnjok village in 1934, which was the object of "the enemy's [i.e., Japanese] brutal subjugation ... [by] beasts with human skin [who] rushed daily to murder local people, burn homes, and steal grain." The article—one of 88 thus far (as of July 2020)—also recounts the resilience of the Chosŏnjok villagers who were willing to fight the Japanese under desperate conditions.[34]

"The Most Korean of Them All"

While Chosŏnjok identity has deep historical roots that necessarily connect to the Korean ethnic homeland, in more recent years Korean Chinese have made a concerted effort to distinguish themselves from South Koreans as *purer* Koreans. In other words, many Chosŏnjok claim that, over successive generations, while they have maintained the purity of Korean cultural traditions, language, and racial identity, South Koreans have "contaminated" the essence of Koreanness, in part, by adopting too much from the United States and other western countries. This is evident, for instance, in critiques of South Korea's tendency to incorporate loan words from western societies. After visiting South Korea, Ri Seon-hi, a Chosŏnjok author wrote, "I saw a signboard with the word, "Sŭt'aendŭba" [스탠드바 stand bar], which made me feel upset ... I felt sorry to see such a sign board in this homogenous country." While seemingly trivial, the use of English loanwords (written in Korean script), left a deep impression on the writer; as she put it, "my heart ached badly." The reason was clear, namely, the use of loanwords meant to the author that her South Korean kin were "losing their cultural heritage" and their "cultural purity."[35] The sense of "shock"—expressed by Ri—and disdain has been a recurring theme in Chosŏnjok literature.

More generally, Chosŏnjok have taken great pride in maintaining their Korean identity in the face of significant obstacles. Kim Gwan-ung, a Korean literature professor at Yanbian University, writes, "In such a gigantic country as China ... we Chosŏnjok are really tiny. Nevertheless, we have managed to keep our identity and the uniqueness of our ethnic culture for over 150 years, which is a miracle."[36] In a similar vein, Kim Chong-guk, the director of the Yanbian Social Science Institute, asserts that the Yanbian Chosŏnjok are the envy of other Korean Chinese, South Koreans, and ethnic Koreans from around the world because of how "we have

kept our nation's traditions and customs so perfectly."[37] In essence, Kim is claiming that the Chosŏnjok are the most Korean of all Koreans. The fact that these and other similar claims first began to appear in the early 1990s, during the first years of Chosŏnjok migration to South Korea, is no accident. In this regard, they contain a strong element of defensiveness, since the early interactions between Chosŏnjok and South Koreans, as we noted earlier, were often fraught due, in part, to overly optimistic expectations of ethnic kinship, which was juxtaposed against the often harsh (mis)treatment of Korean-Chinese migrants who, to repeat, were mostly delegated to low-wage, 3-D jobs in South Korea. The tense relationship between Chosŏnjok and South Koreans was also due to the legal-institutional treatment of Korean Chinese, particularly after 1999 with the establishment of the Act on Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (hereafter, the Overseas Koreans Act or OKA). We will return to this point very shortly.

It was at that point, though, that the line between Chosŏnjok identity as a deeply rooted national and historical identity and Chosŏnjok identity as a strategic tool became blurrier. On the one hand, there can be little doubt, given the long history of maintaining a distinct ethnocultural identity within the confines of a nation-state dominated by Han Chinese, that it has been integral to defining who they are as a people. On the other hand, ever since Chosŏnjok began migrating to South Korea in large numbers, the preservation of an ethnocultural identity per se has (arguably) become less important, while the ability to establish an identity that undercuts the hierarchal assumptions built into South Korea's unequal treatment of the different parts of the Korean diaspora has become more important. In this regard, the (tacit) claim to be the "most Korean of them all," almost surely has a strategic element. To wit, those who make the claim on behalf of the Chosŏnjok were and are doing so not only to challenge the underpinnings of hierarchical nationhood, but also, and more concretely, to reconfigure that (institutional) framework such that it recognizes the Chosŏnjok as co-equal to other overseas Koreans. Reconfiguring the framework of hierarchical nationhood sounds like a tall order; in fact, it was. Obviously, too, it would take far more than simply asserting that they, the Chosŏnjok, were the "most Korean" and therefore were entitled to equal treatment. It is to this issue that we turn next.

Establishing the Hierarchy of Nationhood: The 1999 Overseas Koreans Act

Until the late 1990s, notwithstanding the unfolding of large-scale migration by Korean Chinese since the beginning of the decade, the South Korean state had more-or-less (from a policy perspective), ignored its diasporic communities. A key

turning point came in 1999, however, when the Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans (hereafter, the Overseas Koreans Act or OKA), was passed. This was a groundbreaking law, as it endowed *some* members of the Korean diaspora—including those who were not born in South Korea or who had never even stepped foot in the country—with de facto dual citizenship.[38] More specifically, the OKA created a new visa category—the F-4 Overseas Koreans visa—that granted eligible "overseas Koreans" a two-year renewable visitor permit and, very importantly, a citizen's registration card that qualified those individuals for national health insurance, the right to property ownership, and the freedom to work and change jobs—*except* for non-professional or manual labor jobs—of their own volition (the latter of which is a very important for migrant workers). The F-4 visa also opened the door to permanent residency and to *de jure* citizenship (originally, it is important to note, naturalization required the renunciation of one's existing citizenship, but in 2010, a new law on dual citizenship was passed). There was, however, a gigantic catch. To wit, ethnic Koreans who emigrated to another country *before* 1948 were excluded. Practically speaking, this meant that all Chosŏnjok (and ethnic Koreans in former Soviet states, also known as *Koryŏ saram* 고려사람) were precluded from benefiting from the OKA; in effect, this not only made them "less Korean" than other ethnic Koreans, but also defined them as non-Korean from a legal-institutional standpoint. After all, the bill expressly included the term "overseas Koreans" and included a specific definition clause delineating, in legal terms, who would be considered (an overseas) *Korean* and who would not. The OKA, in this regard, marked the "official" creation of a hierarchy of nationhood whereby the Chosŏnjok were relegated to the bottom and ethnic Koreans in the US and other wealthy countries ascended to the top.

The exclusion of Chosŏnjok from the OKA was based on several easily identifiable factors, as examined elsewhere.[39] First, the *Republic of Korea* did not exist until 1948. Accordingly, "no Chosŏnjok had ever been a citizen of an entity called the Republic of Korea …;" thus, in the view of some (but certainly not all) government officials, "South Korea owed them nothing."[40] Second, it was clear that there was a concern about a surge of Korean-Chinese immigrants causing instability in South Korea's labor market through sheer force of numbers. Third, and likely most important, despite already having normalized relations with China, the prospect of granting special legal status to more than two million Chinese citizens—essentially "claiming" Korean Chinese as belonging to a transborder Korean nation-state—clearly upset China's leaders and threatened the still-nascent relationship between the two countries. On this last point, it is worth noting that most South Korean news reports at the time, citing statements by South Korean officials, highlighted China's strong objections to giving Chosŏnjok the

right to de facto South Korean citizenship as the most important reason for their exclusion. On the flip side, the primary motivation for the OKA was the desire, by state and business leaders, to tap into the economic potential of well-off ethnic Koreans, especially those living in the United States.[41] They were seen as sources of investment capital (the OKA passed during a time of economic turmoil caused by the 1997 Asian Financial Crisis) and as "global talent" who could contribute directly to South Korea's technological advancement.

The key point is this: the OKA was a sovereign decision reflecting South Korea's "national interests" as defined by policymakers, albeit through a fairly intense inter-bureaucratic process.[42] As a sovereign decision, the notion that it could be directly *and* effectively challenged by a group of ordinary *foreign* citizens is, on the surface, absurd. Yet, this is largely, albeit with important qualifications, what happened. To jump ahead, even before taking effect, three Chosŏnjok (all citizens of China), with crucial help from South Korean individuals and organizations, filed a petition with the Constitutional Court demanding the bill be revised. They argued, most generally, that as descendants of Koreans who waged an anti-Japanese struggle in China on behalf of the Korean nation, it was unacceptable to exclude them and all other Korean Chinese from the benefits of the OKA. In addition, Korean Chinese, along with about 60 South Korean civic organizations, waged a public campaign against the OKA. Whether in the courts or on the streets, the core claim advanced by the Chosŏnjok (and their domestic allies), was that they were entitled to equal treatment in virtue of their Koreanness and despite their actual nationality. Perhaps to the chagrin and surprise of powerful bureaucrats and political leaders, the Chosŏnjok and their domestic allies succeeded in compelling the South Korean state to revise the law to include Chosŏnjok and other excluded ethnic Koreans in the definition clause of the OKA. Clearly, the full story is far more complicated, and we will address some of these complications as we proceed. Before doing so, it is necessary to highlight another equally indisputable point: the Chosŏnjok, even with the aid of South Korean NGOs, plainly lacked the material power (economic or political) to "compel" the sovereign South Korean state to do anything. After all, if they had that type of power, they likely would not have been excluded in the first place.

Theoretical Considerations: The Causal Significance of Ideas and Discourse

The capacity of *materially* powerless actors to induce a sovereign state to alter policies—and even to prompt far-reaching institutional change—raises an obvious question: Where does their power come from? Almost by default, the

answer is equally obvious, namely, from immaterial sources. The most salient "immaterial source," in our analysis (and as we already noted), can be found in ideas and discourse. We recognize that we are saying nothing new here. The assertion that ideas and discourse matter (i.e., have political significance) has become quite common and practically hackneyed in academic analyses. Yet, in a great deal of political analysis focused on policy and broader institutional change, there remains a clear and even overwhelming tendency to valorize material or positional power as key explanatory variables. This has particularly been the case in research on policy and politics in South Korea, which has, as we have already emphasized, tended to be state-centric. There has also been a strong tendency to focus on strictly material interests. In considering the power of Korean Chinese to effectively challenge the South Korean state, however, it is apparent that a materialist, state-centric framework cannot provide a sufficient explanation.

Nevertheless, as we noted in the introduction, state power is important and often decisive. But states are not disembodied Leviathans; instead, they are ultimately composed of individual actors—or to use Schmidt's term, "sentient agents" (i.e., real, thinking people)—who make decisions based on their interests and whose actions help to create and reproduce institutions.[43] Crucially, the interests or preferences of the state's sentient agents are not exogenously given or predetermined, but instead are constructed through an endogenous process in which ideas (and discourse) play the central role. To appreciate the role of sentient agents in determining state policy, consider a recent and generally familiar example: the global spread of the novel corona virus (COVID-19). Despite facing objective conditions that were essentially the same for everyone, some countries responded by doing almost nothing; other countries implemented strict shelter-in-place orders, prohibited cross-border and intra-border travel, shut down all non-essential businesses, required social distancing and masks, etc. (of course, most countries were somewhere in-between). What explains the differences? The (highly stylized) answer is clear: different priorities, different assessments of the risk, different goals, and so on. All of these differences, however, come down to specific ideas held by the key decision makers in each country. To return to the main point: the "endogenous process" we spoke of is, at base, nothing more than what goes on inside people's heads, which may reflect long-term and strongly embedded "institutional thinking"[44] or the interplay of various ideas, whether firmly established (within a society) or brand new, already accepted or not-yet accepted, pre-held (inside an actor's head) or recently learned, and so on.

While what goes on "inside people's heads" is vital, there is also an obvious external element of thinking, namely, discourse. Ideas have to be communicated, debated, interpreted or explained, negotiated, clarified (or obscured). This is

all part of a larger discursive process or struggle, which necessarily involves discursive agency. Discursive agency—to repeat—refers to the capacity of actors, again to put it very simply, to think *and* speak for themselves, which means having the capacity to accept or reject ideas and to persuade others to do the same (and vice versa). In this respect, it is discursive agents who create, sustain, or change institutions. Discursive agency, it is also important to emphasize, does not work from only one side or in only one direction. Thus, while there may be people struggling for change, others will be struggling to keep things the same (or to revert back to some past situation, whether real or imagined). This speaks to the deeply political nature of discursive agency and of institutional change or continuity more generally. Position, interests, and power also matter here. Some actors are in a better position to exercise agency and pursue their interests in virtue of the positions they occupy in society. State actors, in particular, are often able to play the most decisive roles, in large part because of their direct control of the policymaking apparatus and their control over material resources. State actors also have privileged access to mainstream media and, therefore, are able to influence the national conversation more easily and readily than many other actors. But position or positional power is not everything.

"Identity Politics": Challenging the Hierarchy of Nationhood

This brings us back to the central question of this analysis, namely, "How and why were entitlement claims by the Korean Chinese effective in bringing about significant change in South Korea?" As we already stated, it was not merely a matter of making the case that they were entitled to equal treatment based on their Korean identity. It also involved three tightly connected elements. First, the Chosŏnjok needed influential allies in South Korean civil society, which they clearly had. These allies, which included religious leaders and rights-based NGOs, were not only willing to work in close conjunction with members of the Korean-Chinese community but were also willing to play leading roles as discursive agents. Second, since the Chosŏnjok community, even with domestic allies, could not compel the South Korean state to do anything it did not want to do, they needed an authoritative "mechanism of change." This mechanism of change was the South Korean court system, which, it is important to add, also has little material power, but does possess a great deal of discursive and positional power (via its institutional role) within the context of South Korean democracy. The third element relates to the ethno-racial foundations of South Korea's immigration and nationality regimes (the core institutions of ethno-national identity); this element, moreover, links

together all the other elements. As we have seen, the ethno-racial foundations of South Korea's immigration and nationality regimes did not prevent the exclusion of the Chosŏnjok from the OKA (nor did it stop the creation of a hierarchy of nationhood), but it nonetheless provided a crucial and perhaps indispensable ideational and discursive basis for challenging that exclusion.

Reprise: The Discursive Challenge to the OKA

As we already discussed, it did not take long for Korean Chinese to challenge the OKA. The challenge, boiled down to its essence, was simply, "We are Korean and as Koreans, we are entitled to equal treatment." In making this claim, they were partly relying on their history of anti-Japanese struggle, resistance, and loyalty to the Korean nation. It is likely the case, too, that their entitlement claim reflected a deeply held conviction that they were, in their hearts, Korean. While saying that what was "in the hearts" of many Korean Chinese may seem inconsequential and even trivial (from a social scientific standpoint), it should not be dismissed. On this point, it is worth emphasizing that the Koryŏin, who were also excluded from the OKA, did not join the Chosŏnjok. While we cannot make a definitive case here, the reason for the lack of action on the part of Koryŏin likely stems from their weaker identification as Korean. This weaker identification was due to a number of factors, including (1) a history of oppression by the Soviet state, including forced relocation to Central Asia; (2) their general loss of the Korean language; and (3) the relatively small size of their population in South Korea.[45] The upshot is this: for the Chosŏnjok community, their identity as "real Koreans" (in contrast to the Koryŏin) is what motivated them to act in the first place. And, without taking that step, there may never have been a challenge to the OKA and to the hierarchy of nationhood.

In making their entitlement claim, on another level, a number of interrelated legal points were advanced, all of which were summarized by Rev. Seo Kyung-seok (who played a leading role in the process), in an interview with the *Tongbuk-A Shimmun*.[46] The main points were, first, Chosŏnjok never voluntarily relinquished their Korean nationality; instead, they were made citizens of the PRC without their consent. By South Korean law, then, they should have been considered dual nationals in the same way that North Koreans are recognized as citizens of South Korea (albeit with conditions). Second, unlike Koreans in Japan and the US, most Koreans in China did not have an opportunity to return to South Korea after Korean liberation. If they had been able to return, their legal status as South Korean citizens would not have been questioned. In addition, the Chosŏnjok community relied on South Korea's existing nationality law, which is based on

the *jus sanguinis* principle, and, by extension, on the idea and discourse of ethno-nationalism.[47] Specifically, in the argument submitted to the Constitutional Court, the Chosŏnjok complainants asserted that, because Article 2–1(1) of the Nationality Act adopted *jus sanguinis* as the essential basis for Korean nationality, they (and all ethnic Koreans) were, in effect, citizens of South Korea, even if living and born abroad with different nationalities. Thus, the South Korean government had no right to enact legislation that "violates the essential aspect of the right of equality stated in Article 1–1 of the Constitution."[48]

Not surprisingly, the *state's* response to the foregoing legal argument, conveyed through the Ministry of Justice (MOJ), rejected the claim that Chosŏnjok, in virtue of their blood ties (as well as their historical connections to South Korea), had any rights as South Korean citizens. Accordingly, the MOJ argued, the case should be thrown out because the complainants were, simply put, foreigners and, as foreigners, they had no standing to file a constitutional complaint, since the case did not involve a violation of natural or basic rights. The MOJ had a number of backup arguments, too: (1) since the complainants had no evidence they were even "ethnic Koreans who emigrated to a foreign country or their lineal descendants," they had no standing; (2) even if they could prove their Korean ethnicity, giving them a path to citizenship on that basis alone would violate "public international law" prohibiting discrimination based on race or nationality; and (3) as citizens of China, granting the Chosŏnjok special privileges would bring about diplomatic friction. The MOJ also asserted that including Korean Chinese in the OKA would create problems for the national economy by disrupting the domestic labor market.[49]

The Verdict and Its Aftermath

The Constitutional Court rejected all of the MOJ's arguments—i.e., they were unpersuaded—and concluded, in the majority opinion, that there was no legitimate basis to exclude Chosŏnjok (and ethnic Koreans from the former Soviet Union) from the provisions of the OKA. Accordingly, the Court ruled that the "definition clause in the Act" (i.e., the clause that defined which ethnic Koreans were included and which were excluded) was unconstitutional and had to be revised. In other words, the Court accepted (or were persuaded by) the entitlement claims made by Korean Chinese and, in so doing, elevated ethnocultural identity above the "socio-economic and security reasons" cited by the Korean government.[50] The Court set a deadline of 31 December 2003, to complete the revision. As the deadline approached, it seemed evident that the government was not only dragging its feet, but also stepping up efforts to deport Korean-Chinese residents who had

overstayed their visas (as part of a broader effort to crackdown on unauthorized foreign workers). This crackdown, along with the foot dragging, provoked more demonstrations, one of which was the "Korean Nationality Recovery" movement, led by Rev. Seo, mentioned above, of the Seoul Chosŏnjok Church. As part of this movement, in November 2003, about 5,000 Chosŏnjok filed a petition with the MOL claiming a right to recover their Korean nationality, staged a rally in Yŏŭido, and then marched to the Constitutional Court where they submitted another petition (formally filed by Jeong Dahwa, a lawyer, Rev. Seo, and Lee Chul-gu, a Korean Chinese).[51]

While the movement was controversial, it brought renewed attention to the OKA, which helped to underscore the entitlement claims made by Chosŏnjok and their South Korean allies. There were, it is important to add, also other protests led by Chosŏnjok activists, including an 84-day public strike that started on 15 April 2003, in central Seoul.[52] Such activity helped to generate sympathetic responses in mainstream South Korean media. One response in the *Hankyoreh* (a progressive newspaper), while only anecdotal, chastised the government for denying the undeniable "fact" that Chosŏnjok were Korean.[53] Less anecdotally, the *Hankyoreh* writer pointed out that, in the "National Public Opinion Survey on the Revision of the Overseas Koreans Act," 77.4 percent of South Korean respondents agreed that Korean Chinese should be included in the OKA.[54]

Amending the OKA: Victory or Defeat?

Despite the long delay, on 4 March 2004, the OKA was amended by presidential decree to include the following definition of overseas Koreans: "A person prescribed by the Presidential Decree of those who have held the nationality of the Republic of Korea (including Koreans who had emigrated to a foreign country *before* the Government of the Republic of Korea was established) or of their lineal descendants, who obtains the nationality of a foreign country ..." This revised definition was largely what Korean Chinese and their allies in the NGO community had demanded from the get-go. This was not, however, the end of the story. Indeed, a few months before the definition clause was revised, the government amended a related law (the Enforcement Rules of the Immigration Control Act) in a manner that would, in practice, negate the ruling made by the Constitutional Court. Specifically, the amendment required that individuals from "foreign countries with a high number of undocumented migrants" applying for Overseas Koreans (F-4) status submit documents evidencing that they would not work in "low-skilled" positions. This was meant to reinforce a much earlier amendment to the Enforcement Decree of the Immigration Control Act, made

when the OKA was first enacted in 1999, which explicitly prohibited F-4 visa holders from engaging in low-skilled labor.

Importantly, the Constitutional Court ruled that these changes—clearly designed to exclude Chosŏnjok from taking advantage of the OKA—were constitutionally permissible.[55] And, for a period of time, the effort to prevent Korean Chinese from coming to South Korea as "overseas Koreans" was effective: for several years after the 2004 revision, not a single F-4 visa (i.e., the Overseas Koreans visa) was issued to an ethnic Korean from China or the former Soviet Union. Clearly, these exclusionary tactics could not but help to anger Chosŏnjok and their supporters in the NGO community, particularly since there was no other way to legally immigrate to South Korea, at least for the large majority. Thus, they continued to advocate for a more inclusionary policy. One particularly important set of advocates, both of whom opposed Rev. Seo, were also religious leaders: Pastors Kim Hae-seong and Im Gwang-bin. They believed that Chosŏnjok, by and large, only wanted an opportunity to visit and work in South Korea and were not interested in permanent residency or in South Korean citizenship per se. Their restrained position attracted a large number of Chosŏnjok activists.[56] It is worth noting that Pastors Kim and Im advanced their positions *before* the revision of the OKA in March 2004, which meant that it presented, to government officials (who were already planning to skirt the Constitutional Court's ruling), a policy *idea* that could be palatable both to the South Korean state and to the Chosŏnjok community, as well as to the PRC. It is perhaps no coincidence, then, that in 2005, the MOJ introduced a plan for a "Visit and Employment" program that more or less mimicked what the two pastors had proposed.

Two years later, in 2007, the "Visit and Employment" program (H-2 visa) was formally established. In practice, it allowed "poor cousin" ethnic Koreans from China and the former Soviet states to work in South Korea as non-professional *foreign* workers. In its original form, the H-2 visa was not much different from the Employment Permit System (EPS), which had been established a few years earlier (in 2004) for non-professional foreign workers more generally. The EPS (E-9 visa), which has a complicated history in its own right,[57] was designed, in part, to be a strictly temporary labor migration program for non-professional work categories in specified industries (the first of its kind in South Korea). Both the E-9 and H-2 visas set a strict time limit designed to prevent long-term settlement, forbade "family reunification," and limited immigrant workers to certain sectors of the economy. There were, however, several important differences that provided significant privileges to Chosŏnjok that other foreign nationals did not enjoy. One such privilege of the H-2 visa was the freedom given to ethnic Koreans to seek employment on their own and move to different workplaces, which is a freedom

that E-9 workers have been fighting to obtain from more than 15 years.[58] Another privilege was the ability to freely *visit* South Korea (the "visit" part of the "Visit and Employment" program) for extended periods (three years) without having to demonstrate a familial connection. The H-2 program also allowed for a high level of migration: in 2007 and 2008, the first two years of the program, 92,212 and 102,767 H-2 visas were issued respectively.[59] Still, while the H-2 program provided Korean Chinese a somewhat privileged position relative to other foreign immigrants, it codified their institutionally inferior position relative to their "richer cousins" from the US and elsewhere. The hierarchy of nationhood was apparently still very much intact.

Climbing to the Top of Hierarchy?

As we noted, the H-2 program reflected the interests and demands of at least part of the Chosŏnjok community (and their South Korean allies). It also reflected the interests of South Korean officials, who understood that the economy still needed a source of low-wage, temporary labor. The latter interest, however, could have easily been met by expanding the EPS to allow in more foreign workers regardless of ethnicity. The fact that South Korean decision-makers chose to rely on co-ethnics speaks to the underlying belief that a shared blood still shaped, to a (causally) significant extent, their decisions and actions.[60] Be that as it may, as a temporary employment program, the H-2 was successful in attracting, over the span of several years, hundreds of thousands of Korean-Chinese workers. On the surface, then, there appeared to be little reason to dramatically alter the program. Yet, in 2010, the South Korean government did just that by allowing H-2 visa holders to change their visa status to F-4 (overseas Koreans) after fulfilling a number of conditions. The main condition was that, prior to applying for the F-4, the H-2 visa holder was required to work continuously for just one year (later changed to two years) in a specified industry (initially, the approved industries included agriculture, livestock, fisheries, and local manufacturing). Importantly, these were all areas designated for non-professional labor; apparently, one-year of work experience as a non-professional worker magically transformed that individual into a highly skilled one. We say "apparently" and "magically" because the prohibition on F-4 visa holders from engaging in "nonskilled" work or manual labor remained unchanged. This seemingly minor change had huge ramifications: during the first year of the revised rules, the number of F-4 visas issued to Korean Chinese shot up from 542 in the previous year (2009) to 10,113 in 2010, an almost 19-fold increase in one year. Nor was this a one-off: from 2011 to 2018, the cumulative number of F-4 visas issued to Chosŏnjok was 215,156. Since 2010,

moreover, Chosŏnjok have accounted for a low of 56.8 percent of all F-4 visas issued to a high of 78.7 percent.

If access to overseas Koreans' status signifies a group's status in the hierarchy of nationhood, then it appears that Chosŏnjok have climbed to the top. We are being a bit facetious: the issue is not quite so simple. After all, most Korean Chinese still must jump through the "H-2 hoop" to qualify for F-4 status—a hoop that does not apply to most Korean Americans and is, therefore, still discriminatory. Indeed, one commentator, the president of the Migration and Overseas Koreans Policy Institute, argued that the change still fell short of a "naturally" inclusive policy since in attaching F-4 status to the H-2 visa; a fundamentally transactional relationship is created whereby Chosŏnjok are "rewarded" with overseas Koreans status only if they agree to engage in 3-D work.[61] Nonetheless, by sheer numbers alone, it is clear that Korean Chinese have basically taken over a visa program from which they were excluded, not once but twice, by conscious design. To repeat, even after the ruling by the Constitutional Court mandating a change in the OKA, policymakers manipulated immigration rules to make it all-but impossible for Chosŏnjok to take advantage of the amended law in 2004. Yet, only a few years later—and less than a decade after creating the OKA—policymakers ended up refashioning the immigration regime in a manner that mostly reflected the demands and interests of a "powerless" community of foreign citizens who, it is worth emphasizing, also lacked support of the state (i.e., the PRC) to which they formally belonged. Indeed, as we already made clear, the PRC was opposed to their inclusion in the OKA from the beginning. In this view. Chosŏnjok and their allies had to struggle against the expressed interests of two powerful states.

The question remains: "Why did the South Korean government, despite a decade of resistance, suddenly create an open path for large numbers of Chosŏnjok to obtain permanent residency and naturalization (via the F-4 visa)?" Unfortunately, there is no clear-cut answer (or at least one that we could ascertain). It is evident, though, that many in the Chosŏnjok community remained unhappy that, even with the "privileges" they enjoyed through the H-2 visa, they were still largely consigned to the "lower working class" in South Korean society.[62] This meant, in turn, that Chosŏnjok would continue to be treated more as "foreigners"— and as disposable labor—than as true compatriots. Thus, the idea that Korean Chinese, *as Koreans*, were entitled to better treatment did not die or fade away. It remained firmly in the minds of activists and supporters, who continued to advocate for policy change and for broader institutional change. Evidently, South Korean officials were still listening, too. For example, shortly before announcing the change in the H-2 program, in October 2009, MOJ officials visited Yanbian, Yantai, Dalian, and Qingdao in China "to listen to the opinions and complaints"

of Chosŏnjok. While plans for a revision to the F-4 were already in place before the visit, it is nonetheless notable that the reason given for the expansion was not only to ensure that Korean Chinese could more easily live, work, and do business in South Korea, but also "to help them have a relationship with their motherland with the pride of the Korean people."[63]

Conclusion

It is worth thinking about where the struggle for greater inclusion began. To quickly recap, it began with a handful of Korean-Chinese individuals—who occupied the very bottom rung of South Koreas' socioeconomic ladder—demanding that a powerful foreign state change its policy to better reflect their interests. It is hard to imagine a more hopeless situation. Of course, these Korean-Chinese individuals had the support of a segment of South Korea's influential NGO community, but even combined, they had no appreciable material or positional power. Their power, instead, rested almost entirely with the ideas and discourse they espoused, which, crucially, were already part of the discursive landscape within South Korea. To fully grasp the significance of "the ideas and discourse they espoused," it is useful consider a counter-factual: What if nobody from the Korean-Chinese community spoke up? What if South Korean activists, as was the case with many ordinary South Koreans, also thoroughly disdained ethnic Koreans from "less developed countries" and saw them as undeserving of any assistance at all? Would the outcome have been different? Would Overseas Koreans status still be limited exclusively to ethnic Koreans from the richest countries? While we cannot know the answers, it is easy to imagine that, without anyone speaking (engaging in discourse), no case would have been brought to the Constitutional Court and the Court would never have ruled on the constitutionality of excluding Korean Chinese (and Koryŏin) from the OKA. And without that ruling, it is likely that the state would have remained on the same institutional path it set in 1999. It is important, in this regard, not to neglect the discursive agency of individual justices: They could just have easily made a contrary decision—their ideas about national identity, one can argue, had a fundamental and clearly causal institutional impact. In short, without the exercise of discursive agency, the institutional reality for ethnic Koreans today would likely not be what it is.

To be sure, Chosŏnjok continue to suffer from societal discrimination and prejudice and their institutional position is still not entirely coequal with ethnic Koreans from the US and other wealthy economies. Indeed, even today, many ethnic Koreans from China have become so alienated by life in South Korea that they have largely rejected their Korean identity, while, for others, the identification

with their Korean heritage may have already been very weak and abstract to begin with.[64] This does not mean that the legal-institutional changes that have opened the door to greater inclusion for ethnic Koreans regardless of nationality have been for naught or otherwise meaningless. Inclusionary legal-institutional change—as the experiences of ethnic and other minority groups around the world, including and especially in the United States, have clearly demonstrated—is often only the starting point for deeper, albeit not necessarily rapid or inexorably progressive, societal change. In South Korea, by some accounts, societal change has been grindingly slow and even regressive. Still, the broader inclusion of Korean Chinese and Koryŏin in the OKA has demonstrated a crucial point: South Korean national identity is not fixed, but instead is subject to change through a discursive or subjective process. This, in turn, has broader implications for the issue of multiculturalism in South Korea. After all, if South Korean national identity has proven to be subjective and malleable, in principle, it can be extended to any group of people regardless of race or ethnicity.

Notes

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2. Dr. Timothy C. Lim, Department of Political Science, California State University, Los Angeles, tclim@calstatela.edu
3. Dr. Changzoo Song, Korean and Asian Studies, University of Auckland, ch.song@auckland.ac.nz
4. Kang Sŏng-bong, "9.2 chŏngch'aek chŏnhwan i Chungguk tongp'o ege chu nŭn hamŭi," *Tongbuk-A Shinmun*, 5 September, 2019.
5. Jung Min-ho, "Chinese Urge Suspension of 'Midnight Runners'," *Korea Times*, 11 September, 2017, https://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/nation/2017/09/177_236284.html (accessed 10 November 2020).
6. Cited in Eddie Park, "'Too Different to Be Chinese, Not Good Enough to Be Korean'," *Korea Exposé*, 20 September, 2018, https://www.koreaexpose.com/too-different-to-be-chinese -not-good-enough-to-be-korean.
7. Our analysis draws heavily from what Vivien Schmidt has labelled, "discursive institutionalism." Schmidt refers to discursive institutionalism as the fourth "new institutionalism," because it goes beyond the limits of traditional institutional approaches (rational choice, historical, and sociological), in part by adopting a dynamic definition of institutions "as structures and constructs of meaning *internal* to agents whose 'background ideational abilities' enable them to create (and maintain) institutions while their 'foreground discursive abilities' enable them to communicate critically about those institutions, to change (or maintain) them" (emphasis added). Vivien A. Schmidt, "Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth 'New Institutionalism,'" *European Political Science Review* 2.1 (2010), p. 1.
8. Schmidt, "Taking Ideas."

9.   Christina Boswell and James Hampshire, "Ideas and Agency in Immigration Policy: A Discursive Institutionalist Approach," *European Political Science Review* 56 (2017), p. 134.

10. See, for example, Jack Jin Gary Lee and John D. Skrentny, "Korean Multiculturalism in Comparative Perspective," in Multiethnic Korea? Multiculturalism, Migration, and Peoplehood Diversity in Contemporary South *Korea,* edited by John Lie (Berkeley, CA: Institute of East Asian Studies, 2015), pp. 301–29; and Han Kyung-Koo. "The Archaeology of the Ethnically Homogeneous Nation-State and Multiculturalism in Korea (Toward a Multicultural Society?)," *Korea Journal* 47 (2007): 8–31.

11. For relevant research on multiculturalism policy, see Iain Watson, "Multiculturalism in South Korea: A Critical Assessment," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* 40 (2010): 337–46; Ahn Ji-Hyun. "Transforming Korea into a Multicultural Society: Reception of Multiculturalism Discourse and Its Discursive Disposition in Korea," *Asian Ethnicity* 13 (2012): 97–109; and Kim Sookyung, "Soft Talk, Hard Realities: Multiculturalism as the South Korean Government's Decoupled Response to International Migration," *Asian Pacific Migration Journal* 24 (2015): 51–78.

12. Nora Kim provides an example of this type of argument as she focuses on the importance of class-based privilege in determining the relative status of Korean Chinese versus ethnic Koreans from wealthier countries, the latter of whom are typically classified as "global talents or upper-class Koreans." Nora Hui-Jung Kim, "Flexible yet Inflexible: Development of Dual Citizenship in South Korea," *Journal of Korean Studies* 18 (2013), p. 9.

13. Schmidt, "Taking Ideas," p. 12.

14. See Hyejin Kim, "International Ethnic Networks and Intra-Ethnic Conflict: Ethnic Trust and Its Demise among Koreans in China" (PhD diss., Rutgers University, 2006); Dong-Hoon Seol and John D. Skrentny, "Ethnic Return Migration and Hierarchical Nationhood: Korean Chinese Foreign Workers in South Korea," *Ethnicities* 9.2 (2009); Hye-Kyung Lee, "Preference for Co-Ethnic Groups in Korean Immigration Policy: A Case of Ethnic Nationalism?," *Korea Observer* 41.4 (2010); Sohoon Lee and Yi-Chun Chien, "The Making of 'Skilled' Overseas Koreans: Transformation of Visa Policies for Co-Ethnic Migrants in South Korea," *Journal of Ethnic and Migrations* 43.13 (2017).

15. Sanghyun Yoon, "Decision-Making Structure and the Policy Process in South Korea's Nordpolitik," *Journal of Northeast Asian Studies* 14.3 (1995).

16. For further discussion, see Sheena Choi, "Globalization, China's Drive for World-Class Universities (211 Project) and the Challenges of Ethnic Minority Higher Education: The Case of Yanbian University," *Asia Pacific Education Review* 11.2 (2010); and Chae-Jin Lee, *China's Korean Minority: The Politics of Ethnic Education* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986).

17. The "industrial trainee system" (ITS) was established in 1993 (as a major addition to a different program known as the Industrial Technical Training Program). The ITS, however, was not a "trainee" system in practice; instead, it was a side-door mechanism designed to allow small- and medium-sized firms to import tens of thousands of non-professional workers (South Korean immigration law, at the time, prohibited any immigration for the purposes of engaging in "low-skill" labor). For additional discussion, see: Hahn Chin Hee and Choi Young Seok, "The Effect of Temporary Foreign Worker Program in Korea: Overview and Empirical Assessment," Unpublished manuscript (2006); Young-bum Park, "Admission of Foreign Workers as Trainees in Korea," ILO Asian Regional Programme on Governance of Labor Migration—Working Paper No. 9 (2008); and Dong-Hoon Seol and John D. Skrentny, "Joseonjok Migrant Workers' Identity and National Identity in Korea," *Korean Identity: Past and Present Conference* (Stanford University, 18–20 October, 2004).

18. Changzoo Song, "Joseonjok and Goryeo Saram Ethnic Return Migrants in South Korea: Hierarchy among Co-Ethnics and Ethnonational Identity," in *Diasporic Returns to the Ethnic Homeland: The Korean Diaspora in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Takeyuki Tsuda and Changzoo Song (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019), p. 64.

19. Rim Yŏn Rim, *Sŏul param: Chungguk kyop'o chakka 36-in sup'il chip* (Seoul: Pangmul Sŏgwan, 1992), p. 3.
20. Kim, "International Ethnic Networks."
21. Cited in James Lim, "Do Not Beat the Foreign Workers," *Korea Times*, February 16, 1996.
22. Kim, "International Ethnic Networks," 2006. For additional discussion of this incident, see Jeongwon Bourdais Park, *Identity, Policy, and Prosperity: Border Nationality of the Korean Diaspora and Regional Development in Northeast China* (Singapore: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018).
23. Kim Dae-joong. "Ethnic Koreans in China." *Chosun Ilbo*, 7 September, 1996 [reprinted and trans. version in *Korea Focus* 4 (5): 143–145].
24. Sautman points out that the CCP's practice of regional autonomy for ethnic groups dates back to the late-1930s and was codified into Chinese law in 1949. The 1949 law was later superseded by the 1984 Regional Ethnic Autonomy Law, which was amended in 2001. Barry Sautman, "Scaling Back Minority Rights? The Debate About China's Ethnic Policies," *Stanford Journal of International Law* 46 (2010): 51+ (Gale Academic OneFile), https://link.gale.com/apps/doc/A242172907/AONE?u=anon~1ab7ba2e&sid=googleScholar&xid=57c596f6.
25. Colin Mackerras, *China's Ethnic Minorities and Globalisation* (London and New York, NY: Routledge Curzon, 2003).
26. Sautman, "Scaling Back," 2010, p. 51. Importantly, "regional autonomy" has always been subject to strict limitations; in particular, any effort to assert political rights as a separate entity in China (i.e., a separatist movement) is not only prohibited, but also subject to severe sanction or punishment. See Hongyi Lai, "China's Ethnic Policies: Political Dimension and Challenges," *East Asian Policy* 13.2 (2009): 5–13.
27. Woogil Choi, "The Transformation of the Korean Chinese Community: The Case of the Age of Migration in China," *Journal of Contemporary Korean Studies* 3.1–2 (2016): 248.
28. Gilnam Lee, "The Yanbian Chosŏnjok Population Decline and the Crisis of Ethnic Education," *Korean Society of Sociology Conference* (Seoul, South Korea, 2010).
29. Choi, "Globalization."
30. Choi, "The Transformation of the Korean Chinese Community," p. 250.
31. Park, *Identity, Policy, and Prosperity*, p. 80.
32. Park, *Identity, Policy, and Prosperity*, p. 80.
33. Park, *Identity, Policy, and Prosperity*.
34. Yŏnbyŏn Ilbo, "Pak Kil-sŏng ch'ogi hangil hwaltong kwa kŭŭi puin uri minjokŭi mumyŏng yŏngungdŭl," *Yŏnbyŏn Ilbo*, 6 January, 2020, http://www.iybrb.com/ser/content/2020-01/06/51_387209.html.
35. Ri Sŏn-hŭi. "T'ullyŏjŏ kanŭn mosŭp ap'e," in *Sŏul param: Chungguk kyop'o chakka 36-in sup'il chip* (Seoul: Pangmul Sŏgwan, 1992): pp. 60–61.
36. Kim Kwan-ung. "Chungguk Chosŏnjok munhake issŏsŏŭi chŏngch'esŏng munje-e taehan yŏngu," *Inmun Kwahak* 93 (2011), p. 93.
37. Kim Chong-guk. *Segikyoch'e ŭi sigak esŏ pon Chungguk Chosŏnjok* (Yŏnbyŏn: Yŏnbyŏn Inmin Ch'ulpansa, 1999), p. 271.
38. Park Hyun Ok, *The Capitalist Unconscious: From Korean Unification to Transnational Korea* (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2015).
39. For a more detailed discussion, see Timothy C. Lim and Dong-Hoon Seol. "Explaining South Korea's Diaspora Engagement Policies," *Development and Society* 47.4 (2018): 633–62.
40. Seol and Skrentny, "Joseonjok Migrant Workers."
41. Changzoo Song, "Engaging the Diaspora in an Era of Transnationalism," *IZA World of Labor* 64 (2014).
42. Lim and Seol, "Explaining."

43. Vivien A. Schmidt, "Taking Ideas and Discourse Seriously: Explaining Change through Discursive Institutionalism as the Fourth 'New Institutionalism'," *European Political Science Review* 2.1 (2010). Our analysis adopts a constructivist definition of institutions. Following Schmidt (and others), we understand institutions as fundamentally subjective entities that are constituted and reproduced by ideas rather than the other way around, although once established, institutions also impact how and what people think. In this regard, they are "the settings within which 'sentient agents' are the thinking agents who develop ideas for action that convey through discourse." Vivien A. Schmidt, "Speaking of Change: Why Discourse Is Key to the Dynamics of Policy Transformation," *Critical Policy Studies* 5.2 (2011): 106–126. For a similar view, see Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy Is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46 (Spring 1992): 391–425.

44. "Institutional thinking" refers to the norms, priorities, rules, duties, and obligations that are "embedded" within specific organizations (e.g., a government bureaucracy), a profession (e.g., journalism), or an epistemic community such as natural scientists.

45. Changzoo Song, "'Uh … Well, We're Russians': Identity and Resistance to Ethnic Hierarchy among Koryŏ Saram Diasporic Returnees in South Korea," in *Transnational Mobility and Identity in and out of Korea*, edited by Yonson Ahn, 131–145 (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020).

46. *Tongbuk-A Shinmun*. "'Kohyang e torawa sal kwŏlli ch'atki undong e taehayŏ," *Tongbuk-A Shinmun*, 30 March, 2004, https://www.dbanews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=904.

47. For a discussion of the ethnonationalist foundations of South Korea's nationality law, see Lim, "It's Not Just Talk."

48. Constitutional Court (South Korea), "Act on the Immigration and Legal Status of Overseas Koreans Case" (13–2 Kccr 714, 99hun-Ma494, 29 November, 2001).

49. Constitutional Court (South Korea), "Overseas Koreans Case."

50. Constitutional Court (South Korea), "Overseas Koreans Case."

51. Kwang-cheol Lee, "Kukchŏk hoebok ŭl wŏnhanŭn Chungguk tongp'odŭl," *Han'guk Kyŏngje*, 14 November, 2003, https://www.hankyung.com/society/article/2003111465818.

52. Melody Chia-Wen Lu and Hyunjoon Shin, "Ethnicizing, Capitalizing, and Nationalizing: South Korea and the Returning Korean Chinese," in *Return: Nationalizing Transnational Mobility in Asia*, ed. Biao Xiang (Durham, NC: Duke University Press Books, 2013).

53. Cho Il-chun, "Chaeoe tongp'opŏp kaejŏngan 'ch'abyŏl' haesonya chŏngdang hwanya" *Hankyŏre Shinmun* (18 November 2003) http://legacy.www.hani.co.kr/section-001065000/2003/11/001065000200311180039127.html.

54. Cho, "Chaeoe tongp'opŏp."

55. Seori Choi and Chang Won Lee, "History and Current Status of the South Korea's Overseas Korean Policies with Korean-Chinese Cases" (working paper, IOM MRTC Working Paper Series, IOM Migration Research and Training Centre, Goyang, 2015).

56. Kim Chae-ŭn. "Chungguk Chosŏnjok chiwŏn nok'o Sŏ Kyŏngsŏk, Kim Hae-sŏng moksa ch'ungdol," *Chosŏn Ilbo*, 8 January, 2004.

57. For additional discussion of this "complicated history," see Julia Jiwon Shin, "A Transnational Approach to the Integration of Migrant Workers: With Focus on the Korea's Employment Permit System," *OMNES: The Journal of Multicultural Society* 7.2 (2017): 128–53; and Denis Kim, "Promoting Migrants' Rights in South Korea: NGOs and the Enactment of the Employment Permit System," *Asian and Pacific Migration Journal* 20.1 (2011): 55–78.

58. The main reason foreign workers in the EPS program have been fighting for the freedom to move between workplaces of their own volition is that it helps, as Piao notes, to balance the employee-employer relationship by allowing workers to easily change jobs if, for example, they can earn a higher wage elsewhere or if they suffer from abuse, nonpayment of wages,

or harassment—all of which are still fairly common occurrences. Piao You. "Hierarchical Citizenship in Perspective South Korea's Korean Chinese." *Development and Society* 46.3 (2017): 557–89.

59. "Number of Incoming Foreigners by Type of Visa and Citizenship," KOSIS (Korean Statistical Information Service), http://kosis.kr/eng/statisticsList/statisticsListIndex. do?menuId=M_01_01&vwcd=MT_ETITLE&parmTabId=M_01_01.

60. It is possible to argue that South Korean officials preferred Chosŏnjok because most spoke Korean fluently and understood Korean cultural norms and practices. But recall that the early interactions between Korean Chinese and their South Korean employers produced a great deal of tension, which not only became violent at times, but also deadly. More broadly, there is evidence that South Korean employers preferred workers from other countries. In a 2002 survey of 1,286 small and medium-size companies, for example, respondents expressed a strong preference for workers from Indonesia. China was second, followed by Vietnam. "Indonesians Most Favored Foreign Workers." *Korea Times*, 1 May, 2002.

61. Kwak Chae-sŏk. "Tongp'o chŏngch'aek ŭn ŏeguk illyŏk chŏongch'aek ŭi kŭrŭs-e tamŭl su ŏpta," *Tongbuk-A Shinmun*, 12 May, 2020, https://www.dbanews.com/news/articleView. html?idxno=40251.

62. Kwak, "Tongp'o chŏngch'aek ŭn ŏgug'in."

63. "Chaeoe tongp'o (F-4) palgŭp taesang hwaktae," *Tongbuk-A Shinmun*, 27 November, 2009, https://www.dbanews.com/news/articleView.html?idxno=12432.

64. See, for example, Song, "Chosŏnjok and Goryeo Saram Ethnic Return Migrants," 2019; Park, *Identity, Policy, and Prosperity*, 2018, Choi, "The Transformation of the Korean Chinese Community," 2018; and Steven Denny and Christopher Green, "How Beijing Turned Koreans into Chinese," *The Diplomat*, 9 June, 2016. https://thediplomat.com/2016/06/ how-beijing-turned-koreans-into-chinese.

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Rethinking Hegemony and Neutralization in Korea: Multinational Diplomatic Engagements in the Run-Up to the Russo-Japanese War (1903–1904)[1]

SANGPIL JIN   Teaching and Research Postdoctoral Fellow, University of Edinburgh

Abstract

This article demonstrates that the Russo-Japanese rivalry, far from being just another example of imperialist competition during the Age of Imperialism, can also serve as a useful case study of a diplomatic contest over a periphery between hegemonic powers. During this diplomatic tug-of-war, the Korean peninsula became the focal point of a contest between Japan and Russia. The present study illuminates the interactive processes of major diplomatic engagements between multiple actors through careful use of multi-lingual archives, as well as locates the significant implications of these exchanges for contemporary geopolitical landscapes in the Far East. Ultimately, this research provides an analytical framework for a more in-depth understanding of diplomatic interactions and the impacts of hegemonic struggles in modern Korean history.

Keywords: Hegemony, neutralization, Russo-Japanese rivalry, Korean
                      peninsula, imperialism

Introduction

The historical contexts and geopolitical factors that loomed over the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) were multi-layered. As a recent addition to the Eurocentric-international system, Korea theoretically enjoyed equal status as an independent state. However, Korea found itself at the centre of a hegemonic rivalry, one in which major powers contested for regional domination at the expense of Korea's territorial integrity and diplomatic sovereignty. Unable to muster the strength to protect its sovereignty, Korea would seek neutralization as a second-best option.

Recent studies from some Japanese scholars suggest there was nothing inevitable about the Russo-Japanese War. Chiba Isao has closely examined the framework of Russo-Japanese proposals presented during diplomatic negotiations from July 1903 to February 1904, as well as the subject matter of meetings convened by Japan's *genrō* (an informal group of Japanese political elders). Chiba asserts that the *genrō*, Prime Minister Katsura Tarō, and Foreign Minister Komura Jutarō remained hopeful for an agreement with Russia until late 1903.[2] Itō Yukio stresses the conciliatory influence of Itō Hirobumi on Japan's Russian policy. Itō Hirobumi, a *genrō* and president of the Seiyūkai Party, the largest party in Japan's House of Representatives, favoured a dovish approach towards Russia well into the second half of 1903.[3]

Different interpretations of the Russo-Japanese War emerge when we examine Russian scholarship. Igor Vladimirovich Lukoianov has analyzed the Bezobrazov clique in St. Petersburg, which earned the patronage of Czar Nicholas II in 1903 and became a major force in Russia's geostrategy in the Far East. Lukoianov finds that this faction pushed for the redeployment of Russian troops from northern to southern Manchuria and the development of the Yalu River basin that bordered the Japanese sphere of influence (i.e., Korea). Under these circumstances, it would have been difficult for Russia and Japan to arrive at a negotiated settlement.[4]

Bella Pak, however, faults Japan's determination to secure political and economic hegemony on the Korean peninsula for triggering the war.[5] Like Lukoianov, she accepts that, during the two special conferences on 8 April and 20 May 1903, Russia decided to exploit its timber concession on the Yalu River to boost Russian influence in Korea.[6] However, Pak also argues, first, that Russia was much more inclined to avoid war than Japan; second, that as the Russian telegram of 3 February 1904 attests, Russia eventually agreed to include Manchuria as part of Russo-Japanese negotiations, and, third, that Russia never wavered from upholding Korea's territorial integrity and independence.[7]

Given such conflicting scholarly interpretations from the main belligerents of the Russo-Japanese War, a closer reading of both published and unpublished

documents and a careful reappraisal of the complex interplay of Russo-Japanese negotiations surrounding Korea and Manchuria (which bordered the former), seems necessary for presenting a more comprehensive picture of the multi-faceted diplomatic manoeuvres undertaken during 1903 to 1904, when Japan and Russia edged closer to war. Relatedly, Korea's diplomatic activities (centring on neutralization) are selectively reviewed to appreciate how a weak state attempted to reshape the geostrategies of Japan and Russia, given that the latter's victory in a possible Russo-Japanese conflict could have allowed Korea to realize a neutral, buffer status.

The structure of this article is as follows. The first section briefly surveys the academic discourse regarding the theoretical concepts used in this study. The next section appraises the instruments of diplomacy that Japan and Russia employed to attain their strategic objectives before the Russo-Japanese War and Korea's endeavors to make its diplomatic voice heard. The third section reviews some of the major aspects of the different actors' diplomatic stratagems and assesses their implications before this study finishes with its conclusions. In retracing some of the significant aspects of diplomatic engagements in the run-up to the Russo-Japanese War, this study delves into the diplomatic side—especially the Russian angles—of the historical and geopolitical dynamics that overshadowed the hegemonic struggle. More importantly, in using a multi-archival approach to examine a much under-appreciated international development, this work aims to transcend the traditional East–West dichotomy, mindful of its implications for modern Korean history, imperial history, and international relations.

Hegemony and Neutralization

No scholarly consensus on the precise definition of hegemony and its application to the international system exists. According to one definition, hegemony is a structure where "a single powerful state controls or dominates the lesser states in the system."[8] Michael Mastanduno suggests that hegemony confers, "a preponderance of material power ... the ability to control international outcomes ... and some degree of consent and acceptance from other states."[9] Approaching hegemony from a Chinese perspective, Yan Xuetong draws on the pre-Qin Chinese thinker Xunzi to critique the supposed notion of equality between nation-states.[10] Yan contends that although the Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 gave rise to principles affirming an equality of state sovereignty that evolved into international norms, a state's status in international society does not necessarily reflect those norms.[11]

Unlike with hegemony, a relatively strong academic consensus exists concerning neutralization. Neutralization is an international status conferred by

stakeholder countries granting neutrality to countries, territories, and waterways through agreement. Neutralised countries maintain militaries only for self-defence and are not a party to treaties that might violate their neutrality.[12] Such countries are expected to maintain political independence, thus contributing to regional stability. First conceived in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, neutrality was not enshrined in international law through judicial rulings and international conventions until the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

A candidate country must be located in an area suitable for neutralization and fulfil subjective, objective, and international requirements.[13] The subjective requirement is the most important for neutralization, requiring the support of the country's leaders and citizens for neutralization. A neutralized state must also demonstrate its political, economic, and diplomatic abilities and its willingness to execute domestic and international rights and duties. The objective requirement relates to a country's geographical position, one containing strategic assets that could intensify neighboring countries' interests. Neutralization is available for a newly created country, a divided but independent country, a country subject to intervention or potentially subject to intervention from a neighboring major power, or a country that could serve as a conduit connecting one major power to another.[14]

Though meeting the subjective requirement might be sufficient to facilitate the customary neutralization of a country, permanent neutralization requires an international guarantee through an agreement between a candidate country and its neighboring countries acting as guarantors. A permanently neutralized country must also maintain a sufficiently strong military for self-defence[15] and is furthermore required to adhere to international expectations. If a neutral country violates its duties, such as by giving assistance or providing any advantages to warring countries, its neutrality would then be void.[16]

Japan and Russia spar for a diplomatic edge in the Far East

Having examined the two theoretical concepts relevant to the present study, we can now turn our attention to reinterpreting the Russo-Japanese interactions in the run-up to the Russo-Japanese War, focusing on the high-level diplomacy involving Japanese and Russian officials. This war, sometimes referred to as World War Zero,[17] involved two rivals with significant stakes in Manchuria and Korea. The conflict began with Japan's initial strike on Russia on 6 February 1904, though it did not officially declare war until six days later. Lasting over a year, the war was brought to a close by the Treaty of Portsmouth on 5 September 1905. Although Japan and Russia eventually went to war, they first made several concerted efforts

to settle their disputes diplomatically (which later involved Korea), that would have prevented war from occurring and preserved the balance of power between continental and maritime powers. The Russian emperor's comment:—"I do not want a war between Russia and Japan and will not allow it. Take all measures so that war will not occur"[18]—suggests it would have been possible for both Japan and Russia to iron out their differences by respecting their respective spheres of interests in Korea and Manchuria.

As early as 31 January 1903, the Russian Foreign Ministry anticipated possible negotiations with Japan concerning Korea[19] and Manchuria.[20] A conference organised by the ministry concluded that a future agreement with Japan should stipulate that neither it nor Russia should occupy any strategic point in Korea. Furthermore, any agreement would have to constrain Japanese rights in Korea and should specify that Japan lead any negotiations.[21] In reality, however, Russia could only do so much to push its agenda regarding Korea. In late 1902, Russian minister to Korea Pavloff had advised Army Minister Alexei Nicholayevich Kuropatkin to allow Japan (at least temporarily) to dominate over the Korean peninsula, noting that Korea remained "politically and militarily incapable of any decisive action."[22] Pavloff's scathing comment suggested there was serious doubt about Korea's ability to protect its sovereignty against Japan among Russian policymakers directly involved in Russo-Korean relations, which meant the Korean court had its work cut out into winning over Russian sceptics of Korean neutralization.

A week after the January 1903 conference, Foreign Minister Vladimir Nikolayevich Graf Lamsdorff, under Nicholas II's orders, convened a council. Attending were Finance Minister Sergei Yulevich Witte, Kuropatkin, acting Navy Minister Fyodor Karlovich Avelan, Russian Minister to Japan Roman Romanovich Rosen, and high-ranking Foreign Ministry officials. At the council, Witte[23] called for a closer relationship with Japan, contending that only by reaching a modus vivendi with it could stability in the Far East be secured.[24] Kuropatkin sympathized with Witte's cautious analysis, warning against cutting off diplomatic relations with Japan.[25] At the same time, while advocating a more prudent approach towards Japan, Kuropatkin did not in any way fear Tokyo. Claiming that St. Petersburg could mobilise 400,000 men in just thirteen days, the Russian general did not believe Japan posed a military threat to Russia. Kuropatkin's complacency (which he would come to regret as described later), might have reflected the Russian military establishment's unfounded confidence in Russia's military strength vis-à-vis Japan's.

While concurring that an agreement was needed, Avelan sought to present a more hard-line stance, arguing that there should be no special compromises from

Russia.[26] Echoing Witte, Rosen, a long-time Japan observer, also called for more amicable ties with Japan but simultaneously argued that Russia required a clear Korean strategy, astutely grasping that Korea should be considered a key element of its strategy to stabilize the Far East. Witte later added that he was against extending Russia's military presence onto the Korean peninsula: his rationale was that Russia, which already had Vladivostok and was occupying Dalian, did not need a port in Korea.[27]

Subsequently, on 7 February, a new conference was convened to reassess Russia's Manchuria policy and, relatedly, its Korean affairs. The conferees' views on Russia's Korean policy were split, with hardliners like Admiral Tyrtov opposing any concessions to Japan, since they could restrict Russia from employing the Korean port of Masanp'o as a temporary naval station.[28] More dovish voices like the Russian minister to Japan Rosen called for caution in dealing with Japan since it did not covet Korean territory. In the end, the conference could not come to a consensus on the Korean issue, and the attendees agreed to table the issue until future discussion,[29] which showed the importance of Korea as an element of regional geopolitical dynamics.

Russia struggled to reach internal consensus on its Korean policy, and it would soon become more interventionist, attesting to Russian policymakers' growing recognition of the Korean peninsula's important geopolitical value. Reflecting Korea's importance in the Russian decision-making process, the 8 April special cabinet meeting was chaired by Nicholas II, who solicited government ministries' views on the role of northern Korea as a shield for Russia. The main participants of the previous conference, Lamsdorff, Witte, and Kuropatkin (relative moderates in Far Eastern affairs), were now joined by Interior Minister Vyacheslav Konstantinovich von Plehve, a hardliner. Plehev's participation signified a growing interest in Korea among the wider Russian political establishment. In the absence of a clear consensus over Russia's geostrategy in the Far East, policy was pulled by the two very different forces (dovish vs. hard line approaches).

The conference's agenda was to discuss the feasibility of establishing a timber company along the Yalu River in response to the expansion of Japanese influence from Korea to southwestern Manchuria.[30] The conference approved the establishment of a corporation to develop said timber resources (which suggested the hard-liners prevailed), while allowing American, Belgian, and French investment in the company.[31] Permitting foreign participation in Russia's strategic asset may have been a way to assuage major powers' suspicions regarding Russia's hegemonic drive in the Far East. However, Japan could still interpret Russia's unwillingness to permit Japanese investment in the company as St. Petersburg's desire to deny Tokyo a share of critical Korean resources. Considering Vladivostok

merchant Briner's success in securing the timber concession along the Tumen and Yalu rivers, which Witte paid close attention to,[32] irrespective of his scepticism towards the value of the concession,[33] it is safe to conclude that St. Petersburg accorded special attention to this strategically important concession.

As will be demonstrated later, Russia's subsequent actions in Manchuria and Korea would indeed fuel Tokyo's distrust over its rival's geostrategic ambitions there. The suspension of the scheduled second-round withdrawal of Russian troops from Manchuria on 8 April,[34] Russia's announcement of seven conditions for their withdrawal (18 April), the Russian occupation of Yongamp'o (21 April), and its construction of a strategic post under the pretext of logging (4 May) severely threatened the status quo in Korea and inevitably increased tensions between Japan and Russia.

The Japanese government believed these moves closely reflected Russia's expansionist "New Course" policy targeting Korea and Manchuria, which was adopted after two rounds of the aforementioned special conferences.[35] This new policy was composed of three parts: maintaining Russia's dominance in Manchuria through increasing the number of Russian troops there, preventing foreign influence or capital from making any inroads in Manchuria, and exploiting timber concessions on the Yalu River to expand Russian influence over Korea.[36] Before Russia could implement this new policy, sizeable roadblocks lay ahead. It hoped to remove at least one of them through bilateral negotiations with Japan to de-escalate tensions. Russia was determined to tread carefully with Japan, and both the Russian government and private commercial interests were eager to explore ways to avoid a war with Japan.[37] St. Petersburg's willingness to engage in diplomacy with Tokyo suggested Russian officials were reluctant to confront Japan too aggressively, at least at this stage.

Coincidentally, the Japanese government also seemed ready to adopt a more cautious stance. On 23 June 1903, the members of the *genrō* joined four cabinet ministers to hold an imperial conference, at which they unanimously agreed to enter negotiations with Russia. Tokyo then informed London about its intention to enter talks with St. Petersburg,[38] which demonstrated Japan's desire to keep its ally abreast of any major diplomatic exchanges between Japan and Russia that could potentially upend the status of Far Eastern geopolitics.

To this end, on 22 July, Komura telegrammed Japanese Minister to Russia Kurino Shin'ichiro to have him test Russia's willingness to enter direct negotiations with Japan. Komura's decision was a by-product of the Murinan Conference on 21 April, the Japanese Imperial Conference, and cooperation with Britain and the U.S.[39] By soliciting necessary advice from Britain, the global hegemon, and the U.S., a rising Pacific power, Japan was trying to enlist friendly Western

powers' diplomatic prowess to advance its interests to push back against Russia's hegemonic ambitions.

On 12 August, Kurino duly carried out Komura's instructions, holding talks with Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff and submitting the first Japanese proposal. Among other things, it called for the preservation of the territorial sovereignty and independence of China and Korea and Russian acceptance of Japanese pre-eminence on the Korean peninsula in exchange for Japan's recognition of Russia's special interest in the Manchurian railways.[40]

From the Russian perspective, Japan's reluctance to accord Russia "preponderance" over its Manchurian railway concession could only be viewed as Tokyo's deliberate intention to undermine St. Petersburg's hegemony in Manchuria. That the proposal also contained a clause dictating Russia's non-interference in the extension of the Japanese-controlled Kyŏngbu Railway (Seoul to Pusan) into Manchuria meant Japan was trying to undermine Russia's hegemonic influence in southern Manchuria by restricting its rights to railroads there.[41]

Japan's decision seemed to reflect its wish to group Manchurian and Korean issues together when dealing with Russo-Japanese spheres of influence, which inevitably Russia could not stomach since Manchuria was an indispensable element in St. Petersburg's Far Eastern geostrategy. For its part, by presenting demands that benefited its hegemonic interests, Japan intended to shift the balance of power in Korea and Manchuria to its favour as it sought to expand its presence in continental Asia. Getting Russia to agree to the future extension of a Japanese-controlled Korean railroad into Manchuria would herald a much-coveted strategic opportunity for Tokyo, one denied Japan after the Triple Intervention in 1895.

The Russian businessman Aleksandr Mikhailovich Bezobrazov was entrusted with the task of drawing up a reply to the aforementioned Japanese proposal by Nicholas II, his draft receiving the Russian monarch's preliminary approval on 29 August. However, it was left to Russian Foreign Ministry official G.A. de Rigny De Plancon to come up with the following official counterproposal to the Japanese proposal, which he shared with Viceroy of the Russian Far East Yevgeni Ivanovich Alexeyev on 7 September:

1) Mutual recognition of the independence and territorial integrity of Korea and equal rights of commerce for all nationals in that country
2) Russian acknowledgement of Japan's special rights and commercial interests in Korea
3) Russian non-interference in Japan's right to dispatch troops to Korea to protect Japanese interests and to suppress uprisings
4) Russian recognition of Japan's right to extend advice and assistance to Korea for its reforms and improvement of government administration

5) Japanese acceptance that it does not have any stake in Manchuria and its coast.[42]

Alexeyev assented to De Plancon's counteroffers but thought that the first article should also include Japan's recognition that Russia possessed all special rights in Manchuria,[43] thus giving St. Petersburg the edge in their strategic contest over Manchuria. De Plancon was equally adamant about the Manchurian issue, asserting that Russia could not tolerate any intervention from Japan. He did, however, believe that Russia had much room for compromise on agreements affecting Korea.[44] Comments from Russian officials with direct influence in shaping its Far Eastern policy suggest that Manchuria (not Korea) remained a central pillar of Russian hegemonic interests, while also indicating that at least some in Russia's top echelon were willing to respect Japanese dominance in Korea, with the latter serving as a buffer protecting Russia-dominated Manchuria.

Russia's reply to Kurino's proposal arrived from Rosen on 3 October.[45] Lamsdorff informed Kurino on 9 September that the Russian foreign minister had already instructed Rosen and Alexeyev to draw up a counterproposal as quickly as possible and to begin talks at their earliest convenience. Wishing to consolidate Russia's sphere of influence in Manchuria and northern Korea, Rosen offered to respect the area south of the thirty-ninth parallel as Japan's sphere of influence. In return, north of the parallel would not fall under Japanese influence and Russian troops would not be required to withdraw.

The Russian diplomat's counterproposal was, in effect, a direct counter-measure against the Japanese strategy spearheaded by Komura (an advocate of the exchange of Korea and Manchuria into distinct spheres of influence) that involved the creation of a neutral zone or a Russo-Japanese joint-protectorate on the Korean peninsula.[46] Given the proximity of northern Korea to Manchuria, Russia's call for the establishment of a neutral zone[47] on the Korean peninsula may have stemmed from the country's desire to use at least a part of Korea as a buffer for constraining Japan's hegemonic designs in Manchuria, Russia's sphere of influence. From Korea's standpoint, this meant that the Korean government could hope to leverage Russia's plan for a neutral zone, although the neutralization of the Korean peninsula was clearly not part of the Russian agenda.

While all this was taking place, a wary Korea remained in the dark about the Russo-Japanese diplomatic exchanges that could potentially undermine its already fragile independence—a justifiable concern given Seoul's peripheral status in the regional world order. As a remedy, the Korean court geared itself to keep abreast of contemporary geopolitical developments in readiness for having to formulate a possible policy response against this new strategic reality. Accordingly, on 1 June, Kojong held an audience with U.S. Minister to Korea Horace Newton Allen, an

old Korea hand who enjoyed close personal ties with the Korean monarch, to sound him out on the possible outbreak of war. From his meeting with Allen, Kojong judged that Russo-Japanese armed conflict was likely unless Russian troops withdrew from Manchuria and that the dispute over the Yalu River concession could also end in bloodshed.[48]

As if to validate Kojong's suppositions, on 4 July, Korean Minister to Japan Ko Yŏunghǔi dispatched an urgent telegram to Seoul concerning a rumour of an impending war between Japan and Russia. Kojong anxiously tried to corroborate the risk of hostilities through existing diplomatic channels and, from August to October 1903, contemplated diplomatic options to prevent Korea from becoming involved in such a war.[49] One option was declaring wartime neutrality; Kojong's efforts to make that happen deserve further scrutiny, for successful neutrality could have shielded his country from the worst effects of the Russo-Japanese hegemonic intrigues and increased his country's bargaining power in the diplomatic arena.

Kojong's efforts included him and his close aides launching a series of diplomatic initiatives aimed at major powers, seeking assistance from abroad to turn the Korean peninsula into a neutral zone in the event of war.[50] Their vision for neutrality resembled that of Russia, which toyed with the same concept, albeit in a geographically limited area (i.e., a neutral zone) to protect its strategic interests in Manchuria. According to a report from British Minister to Korea Sir John Newell Jordan, the British financial advisor to Kojong and Chief Commissioner of Korean Customs Sir John McLeavy Brown was instructed to compose official notes[51] addressed to Japan and Russia under the name of Korean Foreign Minister Yi Tojae. These notes restated Korea's desire to remain neutral during wartime and requested that neither powers use the Korean peninsula for military operations.[52] Upon their completion, they were forwarded to Russia and Japan by Hyŏn Sanggŏn and Ko Ŭisŏng,[53] who respectively departed for St. Petersburg on 21 August and for Tokyo four days later.[54]

Kojong had to rely on emissaries to handle diplomatic messages related to neutralization because Japanese surveillance severely undermined the operation of Korea's telegraph network,[55] inevitably undercutting the Korean government's ability to implement major power diplomacy confidently and speedily. For its part, Japan was determined to make the best use of its control of Korean telegraph lines, seeking to exploit these critical modes of communication to its advantage. For example, while Russian Foreign Minister Lamsdorff was engaging in tough negotiations with his Japanese counterpart Komura concerning Korea and Manchuria, Russia's representatives in Japan and Korea could not utilize telegraphy to securely exchange diplomatic messages with Lamsdorff. In Japan, the Russian diplomat

Gagarin noted at one point that it had become almost customary for Japan to purposely destroy Russia's secret telegraphs.[56]

Cynics may question the authenticity of a Russian diplomat's statement and dismiss Gagarin's assertion as a simple anti-Japan gambit. However, the Korean government's subsequent wartime neutrality declaration process and a report from the French representative in Korea would provide strong indications that Japan was monitoring telegraphic correspondence related to Korea, knowing all too well the importance of secured diplomatic communication channels in times of urgency.

While both missions had important diplomatic implications for Korea, Hyŏn Sanggŏn's tasks carried more weight because they involved ascertaining the stance of relatively friendly powers (France and Russia) on Korean neutral-ization, in addition to exploring mediation by international organisations.[57] Hyŏn's missions thus marked a new beginning for Korea, a fresh approach to its foreign policy via direct communication with possible benefactors of Korean neutralization—Russia and France—and international institutions. The potential role of the latter in shaping Korea's neutrality diplomacy needs to be taken into account as the Korean monarch may have calculated that Korea would have a better chance of securing Korean independence through an international forum, one perceived to be even-handed,[58] and by extension, free from the influence of a single hegemonic power.

Living up to his sovereign's expectations, Hyŏn, upon his arrival in France, threw himself into a diplomatic offensive, attempting to secure a meeting with French Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé. When this failed, he left Kojong's secret message regarding neutrality in the hands of Min Yŏngch'an, the Korean minister in France,[59] thus indirectly laying the groundwork for French cooper-ation with Korea's later wartime neutrality declaration. In the Netherlands, Hyŏn sought to attend the International Peace Conference and visit the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, but the conference did not convene, and the court was in recess. He then travelled to St. Petersburg, where he conferred with Korean Minister to Russia Yi Pŏmchin on neutrality and met with former Russian Chargé d'affaires to Korea Waeber, an old-Korea hand, with close ties to Kojong and pro-Russia faction members in Korea. On his way back to Korea, Hyŏn visited Dalian and spoke with the Russian governor of the Far East.[60] In the end, for all his efforts, Hyŏn failed to win any qualitative support for Korean neutrality; Russia and France did not seem ready to respond to his overtures, and support from the International Peace Conference was unavailable.[61]

Despite this setback, Kojong's quest for international support for Korean neutrality continued. In October, he passed on his letter expounding on Korea's

wartime neutrality plan to the Korean Minister to Russia Yi Pŏmchin. Later that month, the Korean minister met with Russian Vice Foreign Minister Obolensky and presented Kojong's letter to him. Korea also reached out to France, where Korean minister Min Yŏngch'an, notwithstanding his earlier disappointment with the French government, called on Paris to persuade Russia to back Korean neutrality.[62] To Yi's chagrin, Obolensky agreed only to consider the merits of Korean neutrality without offering any explicit assurances. More distressingly, Obolensky's superior Lamsdorff was sceptical of the plan, citing Japan's inconsistent adherence to the Rosen-Nishi Protocol.[63] He expressed his doubts about Japan's record of complying with international accords and the chances of that changing. Though by no means certain, had Lamsdorff regarded Japan as a trustworthy partner, Korean neutralization could have at least received a more sympathetic hearing from the Russian government.

Undaunted, Yi met with Kurino on the same evening to discuss neutralization of the Korean peninsula. During the meeting, the Korean diplomat sounded out his Japanese counterpart's thoughts on Korean neutralization, but Kurino held his tongue and merely replied that Korea should cooperate with Japan and China.[64] He did not explain why Korea's cooperation with its East Asian neighbours was necessary, but his rationale may have been based on the then fashionable "Theory of East Asia Peace,"[65] insinuating that Kurino may have subscribed to a pan-Asian philosophy in which Korea and Japan could cooperate together.

Lukewarm responses from senior-level Russian officials may have convinced Yi that even if Korea declared neutrality in the event of a Russo-Japanese war, neither country would support it (prematurely since it turned out that Russia supported it), and that Japan was likely to disrupt Korea's neutralization efforts, which were already facing severe headwinds. Yi instead turned his attention towards an alliance with Russia,[66] revealing not just his pro-Russia colours but also indicating the residual strength of Russian influence within Korean diplomatic circles. To facilitate this process, he sent a report to Yi Tojae, reminding him that Korea, lacking military muscle, had failed to prevent the invasion of foreign troops during the Sino-Japanese War and had been unable to resist foreign demands. This document underscored his point that Korea would be unable to abide by neutrality and his concern that even if it declared neutrality, neighbouring countries could question Korea's commitment to international law if it failed to observe the rules of neutrality.[67] Yi Pŏmchin might have had a point about Korea's inability to secure its neutral status during geopolitical crises, one attested to by damning contemporary assessments of Korean military strength from both inside and outside Korea.[68]

Irrespective of his pro-Russia bias, a front-line Korean diplomat's serious reservations about the feasibility of neutrality for securing Korea's territorial integrity

and sovereignty forewarned of the severe difficulties the Korean state could face after declaring neutrality. Meanwhile, after receiving Rosen's counterproposal, the Japanese government convened a cabinet meeting on 24 October to discuss possible alternatives. Rosen opined that Japan was now torn between accepting Russia's substantial compromise over Korea and maintaining a hard-line stance towards the Manchurian question.[69] His astute observation suggested that, at least for now, there was a lack of consensus among the Japanese political establishment on the appropriate direction of Japan's policies towards Korea and Manchuria, leaving more wiggle room for policymakers in Tokyo to manoeuvre on the international stage.

As it turned out, even after Rosen, who unlike his more hard-line Russian colleagues had advocated reaching an accommodation with Japan over Korea, tried several times to explain to Komura that Russia could not stomach the thought of intervention from a third power owing to his country's centuries-long relations with China, Japan would not budge. Eight days after the cabinet meeting, Komura presented to Rosen a revised Japanese proposal comprised of eleven articles. Alongside the independence and territorial integrity of China and Korea, this counterproposal highlighted Japanese recognition of Russian interests in Manchuria, restrictions on where in Manchuria Russian troops could be deployed, and Japan's consular jurisdiction and the establishment of a Japanese settlement in Manchuria.[70] Upon closer inspection, we can reasonably conclude that this revised proposal favoured Japan, as it sought to constrain Russia's military presence in Manchuria and to strengthen Japan's diplomatic and geo-economic influence there.

Rosen observed that Japan's uncompromising stance was rooted in its ability to deploy troops in Manchuria faster than Russia could and in a deep-seated belief that Russia would do whatever it took to maintain its superior status there. For his part, the Russian emperor was unperturbed by this perceived intransigence and continued to support continued negotiations with Japan while pushing forward with Russia's main demands.[71] Nicholas II's firm stance towards his country's hegemonic interests in the region intimated that it would be increasingly unlikely for his government to reach a workable compromise with Japan over Russia's core interests in the region. This indeed proved to be the case, for as an aspiring regional hegemon, it would have been unthinkable for Japan to give any ground in Manchuria (let alone compromise over Korean independence) to its rival Russia. In this context, Korea's path towards neutralization, already tortuous, would inevitably face further difficulties, stymied by the disparate national interests of Japan and Russia.

Against this backdrop, the secretary general of the special committee of the Far East, Alexey Mikhailovich Abaza, joined the fray, sharing his views on the second proposal from Japan with Rosen. Extending an olive branch to Japan, Abaza sought

to acknowledge that country's dominance over Korea, its right to dispatch troops there, and even conceded that Korean railroads and the Chinese Eastern railroad could be connected. On the other hand, he concurred with Rosen that Japanese involvement in Manchuria should be blocked and was equally resolute in leaving the area north of the thirty-ninth parallel a neutral zone.[72]

Abaza was tactically astute enough[73] to anticipate Japan's possible objections to Russian demands, irrespective of his willingness to entertain pragmatic diplomatic options. He enquired into Japanese activities in Beijing and Seoul (which counted on sympathy and support from American and British representatives) and paid close attention to Japan's efforts to maintain combat readiness. Abaza also feared Japan would discuss not just the Korean issue but also bring up Manchuria in future negotiations and weighed postponing Russia's submission of a revised counterproposal to Japan.[74]

By this stage, an inability to receive a rapid response to the questions put forward during previous Russo-Japanese diplomatic exchanges was vexing the Japanese government, which felt it maintained a much more efficient and speedy decision-making process on Far Eastern diplomacy. Komura complained to Kurino that even though Tokyo had given "prompt answers to all propositions of the Russian Government ... the negotiations have not yet reached a stage where the final issue can certainly be predicted."[75] Kurino thus met with Lamsdorff on 9 December to press the Russian foreign minister about a Russian counterproposal to the Japanese propositions.[76]

Two days after Kurino's inquiry, Russia presented its second counterproposal, consisting of eight articles, to Japan via Rosen. As in the first counterproposal, the Russian government accepted Japan's special interests in Korea and its right to advise on its internal affairs and send military forces there. But Russia remained resolute in designating the area north of the thirty-ninth parallel a neutral zone and refused to extend the scope of the agreement to Manchuria.[77] Neither Japan nor Russia seemed disposed to yielding an inch regarding their respective spheres of interest in Korea and Manchuria.[78] This deadlock left Korea in a less and less advantageous position, with Japan especially determined to make up ground as a latecomer to imperialism.[79] This constrained Seoul's ability to pursue more hard-headed diplomacy (i.e., neutrality) that could not only defuse Russo-Japanese tensions over the Korean peninsula but that could also change the geopolitical status of the region.

The third proposal from Japan reached Russia on 21 December. While interviewing Rosen, Komura referred to profound discrepancies in the territorial compass between Japan's original proposals and Russia's counterproposals.[80] Komura subsequently ordered Kurino to deliver a *note verbale* to Lamsdorff and

obtain an early response from Russia. Japan further requested the excision of article six of Russia's second counterproposal, which dealt with the creation of a neutral zone north of the thirty-ninth parallel.[81] With Tokyo refusing to consider even a limited form of Korean neutrality, Seoul's drive for neutralization was in danger of stalling out.

Upon reviewing this note, Abaza saw through Japan's steadfast refusal to walk back from its core demands and now feared that obtaining a workable compromise with Japan was increasingly futile. He thus advised the Russian emperor to make use of the available time to comprehensively review Russia's Korean policy in connection with Manchuria and other issues in the Far East.[82] The secretary general's concern had some basis, as Komura warned Rosen of the Japanese public's extreme anger towards Russia for its rejection of including Manchuria as part of an agreement; during this period, Japanese newspapers were stoking war fever, urging their government to send an ultimatum to Russia for a declaration of war and to occupy Korea.[83] The reality in Japan was much more nuanced, however, as Naoko Shimazu points out that not all Japanese society segments bought into their government's war narrative.[84] Thus, we can surmise that Komura may have exaggerated the degree of anti-Russia sentiment within Japan to push Tokyo closer to a war with St. Petersburg.

At this juncture, Rosen developed new plans to cope with Russia's diplomatic conundrum, suggesting that some Russian officials perhaps still preferred a diplomatic settlement to a costly military conflict. He proposed a conventional agreement that confirmed Korea was not part of Russia's sphere of influence and that Manchuria was not part of Japan's. In a rider, Rosen pushed for the inclusion of a provisory clause that banned the construction of any facility on the Korean coast that might threaten freedom of navigation along the Korea Strait.[85] He reasoned that such an approach would not predetermine Korea's independence problem and would stop Japanese interference in Manchuria,[86] thereby frustrating Japan's hegemonic drive in Northeast Asia.

Nicholas II's subsequent instructions to Rosen showed that the minister's strategic acumen might have had some impact in recalibrating Russia's policy stance in the Far East. The Russian emperor insisted that three amendments had to be included in the third counterproposal. The first amendment banned any military activity on the Korean coast that could threaten freedom of navigation and forbade the use of any part of Korean territory for strategic purposes. The second amendment reaffirmed the preservation of a neutral zone,[87] and the third promised Russia would not interfere with Japan exercising its rights and privileges in Manchuria, though the creation of a settlement zone was still ruled out. Rosen delivered Russia's third counterproposal to Komura on 6 January 1904.[88]

The Russian sovereign's firm stance meant the prospect for a peaceful resolution of Russo-Japanese disputes became increasingly grimmer. As a precautionary measure, the Western powers (the U.S., Britain, France, Italy, and Germany) now prepared for the worst, sending reinforcements to guard their legations.[89] This new strategic reality shook Korea's political world and caused public sentiment to plummet, fuelling skyrocketing inflation in Seoul.[90] The last thing the Korean state wanted was a fragile domestic economy, complicating its task in grappling with the immensely challenging diplomatic landscape.

Meanwhile, on 11 January, Japanese political leaders met at the Tokyo residence of Prime Minister Katsura Tarō to discuss the latest Russian counterproposal, which pushed for a neutral zone north of the 39th parallel in Korea while refusing to acknowledge China's territorial integrity in Manchuria. St. Petersburg's reaction manifested its determination not to sanction Japanese predominance over Korea and, from Tokyo's standpoint, to defuse any attempts at frustrating Russia's hegemonic designs in Manchuria. Though Komura wanted Japan to end negotiations with Russia and declare war, the navy asked for more time for war preparations.[91] Hence, together with its war preparation, Japan decided to make one last diplomatic push, submitting a final proposal restating its main stance to Russia.[92]

Two days after the Tokyo meeting, Komura presented Japan's final proposal to Rosen, declaring that Japan could neither accept any compromise in Manchuria nor Russia's proposal of the establishment of a limited neutral zone north of the 39th parallel in Korea. A seasoned observer of East Asian affairs, British Minister to Japan Sir Claude Maxwell MacDonald intuited that unless Russia quickly made concessions, a Russo-Japanese war was now all but certain.[93] Komura also showed a copy of his communication to U.S. Minister to Japan Lloyd Carpenter Griscom, saying that unless Russia's reply arrived within a reasonable time, Japan would "decide what measures it may have to take to protect its rights and interests".[94]

Griscom did not mince words when he reported on Komura's ultimatum to Secretary of State John Hay: "It is no exaggeration to say that if there was no war it will be a severe disappointment to the Japanese individual of every walk of life."[95] Unlike Britain, which enjoyed a formal alliance with Japan, the U.S. remained officially neutral amidst the Russo-Japanese stand-off.[96] However, Komura's action signified that Tokyo regarded Washington as a de-facto ally. Maintaining friendly ties with the U.S., after all, would bolster Japan's negotiating position vis-à-vis Russia and tilt the regional balance of power in Tokyo's favour (indeed, U.S. President Theodore Roosevelt would broker the peace between Japan and Russia at Portsmouth in 1905).

As Japan stepped closer to war, the Korean establishment scrambled to enact an urgent measure to preserve at least some semblance of Korean sovereignty.

Hyŏn Sanggŏn returned from his European mission on 11 January, carrying a letter from French Foreign Minister Théophile Delcassé that advised Korea to align itself closely with Russia and France. Interpreting the French official's advice as pertinent to his efforts to salvage Korea's sovereignty and to protect its border and his subjects from becoming casualties of a war fought by and for others, Kojong backpedalled from exploring a potential alliance with Japan.[97] Aside from the letter from France, Kojong had one more reason to align Korea more closely with the Franco-Russian axis; around this time, Nicholas II's reassuring letter reached Seoul, further convincing Kojong he could count on Russia to support Korean independence.

Energised by these encouraging signs, Kojong and Korea's newly emboldened pro-neutralization faction, led by the high-ranking courtier Yi Yongik, proceeded with a wartime neutrality declaration. On 14 January, Hyŏn took a preliminary step for wartime neutrality by revealing to Russian Minister to Korea Pavloff Kojong's intentions to proclaim Korea's strict neutrality in the event of a Russo-Japanese war.[98] He then requested Pavloff's assistance with sending a statement of wartime neutrality via telegram from Shanghai to avoid the Japanese-controlled telegraph office in Korea, perhaps cognizant of possible manipulation and even worse, the delay of the telegram's transmission abroad by the Japanese authorities.[99] Now that the Russo-Japanese War was on the horizon, Korean policymakers needed to obtain international recognition of Korean neutrality from their foreign counterparts, however slim the possibility.

Pavloff told Hyŏn to wait until he had received instructions from his government and advised that Shanghai could not be used to transmit the telegram since no passenger ship would leave for Shanghai for four days. On 17 January, Russian Foreign Ministry official De Plancon telegrammed Pavloff, concurring with his scepticism of the Shanghai option and asking that Kojong's telegram be transmitted to the French consulate in Shanghai from the French legation in Seoul. The next day, Pavloff telegraphed the Russian foreign minister, reporting that Korea's neutrality declaration would be announced from the French consulate in Chefoo, China, by French Consul (referred to as a vice-consul in French sources) A. Guérin, who doubled as acting Korean consul.

As if to prove the point made by the French foreign minister (that Korea should depend on his country and Russia), French nationals acting as facilitators of Korea's wartime neutrality were of substantial benefit to Seoul, even in the absence of explicit instructions from the French government to support its Korean counterpart. Working in concert with neutralization advocates Yi Yongik, Kang Sŏkho, Yi Hakkyun, Hyŏn Sanggŏn, and Yi Yinyŏng, the French language teacher Martel became intimately involved in Korea's neutrality policy, including crafting

appropriate negotiation strategies.[100] Most importantly, French Chargé d'affaires Vicomte de Fontenay would compose Korea's neutrality declaration and even suggest a reliable means for transmitting this message abroad.

Fontenay first broached a major power-guaranteed Korean neutralization to Pavloff, arguing that this would help defuse the ongoing tension between Japan and Russia and preserve peace in the Far East. During Fontenay's second meeting with him on 14 January, Pavloff told him that with the Russian government's blessing, he too was backing Kojong's wartime neutrality project. Encouraged by this positive development, Fontenay drafted a declaration of Korean neutrality addressed to eleven countries that maintained diplomatic ties with Korea and to seven Korean diplomatic representatives. Next, Kojong received the text of the neutrality declaration statement, which Fontenay asked him to approve. But at this moment, the Russian government objected to transmitting any telegrams from the Russian-controlled Port Arthur, fearing that it could diminish the declaration's value due to its lacking spontaneity. Fontenay then stepped into the breach, remembering that French Consul Guérin in Chefoo was also serving as the consul of Korea and recommending that Guérin transmit the Korean government's messages abroad from there.[101]

Eventually, working in concert with Martel and Adhémar Delcoigne,[102] Kojong's palace aides Hyŏn Sanggŏn, Kang Sŏkho, Yi Hakkyun, and Yi Yinyŏng composed an official wartime neutrality statement. Fontenay translated this into French, and Yi Kŏnch'un, an interpreter at the Foreign Ministry, was reportedly sent to Chefoo to deliver the text and have the French vice-consul declare it on behalf of the Korean government.[103] Finally, under the name of Foreign Minister Yi Chiyong, the wartime neutrality of Korea was announced at Chefoo on 21 January,[104] a declaration the Russian cabinet believed (wrongly as it turned out) could prevent Korea from becoming Japan's protectorate.[105]

Meanwhile, back in St. Petersburg, having reviewed the fourth proposal from Tokyo, Russian officials now realised their country's talks with Japan had reached a dead end. Abaza, for one, did not see any value in prolonging negotiations. In addition to calling for the comprehensive review of the Korean issue, Abaza advised the emperor to transfer a battalion to southern Manchuria on the Korean border.[106] As a high-ranking official on Far Eastern affairs, Abaza's words would have carried considerable weight in Russia's Northeast Asian policies, and his latest advice suggested that the hardliners within Russian officialdom were baying for blood (i.e., war with Japan).

However, the Russian sovereign, reluctant to forcefully break the diplomatic deadlock with Japan, maintained that Russia should still pursue a peace agreement by continuing talks with the Japanese cabinet, and on 3 February, he instructed

Alexeyev to submit a fourth counterproposal to Tokyo.[107] While the original counterproposal contained eight articles, the Russian monarch now consented to the removal of article six, which dealt with a neutral zone in Korea.[108] Despite this new overture, the Japanese government refused to receive the counterproposal and severed diplomatic relations with Russia on 7 February,[109] bringing to an end Russo-Japanese efforts to avoid a military showdown, and by extension, essentially extinguishing any realistic chance for even a limited form of Korean neutrality.[110]

Disparate Diplomatic Stratagems: Some Observations

To recapitulate: in the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century Korea fell victim to a hegemonic rivalry between Russia and Japan. Overwhelmed by their hard power and dominant international status, Korea could only hope to safeguard its territorial integrity and independence through deft diplomacy—but this proved to be beyond Korea's grasp. More hard-headed observers may argue that Korea's diplomatic activities did little to change the multi-level dynamics of regional geopolitics and failed to contain a hegemonic rivalry over a key conflict zone, given the considerable gap of state capacities between Korea and the two hegemonic powers (Japan and Russia). Considering these assessments, we can observe the following findings.

First, Korea was effectively side-lined from a series of key Russo-Japanese diplomatic exchanges, in which issues affecting Korea's geopolitical position were brought to the fore. Having joined the Western-led international system, Korea was not theoretically obliged to maintain a subservient relationship with any hegemon; however, Korea had to remain alert to the geostrategic intents of Japan and Russia, both of which exerted a strong influence over the peninsula. Their strategic presence on the Korean peninsula forced Seoul to continuously adjust its diplomatic strategy through the dispatch of special envoys, multilateral diplomacy and eventually, the declaration of wartime neutrality.

Second, despite playing a minor role on the regional diplomatic stage, Korean policymakers still tried to play Korea's weak hand to their advantage by searching for a card that would deliver a way to peacefully preserve the country's sovereignty. Their wartime neutrality diplomacy marked the high point of such efforts, receiving a sympathetic hearing from several powers. In its documents (dated 20 February 1904) dispatched to Russian representatives abroad, the Russian Foreign Ministry noted that Korea's wartime neutrality declaration won sympathy from Russia and other major powers.[111] Given Russia's strong desire to contain Japan's strategic influence in Northeast Asia, some cynics may question the

accuracy of this report. Nevertheless, it would be equally wrong to entirely dismiss the effects of the declaration on the international stage and not recognise Korea's unyielding desire to survive the Russo-Japanese imperialist intrigues.[112] At the same time, given Korea's well-publicised ties with Russia, as Kim Sŭngyŏng rightly notes, it was not easy for Japan to stomach the idea of neutralization since a neutralized Korea could end up toeing the pro-Russia line,[113] thereby undermining Japan's hegemonic position on the Korean peninsula.

Third, Russia waged a protracted struggle with Japan to consolidate its sphere of influence in the region, but was perhaps blindsided by a widespread tendency to underestimate Japan's military capabilities, as evidenced by the statement: "Russian society and officer corps [who were] obsessed with illusions of an easy, quick colonial expedition to ... punish 'yellow dwarfs,' 'ugly pigmies' or simply 'macaque'."[114] Such prejudices notwithstanding, in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, unable to exercise exclusive hegemony over the Far East, Russia moved to obtain Japanese understanding for creating a neutral zone within Korea. But because St. Petersburg remained preoccupied with preserving its position along the Pacific coast and retaining an interest in Far Eastern development, it could not afford Korea falling under Tokyo's sphere of influence. Its decisions also reflected Russia's prudent approach to the changing geopolitical landscape on the Korean peninsula, which went as far as advocating neutrality to stabilize the region's geopolitical situation. Only Korea housed an ice-free port that Russia might require in the future,[115] which explains Witte's interest in Korea.[116] If Japan took Korea and Manchuria, Russia might end up losing all its territories on the Pacific.[117]

Fourth, there were significant differences in how the three countries' leaders and administrations arrived at policy decisions. In Korea, the country's major power diplomacy and, crucially, neutrality diplomacy, were spearheaded by Kojong, who relied on trusted aides and diplomats to execute a series of important diplomatic tasks. This tendency ensured that Korea's diplomacy effectively bypassed a conventional channel, the Foreign Ministry (even though the wartime neutrality declaration was declared under the foreign minister's name). Russia's Far Eastern diplomacy was a by-product of tripartite coordination among the Russian Foreign Ministry, Far Eastern Governor-General, and the Far Eastern Committee. Though Nicholas II acted as a final arbiter in all matters related to Korea and Manchuria, this institutional complexity culminated in disharmony and sowed confusion in Russian decision-making. Compare Seoul and St. Petersburg's institutional deficiencies with Tokyo's comparatively smooth decision-making process. During pivotal moments in Russo-Japanese negotiations, Japanese officials quickly convened cabinet meetings to decide upon negotiating tactics and

to fine-tune Japan's Korea and Manchuria strategies. Furthermore, all diplomatic instructions passed through the foreign minister, unifying the chain of command and ensuring the smooth execution of foreign policy measures.

To the above-mentioned inability of Japan and Russia to reach a modus vivendi, we should add their choosing instead to reject opportunities to find common ground. Since both powers were competing for regional hegemony, despite the flurry of diplomatic exchanges between Tokyo and St. Petersburg, neither would completely accommodate the opposing party's hegemonic ambitions.[118] To be fair, at one time, both Tokyo and St. Petersburg tried to reach possible compromise scenarios regarding Korea and Manchuria. Russia's proposal for a neutral zone in northern Korea and Japan's call for China and Korea's territorial integrity were cases in point. Had cooler heads prevailed in both capitals, Japan and Russia could have settled their differences peacefully by agreeing to limit their hegemonic presence in Korea and Manchuria. Consider Witte's failed 1901 proposal, which judged that avoiding a war with Japan was Russia's top goal. In this plan, he contemplated abandoning the political and military occupation of Manchuria and minimizing his country's strategic priority to railroads on Manchuria,[119] which could have given diplomacy between Japan and Russia new momentum. In the end, neither Japan nor Russia was ready to offer substantial concessions that could undermine either party's long-term hegemonic position in Northeast Asia.

Conclusion: Impacts, Echoes and Legacies

Japan's victory in the Russo-Japanese War sent shock waves through the international community. By defeating a major European power, Japan sealed its stature as a new imperial power. Soon to be embroiled in revolutionary turmoil, Russia's hegemonic strength would be markedly reduced in the Far East, and it would henceforward direct its strategic attentions towards Europe. Relying on the goodwill of Britain and the U.S., Japan reinforced its economic, political, and military dominance over the Korean peninsula. In November 1905, Korea became a protectorate of Japan and, despite protests from Kojong and Russia, other major powers backed this decision, which culminated in the official loss of Korean independence in 1910. Having colonized Korea, Japan now turned its attention to Manchuria, using its newly acquired possession as a stepping stone to expand its hegemony in Northeast Asia.

Though failed, Korea's neutralization would have laid the basis for a more stable, multipolar order, in which both Japan and Russia could have solidified their commercial and political interests in their respective spheres of influence without undermining Korea's formal independence. Considerable time has passed

since the Korean peninsula became the focal point of hegemonic conflicts between major players in the region. However, the danger of the Korean peninsula becoming ground zero for a proxy war between hegemonic powers remains real. The geopolitics of contemporary East Asia resemble those of early modern and modern East Asia; just like nineteenth century Korea, South Korea is a faithful participant in a regional world order underwritten by a strong hegemon (the U.S.) which is locked in a rivalry with an ambitious challenger to its hegemony (China).

Then again, the division of the Korean peninsula into two separate states, North and South Korea, and the growing hegemonic rivalry between China and the U.S. may catapult the spheres of influence issue onto centre stage. If today's Korea peninsula is to avoid meeting a fate similar to Kojong's Korea, policymakers should seriously revisit these fascinating episodes in the history of East Asia and envision a unified and *neutral* Korean peninsula acting as a strategic buffer between China and the U.S.

Notes

1. The Seed Program for Korean Studies through the Ministry of Education of the Republic of Korea and Korean Studies Promotion Service of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2019-INC-2230005) supported this research.
2. Katō Yōko. "What Caused the Russo-Japanese War—Korea or Manchuria?" *Social Science Japan Journal*, 10 (2007), p. 96.
3. Katō Yōko. "What Caused the Russo-Japanese War—Korea or Manchuria?," p. 69.
4. Katō Yōko. "What Caused the Russo-Japanese War—Korea or Manchuria?," p. 100.
5. Bella Pak. "Russia's Policy Towards Korea during the Russo-Japanese War," *International Journal of Korean History*, 7 (2005), p. 30.
6. Bella Pak. "Russia's Policy Towards Korea during the Russo-Japanese War," pp. 36–37.
7. Bella Pak. "Russia's Policy Towards Korea during the Russo-Japanese War," p. 49.
8. Robert Gilpin. *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1981), p. 29.
9. Michael Mastanduno. "Incomplete Hegemony" in *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*, edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 145.
10. Daniel Bell. "Realizing Tianxia: Traditional Values and China's Foreign Policy" in *Asian Security Order: Instrumental and Normative Features*, edited by Muthiah Alagappa (Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 134.
11. Yan Xuetong. *Ancient Chinese Thought, Modern Chinese Power*, translated by Edmund Ryden (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 2013), pp. 104–105.
12. Cyril Black, Richard Falk, and Oran Young. *Neutralization and World Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University, 1968), p. 11.
13. Graham Evans and Jeffery Newnham. *Dictionary of International Relations* (London: Penguin Books, 1998), p. 366.
14. Kang Chongil and Yi Chaebong. *Hanbando ŭi yŏngse chungniphwa tongil ŭn kanŭnghan-ka* (Seoul: Tŭlnyŏk, 2001), p. 237.
15. Roderick Ogley. *The Treaty and Practice of Neutrality in the Twentieth Century* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1970), p. 10.

16. Kang and Yi, *Hanbando ŭi yŏngse chungniphwa tongil ŭn kanŭnghan-ka*, p. 235.
17. The war was a "modern twentieth century conflict that offers much evidence revealing the direction in which the policies of the Great Powers … were taking the rest of the world." John Steinberg, "Was the Russo-Japanese War World War Zero?" *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero, Volume II*, edited by David Wolff, Steve Marks, Bruce Menning, David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, and Shinji Yokote (Leiden: Brill, 2007), p. 7.
18. Andrew Malozemoff. *Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881–1904: With Special Emphasis on the Causes of the Russo-Japanese War* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1958), p. 243.
19. It is important to stress that in contrast to Japan, Russia was less interested in acquiring Korean territory. Still, St. Petersburg entertained a "new method of conquering backward countries" and sought to use the East-Asiatic Company as a means to exploit "the natural riches of Korea and East Asia". Boris Romanov, *Russia in Manchuria (1892–1906)* (New York, NY: Octagon Books, 1974), p. 259. Romanov's observation could also be found in an official Russian document, which acknowledged Russia's interest in Korea's timber concession. Kim Sŏnan, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip V: yŏnbang kungnip munsŏ pogwanso (ГАРФ)* (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2011), p. 165.
20. John Albert White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War* (Princeton, NJ: 1964), p. 57.
21. Yi Wŏnyong, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip IX: yŏnbang kungnip munsŏ pogwanso (ГАРФ)* (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2013). p. 57.
22. Though unmentioned, it is possible to deduce that Russian policymakers were conscious of the negative international reception surrounding Russia's perceived threatening presence on Manchuria and northern Korea. White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 51.
23. Unlike his more hard-line colleagues, Witte was ready to compromise with Japan over Korea, advising the Russian emperor to allow Tokyo to "temporarily" seize Korea provided that Japan recognised Manchuria was "unconditionally and forever lost" to her (i.e., Japan). Romanov, *Russia in Manchuria (1892–1906)*, p. 294.
24. Yi Wŏnyong, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip IX*, p. 60. He thought that this temporary agreement would bring a much needed stability for the economic development of Russia. Witte also had the recently acquired Chinese Eastern Railway in mind, for which security was crucial for enhancing Russian prestige in the Far East. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI: yŏnbang kungnip munsŏ pogwanso (ГАРФ)* (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2013), p. 61. By preferring Russia's economic development and its directly-controlled Chinese railroads over direct competition with Japan, Witte signalled that he opted for a more prudent course, one plotted to avoid unnecessary confrontation with Tokyo.
25. Kim Yonggu, *Segye oegyosa* (Seoul: Taehakkyo Ch'ulp'an munhwawŏn, 2006), p. 367.
26. Yi Wŏnyong, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip IX*, p. 62.
27. Yi Wŏnyong, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip IX*, p. 63. From Russia's perspective, together with the port of Dalian, Korea could serve as an excellent base for Japan to attack China and Russia. Kim Sŏnan, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip V*, pp. 172–173. Thus, it would have been inconceivable for Russia to bend over and meet Japan's demands without reassurances.
28. Malozemoff. *Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881–1904*, p. 203.
29. White. *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 53.
30. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI: yŏnbang kungnip munsŏ pogwanso (ГАРФ)* (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2011), p. 131.
31. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI: yŏnbang kungnip munsŏ pogwanso (ГАРФ)*, p. 153.
32. Romanov, *Russia in Manchuria (1892–1906)*, p. 268.
33. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 135.
34. True enough, both the Blue Paper of Britain and White Paper of Japan would later point to this Russian action as one of causes of the Russo-Japanese War. Kim Sŏnan, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip V*, p. 165.

35. Hyŏn Kwangho. *Taehan Cheguk kwa Rŏsia kŭrigo Ilbon* (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2007), p. 203.
36. Pak Bella. "Russia's Policy Towards Korea during the Russo-Japanese War," p. 37.
37. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 174. Later, on 31 June at a Dalian conference, the participants unanimously agreed that occupying all of or the northern part of Korea would not benefit Russia. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 177. This insinuated that, for the time being, Russia was determined not to make any aggressive moves in Korea.
38. Malozemoff, *Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881–1904*, p. 237.
39. Kim Wŏnsu. "The Russo-Japanese War and the Crisis Diplomacy of the Great Han Empire—Connected with the Yongamp'o Incident," *Sŏyang yŏksa wa munhwa* yŏn'gu, 2016, pp. 224–225. The Murinan Conference saw two prominent *genrō*, Itō Hirobumi and Yamagata Aritomo, were joined by prime minister Katsura Tarō and foreign minister Komura Jutarō to confer Japan's negotiation strategy with Russia. The idea of a 'Manchuria–Korea' exchange was one of the major results of this conference.
40. Kim Wŏnsu. "The Russo-Japanese War and the Crisis Diplomacy of the Great Han Empire—Connected with the Yongamp'o Incident," p. 225.
41. Paek Chungi, *Eurasia cheguk ŭi t'ansaeng: Eurasia oegyo ŭi kiwŏn* (Seoul: Hongmunkwan, 2014), p. 687.
42. Pak Chaeman ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VIII*, p. 129.
43. Pak Chaeman ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VIII*, p. 130.
44. Pak Chaeman ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VIII*, p. 131.
45. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VIII*, p. 215.
46. Kim Wonsu. "The Russo-Japanese War," pp. 225–226.
47. In fact, Kuropatkin had already, 1901, contemplated creating a neutral zone on the Yalu River's Korean side as a buffer between Japan and Russia's spheres of interest. White, *The Diplomacy of the Russo-Japanese War*, p. 56.
48. Kim Wŏnmo ed., *Allen ŭi ilgi* (Seoul: Tan'guk University Press, 1991), pp. 203–204.
49. Kim Wŏnsu "The Russo-Japanese War," p. 228.
50. Kim Sŭngyŏng. "Russo-Japanese Rivalry over Korean Buffer at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century and Its Implications", *Diplomacy and Statecraft* 16.4 (2005), pp. 632–641.
51. Eŏm Ch'anho. "Chugwŏn suho rŭl wihan Kojong ŭi tŭksa woegyo," *Kangwŏn sahak* 15. 2000, p. 209.
52. The National Archives. *Affairs of Corea and Manchuria Further Correspondence* Part II, FO 405/139, no. 6, Jordan to Lansdowne, 26 August 1903.
53. Known as Hyŏn Yŏngun in other accounts.
54. Pak Chonghyo, ed., *Rŏsia kungnip munsŏ pogwanso sojang Han'guk kwallyŏn munsŏ yoyakchip* (Seoul: Han'guk kukche kyoryu chaedan, 2002), p. 406, p. 409.
55. Pak Chonghyo, ed., *Rŏsia kungnip munsŏ pogwanso sojang Han'guk kwallyŏn munsŏ yoyakchip*, p. 363.
56. Pak Chonghyo, ed., *Rŏsia kungnip munsŏ pogwanso sojang Han'guk kwallyŏn munsŏ yoyakchip*, p. 311.
57. Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe, ed., *Chu-Han Ilbon kongsagwan kirok*, 21, p. 247.
58. In so doing, Kojong was placing his hopes on an international organization (albeit without clear enforcing mechanisms) rather than a friendly power like China, which Yu Kilchun sought to rely on to fulfil Korean neutralization. Kang Manki, *Pundan sidae ŭi yŏksa insik* (Seoul: Ch'angjak kwa pip'yŏngsa, 1978), pp. 110–111.
59. Min was said to have appealed to the French government to induce Russia to help realize Korean neutrality. Hyŏn Kwangho, *Taehan Cheguk ŭi taeoe chŏngch'aek* (Seoul: Sinsŏwŏn, 2002), p. 119.
60. *Hwangsŏng sinmun*, 20 August, 1903; 12 September, 1903.

61. Hyŏn Kwangho, "Taehan Cheguk ŭi taeoe chŏngch'aek," p. 120. Hyŏn Sanggŏn pursued Korean neutralization under the guarantee of major powers and through international institutions (e.g. the Red Cross, the International Peace Conference, and the International Court of Justice). *Tokyo asahi shimbun*, 24 January 1904.

62. Hyŏn Kwangho, "Taehan Cheguk ŭi taeoe chŏngch'aek," p. 119.

63. Kim Wŏnsu, "The Russo-Japanese War", p. 236. Concluded on 25 April 1898, the Rosen-Nishi Protocol was meant to guarantee Korea's independence and non-interference in the country's internal affairs by Japan and Russia. However, Russian recognition of Japan's economic primacy in Korea allowed Japan to consolidate its presence in Korea, unintentionally undercutting its independence. Sŏng Hwangyong, *Kŭndae Tongyang oegyosa* (Seoul: Myŏngjisa, 2005), p. 274.

64. Kuksa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe, ed., *Chu-Han Ilbon kongsagwan kirok* 20, pp. 358–360.

65. This theory was first propagated in August 1898, by Japanese statesman Itō Hirobumi, who urged China to ally with Japan to counter Western imperialism. Some Koreans also advocated cooperation among Korea, China and Japan under Japan's tutelage, provided that Korean sovereignty was not put in danger. Hyŏn Kwangho. *Taehan Cheguk kwa Rŏsia kŭrigo Ilbon* (Seoul: Sŏnin, 2007), p. 95. These contemporary trends suggest that while not constituting a clear majority, there was a sizeable minority among the East Asian establishment who supported cooperation with Japan.

66. Kim Wŏnsu, "The Russo-Japanese War," p. 237.

67. Kyujanggak sojang munsŏ, ed., *Chu A raegŏan*, 28 November 1903, No. 18062.

68. A Russian report harshly criticized Korea's military strength, stating that it lacked real fighting power. Kim Sŏnan, ed., "Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip V," p. 16. French military attaché Colonel Clement de Grandprey was no less critical in describing the woeful status of the Korean military, calling it too weak to defend itself from potential military aggression. Diplomatic Archive Centre, *Correspondance Politique et Commerciale/Nouvelle Série 1897–1910 Corée: Armée-Marine (1901–1917)*, 20 December 1902, p. 24. The Korean army marshal Paek Sŏnggi lamented that instead of producing weaponry domestically, Korea was importing it. Sŏ Inhwan, *Taehan Cheguk ŭi kunsa chedo* (Seoul: Hyean, 2000), p. 162. This laid bare Korea's grossly inadequate combat readiness, as a steady access to military ordinance is vital for military operations, and by extension, the Korean state's ability to safeguard its independence and ultimately, Korean neutralization.

69. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 262.

70. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 263.

71. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 264.

72. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 265.

73. According to Andrew Malozemoff, Abaza thought Russia could afford to compromise with Japan over Korea since the Japanese takeover of the Korean peninsula would arouse resentment of other powers and fail to secure its position there. The Japanese were "petty traders, not large merchants." Malozemoff, *Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881–1904*, p. 245. Abaza's seemingly dismissive attitude of Japanese ambitions on Korea implied the Russian official might have underestimated the international support that Japan could count on, including from its ally, Britain, who remained wary of Russia's hegemonic intents in Asia.

74. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 266.

75. Gaimushō, ed., *Correspondence Regarding the Negotiations between Japan and Russia (1903–1904), Presented to the Imperial Diet, March 1904*, Baron Komura to Kurino, 1 December 1903, No. 30, Forgotten Books, 2008, p. 38 [hereafter *Correspondence*].

76. Ibid., Mr Kurino to Baron Komura, 9 December 1903, No. 33, p. 40.

77. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 267. Abaza commented that although he thought this revised counterproposal represented the maximum gain for Russia, it was

highly unlikely that Japan would accede to it. Abaza mentioned the Japanese government's decision to prepare for possible military action in Korea as proof. Ibid.

78. Korean scholar Shin Pokryŏng contends that Japan and Russia had different interpretations concerning a neutral zone on the Korean peninsula. Shin reasons that St. Petersburg was interested in establishing a "line" along the borders of China and Korea and Korea and Russia. Conversely, Japan envisaged a neutral zone between China and Korea, signifying Tokyo's desire to associate neutrality with "territory". Shin, Pokryŏng. "Rŏ-Il chŏnjaeng ŭi han tanmyŏn: kŭgŏsŭn ŏttŏk'e Taehan Cheguk ŭi mangguk kwa yŏn'gwan toeŏnna", *Hanguk chŏngch'isa nonch'ong* 42. 1 (2020), p. 101.

79. Jordan Sand. "Subaltern Imperialists: The New Historiography of the Japanese Empire", *Past and Present* 25.1 (November 2014), p. 275.

80. Gaimushō, ed., *Correspondence*, Baron Komura to Mr Kurino, 21 December 1903, No. 35, p. 42.

81. Gaimushō, ed., *Correspondence*, p. 44.

82. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 268. Abaza's intervention showed a close link between Korea and Manchuria in Russia's hegemonic designs in the Far East.

83. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 269.

84. See Shimazu Naoko, *Japanese Society at War: Death, Memory and the Russo-Japanese War* (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2009).

85. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 269.

86. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 270.

87. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 271.

88. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 272.

89. Sŏ Yŏnghŭi, *Taehan Cheguk chŏngch'isa yŏn'gu* (Seoul: Taehakkyo ch'ulp'anbu, 2003), p. 179.

90. Sŏ Yŏnghŭi, *Taehan Cheguk chŏngch'isa yŏn'gu*, p. 180.

91. Raymond Esthus, *Theodore Roosevelt and Japan* (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1967), p. 20.

92. Tatsuji Takeuchi, *War and Diplomacy in the Japanese Empire* (Doran: Doubleday, 1935), p. 142.

93. *Correspondance Politique et Commerciale/Nouvelle Série 1897–1917 Japon*, 14 January, 1904, Tel. No. 37, p. 84.

94. The National Archives and Records Administration, *Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Japan, 1855–1906*, M133, Griscom to Hay, Telegram, 13 January 1904.

95. The National Archives and Records Administration, *Dispatches from the United States Ministers to Japan, 1855–1906*, Griscom to Hay, 21 January 1904.

96. But it was equally true that there was a call for an Anglo-American-Japanese entente. Malozemoff, *Russian Far Eastern Policy 1881–1904*, p. 229. This suggested that the United States was keen to align its Asia policy with Britain and Japan to preserve a favourable balance of power to aid Washington's geostrategy in China, short of a formal alliance among the three countries.

97. Hyŏn Kwangho, "Taehan Cheguk kwa Rŏsia kŭrigo Ilbon," p. 282.

98. Pak Chonghyo, ed., *Rŏsia kungnip munsŏ pogwanso sojang Han'guk kwallyŏn munsŏ yoyakchip*, p. 429.

99. American scholar John Albert White underscores this point in his study, acknowledging Korea's difficulty in transmitting diplomatic message directly to the Western powers. White, *The Diplomacy of Russo-Japanese War*, p. 124.

100. *Hwangsŏng sinmun*, 30 September 1902.

101. Diplomatic Archive Centre, *Correspondance Politique et Commerciale/Nouvelle Série 1897–1910 Corée: Politique extériure Étrangers en Corée III, 1902–1904*, Fontenay to Delcassé, 2 February 1904, No. 210, pp. 16–18.

102. Adhémar Delcoigne was a Belgian advisor appointed by Kojong in July 1903 to reinforce his neutralization policy. William Franklin Sands, Sands to Hulbert, *Sands Papers*, 12 January 1904; Box 3, Folder 2, Doc. 3. Delcoigne's appointment showed that the Korean monarch remained determined to change his country's unfavourable international situation by reattracting major powers' attention to Korea's plight under Japan's domination. That Delcoigne was from Belgium, an internationally-recognized neutral state, may have induced Kojong to put his faith in the Belgian, since, unlike other foreign advisors, Delcoigne could offer practical advice on Korea's neutralization diplomacy.

103. Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon gaikō bunsho* 37(1), http://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/annai/honsho/ shiryo/archives/mokuji.html, No. 348, p. 319.

104. Gaimushō, ed., *Nihon gaikō bunsho* 37(1), No. 332, pp. 310–11.

105. Diplomatic Archive Centre, *Correspondance Politique et Commerciale/Nouvelle Série 1897–1917 Japon*, No. 200, Fontenay to Delcassé, 23 January 1904, p. 135.

106. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 273.

107. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 277.

108. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 279.

109. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VI*, p. 280.

110. According to one analysis, along with Britain, Japan and Germany, the U.S. sought to implement the American strategist Alfred T. Mahan's containment strategy against Russia to prevent its access to the sea. Choi Dŏkkyu, "Taehan cheguk ŭi chŏnsi chungnip kwa Rŏ-Il chŏnjaeng—Miguk ŭi taeRŏ pongswae chŏllyak ŭl chungsim ŭro," *Slav hakpo* 34.2 (2019), p. 262. This could explain the U.S. decision to ignore Korea's wartime neutrality, unlike China's, which received Washington's backing. Choi Dŏkkyu, "Taehan cheguk ŭi chŏnsi chungnip kwa Rŏ-Il chŏnjaeng—Miguk ŭi taeRŏ pongswae chŏllyak ŭl chungsim ŭro," p. 261.

111. Pak Chaeman, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip VIII*, pp. 139–40.

112. Seen from this light, we could understand why Kojong and his aides ended up adopting Korean opinionmaker Yu Kilchun's theory concerning a Western-inspired neutrality of Korea (Kang Mankil, "Pundan sidae ŭi yŏksa insik," pp. 111–16), under the guarantee of major powers. Kang Mankil. "Pundan sidae ŭi yŏksa insik," p. 108.

113. Kim Sŭngyŏng. "Russo-Japanese Rivalry over Korean Buffer at the Beginning of the Twentieth Century and its Implications," p. 640.

114. Streich, Philip and Levy, Jack. "Information, Commitment, and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905." *Foreign Policy Analysis* 12.4 (2016), p. 505. Such fateful misjudgement could be attributed to cultural complacency, which even weakened the state's institutional capacity, as recognised by Kuropatkin. In his post-war memoir, the Russian minister lamented that while Japan boasted hundreds of agents monitoring Russian military and naval forces in the Far East, a single officer was tasked with keeping track of the Japanese forces in the region. Streich, Philip and Levy, Jack. "Information, Commitment, and the Russo-Japanese War, 1904–1905."

115. If the Russian navy were to occupy a port on Korea's southern coast, Russia expected taking a central position on the oceans of the Asiatic region. Kim Sŏnan, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip V*, p. 102. Evidently, despite exercising limited hegemonic influence over the Korean peninsula, St. Petersburg knew all too well that Korea served as a bridgehead for Russia's access to maritime Asia.

116. Romanov, *Russia in Manchuria (1892–1906)*, p. 268.

117. Kim Sŏnan, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip V*, p. 181. Nevertheless, a prudent Korean strategy ruled the day in Russia, with Witte counselling that a war with Japan would harm Russia's relations with other powers and weaken its position in the West and the Near East. Kim Sŏnan, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip V*, p. 227. This reveals the nexus of Korea and Russia's grand strategy in the Far East.

118. Kim Sŏnan, ed., *Rŏsia munsŏ pŏnyŏkchip V*, p. 224. This was especially true for Tokyo, as Korea constituted a geopolitical priority for Japan, offering a solution to overpopulation and a new market for manufactured goods.
119. Paek, "Eurasia cheguk ŭi tansaeng," p. 683.

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Adaptation of Western Modern Concepts in Modern Korean Architecture in the Early Twentieth Century: Through the Perspective of Science, Efficiency, and Hygiene[1]

MYENGSOO SEO   Assistant Professor, Hankyong National University[2]

Abstract

This research explores the characteristics of Korean early modern architecture in the early twentieth century. Modern Korean architecture experienced conflicts and continuities between tradition and modernity from the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries. To evaluate these various influences, this article considers Korean early modern architecture through the perspective of such modern concepts as "science," "efficiency," and "hygiene." These modern concepts emerged first in the West before the nineteenth century, and they played significant roles in constructing a modern society in the West and the East. By investigating how these modern concepts were adopted in Korea in the early twentieth century, this research scrutinizes not only individual architects such as Park Gilryong and Park Dongjin but also newly constructed buildings such as *kwansa* (official residences of Japanese ministries) and *sat'aek* (company housing), especially during the Japanese colonial period. Furthermore, this research goes beyond Korean architecture to encompass regional and cultural differences. This research enables early modern Korean architecture to find its identity through the approach of social and cultural contexts, and by comparison with Western architectural culture.

Introduction

After the opening of its ports in 1876, Chosŏn Dynasty Korea not only began to face social and cultural changes but also experienced cultural encounters between the West and the East in the context of modernity. In this complex situation, Western culture began to encounter and mix with Korean tradition. In the late-nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries, Korean intellectuals persistently sought new cultural identities. These were reflected in architecture because architecture is a kind of vessel that contains many different elements of society. Examining other cultural phenomena of the modern Korean period helps to comprehend the characteristics of modern Korean architecture.

In this context, this research examines the origins of modern Korean architecture through cultural encounters and social aspects beyond architecture or individual architects. The overall research is informed by the new Western modern concepts, which emerged first in the West before the nineteenth century, such as "science," "efficiency, "hygiene," and so on.

Science, efficiency, and hygiene in the modern period are the key concepts forming and understanding modernity. Above all, science had been continuously asserted by rationalists as premodern society transitioned into modern society.[3] In the early twentieth century, the more concrete concept of "scientific management" started to be discussed, centering on architecture. Scientific management was a theory of management in industrial engineering that was internationally affected, focusing on the United States of America.[4] Although the term "Taylorism" or "Taylor system" is commonly used according to the name of Frederick Winslow Taylor (1856–1915), who was the most famous in his field, Taylor himself preferred the term "scientific management."[5] The most significant ripple effect that scientific management left in modern society in the early twentieth century was disseminating "efficiency." Efficiency was recognized as the clearest standard to judge labor input vs. productivity and has become a means and an objective for all types of productivity improvement. It was when the value of "micro-time," which had hardly existed in traditional society, emerged as the modern period approached.[6] Moreover, in this period, "hygiene" was regarded as an indicator of modernization. Modern hygienic work is essentially required in the early stage of modern urbanization. Damage to city dwellers due to infectious diseases in European or Japanese cities that started modernization, as well as Chosŏn's Hansŏngbu (the

former name of the city of Seoul during the Chosŏn Dynasty), urgently demanded modern hygienic work above all.[7] As such, the concepts of "science," "efficiency," and "hygiene" can be the most essential concepts in understanding modern cities and architecture around the twentieth century in the West and the East.

By scrutinizing these modern concepts, this research explores how they were adopted into modern Korean society, especially in architecture and urban contexts, not only through the West but also through Japanese or Japanized Western influences. This research examines how the three concepts were understood and interpreted in the West and the East from the end of the nineteenth century until the early twentieth century, focusing on their origins. It also investigates how these three concepts emerged concretely in Korea in the early twentieth century based on their origins. This research looks at not only the efforts of individual architects (Park Gilryong; 1898–1943 and Park Dongjin; 1899–1981) but how efforts to achieve modernity were revealed in newly constructed buildings such as *kwansa* 官舍 (official residences of Japanese ministries) and *sat'aek* 舍宅 (company housing).[8] This research helps to demonstrate the various influences from Western concepts as they created the new cultural identity of modern Korean architecture in the late nineteenth to the early twentieth centuries.

Moreover, this research explores beyond architecture to encompass regional and cultural differences. Examining differences from the perspective of comparative studies between not only East Asian countries, such as Korea, Japan, and China but also the East and the West can provide a new interpretation of Korean early modern architecture and urban contexts.

Eastern essence and Western means

In the late nineteenth century, the Chosŏn Dynasty began to accept modern Western civilization gradually, and the Kaehwadang 개화당 開化黨 (Enlightenment Party) recognized the superiority of Western science. Particularly from the opening of the ports in 1876 to the Japanese annexation of Korea in 1910, the government of Chosŏn claimed to advocate the concept of *Tongdo Sŏgi-ron* 東道西器論 (Eastern Essence and Western Means).[9] This referred to the maintenance of traditional spiritual culture while adapting to Western science; keeping Eastern traditions and adapting to Western technical foundations.

In contemporaneous China, there was a similar concept—*Zhongti Xiyong* 中體西用 (Chinese Essence and Western Methods).[10] This modern Chinese concept between the East and the West is related to the Chinese Daoist sage Laozi's idea about the relationship between "[shaped] mass" (*qi* 器) and "void" (*wu* 无). Laozi's

statement about the essence of space is given in Chapter 11 of *Tao Te Ching* (道德经).
The text reads as follows:

> Thirty spokes are integrated into one by holes in a hub,
> Through voids, they are jointed for a wheel's use.
> Clay is molded for creating pitchers,
> The pitcher's use comes from its void.
> Doors and windows are built for a house,
> Their emptiness defines the use of the house.
> Thus, a shaped mass can be useful,
> It is all because of its contained void.[11]

> 三十根辐条汇集于车毂而造车, 有了其中的虚空, 才发挥了车的作用；糅和陶土制作器
> 皿, 有了器皿内的虚空, 才发挥了器皿的作用；开凿门窗建造房屋, 有了门窗四壁内的虚
> 空, 才发挥了房屋的作用。所以, "有"之所以能给人以便利, 是因为它营造的"无"发挥了
> 作用。[12]

As Laozi observed, the wheel's use depends on its emptiness (vacancies). The use of clay also lies in its emptiness (void). The emptiness does not indicate a nihilistic nothing; it provides something essential for use. In the process of constructing Eastern modernity, the insufficiency of Eastern essence is filled with Western means, which are the pragmatic and tangible things originating from science and modern civilization. By "Chinese Essence and Western Methods," Chinese intellectuals intended to maintain Chinese essence but with the help of Western means.

The Chosŏn government began to formulate policies for adapting advanced Western culture to the Korean context. For instance, Western technology, such as the telephone and electricity, had been flooding into Chosŏn. Western music, arts, and religious ideas were also introduced to Chosŏn. Thus, all aspects of life and culture experienced changes. During the Japanese colonial era, it was difficult to sustain traditional culture because of the cultural assimilation policies of the Japanese rulers and their desire to obliterate the Korean nation. However, Chosŏn made steady and persistent efforts to maintain Korea's authentic culture and to safeguard the national culture movements.[13]

In this context, in the early-twentieth century, tradition and modernity came into conflict, and new ideas began to appear in modern Korean architecture. It is important to explore the impacts of modern concepts such as "science," "efficiency," and "hygiene" on architecture, because these concepts played a significant role in shaping the characteristics of Korean early modern architecture.

Adoption of modern "scientific concepts"

Scientific historian and philosopher Alexandre Koyré analyzed with insight the mutual coexistence and duality between human phenomena and nature that are embodied by modern natural science: "the world of science—the real world—became estranged and utterly divorced from the world of life, which science has been unable to explain—not even to explain away by calling it 'subjective'."[14] In the same vein, as architectural historian Dalibor Vesely argues, "the most important influence on the idealization of architectural physiognomy was the emergence of modern science."[15] In this way, architecture began to adopt key concepts from modern sciences into its designs, both functionally and aesthetically.

It is necessary to clarify the origins of modern science and the relationship between science and art. Following Heidegger's theory on the relationship between art and technique, in the Greek sense, works of art originated from *techné*, and art and *techné* are strongly related to the human act of making objects. Ancient artists and craftsmen were called *technites*.[16] In this sense, architecture and art were also the representation of *techné*, and *techné* was considered creative knowledge. More significantly, *techné*'s emancipation is strongly related to the origins of technology, which, according to Heidegger, comes from modern science and aesthetics.[17] Even if science and technology have been considered the opposite of aesthetics for the past few hundred years, science, technology, and aesthetics originated from the same conceptual root and belong together.[18] As Heidegger emphasizes, "because the essence of technology is nothing technological, essential reflection upon technology and decisive confrontation with it must happen in a realm that is, on the one hand, akin to the essence of technology and, on the other, fundamentally different from it. Such a realm is art."[19] The essence [nature] of technology thus concluded in the essence of art. In this sense, technology and art are identical in their Greek semantic root. Just as architecture could be an art, so architecture and technology are also related because art and architecture have been close throughout modern times.[20]

Many scholars consider early mechanics, medieval optics, and the Renaissance concept of perspective to be modern sciences.[21] Since architecture made use of medieval optics and Renaissance perspective, which were considered sciences in the modern period, architecture began to adopt the concept of science through these ideas. As architectural historian Sigfried Giedion states: "Thus in the Renaissance the dominant space conceptions found their proper frame in perspective, while in our period the conception of space-time leads the artist to adopt very different means."[22] Thus, the invention of perspective in the Renaissance period triggered the unity between art and science; the invention of perspective enabled the unification of architecture and science.

In Korean history, Western science was accepted in Chosŏn during the opening of the ports, and the arrival of missionaries in Chosŏn played a significant role not only in theology but also in the development of science. Chosŏn society had already begun to recognize and accept Western science beginning in the seventeenth century. Before the opening of the ports, Chosŏn mainly imported Western science, such as new machines for making cloth and weaponry. At that time, the adaptation of Western science was not a significant influence on society and economic life. Nevertheless, the understanding of Western science opened up people's viewpoints.[23]

After the opening of the ports, the Chosŏn Dynasty tried to adopt "Western technology," and its products were seen more frequently. Chosŏn sent the Sushinsa 修信使 (envoys dispatched to Japan after the opening of the ports), and they examined weapons-making facilities, which enabled them to widen their perspectives. Chosŏn also assigned 96 young Korean students to the Yŏngsŏnsa 領選使 (envoys to the Chinese Qing Dynasty to learn their developed culture) to look at weapons factories. Koreans were educated in mechanical engineering, electrical engineering, and chemical engineering as a part of the broad context of *yangwu yundong* 洋務運動 (Self-strengthening Movement). Meanwhile, the Chosŏn Dynasty sent various technological trainees to Japan to acquire modern Japanese technology.[24]

Even though new philosophies and modern technologies were adopted during the opening of the ports, there were limitations in adopting Western technology because of conservative beliefs and the imperialist aggression directed toward the people. Western philosophy and technology were not accepted from the West directly; instead, modern ideas were transferred from skewed modern ideas through China and Japan before coming to Korea. Furthermore, imperialist powers employed the theory of social evolution to control Korean society. These were the limitations of the acceptance of the new philosophy and technology during the opening of the ports.

In the early-twentieth-century, the Palmyŏng hak'oe 發明學會 (the Society of Invention) played a significant role in adapting the concept of "science" to a public that was not familiar with scientific life at that time. The Society of Invention, which was the first association that promoted scientific life in Korea, was founded on 1 October 1924.[25] Its purpose was to spread scientific knowledge and guidance on industrial technology to the public. Even though it held an inaugural conference on 1 October 1924, the society's activities were stalled due to lack of response from the public. In June 1932, the first meeting of the board of directors was held, and Park Gilryong (1898–1943), who was the first generation of Korean modern architects during the Japanese colonial period, became the chairman of the board of directors for the Society of Invention.[26]

Figure 1   Cover of *Science and Korea*.
Source: Park, *Science and Korea* 2
(July–August 1933): 1.

Park Gilryong was a representative Korean modern architect who actively practiced during the Japanese colonial period in Seoul and tried to amalgamate Western modernism and Korean traditional characteristics into Korean architecture. In the early twentieth century especially, Japanese and Western architects designed most modern buildings in Korea. However, Park, as a Korean architect, actively designed various modern buildings, and participated in various social activities in architectural fields and beyond. The Society of Invention was one of his social activities outside of architecture.

The Society of Invention, led by Park Gilryong, also published *Kwahak Chosŏn* 科學朝鮮 (Science and Korea) from June 1933 to October 1943 (for a total of 38 issues), which was the first magazine to focus on science (Figure 1). This magazine deals with general science, such as the history of the formation of the earth, thoughts about the universe, identity of materials, and so forth. As Park mentioned in the first issue:

It is fundamental to use natural resources in our life. We should make our own daily supplies and systems of civilization by ourselves. We should support inventors (scientists) to improve our future, and should stimulate the public to increase their spirit of invention. For these reasons, to achieve our purpose [to overcome our social problems using science] Palmyŏng hak'oe 發明學會 (the

Society of Invention) founded this magazine *Kwahak Chosŏn* 科學朝鮮 (Science and Korea).[27]

In this magazine, architect Park Gilryong published several articles about general science concepts, such as "Chigu saengsŏngsa 地球生成史" (History of the Earth's Formation), in July and August 1933, "Uju e taehan koch'al 宇宙에 對한 考察" (Thoughts about the Universe) in March 1935, and "Mulchil ŭi chŏngch'e 物質의 正體" (Identity of Material) in April, 1940.[28] Additionally, he wrote generally on scientific life, such as the "Saenghwal ŭi kwahak'wa e taehayŏ 生活의 科學化에 對하여" (About the Life of the Scientific Movement), several times.[29] In particular, the concept of "Saenghwal ŭi kwahak'wa 生活의 科學化" (Life of the Scientific Movement) came from the motto of "Saenghwal ŭi kwahak'wa, kwahak ŭi saenghwal hwa 生活의 科學化, 科學의 生活化" (Life of the Scientific Movement and Science of Life), which originated from the objectives of Kwahak chishik pogŭp'oe 科學智識普及會 (Association for Supplying Scientific Knowledge). This association was aimed at promoting the popularization of science.[30] Park argued that:

> We [Korean people] should develop science, and the knowledge of science should be accumulated. Our society not only cannot develop without the development of science, but [it] also [cannot] survive or persist in this competitive society.[31]

Park gave a radio lecture about the life of the scientific movement on 16 April 1935.[32] He focused on scientific fundamentals such as the "universe," "earth," and "materials," and he also tried to apply these pure scientific concepts to formulate a more practical approach for the public.

After the March First Independence Movement in 1919, when the Japanese colonial government professed cultural politics, newspapers and magazines were published in the Korean Peninsula. Intellectuals made efforts to disseminate lifestyle improvement awareness using the press. The lifestyle improvement movement discussed in the 1920s was an extensive effort encompassing residential life, as well as clothing and food.[33] The movement of improvement in the period was related to the life of the scientific movement and changed residential life from men-centered residential life to home-centered residential life. In addition, the space of women and children began to appear as the center of the home.[34]

The application of efficiency in Western and Korean architecture

The idea of "efficiency" in spatial layouts can be aligned to Jacques-François Blondel's theory of the "distribution of spaces" in French hotels. In late-eighteenth century France, Blondel scrutinized spatial distribution and the disposition of various types of buildings in his treatise *Cours d'architecture* (1771).[35] Blondel explored not only the connections between spaces (rooms) but also their relationship to the land.[36] In the plan of the main floor of the Maison à l'italienne (1737–38), the arrangement and the partition of rooms were aligned correctly between the private and public spaces in a hierarchical fashion (Figure 2).[37] Each door helps to maximize the efficiency of movement between rooms. Therefore, the compact plan of tightly clustered rooms and hierarchically distributed spaces increases the efficiency of communication in the building.

The French hotel (Figure 2) in Jacques-François Blondel's book can be comparable to the Korean institutional building Taehan ŭiwŏn pon'gwan 大韓醫院本館 (Taehan Hospital's Main Office, 1907) in the early twentieth century (Figure 3). As in French


Figure 2   Jacques-François Blondel, Plan of the main floor of *Maison à l'italienne*, 1737–38.

Source: Bastide, *The Little House: An Architectural Seduction* (New York, NY: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996), 25.

Figure 3   First and second plans of Taehan Hospital's Main Office, ca. 1907.

Source: Kyujanggak Institute for Korean Studies Archive, Seoul.

eighteenth-century rational plans, Blondel focused on modern concepts, such as system, logic, hierarchy, and efficiency. The basic principles of the Taehan Hospital's Main Office also pursued these modern concepts in its plans. The Taehan Hospital's Main Office is composed of a systematic plan: each space is hierarchically organized in a system for efficiency based on the frequency of use. The stairs are located in the front entrance to help people move easily and quickly through the building. Concerning spatial circulation, the middle hallway in the Taehan Hospital's Main Office plays an important role in connecting each room for easy circulation and communication. Although in Blondel's French hotel there is no central hallway, the rooms are connected by doors through a circular circulation of a door-to-door body movement. This helps residents move efficiently and effectively within the hierarchically distributed spaces based on the relationship between sociality and privacy. With subtly different spatial layouts, these two buildings pursue their efficiency of use and organization. The buildings also demonstrate the common social phenomenon of institutionalizing life through the efficient distribution of spaces. Although these Eastern and Western building plans originated in different historical periods and locations, they shared some common scientific building concepts, which emerged in their respective cultures when life began to be modernized.

Moreover, interest in efficiency in the twentieth century offered the foundation of mass production persistently appearing in modern society. Such an aspect is shown in buildings including *kwansa* 官舍 (official residences of Japanese ministries) and *sat'aek* 舍宅 (company houses) built in Korea in the early 1900s. These buildings reveal efficiency based on scientific concepts and show the image of an emphasis on hygiene.

There were plenty of *kwansa*, built for Japanese who were assigned to Korea after the Japanese occupation began, incomparable to *yanggwan* 洋館 (legations of the Western countries) built for Western people after the opening of a ports.[38] *Kwansa* were built in the center of large cities, and they became familiar architectural forms over time which had a considerable effect on Korean housing history. As *kwansa* were built collectively, building *kwansa* became an opportunity for a new modern residential area planning technique, which can be called complex planning. Handing down *sat'aek* that had followed the Japanese Government-General of Korea's *kwansa* standard was no different.[39] In 1923, a report that 6/10 of the entire city of Seoul were the *kwansa* zones[40] could be found in a magazine, although it was difficult to check if it was true or not.[41]

In the Japanese Government-General of Korea's *kwansa* building, the standardization of plan design and mass production, the engineering principle of modern industry, was applied. Change in residential recognition by family-centered private spatial composition appeared, and the aspect putting the importance of individuals

and privacy also emerged. Hygienic living environments, concentration through spatial integration, lattice-type sitting, and the loss of a relationship between land and housing also appeared.[42] It was a principle pursuing the maximization of efficiency through the collectivization of *kwansa*, and it resulted in the shaping of complexes and concentration. This was also the adoption of a large amount of duplication, not specifying housing occupants.

In the early twentieth century Korea, when architect Park Gilryong designed various types of buildings, he tried to embody such basic scientific ideas in his designs. Park applied the concept of efficiency to traditional Korean housing known as *hanok*. For example, he suggested the Movement of Housing Improvement in the layout of *hanok*: he believed that the "Courtyard Housing Plan" used in traditional *hanok* was very inconvenient because individual rooms, such as the kitchen, living room, toilet, and bedrooms, were not linked to each other (Figure 4). In particular, Park argued that the problem of the relationship between a kitchen and other places focused on efficiency, because Korean housewives spent most of their time there.

> Not only that, the kitchen is a working space for our housewives. So, well-equipped kitchens enable housewives to work with a very delighted feeling, and this good condition helps housewives to work more efficiently and effectively. An incomplete kitchen not only makes the workers feel unpleasant, but also produces a lot of ineffective movement. ...
>
> The relations between a kitchen and other rooms are not clearly connected, and this inefficient connection between a kitchen and other places make us feel more uncomfortable.[43]

Therefore, Park Gilryong suggested the exclusion of an enclosed courtyard, which was called the "Centralized Housing Plan" for the "Movement of Housing Improvement" (Figure 5). Park believed that the "Centralized Housing Plan" was more efficient and effective for movement within one building. However,


Figure 4   Park Gilryong, A Study of House Layout about "Courtyard Housing Plan."
Source: Park, *Chaeraeshik chuga kaesŏn e taehaya:che il p'yŏn* (Seoul: self-published, 1933), image no. 8 and 9.

Figure 5   Park Gilryong, A Study of House Layout about "Centralized Housing Plan."

Source: Park, *Chaeraeshik chuga kaesŏn e taehaya:che il p'yŏn* (Seoul: self-published, 1933), image no. 12 and 13.

although he suggested a new plan, he insisted on including *ondol* (a Korean traditional under-floor heating system) in the middle of the plan. Therefore, his modern dwelling was an advanced modern building constructed based on Korean traditions such as *ondol*.

> It is called a modern dwelling. The structure and general atmosphere are Western style, and it is installed with the Korean traditional heating system *ondol*. Windows and the interiors are of the Korean style. But each room's arrangement goes beyond traditional patterns. One room was covered by a wood floor and looks like a Western room. In general, my new housing improvement plan is like this kind of arrangement.[44]

In the early twentieth century, a representative Korean architect Park Gilryong tried to apply Korean tradition to modern architecture while carrying out housing improvements. However, he made endless efforts to maintain traditional Korean elements, such as *ondol*, in the process. *Puragungi* (Fireplace) in the houses of Min Ikdo (1938) and Jeon Joonsoo (1930) was newly devised by Park Gilryong, and its management was much easier in comparison with existing *puragungi* exposed outside.[45]

The conceptualization of hygiene in Korean urban contexts

Modern cities in the West adapted the concept of hygiene to solve their urban problems, enacting various laws, such as building codes, and town planning and zoning acts to regulate their cities' hygienic requirements, such as fresh air, water,

a place to wash clothes, and so on.[46] In Seoul during the Japanese colonial period, the hygienic issues were the most significant agenda of the Japanese empire in the early twentieth century. This is because, at that time, this issue represented a challenge between Korean tradition and modernity, and between Western and Japanized modernity.[47] Not only in Korea but also in Japan and European cities, the harm done by infectious diseases stimulated countries to legislate more hygienic regulations and engage in urgent discussion.[48] In this sense, modern hygienic affairs and systems were necessary for the early stages of Korea's modern urbanization process.

After the mid-nineteenth century, exotic infectious diseases, such as cholera, disseminated among the public quickly, and populations were gravely affected in Korea.[49] Cholera was first detected in Korea in 1821, and hundreds of thousands died that year.[50] In 1859–1860 and 1862, there were further epidemics of cholera, and outbreaks occurred more often after the opening of the ports in 1876.[51] The epidemics peaked during the outbreaks of 1859–60, when 400,000 people died, and in 1895 when 300,000 people passed away.[52] According to *Keijō fushi* 京城府史 (History of Keijō or Seoul), 3,600 people died in Hansŏng-bu 漢城府 (the former name of the city of Seoul during the Chosŏn Dynasty) in ten days in 1886; and when cholera spread in 1902, around 300 people died every day in the Sŏsomun and Kwanghwamun areas.[53] Poor hygiene, in addition to the absence of any cholera treatment, primarily accounted for the outbreaks and the deaths.

These epidemics (cholera in particular) spurred national momentum toward the adoption of modern hygiene systems and hygiene facilities in Korea. Cholera is a waterborne disease, and it was essential to quarantine the sick from others. The first quarantine station and an isolation hospital were installed in the Hansŏng-bu area in 1895. In general, the occurrence of infectious diseases gave rise to isolation hospitals and hygiene facilities in Korea. In particular, the Japanese, who lived in Japanese residential areas in Korea, made persistent efforts to overcome these infectious diseases through changing the isolation hospitals from temporary to permanent organizations, installing the first hygiene facilities, and expanding the public health system.[54]

Japan experienced a similar situation during this time, but its responses were different. After the Meiji Restoration (1853–1877), Japan was suffering from serious urban problems, such as a rapid explosion of the population, architectural and environmental problems resulting from structures like *nagaya* 長屋, frequent fires, and infectious diseases. The *nagaya* was a Japanese-style townhouse and multiplex house comprised of multiple units sharing outer walls, and consisting of one long building separated into several family units. Under such circumstances, the Japanese medical doctor Nagayo Sensai 長與專齋 (1838–1902)

introduced the term "hygiene" (*eisei* 衛生) from Europe to Japanese society. Japan installed the Imukyoku 醫務局 (Medical Board) in the Monbushō 文部省 (Ministry of Education) in 1873 and finally changed the name of the Imukyoku (Medical Board) to the Eiseikyoku 衛生局 (Board of Health or Sanitary Board) within the Naimusho 内務省 (Home Ministry).[55] Nagayo Sensai served as a doctor with the Iwakura Mission 岩倉使節団 (Iwakura Embassy)[56] to Europe to survey developed Western cultures. After he returned to Japan, he translated the German term *Gesundheitspflege* (health care) to "衛生" (*eisei* or hygiene). Hygiene in the East was a different concept from "sanitary" or "health," which were concepts used in England and America. Nagayo Sensai borrowed the concept of hygiene from the chapter "Geng-sang-chu-pian" (庚桑楚篇) in *Zhuangzi* (莊子), a Chinese Daoist scripture.[57]

In *Zhuangzi* (莊子), the author Zhuangzi used the term "衛生" (*weisheng*), the same as "hygiene" in the modern sense:

行不知所之,
居不知所為,
與物委蛇,
而同其波,
是衛生(*weisheng*)之經已.[58]

Going without knowing where we are going,
Living without knowing what we are supposed to do,
Accommodating things like a meandering snake,
Following the flow of natural things,
This is the way of *preserving life*.[59]

Based on *Zhuangzi*, the East Asian traditional concept of "*weisheng*" is very different from the Western concept of "hygiene." The meaning of *weisheng* is "preserving or protecting life" or "cultivating life." Even if the concept of "hygiene" was a social movement and a modern concept in the West, the concept of *weisheng* in *Zhuangzi* dealt more with the individual cultivation of harmony with nature; there was no government involvement, and it was not related to society. In the East, the concept of *weisheng* was more related to individualism and did not refer to the imperative to protect the health of society, which was emphasized by the modern term "hygiene." Conversely, in the West, the concept of hygiene involved the idea that the government should take responsibility for the public through specific administrative organizations. The traditional concept of *weisheng* in the East concerns the bodily balance between a person's interior and exterior, whereas the Western understanding of hygiene focused more on cleaning or purifying the physical environment.

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, Korea began to conceptualize hygiene further, and Japan influenced Koreans in adopting a hygienic life in their everyday routines. In the late Chosŏn Dynasty, hygiene was considered one of the best ways to demonstrate national prosperity and defense. In the early 1880s, the Kaehwap'a (Enlightenment Party) members such as Kim Okkyun (1851–1894), Park Yŏnghyo (1861–1939), and Yu Kilchun (1856–1914) tried to adopt the Japanese concept of hygiene in Korea after they returned from Japan as members of the Sushinsa (envoys dispatched to Japan since opening the ports). They argued for the adoption of a vaccine against smallpox in 1882, and Kim Okkyun wrote the *Chido yangnon* 治道略論 (On Good Administration of a Nation) in 1883 under the orders of Park Yŏnghyo, in which Park Yŏnghyo argued:

> The most significant thing[s] for a nation's essential policies. … is *hygiene*. The second is agriculture and commerce, and the third is roads. There are no differences between these three policies and laws of ruling in Asian nations.[60]

In the *Chido yangnon*, Kim Okkyun emphasized the necessity of ruling through a consideration of hygiene, the prevention of epidemics, and the development of agriculture. After Park Yŏnghyo returned to Korea in 1883, he became a Hansŏngbu-panyun (漢城府判尹), which was at the same administrative level as the mayor of Seoul in modern times. Park also tried to put his ideas into practice: based on the *Chido yangnon*, as a leader of Hansŏngbu, he argued in favor of similar efforts relating to hygiene, the prevention of epidemics, and agricultural development.[61] Moreover, Yu Kilchun moved one step forward: he founded the Wisaeng kwansa (Hygiene Department), and he was interested in establishing a systematic administration of hygiene.[62] Yu Kilchun believed that hygiene was important enough to merit government interventions into public and private affairs to prevent diseases.

However, in the 1880s, the Korean government failed to enact a hygiene policy due to the failure of the Kapshin chŏngbyŏn (Kapshin Coup, 1884). After the Kabo kaehyŏk (Kabo Reform, 1894), Korea began to establish the Wisaengguk (Board of Health) and finally constructed a modern hygiene system. At that time, the Japanese doctor Sewaki Hisao (瀬脇壽雄) was hired as an advisor regarding hygiene in Korea, and when cholera spread in Korea in 1895, Japanese doctors participated in hygiene inspections there. Thus, the Japanese government participated in inspecting areas in Korea before the establishment of Japanese resident areas. In this sense, Korean hygiene affairs were strongly influenced by Japan's hygiene policy in the early stages of adoption in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.[63] After the establishment of the Han'guk T'onggambu (Japanese Resident General) in 1905, the overall hygiene system was reorganized

by Japan and controlled by Japan directly, with the Japanese resident areas serving as a model for the rest of Hansŏngbu.[64] However, even if the Seoul government attempted to assimilate (integrate) modern sanitary practices from 1883, Korea still had to handle problems caused by the resistance of citizens in Hansŏngbu.[65]

Exploring hygienic issues in Western and Korean architecture

In the late eighteenth century, in this transitional period in the West, European architects heatedly explored multiple key issues: tradition, modernity, aesthetics, science, and so on. Each architect interpreted these ideas or concepts differently based on their philosophies and situations, and they tried to materialize these thoughts in their architectural projects. Moreover, under the broad roof of modernized life, Western architects also began to consider the hygienic issues in their architectural representations. Jacques-François Blondel (1705–1774) was a pioneering architect who explored the concept of "hygiene" by adopting the latest flushing toilets in his designs. In his hotel design entitled "De la distribution des maisons de plaisance" (Distribution of entertainment houses) in 1738, Blondel introduced not only small storage rooms for commodes and clothes but also described the plans and sections of the latest flushing toilets (Figure 6).[66]


Figure 6   Jacques-François Blondel, Plan and sections illustrating a flushing toilet.

Source: The Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities, California.

By providing detailed drawings of the toilets, Blondel demonstrates their use for improving hygiene, which other architects were not interested in at that time. Eventually, he tried to incorporate the recent flushing toilet into his building designs. This drawing indirectly showed his interest in addressing hygienic matters in the first half of the eighteenth century.

In early twentieth century Korea, the hygienic conditions of Japan's Sogaichi 租界地 (the Japanese residential area in Korea) were considered to be more progressive than other areas in Korea. These advanced hygienic systems came to affect other areas in Hansŏngbu. Because Japan had already experienced epidemics, especially cholera, before colonizing Korea, they recognized the significance of modern hygienic systems, which Japan only deployed in Korea's Japanese residential areas.[67] One of the Japanese resident areas, the Chin'gogae district in Seoul, conducted hygienic maintenance from the beginning, such as building public bathrooms along the streets in 1895 and crematoriums in 1907.[68] Regarding hygiene innovations, the Chin'gogae district served as a pioneering area compared to other places in Hansŏngbu. Hygiene affairs in Japanese resident areas in Korea were not only held to a higher standard, as evident in the enactment of laws and the establishment of different organizations, but also through more practical acts, such as constructing cleaner roads, water and sewage systems, and the installation of hygiene facilities. These movements played an important role in the changing aspects of modern architecture and urbanism in early-twentieth-century Korea.

In particular, the Chosŏn government began to create modern environmental streets. From 1895 in the Chin'gogae area, they began to regulate houses, creating rules regarding the location of houses so as not to invade the road line, specified the interval between houses, required a level road of sand and pebbles, and installed public bathrooms and lights.[69] Also, the government began to make new roads and water drains next to roads. They installed water and sewage systems from 1895 in earnest, preventing the public from placing garbage and sewage in the drainage systems. In particular, in the Japanese residential area, Japan installed public hygiene facilities, such as public bathrooms, barber shops, dumping grounds, and crematoriums. This represented a major change in urban life in which, previously, most Koreans used riversides or streams to wash their hair or bathe.

Japan continuously improved roads within their settlement in Korea from the end of the nineteenth century until the beginning of the twentieth century (from 1895 until 1910). The improvement of roads was directly related to the Japanese people's efficient entry into the new settlement in Korea. Another reason why the road improvement was urgently needed was to resolve hygienic problems related to drainage within the Japanese settlement. For example, Chin'gogae district, a

typical Japanese settlement, was muddy to the extent that travel was impossible in summer when it rains heavily, so the solution to the drainage problem was essential for an effective traffic and transportation system. However, drainage and sewer problems were correlated with hygiene rather than road management.[70]

The efforts of exploring hygienic issues were seen in newly constructed buildings in Korea during the Japanese colonial period. *Kwansa* and *sat'aek* were built and distributed based on modern patterns or types, technology, methods, materials, facilities, furniture, and fixtures accompanied by modernity.[71] Housing lot development and awarding individual numbers, which are the basis of modern spatial work, belonged to this category. Japanese attitudes and methods supplying the *kwansa* or *sat'aek* were different from general work to build Korean houses. As stated above, easy accessibility to use public transportation and road construction based on public works and modern hygiene theory, waterworks, and drainage, and gas supply facilities were important considerations for their design.

With the increasing social concern for healthy living environments in cities, the two Korean architects Park Gilryong (1898–1943) and Park Dongjin (1899–1981) began to consider hygienic issues in housing. They believed that there were many problems to overcome in traditional Korean houses to answer to the needs of modern life. Among those problems, the most urgent and significant matter was sanitation and hygiene. In particular, Park Dongjin strongly argued that traditional kitchens and bathrooms should be improved for sanitation and hygiene:

> Kitchen: The kitchen is the most difficult place to design in a housing plan. It is the place where we generate our family's energy and affect our family's life. … [In terms of the kitchen] the whole area of the kitchen should be managed in a hygienic way. It should be not only well-lit and ventilated, but also prevent the decomposition of plants and dust.

> Bathroom: In our housing, we have not recognized the importance of the bathroom; instead, we have scorned it. … We should improve the *sanitary structure and facilities* [emphasis added]. A Western flush toilet is perfect and ideal for us.[72]

Park Gilryong also indicated the problems of traditional Korean kitchens. Park published articles entitled "Kaesŏn ŭi p'iryosŏng 개선의 필요성 (The Need for Improvement)" in the *Tong-A Ilbo* in August 1932. When Park discussed the improvement of kitchen spaces, his analysis of traditional kitchen spaces focused on "hygiene," because kitchens are strongly related to the foods which we have in our everyday life. To solve the hygienic problem in traditional kitchens, Park insisted on modernizing Korean traditional kitchens' ventilation and lighting systems, because kitchen spaces were infected very easily by pathogenic germs

and bacteria. Park insisted that a better ventilation and lighting system would help kitchens be a better hygienic space.

> A kitchen is an organization rather than just a place to preserve the foods that support our lives. ...
> Incomplete kitchens influence our family's hygienic matters and take away our housewives' happiness. ...
> As I already mentioned, our traditional kitchens are incomplete. It is easy for germs to breed because the lighting and ventilation are imperfect.[73]

In this sense, from the early twentieth century, a few advanced Korean architects began to consider hygienic issues in the context of modern architecture and urbanism, and they tried to overcome such problems in the construction of their architecture, paying particular attention to kitchens and bathrooms, which were the most important in addressing hygienic concerns in the early twentieth century.

Conclusion

From the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, in Korean society, there were continuing conflicts between tradition and modernity. In particular, a few modern concepts, such as "science," "efficiency," and "hygiene," were implemented into Korean architecture and urban contexts, and these concepts were important in forming new characteristics of modern Korean architecture and urbanism.

In the early twentieth century, active efforts to adopt the three concepts shaping modernity in Korean architecture were revealed not only through individual architects, but also from newly constructed buildings. A few Korean architects began to adopt the concept of science in architecture in earnest. In earlier times, Korean traditional architecture was not built to consider the framework of science. For example, the traditional Korean house (*hanok*) was built by carpenters who were educated in their construction skills by their elders through their own experiences. However, the concept of efficiency began to be implemented in traditional Korean house design through the "Centralized Housing Plan" of the "Movement of Housing Improvement". Therefore, considering scientific methods related to efficiency in architecture represented a paradigm shift from tradition to modern times. The late Chosŏn Dynasty also began to adopt the concept of hygiene in architecture to solve urban problems, such as exotic infections. Even if the hygienic concept was applied and discussed in the Japanese residential area first, modern Korean architecture began to adopt hygienic matters through their understanding of the context of Korean culture, and a few innovative and detailed realizations of hygienic ideas were embodied in modern Korean housing and urban contexts.

The details of efficiency and hygiene were also concretely embodied in *kwansa*, or *sat'aek*, which were extensively constructed in the early twentieth century before and after the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula began. It can be ascertained that these three concepts shaping the modern period were extensively revealed in newly built buildings in Korea during the Japanese colonial period and Korean architects' efforts towards the three concepts were adopted in Korean architecture and cities.

The development of modern ideas in modern Korean architecture enabled Korean society to solve its social and cultural problems, which had not been addressed by traditional methods. These Western concepts were adopted into Korea and into other non-Western societies, which began to adapt Western ideas in architecture. Even if architecture was a slow reflection of social changes, these changes were nevertheless embodied in modern Korean architecture and urbanism. These phenomena constructed the aesthetic of modern Korean architecture, and it made an authentic Korean society different from Western or Japanese modernity.

Notes

1. Acknowledgement: This research was adopted and developed from the author's doctoral dissertation "Origins of Korean Modern Architecture" from the University of Florida, 2016, and a part of this research was presented at the 13th Docomomo International Conference Seoul, 2014. I thank Dr. Hui Zou for his discussion of this manuscript in the early stage. I also received invaluable feedback on this essay from editors and anonymous peer reviewers of EJKS.
2. Assistant Professor, Hankyong National University, Gyeonggi-do, Korea, Email: seomyeng@gmail.com, seoms@hknu.ac.kr
3. Alberto Pérez-Gómez, *Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1983), pp. 285–291.
4. Sungsoo Song, "T'eillŏrijŭm ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng e issŏsŏ kisul ŭi wich'i," *Han'guk kwahak sahoe hak'oeji* 16. 1 (1994), p. 67.
5. Christine Frederick, *New Housekeeping: Efficiency Studies in Home Management* (Garden City, N.Y: Doubleday, Page & Company, 1913), pp. 3–13; Christine Frederick, *Household Engineering; Scientific Management in the Home* (Chicago, IL: American School of Home Economics, 1920), p. 8.
6. Younjung Do, *Kŭndae puŏkk ŭi t'ansaeng kwa imyŏn* (Seoul: Spacetime, 2020), p. 71.
7. Ryūichi Narita, *Kŭndae toshi konggan ŭi munhwa kyŏnghŏm*, trans. Mingyo Seo (Seoul: Puripari, 2011), p. 32.
8. The classification of the examples of *kwansa* 官舍 (official residences of Japanese ministries), *sat'aek* 舍宅 (company house), and *sat'aek* 社宅 (rental house) provided in Chosŏn before and after the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula was not strict. *Sat'aek* 舍宅 (company house) refers to a house built for public officials of public institutions or employees of public companies, and it was used as containing *kwansa*. Meanwhile, *sat'aek* 社宅 (rental house) primarily refers to a rental house where the employees or laborers of private companies that entered Chosŏn to make money or collaborate on the expansion or development of the

Japanese colony. *Sat'aek*, in this paper, is defined as *sat'aek* (舍宅) which means a company house. For the definition and classification of the above words; see the following research: Myung-Sook Kim, "Ilche kangjŏmgi Kyŏngsŏng-bu Sojae Ch'ongdokpu kwansa e kwanhan yŏn'gu." Masters thesis of Seoul National University, 2004.

9.   Mangil Kang, *Han'guk kŭndaesa* (Seoul: Changbi, 1984), pp. 281, 284.

10. Harold Miles Tanner, *China: A History* (Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Pub. Co., 2009), p. 397.

11. The author translated this quote. For a questionable published translation; see Laozi, *The Way of Life: According to Lao Tzu*, trans. Witter Bynner (New York, NY: TarcherPerigee, 1962), pp. 30–31.

12. *Tao Te Ching* (道德經) is a classic Chinese text originally created by Laozi in the sixth-century BC. This modern Chinese version is translated from the classic version of Laozi, Chapter 11, *Tao Te Ching* (道德經).

13. The National History Compilation Committee, *Han'guksa*, ed. the National History Compilation Committee (Seoul: Doosan, 2002), p. 379.

14. Alexandre Koyré, *Newtonian Studies* (London: Chapman & Hall, 1965), p. 24.

15. Dalibor Vesely, *Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation: The Question of Creativity in the Shadow of Production* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2004), p. 238.

16. Martin Heidegger, "The Origin of the Work of Art," *Basic Writings* (New York: Harper & Row, 1977), p. 184.

17. Ernesto Grassi, *Kunst und Mythos* (Hamburg: Rowohlt, 1957); Ernesto Grassi, *Die Theorie des Schönen in der Antike* (Cologne: DuMont, 1980).

18. Vesely, *Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation*, p. 249.

19. Martin Heidegger, "The Question Concerning Technology," *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*, trans. William Lovitt (New York, NY: Garland Pub., 1977), p. 35.

20. Vesely, Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation, p. 307.

21. Vesely, Architecture in the Age of Divided Representation, p. 292.

22. Sigfried Giedion, Space, Time and Architecture: The Growth of a New Tradition (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 16.

23. Seongrae Park, "Kaehwagi ŭi kwahak suyong," *Kŭnhyŏndae Han'guk sahoe wa kwahak*, ed. Yeongsik Kim, Geunbae Kim (Seoul: Changbi, 1998).

24. Kang, *Han'guk kŭndaesa*, p. 285.

25. Don-son Woo, "Kwahak undong kwa ŭi kwallyŏn ŭro pon Pak Kilyong ŭi chut'aek kaeryang-non," *Taehan kŏnch'uk hak'oe nonmunjip* 17.5 (May, 2001), p. 82.

26. Wonbok Hyeon, "1930 nyŏndae ŭi kwahak kisurhak chinhŭng undong," *Minjonk Munhwa Yŏn'gu* 12 (1977), p. 270; Kyungah Lee, *Kyŏngsŏng ŭi chut'aekchi*. House: Seoul, 2019), p. 74.

27. Gilryong Park, "Ch'anggan e chehaya," *Kwahak Chosŏn* (June, 1933), pp. 3–4.

28. Gilryong Park, "Chigu saengsŏngsa," *Kwahak Chosŏn* (July and August, 1933), pp. 37–38, 40; Gilryong Park, "Uju e taehan koch'al," *Kwahak Chosŏn* (March, 1935): pp. 7–8; Gilryong Park, "Mulchil ŭi chŏngch'e," *Kwahak Chosŏn* (April, 1940): pp. 21–23.

29. Gilryong Park, "Saenghwal ŭi kwahak'wa e taehaya," *Kwahak Chosŏn* (June, 1935), pp. 15–17; Gilryong Park, "Saenghwal ŭi kwahak'wa e taehaya (sok)," *Kwahak Chosŏn* (August and September, 1935): pp. 12–13, 6; Gilryong Park, "Saenghwal ŭi kwahak'wa e taehaya che 3," *Kwahak Chosŏn* (November, 1935): pp. 7–9; Gilryong Park, "Saenghwal ŭi kwahak'wa e taehaya 2," *Kwahak Chosŏn* (November, 1941).

30. Woo, "Kwahak undong kwa ŭi kwallyŏn ŭro pon Pak Kilyong ŭi chut'aek kaeryang-non," p. 83.

31. Gilryong Park, "Saenghwal ŭi kwahak'wa e taehaya che 3," p. 9.

32. Hyeon, "1930 nyŏndae ŭi kwahak kisurhak chinhŭng undong," p. 261.

33. Changbok Lim, Han'guk ŭi chut'aek, kŭ yuhyŏng kwa pyŏnch'ŏnsa (Seoul: Dolbegae, 2011), p. 237.

34. Hana Kim, "Kŭndaejŏk ŏrini kaenyŏm ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa chugŏ ŭi pyŏnhwa," Master thesis of Seoul National University, 2006.

35. Jacques-François Blondel, Cours d'Architecture ou Traité de la Décoration, Distribution et Construction des Bâtiments (La Veuve Desaint: Paris, 1771).

36. Pérez-Gómez, Architecture and the Crisis of Modern Science, p. 67.

37. Jean-François de Bastide, *The Little House: An Architectural Seduction*, trans. Rodolphe El-Khoury (New York, NY: Princeton Architectural Press, 1996), p. 25.

38. Chulsoo Park, *Han'guk chut'aek yujŏnja 1* (Seoul: Mati, 2021), p. 23.

39. Bong-Hee Jeon and Yongchan Kwon, *Hanok kwa Han'guk chut'aek ŭi yŏksa* (Paju: Dongnyok, 2012), p. 173.

40. Sochun, "Yero pogo chigŭm ŭro pon Sŏul chungshim seryŏk ŭi yudong," *Gaebyeok* 48 (1924), pp. 58–59: The typical *kwansa* zones in this paper are the present Pil-dong, Namhak-dong, Mok-dong, Ju-dong, Inui-dong, Anguk-dong, Bukchang-dong, and Yongsan.

41. Park, *Han'guk chut'aek yujŏnja* 1, p. 27.

42. Myung-Sook Kim, "Ilche kangjŏmgi Kyŏngsŏng-bu Sojae Ch'ongdokpu kwansa e kwanhan yŏn'gu," p. ii.

43. Gilryong Park, "Chu e taehaya sam," *Tong-A Ilbo* (August 11, 1932), p. 5.

44. Gilryong Park, "Chosŏn chut'aek chapkam," *Chōsen to kenchiku* 20.4 (April, 1941), p. 15. The Translation was adopted from the author's previous conference presentation paper: Myengsoo Seo, "The Recognition of Tradition in Early Modernity: A Cross-Cultural Approach to Korean Modern Architecture," *Proceedings of the 13th Docomomo* International Conference Seoul (2014): p. 403.

45. When Korean architectural historian Changbok Lim conducted a research project titled "A space analysis of modern hanoks in Seoul area," Lim had a chance to explore Ikdo Min's house. At that time, Lim found a very unique *ondol* system in Ikdo Min's house. Lim was told from the owner of this house that it was designed by Gilryong Park. Lim argued that Park was the only Korean architect who had ability and techniques to design this kind of building at that time. From Changbok Lim, *Han'guk ŭi chut'aek, kŭ yuhyŏng kwa pyŏnch'ŏnsa*, p. 153.

46. Leonardo Benevolo, *The Origins of Modern Town Planning* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 1980), p. 130.

47. Todd Henry, *Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea, 1910–1945* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 2014).

48. Ryūichi Narita, *Kŭndae toshi konggan ŭi munhwa kyŏnghŏm*, p. 32.

49. Yeonkyung Lee and Sungwoo Kim, "1885–1910 nyŏndae Hansŏngbu nae Ilbonin kŏryuji ŭi kŭndaejŏk wisaeng saŏp ŭi shihaeng kwa toshi pyŏnhwa," *Taehan kŏnch'uk hakhoe nonmun-jip* 28.10 (October, 2012), p. 215.

50. Dongwon Sin, "Chosŏnmal k'ollera yuhaeng, 1821–1910," *Han'guk kwahaksa hak'oeji* 11.1 (1989), p. 57.

51. Cholera occurred seriously in 1879, 1885, 1886, 1888, 1890, 1891, 1895, 1902, 1907, 1909 and 1910.

52. Sin, "Chosŏnmal k'ollera yuhaeng, 1821–1910," p. 57.

53. Keijō-fu, *Keijō fushi 2*, pp. 582, 705.

54. Hyungwoo Park, *Chejungwŏn* (Seoul: Body and Mind, 2002), p. 89.

55. Geauchul Lee, "Kŭndae ihaenggi kŏnch'ukpŏb ŭi toip kwajŏng yŏn'gu," *Taehan kŏnch'uk hakhoe nonmun-jip* 29.5 (May, 2013): 172–173.

56. "The Iwakura Mission was a visit to the United States and Europe between 1871 and 1873 by many of the top officials of the new Meiji government." It originated from Emperor Meiji to President Grant on Iwakura Mission, 1871, Adopted from the official translation as reproduced in *The New York Times* (5 March, 1872).

57. Jongchan Lee, "Meiji Ilbon esŏ kŭndaejŏk wisaeng ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwajŏng, 1868–1905," *Taehan ŭisa hak'oe* 12.1 (June, 2003), p. 36; Yunjae Park, "Hanmal Ilche ch'o kŭndaejŏk

ŭihak ch'egye ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa shingmin chibae," PhD dissertation of Yonsei University, 2002, p. 12.

58. William Hung, *A Concordance to Chuang Tzu* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1956), p. 62.

59. Translated by author, with an advice by Hui Zou.

60. Minsu Lee, *Han'guk ŭi kŭndae sasang* (Seoul: Samsung Publishing, 1992), p. 89. Originated from Okgyun Kim, Chido yangnon, p. 1882.

61. Gyuhwan Shin, *Chilbyŏng ŭi sahoesa Tong Asia ŭihak ŭi chae palgyŏn* (Paju: Sallim Press, 2006).

62. Gyuhwan Shin, *Chilbyŏng ŭi sahoesa_Tong Asia ŭihak ŭi chae palgyŏn.*

63. Park, "Hanmal Ilche ch'o kŭndaejŏk ŭihak ch'egye ŭi hyŏngsŏng kwa shingmin chibae," pp. 11–17.

64. Lee and Kim, "1885–1910 nyŏndae Hansŏngbu nae Ilbonin kŏryuji ŭi kŭndaejŏk wisaeng saŏp ŭi shihaeng kwa toshi pyŏnhwa," p. 221.

65. Henry, *Assimilating Seoul: Japanese Rule and the Politics of Public Space in Colonial Korea*; Lee and Kim, "Modern Sanitary Work and Urban Changes in Japanese Populated District in Seoul from 1885–1910," p. 215.

66. Nicolas Le Camus de Mézières, *The Genius of Architecture, Or, the Analogy of That Art with Our Sensations*, trans. David Britt (Santa Monica, CA: Getty Center for the History of Art and the Humanities, 1992), p. 39.

67. Lee and Kim, "1885–1910 nyŏndae Hansŏngbu nae Ilbonin kŏryuji ŭi kŭndaejŏk wisaeng saŏp ŭi shihaeng kwa toshi pyŏnhwa," p. 217.

68. Keijō-fu, *Keijō fushi 2*, pp. 634, 690.

69. Lee and Kim, "1885–1910 nyŏndae Hansŏngbu nae Ilbonin kŏryuji ŭi kŭndaejŏk wisaeng saŏp ŭi shihaeng kwa toshi pyŏnhwa," p. 222.

70. Please see the following research about Chin'gogae: Yeonkyong Lee, *Hansŏngbu ŭi 'chakŭn Ilbon' Chin'gogae hokŭn Ponjŏng* (Seoul: Spacetime, 2015): 204–229.

71. Myung-Sook Kim, "Ilche kangjŏmgi Kyŏngsŏng-bu Sojae Ch'ongdokpu kwansa e kwanhan yŏn'gu," pp. 56–69.

72. Dongjin Park, "Uri chut'aek e taehaya sibo," *Tong-A Ilbo* (4 April, 1931), p. 4.

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Different Cinematic Interpretations of *Ch'unhyangjŏn*: The Same Korean Identity[1]

GÁBOR SEBŐ Visiting Scholar, Korea University (RIKS)

Abstract

The article examines the classic Korean folklore fable, 춘향전 (春香傳), *Ch'unhyangjŏn* (*The Fragrance of Spring*), *The Tale of Ch'unhyang*, through the lens of three different successful movie adaptations produced in North and South Korea. Respectively, Yu Wŏn-chun and Yun Ryong-gyu portrayed *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (1980) in its modest "Juche realist" North Korean film style, whereas Im Kwŏn-t'aek depicted his work, *Ch'unhyang* (2000), in a contemporary liberally and daringly revised version, while the romantic portrayal produced in North Korea by the South Korean film director, Shin Sang-ok, in *Love, Love, My Love* (1984), is performed from a human-oriented and entertaining perspective filled with musical ingredients and brave images of love. The study aims to demonstrate how the story is diversely interpreted through the two divided film cultures by highlighting differences between collectivism and individualism, noting also that all three interpretations emerge from similar roots of cultural and national identity.

Keywords: *Ch'unhyangjŏn*, North Korean cinema, South Korean cinema, Korean national identity

Introduction

The paper analyzes how movie adaptations of the same story filmed in South Korea and North Korea differ on one level, and unmistakably reveal cultural kinship on another level, looking at variations in Korean cinema history of 춘향전 *Ch'unhyangjŏn* (*The Tale of Ch'unhyang*). Im Kwŏn-t'aek's 춘향뎐 *Ch'unhyangdyŏn* (*Ch'unhyang*, 2000) from South Korea, along with Yu Wŏn-chun and Yun Ryong-gyu's 춘향전 *Ch'unhyangjŏn* (*The Tale of Ch'unhyang*, 1980) from the North are used as case studies.

All the re-imaginings have their own distinct narrative techniques in their visually contrasting sets and soundtracks. Still, regardless of the explored works' periodical, aesthetical, and ideological mismatches, the article simultaneously highlights the commonness of Korean identity, through the recognition of shared traditional cultural roots, and the estrangement between the two Koreas brought about by the division of the nation in the post-Liberation period. The main contrast is discernible in the various depictions of romance intermingled with political ideology. While Im emphasizes the direct expression of the two main protagonists' emotions from an individualistic perspective by depicting the couple's *amour*, the North Korean filmmakers emphasize the apotheosis of this, through a didactic approach, spouting messages of collectivism, focusing on Ch'unhyang's political awareness serving as an ideal model of the socialist heroine coupled with revolutionary spirit.

The study additionally unpacks the special combination of theatrical and cinematic compositions suggesting a common link and a cultural bridge between Im's *Ch'unhyang* (2000) and another popular movie alteration from North Korea, 사랑 사랑 내 사랑 *Sarang, sarang, nae sarang* (*Love, Love, My Love*, 1984) directed by the abducted South Korean director Shin Sang-ok. Im transferred the original story into contemporary South Korean society with the target of reaching both young domestic and global audiences by a unique blend of traditionalism, through the use of Korean classic *p'ansori* performance staged in and utilizing young Korean spectators in scenes shot in an actual theater in Seoul, Chŏngdong (or Jeongdong) Theater, together with a modernity epitomized by the shape of cinema itself. Nonetheless, the tone of the two productions' soundtracks draws a clear divergence. Im achieved this duplexity not only through the pictures of the visual landscape, and the perfect synchronization between virtual illustration of the initial script and musical rhythm of the *p'ansori* narration, creating a perfect visual text for the conventional musical storytelling, but also through the use of daring images of the intimate scenes between Ch'unhyang and Mongnyong. Specifically, Im returns to the roots of traditional *p'ansori* artistic form. In *Love, Love, My Love* (1984), Shin brings new elements of a Western-style musical

experimenting with a special hybridity of dance, theater, inventive music, and the visual illusion of cinema to advance entertainment and implement a new design of enjoyment among North Korean moviegoers.

Taken together, the essay attempts to collect a selection of *Ch'unhyangjŏn* variations made for the silver screens of North and South Korea, emphasizing their novel forms in terms of musical performances, their depictions of romance and entertainment, and the adjustment of the narrative into their own cinematic environments. Accordingly, the article aims to overcome the general misconceptions about North Korean film aesthetics, culture, society, and identity. The paper concludes that despite the obvious dichotomies among the movies studied, the contrast of individual vis-à-vis communal concepts due to their ideological division well acknowledged, the crossing points stress the common links between the two Koreas, underlining the shared legacy of traditional national identity.

The Symbolic Representation of *Ch'unhyangjŏn* in Korean Culture

The abiding classic 춘향전 *Ch'unhyangjŏn* has been a pure representation of Korean culture and identity, a true example of Korean ethno-national sensibility, on both sides of the Korean Peninsula. In total, there have been more than twenty (probably even more), film, animation and TV drama variants of the esteemed tale made in North and South Korea. The sheer quantity of *Ch'unhyangjŏn* adaptations stands as evidence for the reputation of the genuine story starting from the earliest era of Korean cinema. Not to mention that historical dramas (사극 *sagŭk*) and period drama pieces (시대극 *sidaegŭk*) have always enjoyed extreme popularity in Korean cinema and television histories. Most of the film versions have touched the hearts of Koreans through the decades, in spite of depicting different ideologies and political division.[2] This section focuses on the common characteristics of the folktale, as perceptible in the two Koreas' variations, and providing ample justification for the *two countries—one nation* concept. Thus, the Korean classic fables, like *Ch'unhyangjŏn*, 홍길동전 *Hong Kildongjŏn*, 심청전 *Shimch'ŏngjŏn*, 온달전 *Ondaljŏn*, or 운영전 *Unyŏngjŏn*—particularly, ending with a tragedy—can be future joint cultural symbols for inter-Korean discussions, being shared by both nations, in which the common origins of Korean identity are preserved in spite of conflicting creeds and political ideologies.

Ch'unhyangjŏn, which literally means *The Fragrance of Spring*, is the Korean nation's most esteemed folklore tale stemming from shamanistic ritual performed in the Namwŏn area probably created during the Sukjong period (1661–1720) of the Chosŏn (Joseon) dynasty. The fable is based on the *p'ansori* artistic play of

춘향가 *Ch'unhyangga*.[3] *P'ansori* is a traditional musical and theatrical narration of the Korean Peninsula performed by a singer (*sori kun*) or *p'ansori* artist (廣大 *kwangdae*, performer/peripatetic minstrel) and a drummer (*kosu*) as the accompaniment to the *p'ansori* artist providing the rhythm and guiding the narrative's mood and atmosphere.[4] The classic performance has initially been a form of folk entertainment for the lowborn as the elite yangban class has embraced it only since the nineteenth century. *Ch'unhyangjŏn* has been shifted with the flow of time and new generations of Korean storytellers, as recognized in numerous movies, animated films, and theatrical, dance and traditional *p'ansori* performances.

The original legend begins with an undesirable woman who died unwanted and unmarried. By the practice of exorcism, her spirit is reincarnated in a beautiful body. The classic tale delineates the significant cultural resistance against the corruption of their noble oppressors who robbed and exploited the peasantry. The majority of the lower class, who created myths and legends, such as *Ch'unhyangjŏn*, dreamed of a classless society, yet they did not oppose the structure of the Korean kingdom, being loyal to the archaic traditions and values of Korea. As the word "folklore" concerns the traditional beliefs, myths, legends and customs of the commoners, the contents of these stories have been created for hunger for a quasi-utopian, but at least a fair and just, society for *hoi polloi*.[5]

The touching love story of Ch'unhyang Sŏng and Mongnyong Lee, which most of the Koreans know by heart, focuses on the couple's separation due to their social status differences and illicit marriage, which is prohibited by the laws of Chosŏn. Nonetheless, this is not the sole violation of the period's rule, the tale additionally includes Mongnyong's disobedient social manner to his father by violating filial piety (효도 *hyodo*) through premarital sexuality and the secret marriage of the couple. Therefore, breaking the period's social rules is rebelling against the principle moral code of the Chosŏn dynasty. The illegal marriage of our couple is *de facto* a criticism of the mendacity of the ruling class. The protagonists fight against corruption facing the public and the exploitation of the people, personified by the antagonist new magistrate, Pyŏn Hakto. He does not only unfairly torture people, but he also desperately yearns to make Ch'unhyang his personal concubine. Likewise, Ch'unhyang's mother, Wŏlmae, behaves unethically, despite not being part of the ruling class, by allowing the couple to marry, hiding her daughter from Hakto's guards, and attempting to bribe them to protect her daughter. This is not to mention the personal servant and maid Pang Cha and Hyang Tan who conceal their masters' romance. It is clear that characters from all social classes bear their own guilt or act immorally in a Confucian society where the people are obligated to keep strict rules and simply present their best selves to the community. The story, thereby, functions as a social-critical mirror

suggesting that keeping the expected omnipresent pure image of Korean society has been cumbersome for all social groups through the centuries. Recognizing the violation of these ancient sacred morals in Korean traditions is essential to inspect how different filmmakers from North and South depicted romance and relationship of the main leading figures. The major disparity between the versions of both sides is distinguishable in the various illustrations of love intermingled with political ideology.

Mongnyong Lee is suggested first as an ideal Korean male, coming from a respected aristocratic yangban family, who is diligent, well educated, and adept at sports like archery. Not to mention, he is fair and humble to those beneath his station, to the commonalty, and faithfulness (충실 *chungsil*) to his love, Ch'unhyang Sŏng. The female protagonist is a testament to the ideal standard of Korean beauty and shares a framework of moral values with Mongnyong, such as conjugal fidelity, maintaining her purity and being ultimately willing to sacrifice herself for their common love. Nevertheless, beyond the sugarcoated surface, the couple is forced to intentionally act against the social morals of the period.

Furthermore, exotic and mystical elements were included to balance and even dissolve the strife between conventional Korean society and the actions of the protagonists. The main potential conflicts with Chosŏn law and politics are disentangled by inserting spirituality, namely, in the form of fortune-telling, in the dreams of Wŏlmae about a blue dragon, or in the nightmares of Ch'unhyang in the prison, mentally preparing for her death.[6] Although it is mainly Shin Sang-ok who emphasized the supernatural ritual basics of the classic tale most significantly among Korean filmmakers, it is undeniable that the original narrative has been strongly bent towards spirituality, the fortune-teller's dream interpretation "as a semiotic code to predict the future," standing in close relation to Korean shamanism, which is not solely relevant to the *Ch'unhyang*-story *per se* but also to the traditionalism of ancient Korean society.[7] It is Mongnyong who must resolve these bad omens by finding and marrying Ch'unhyang to fulfill his social duty and political destiny through demolishing corruption and providing justice for the peasantry.

Scholars in the fields of languages and cinema, Keumsil Kim-Yoon and Bruce Williams point out, esteemed Korean folklores, for instance 심청가 *Shimch'ŏngga* (*The Tale of Shim Cheong*), 춘향가 *Ch'unhyangga* (*The Tale of Ch'unhyang*), or 흥부가 *Hŭngbuga* (*The Tale of Heungbu*), refer to the "contradiction of *han* (sadness and hope)."[8] More directly, adhering to one's filial duty is an example of the origins of *han*. These social and family expectations are the roots of much of the social and personal anguish that is continuously endured by *han* within Korean society. Several scholars aimed to define the communal identical sadness of the Korean

nation. Hye Seung Chung describes *han* as "deep-rooted sadness, bitterness and longing prolonged injustices and oppression."[9] The scholar follows others asserting *han* had been ensued by foreign invasions of Chinese, Japanese and Western powers, the patriarchal Confucian traditions enforcing Korean women to be muted and objected by the male-dominated society. The feudal caste system during the Chosŏn-era, and later the modernization process of the military regimes in the twentieth century strengthened further these social discrepancies against the female. Moreover, Chung adds that experts like Ahn Byung-Sup and Rob Wilson allege "Korean melodrama hinges upon the national sentiment of *han*, a slippery and subtle term that, depending on context, denotes everything from 'resentment' and 'lamentation' to 'unfulfilled desire' and 'resignation.'[10] Chung even provides different translations of the word. The *han* is *hen* (hate) in the Chinese language, *kon* means bear a grudge in Japanese, and *horosul* implies sorrowfulness in Mongolian.[11] In the same monograph edited by the film scholar Kathleen McHugh and the anthropologist Nancy Abelmann, both Soyoung Kim and Kyung Hyun Kim use the term of "pent-up grief" for *han*.[12] The parallel with the analogous Japanese term *mono no aware* (the empathy or "bittersweet realization of the ephemeral nature of all things"), used for expressing the awareness of impermanence, is easily recognizable.[13] The film historian of Japanese cinema, Donald Richie, calls the Japanese *mono no aware* as a "sympathetic sadness … a serene acceptance of a transient world" or the film historian David Bordwell translates it to mean "the pathos of things."[14] The Japanese approach includes both short-term and longer, deeper sadness of life, whereas the Korean term mainly refers to the aforementioned deep-rooted sadness towards past history.

The Dawn of Diverse *Ch'unhyangjŏn* Film Interpretations

The social, moral, and political messages of *Ch'unhyangjŏn* received newfound recognition at the birth of Korean motion pictures (활동 사진 *hwaltong sajin*) during the Japanese occupation, the so-called Chosŏn cinema.[15] The *Ch'unhyangjŏn*-boom, in accordance with the intensity of national resistance—arose from the cumulative nationwide feeling of the lost-nation wound—from the Korean side and "colonial nostalgia" from the Japanese side, has its roots in different reasons and served divergent goals in the roles of the colonizer Japan and the colonized Korea.[16] The first movie version of *Ch'unhyangjŏn*, which was also the first *sagŭk* produced, entitled 춘향전 *Ch'unhyangjŏn* (*The Story of Ch'unhyang*, 1923) (Figure 1, on the left) directed by the Japanese Hayakawa Koshū Matsujiro (早川孤舟), which was followed by a 1935-version with the same title, directed by Lee Myŏngu, was the first sound and widescreen film in Korea that made the movie a cult classic

Figure 1   Left: The first sagŭk, the first movie version of *Ch'unhyangjŏn* (*The Story of Ch'unhyang*, Hayakawa Koshū Matsujiro, 1923).

Middle: The second version of *Ch'unhyangjŏn* (*The Tale of Ch'unhyang*, Lee Myŏngu, 1935)—the first Korean sound (talkie) film—starring Mun Ye-bong as Ch'unhyang and Han Il-sŏng as Mongnyong.

Right: The North Korean film icon, Mun Ye-bong, in her early role of Ch'unhyang in *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (1935).

within the record of Korean cinema (Figure 1, in the middle). The leading role of Ch'unhyang was played by the later North Korean film icon, Mun Ye-bong (Figure 1, on the right). The Korean audience demanded a new variation, which was released again in the Korean language in 1941, titled 반도의 봄 *Pando ŭi pom* (*The Spring of the Korean Peninsula*, Lee Pyŏng-il, 1941), which was labeled as "pro-Japanese," also regardless the fact that the film's narrative solely used the *Ch'unhyangjŏn*-story as a frame.[17] By that time, *Ch'unhyangjŏn* symbolized the first spark of "the hope and passion of Korean filmmakers."[18]

The meaning of the story has been extended and intensified during these years, namely that Korea, via the metaphor of the vulnerable and tormented body of Ch'unhyang, had already suffered at the hands of foreign suppressors.[19] Eventually, the character of Ch'unhyang started to personify the exploited Korean nation. The heroine's last wish in prison is that only Mongnyong may take her body after her execution, allowing no other soul to touch it. In this way, Ch'unhyang's corpse would symbolize the whole Korean Peninsula *per se*, enduring unfair hardships brought about by their exploiters.[20] *Ch'unhyangjŏn*, thereby, developed into an iconic national symbol, reinforcing both the nationwide movement for independence from the Japanese invaders, and underlining the collective national identity of all Korean people.

In the post-Liberation period after 1945, two sharply different variants began to emerge on the northern and southern sides of the peninsula. On the one hand, the tale served as a common link that connected members of the nation and epitomized national resistance efforts for an independent Korea before the division. On the other hand, *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* has gradually appeared

to represent the divided country since the Liberation era. The mere volume of *Ch'unhyangjŏn*-retellings is an example of how nationwide folktales and artistic works, signifying the common traditional treasures and the pride of Korean national identity at an earlier stage of Korean history, took different paths under divergent political-ideological conditions. These distinct translations are the direct outcome of the separated identities of the divided Korea.

Transforming Korean identity, recently traumatized by Imperial Japan, has produced spatial, ideological, and cultural gaps between the two Koreas. Both sides began to shape and create their own readings of pieces of history and culture, including literature, music, cinema, and dance, yet falling under the origins of the same Korean umbrella. The emergence of ideological competition was clearly detectable from a political point of view through the film varieties of *Ch'unhyangjŏn*.

The first main prominent South Korean versions, such as 춘향전 *Ch'unhyangjŏn* (*The Tale of Ch'unhyang*, Lee Gyu-hwan, 1955), 춘향전 *Ch'unhyangjŏn* (*The Love Story of Ch'unhyang*, Hong Sŏng-ki, 1961) and Shin Sang-ok's 성춘향 *Sŏng Ch'unhyang* (Shin Sang-ok, 1961)—that emphasizes Ch'unhyang's yangban status by mentioning her family name in the title—experimented with portraying the hardships endured by Ch'unhyang from an individual and gendered perspective, focusing on personal human emotions. These South Korean examples form sharp contrasts with their northern counterparts, which are class- and community-oriented, as perceptible by the position of social classes, the central object of the story.

Lee Kyu-hwan's 춘향전 *Ch'unhyangjŏn* (*The Tale of Ch'unhyang*, Lee Kyu-hwan, 1955) was created to revive and give an intense push for the post-war South Korean film industry, as film scholar Darcy Paquet notes.[21] Kim Hyang made his variant, 대 춘향전 *Tae Ch'unhyangjŏn* (*The Story of Great Ch'unhyang*, Kim Hyang, 1957) and An Chongwa shot 춘향전 *Ch'unhyangjŏn* (*The Tale of Ch'unhyang*, An Chongwa, 1958), illustrating the Korean cultural hunger for many Ch'unhyang-stories after the Korean War.[22] There was a course of Koreanization for both Koreas, starting from the post-colonial period and eventually the division of the nation in the same year (1945).[23] The era demanded abundant movie formats and cultural alterations of the classic story, thus, the cinema revolution and *Ch'unhyangjŏn*-fever did not stop in the 1960s and 1970s in South Korea.

Since the nation was first divided, there has been an ongoing competition for *Ch'unhyangjŏn* film remakes between North and South Korea. The question over which of the different adaptations are contenders has always remained the same: who is more loyal to the ancient and ethno-national Korean conventions, and who represents the truest, the most patriotic and the purest Korea?[24] The competition over Korean national identity is palpable to this day, despite the external factors,

such as the global ideological contest in the bipolar political arena induced by Cold War, and in spite of the ever-changing domestic priorities since the two nations' foundations (1948). Nowadays, North Korea attempts to keep pace with South Korean contemporary popular culture by imitating South Korean-style music, films, and TV dramas adjusted into its own media culture.[25]

The Evolution of *Ch'unhyangjŏn* in North Korean Cinema

This part of the paper focuses on the two North Korean cinematic re-modelings of *Ch'unhyangjŏn* produced in 1980 and 1984. I aim to highlight the main differences in terms of the portrayal of romance, the notion of individualism contra conformity. Further, the section seeks distinctness in practices of music between the traits of Yu Wŏn-chun (인민배우 "People's Actor" who also played the antagonist Hakto in the 1980-version), and Yun Ryong-gyu's *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (1980), representing softer and slower lyric song-based revolutionary opera-esque Juche realist patterns[26] vis-à-vis Shin Sang-ok's more dynamic and more intense westernized musical-shaped original soundtrack,[27] in his liberally revised cinema, *Love, Love, My Love* (1984), shot four years later.

The Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) produced at least three famous films from the esteemed tale of *Ch'unhyangjŏn*. The first one was released in 1959, 춘향전 *Ch'unhyangjŏn* (*The Tale of Ch'unhyang*, Yun Ryong-gyu, 1959), which became highly attractive among domestic and global audiences.[28] The scriptwriter was Kim Sŭng-ku and the movie was recognized for its cinematography at the Moscow International Film Festival.[29] Nevertheless, the classic tale as a 창극 *ch'anggŭk* (Korean traditional opera performed on theatrical stage and accompanied by *p'ansori*), was played in Pyongyang even before the foundation of the country, in May 1948.[30]

Following the Soviet-North Korean co-production of 형제/동방의 아침 *Hyŏngje/ Tongbang ŭi ach'im* (*Brothers* a.k.a. *The Morning of the East*, Ch'ŏn Sang-in, Yun Ryong-gyu, 1957), which was shot in color and ultimately banned,[31] Yun Ryong-gyu filmed his first *Ch'unhyangjŏn* picture in color, which was deemed sensational at the time.[32] Unfortunately, the movie fell out of favor in North Korea after the purge of the leading actress, U In-hŭi, as she was found guilty of "gross immorality" and was publicly executed.[33] Thus, the earliest North Korean *Ch'unhyangjŏn* movie version is difficult to acquire outside of the country. However, the movie's aesthetic qualities were domestically recognized, and North Koreans have remembered the film fondly throughout the decades as their attention might have been drawn to the romantic narratives, rather than to the repetitious political notes, similar to the perceptions of those Japanese journalists who had the chance to watch the movie

during their travel in the country, and who "were surprised how free it seemed of propaganda value."[34] Nonetheless, these folk themes became completely absent from the silver screen of the mid-1960s and the 1970s until their rebirth in the 1980s.

In North Korea, the cinematic versions of traditional folk stories, like 불가사리 *Pulgasari* (Shin Sang-ok, and after his name's removal: Chŏng Kŏn-cho, 1985), 심청전 *Shimch'ŏngjŏn* (*The Tale of Shim Cheong*, Kim Rak-sŏp, 1957, and Shin Sang-ok, 1985), 홍길동 *Hong Kil Dong* (Kim Gil-in, 1986), 온달전 *Ondaljŏn* (*The Tale of Ondal*, Man Ha-ung, 1987) and 림꺽정 *Rim Kkŏkjŏng I–V* (Chang Yŏng-pok, 1987–1989), gained high popularity among North Korean moviegoers as the period of the 1980s allowed these pictures to be retold in forms of visually pleasurable film productions using vivid colors, eye-catching flashy costumes, new types of soundtrack, brave adventure and action scenes coupled with fast cutting, thrill and fear of the monster projected on the North Korean silver screen for the first time, and even daring sexuality, spreading beyond the limits and visual habits of North Korean spectators. It is also true that none of these pictures could have been produced without the direct input of Shin Sang-ok in the mid-1980s.

This does not mean that Juche realist politico-ideological directives were completely excluded from these works, but political substances could be wrapped in more enjoyable forms and more fashionable compositions. Still, the North Korean audience followed these newly designed movie illustrations focusing more on the engrossingly delightful components, for instance, emotional romantic backdrops, eye-catching action sets and breathtaking special effects, rather than the deeper symbolical political notes.

During the Korean folklore renaissance of the 1980s, twenty-one years later of Yun Ryong-gyu's film success with *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (1959), the veteran director created *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (1980), in a close collaboration with his younger filmmaker fellow, Yu Wŏn-chun,[35] rewritten for the screen by the scriptwriter of the first film, Kim Sŭng-ku, together with his colleague, one of North Korea's most well-known film writers of the period, Paek In-chun.[36] The didactic words are associated with entertaining romantic and lyrical cinema. The character of Ch'unhyang is portrayed as a breadwinner and self-supporting heroine—as immediately represented by the introductory scene right after the opening title delineating Ch'unhyang at her weaving loom—who does not depend on Mongnyong's appeal but works for the community while staying meek to viewers so far as showing her emotions to the hero is concerned. She is faithful by keeping her chastity for Mongnyong and directly rejecting the approach of the feudal and corrupt Hakto. Yu and Yun's *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (1980) accentuates the diligent worker and Juche-realist type of female idol, bringing not solely the Juche excerpts but also the "truly Korean" *sobak ham*, the innocence and

ethno-national purity.[37] The film further considers romance from the point of view of Ch'unhyang, a character the audience can connect to, filtering out the repetitive aphorisms of the previous era.[38]

Shin Sang-ok's North Korean redesign, *Love, Love, My Love* (1984), went beyond the portrayal of love in the 1980-adaptation, highlighting the couple's courtship and gendered representation, stressing Ch'unhyang's vulnerable and erotic female beauty. It makes direct references to sexuality, including longing gazes of the male protagonist and antagonist, objectification of the female body, and daring physical contact between Ch'unhyang and Mongnyong.

The usage of the word love in a movie title was unusual before Shin's arrival in the country's film industry, but not unprecedented (even though he stated its opposite), demonstrated by the movie titles 미래를 사랑하라 *Mirae rŭl sarang hara* (*Love the future!*, Ch'oe Nam-sŏn, Ch'ŏn Sang-in, 1959),[39] 사랑의 기적소리 *Sarangŭi kijŏksori* (*The Miracle Sound of Love*, 1975), the Kim Jŏng-suk-biopic 미래를 꽃피운 사랑 *Miraerŭl kkotp'iun sarang* (*The Love That Blossomed the Future*, Pak Hak, 1982), or 사랑의 노래 *Sarang ŭi norae* (*The Song of Love*, Rim Ch'ang-bŏm, 1982), and by Han Sŏrya's literary work, 사랑 *Sarang* (*Love*, 1960). Even though that Shin's film title directly recalls the most famous strophes of 사랑가 *Sarangga* (*Love Song*) from the original work, *Ch'unhyangga*, Shin was indeed the first to use a repeated emphasis of the term *love*, stressing the "first utterance of love."[40] It must have referred to the open amorous theme of the story, which even Shin was concerned about in the beginning. Still, as Kim Il Sung admired the movie, Shin's fears were unfounded.[41] The portrayal of courtship is accomplished by intimate closeness and the erotic scene of undressing by the female character, which Shin had already used in his South Korean translation (1961) (Figure 5, bottom left), "exceeding commercial popularity" like his later North Korean revision.[42] Sexuality is additionally embodied in the negative figure of Hakto, who is shown to be a perverted sexual predator, longing to touch the body of Ch'unhyang immediately while gasping rapidly and hysterically. In the light of these concepts, the entire narrative returns to the framework of the initial storyline, a fabulous love story, making the folktale fashionable and timeless on the Korean Peninsula.

In certain respects, the figure of Mongnyong in Shin's *Love, Love, My Love* (1984) follows the male-centered discourse and therefore the film breaks away from the traditional North Korean approach due to the fact that the previous version (1980) focuses on Ch'unhyang as the main dominant character. Furthermore, Yu and Yun delineated her as an independent and strong working heroine, while Mongnyong remained in the background, in sort of a supporting role, in Ch'unhyang's shadow. Conversely, the domination of the male protagonist as a fair reformer and idealized leader—echoing the transition of Kim Jong Il's succession period since

the Sixth Party Congress in October 1980—is stressed in a broader way in *Love, Love, My Love* (1984) at the cost of Ch'unhyang's sovereign status depicted in the 1980-variant. Adding to it, Mongnyong's active return in *Love, Love, My Love* (1984) invokes Shin's South Korean retelling from 1961. Ch'unhyang becomes passive again in Shin's North Korean remake, whereas Mongnyong represents the dominant active player. The South Korean director shatters this tendency by positioning Mongnyong's role to the fore and by objectifying Ch'unhyang. The facial expression and the lustful gaze of the actor Lee Hak-ch'ŏl illustrates masculine and charismatic features, whereas the focal point was Ch'unhyang's own charisma, acted by Kim Yŏng-suk, in Yu and Yun's work.[43]

Ultimately, Shin hints to male-domination even from the very beginning: the title, *My Love*, stressing the subject-object correlation of possession, nodding to the vertical hierarchical dependence between the genders just as was done in his South Korean formula (1961). Shin's choice to use the possessive adjective in singular first person (내, my), instead of the plural first person (우리, our), was not accidental but used to underline the individualistic focus of Mongnyong on his partner Ch'unhyang, lessening the often used collective form on both sides of the peninsula, *ouri* (our), reflecting the shared national and filial identity. Similar to Shin's *Sŏng Ch'unhyang* (1961), Mongnyong is introduced mainly from low-angle shots, spotting him at a high position from the beginning, locating his residence on the top of the hills, while he is staring at Ch'unhyang swinging in the forest, placed directly below Mongnyong. Not merely the camera movement underlines the superior (male)—subordinate (female) relationship, but also the couple's first meeting at the tomb of Ch'unhyang's father, which is a rare moment in Korean cinema history.

Shin's North Korean variant (1984) contains the aforementioned rare sight where Ch'unhyang secretly visits the monument of her deceased father with her personal maid, Hyang Tan. When Mongnyong approaches the location with his servant, Pang Cha, the girls have to hide from the eyes of the male visitors. The scene underlines both the momentum of the couple's first encounter and the contro-versy coupled with social criticisms of Confucianism, namely that Ch'unhyang must hide and deny her aristocratic origin, despite her noble status inherited from her yangban father's bloodline. These themes of internal persistence and tacit rebellion are two of the central social conflict messages of the film, underscoring the social desire of Ch'unhyang to be considered a yangban but not a kisaeng (female entertainer), as Shin also highlights by using Ch'unhyang's family name in his South Korean version's title (1961). In this scenery, Mongnyong maintains the straightforward male gaze, which the girl cannot receive with her own gaze due to her constant embarrassment. The allegory appears in both of Shin's telling

illustrations, stating the female is expected to be faithful and self-sacrificing while passively waiting for the active male.

In the light of the previous arguments, *Love, Love, My Love* (1984) is not an exclusive story fastening solely on *her* (Ch'unhyang) record and stressing her self-determination against the unfair system, as is the case in *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (1980). Shin's hugely different northern reconstruction of the film is rather about *their* (Ch'unhyang and Mongnyong's) common romance.

Regarding the elite yangban social class criticism, the 1980-model attempts to install propaganda class conflict elements through imagery of the *entire* noble yangban class exploiting the lower social groups, including Chunhyang. On the contrary, Shin's northern form (1984) and the southern versions only refer to Pyŏn Hakto (and his inner circle), as the main source of the social injustice and unfairness but do not attempt to criticize the necessity of the ancient Korean royal dynasties. The northern adaptations do not depict detailed images of a morally good and legally fair yangban character, like the father of Mongnyong, whereas the southern ones go the opposite direction, as they often begin with an opening scene of his portrait. Im Kwŏn-t'aek's *Ch'unhyang* (2000), as discussed in detail in the next part, can remind us of how the North Korean filmmakers tailored the story to bear their core political messages in the scene when Mongnyong exclaims "Our enemy is not a person. The enemy is the *class* that divides us."[44]

Bringing the Traditional Folktale into the Modern Society of South Korea

This section of the paper follows the ballad of Ch'unhyang and Mongnyong adapted into the contemporary culture of South Korea reimagined by Im Kwŏn-t'aek. The aim of *Ch'unhyang* (2000) was to reach both young Korean and worldwide audiences of all ages through a cultural dissemination of Korean traditional artistic performance, *p'ansori*. Im was able to reach the special mixture of traditionalism and modernism in a stylish form via daring means of intimate pictures, and the perfectly synchronization of visual illusions and the rhythm of the *p'ansori* soundtrack creating a balance of music and images at the same time. The reader will be able to observe how the director of South Korean national cinema innovatively combined the components of at least two artistic fields, theater and cinema. First, theatrical pieces have been strongly involved using the classical play of *p'ansori*, shaping dramatic atmosphere by installing young viewers literally set in the Chŏngdong Theater. Second, the visual illusions of cinema are reflected in modern high-tech South Korean society. As the current filmic redesign of *Ch'unhyang* (2000) exemplifies, the national cinema of the South

became a gifted and powerful cultural force reflecting a traditionally conservative society in which social and cultural norms have understandably become much less timid and more liberal by the dawn of the twenty-first century.

Im Kwŏn-t'aek made his greatest domestic financial and critical success with the movie 서편제 *Sŏp'yŏnje* (*Sopyonje*, 1993) narrated in *p'ansori* for the first time in his filmography. In addition to the film being a box-office hit, it won six Korean Film Critics' Awards and the Grand Bell Award for Best Film. His aim was to revive the unique narration style in modern South Korean cinema, specifically in a technologically advanced digital arena. Im's novel creation of mixing the traditionalism of *p'ansori* with the technical modernity of cinema has created "*Sopyonje* Syndrome" (or *Sopyonje* fever), among Korean filmmakers.[45] These hybrid patterns have been continued in Im's ninety-seventh work,[46] *Ch'unhyang* (2000), to "recreate the popular operatic tradition, which originates from local culture, as a modern art form for a global audience."[47]

Despite the resemblance of the revival of conventional cultural values, artistically symbolized by *p'ansori*, Im's two masterpieces are mutually distinct in locating the role and the visualization of the worldwide unique Korean musical performance. In the words of Lee, "*Sopyonje* rewrote Korean film history by generating a harmony between film critics and ordinary film-goers which helped orchestrate the successful realisation of the old tradition in a contemporary form,"[48] while *Ch'unhyang* (2000) "tends to silence the authoritative voices of the subjects"[49] as it mainly spotlights the visualization of *p'ansori*'s sound and lyrics, nonetheless, "largely dismisses *imyŏn*, that is, the inner dimension of the narrative,"[50] recalling the concept of Chan E. Park. The domestic box-office failure of *Ch'unhyang* (2000) may be located in the lack of representation of resentment (*han*) and excitement (*shinmyŏng* or *hŭng*) of the period.[51] Despite the negative reception from South Korean audiences, the film scholar praises Im's work for its experimental creativity: the "reversed relationship between sound and image (…), the perfectly coincident rhythms between acting and music, the synchronised editing according to the dictates of the songs, and the visualisation of lyrics concerning beautiful landscapes and affectionate love, present new artistic experiences to a global audience."[52]

Im's *Ch'unhyang* (2000) created an innovative mixture of traditional Korean nationalism, accompanied by *p'ansori*, and modernization via the tools of cinema and a bold depiction of eroticism. *P'ansori*, as an "intangible treasures of national culture," initially epitomized all social classes of Korea, from the nobility to the peasantry.[53] Moreover, the *p'ansori* narrator was typically a member of the lowborn, living as a street performer, who gained the respect of "the government as well as the society."[54]

Im Kwŏn-t'aek has received more positive film critics than financial success with *Ch'unhyang* (2000).[55] The long static takes and landscape shots linger on the idea of national cultural heritage, preserving original Korean traditions and roots. It was done to purposefully contrast a period of the time when the film was made. It was the dawn of the age when the Korean identity was repressed by the computerized and virtualized world of modernization, countering its ancient Korean traditions, like *p'ansori*. Im illustrated this massive gap in culture and deeply-rooted conflict between the older generations of South Korea, who respected more the Confucian ethics, and Generation Z, who turned to the digital world.

Im, the nation's director, targeted nationwide young moviegoers and international spectators to advance Korean ethno-nationalism in virtue of a modernized dissemination of the almost forgotten Korean traditional art of *p'ansori*. As Lee mentions, the cultural approach of Im's contemporary "truly Korean" films, like *Sopyonje* (1993), 축제 *Ch'ukchae* (*Festival*, Im Kwŏn-t'aek, 1996), *Ch'unhyang* (2000), 취화선 *Ch' wihwasŏn* (*Painted Fire*, Im Kwŏn-t'aek, 2002) (and since then: 천년학 *Ch'ŏn-nyŏn-hak* [*Beyond the Years*, Im Kwŏn-t'aek, 2007]), attempts to show that "the current renaissance of Korean national cinema lies in his pursuit of creating a national identity (…) his persistent cinematic enquiry into the organ of Korean-ness encourages the younger generation of film-makers to redefine cultural tradition through new creativity and experimentation."[56] Eventually, these works did not encourage solely the generation of young filmmakers, but also called out to a younger cinematic public, represented by the high demand of Korean classic folklore contents in modernized film versions caused by the aforementioned "*Sopyonje* Syndrome."

Im's presentation of a young audience in the theater is obviously not a coincidence, but because of cultural educational purposes to raise awareness of the unique but, sadly, fading Korean cultural values. The film was intended to be viewed as a visual reading for the future Korean and global generations in an entertaining format. The catchy and trendy erotic scenes, the vivid colors, the perfect harmonization and editing of sound and image were created not only to delineate the deep and passionate (sometimes wild), love of Ch'unhyang and Mongnyong in the most realistic and authentic form but also to attract worldwide and national viewers, and to find a way back to traditional Korean treasures, having "influenced major trends in New Korean Cinema by urging his [Im's] audiences to think about what they have lost through processes of modernisation and political change (…) in response to the simultaneous cross-trends of globalisation and localisation in world film culture."[57]

Im Kwŏn-t'aek's national cinema, counting *Ch'unhyang* (2000), as "truly Korean" for a cinematic reader, marked by Im's signature style of static shots,

long or extreme long takes, and long panoramic shots (pan) on the Korean scenery lionizing and celebrating the country's spatial beauty and Korean-ness that in Mun-yŏng Hŏ's words "can be a unifying concept in defining the collective identity of the people, regardless of their experiences of historical and social processes of Westernisation and modernisation."[58] As such, Im's aim was to call both the domestic and international audiences towards the kernel of Korean-ness, as Chŏng-nam Sŏ goes further.[59] *Ch'unhyangjŏn* and Korean-ness itself reveal the notion of the collective Korean beauty "as a universal aesthetic ideal," echoing the words of Chae-hyŏn Yi.[60] Manifold cinematic portrayals of the classic Korean beauty standards of Ch'unhyang are discernible opening from the stage of colonial cinema (Figure 1), through the North Korean film adaptations during the 1980s (Figure 3 and Figure 5), and closing with Im Kwŏn-t'aek's retelling from 2000 (Figure 2, Figure 4 and Figure 5).

Im's cinematic gem is a perfect example of hybridization between theater and cinema, on the one hand, and of modernity and tradition, on the other hand. Im has enabled the all-encompassing cinemagoers (both, inside and outside of the country), to use his film as an avenue to escape to the affectionate universe of Ch'unhyang and Mongnyong, depicted alongside the importance of conventional Korean values. The beginning of the movie immediately shows this polarity. The first sets during the opening credits portray the *p'ansori* singer Cho Sang-hyŏn, performing the introduction, accompanied by his drummer (*kosu*). The next cut, however, sharply turns to images of contemporary Seoul with modern buildings, cars, and crowds of running people. The film correspondingly ends up with cuts between the *p'ansori* narrator, signifying the traditional *past*, and the theatrical audience set in our *present* modern times, supporting an aesthetic ambience for the film. These opening and closing frames equivalently evoke the special mixture of tradition exemplified by *p'ansori* narrator and musical style, on the one side, and modernity, embodied in the contemporary theatergoers and cinema *per se*, on the other side. The two contrasting poles are reproduced differently in cinematographic terms.

At the beginning, the *p'ansori* narrating scene and the young viewers sitting in Chŏngdong Theater are sharply divided from each other. They are exhibited conjointly in the same frame only after the first five-minute-long opening sequence when the house (audience area) welcomes the singer and the drummer (Figure 2, top and middle). But until those moments, the two separated dimensions could hardly meet. In the backdrop when the narrator starts to discuss the length of the performance and introduces the location, the detached portrayals of the theatergoers and the singer allegorically keep mutual distance in two distinct spatial poles, traditionalism and modernity. The concluding part reveals the active

Figure 2   Rare meeting moments in Im Kwŏn-t'aek's *Ch'unhyang* (2000), depicting different spatial dimensions of the narrative in the same frame.

Top: Welcoming the audience by the *p'ansori* singer Cho Sang-hyŏn, displaying the two theatrical spaces of the *p'ansori* performers and the audience in the same frame.

Middle: Reunion of the two theatrical spaces at the end of the plot (and a couple of times during the movie).

Bottom: Superimposition of the three spatial arenas, the two theatrical and the cinematic virtual locations.

performer and the passive spectators in the same frame within a relatively short period of time, allowing the two spaces finally to reunite, after the cinematic plot finishes, played by the actual actors and actresses. Moreover, there is a rare moment when the close up of Ch'unhyang and the conjoined set of the theatrical audiences and the *p'ansori* performers are exposed in the same frame in super-imposition film technique (Figure 2, bottom). This final meeting of the three dimensions, namely the private and non-virtual spaces of the *p'ansori* narrator and the audience positioned in the theater, and the public (virtual) space of the

classic tale's filmic performance, suggests that the approach of the traditional *p'ansori* towards the viewers of modern times has been successfully achieved by the finale with the help of the realistic acting of the film stars in the virtual space of cinema.

Im Kwŏn-t'aek set *Ch'unhyang* (2000) where *p'ansori* stemmed from, namely Haenam, located in Chŏlla Province, recruiting Haenam locals for the film shoot, an endeavor akin to another genre hybridization: Shin Sang-ok's *Love, Love, My Love* (1984). Both directors not only mixed the genres of musical presence and historical costume dramas, they additionally combined factors of theater and cinema into one. While the majority of the *Ch'unhyangjŏn* interpretations narrate the fable in simple oral and common language forms, Im sent the legend back in time in service of the cultural memory of *p'ansori*. Shin Sang-ok's North Korean hybrid genre of the romance-musical introduces a dynamic and westernized pop culture-esque soundtrack by echoing his beloved American musicals, such as *My Fair Lady* (George Cukor, 1964) or *The Sound of Music* (Robert Wise, 1965). These themes are particularly detectable in the carefully choreographed mass dance settings, expressing collectivism and people's unity but not only from the North Korean perspective of socialist entity, but also the collective identity of belonging to one Korean nation, a sense of Korean national unity. These energetic crowd scenes are based on Korean folk dance elements, and catchy duets, that sounds and timbres stand in opposition to the tones of the repetitive strophes (stanzaic form) and slow tempo of the former off-stage structured lyrical North Korean revolutionary opera film and mainstream soundtrack forms.[61]

The earlier film music formats, performed for instance in *pangch'ang* (chorus), expressing the inner emotions of the protagonist and supporting "portability,"[62] unmistakably indicates kinship with the notion of the Stephanie Donald's socialist realist gaze (leader gaze) concept also performing into an off-screen space.[63] Both, off-stage lyrical performance and leader gaze, enhance the full commitment and unconditional fidelity towards the Great Leader (*suryŏng*)-cult through the innermost mental state of the main character, effectively intensifying the omnipresent ambience of Kim Il Sung. By contrast, Shin's soft musical melody, the dynamic dances, the vivid and sharp colors of hanbok, flowers, and the nature promote the vital life of the Korean people in a liberated and joyful way instead of permanent veneration for Party rights and responsibilities, in accordance with unconditional obedience towards the Leader. Turning back to the pace of Im's cinema, even though the typical tempo of *p'ansori* is slow, it does not lose its dynamism. The intense love, emotions, and the hardships of the couple masterfully shape the movie's spatial trinity: the play of the actors' performances, the *p'ansori* narrator, and the theatergoers.

Both Shin and Im used theatrical details in their visual storytelling. Shin built massive ink-written sets in the movie's memorable love dance backdrop, also echoing traditional Korean folk dance motives, where the hero and heroine play hide-and-seek among human-sized paperboards (Figure 3), drawn to resemble humans, providing a three-dimensional illusion of sitting in front of a theatrical stage and palpably being part of the audience, "promoting the hybridity of all forms of arts," like painting, theater (dance and performance), and film, coupled with the new Western-style of music.[64]

Likewise, the theatrical milieu has been utilized by Im. The leading divergence between Shin's and Im's applications, however, rests on the fact, while Shin solely (still, genuinely) composed the visual illusion of theatrical surroundings among film sets, Im shot these scenes *inside* an actual theater, openly depicting the theatrical stage with the *p'ansori* narrator and the drummer, and the house displaying the reactions of the technology-obsessed and digital-experience-demanding young spectators. The director, thereby, visually invites the moviegoers themselves to take seats in the theater portrayed in the film and brings them (us who watch the movie), to the visual space of the film, helping to unite with the theatrical public. The cinematic effect of "film in a film" (in this case, theater in a film), is quite impactful. The *mise en scène* in Im's work is complemented by the acclaimed *p'ansori* narrator artist, Cho Sang-hyŏn, who grows to be as crucial character in the movie as Ch'unhyang or Mongnyong. From the first cityscape moments


Figure 3   The love dance scene of Mongnyong (acted by Lee Hak-ch'ŏl) and Ch'unhyang (acted by Chang Sŏn-hŭi) in *Sarang, sarang, nae sarang* (*Love, Love, My Love*, Shin Sang-ok, 1984), combining the elements of dance, theater and cinema, providing the impact of a special combination of traditionalism (represented by sets and costumes) and modernity (symbolized by westernized musical-esque soundtrack, dance and the tool of cinema itself). The blend of collection of artistic variety (dance, music, theater, cinema, painting), cannot be separated but is presented within one single (and merged), performing space.

of the modern Seoul, where the young companion—as the major viewers of the theatrical house—arrives to watch the *p'ansori* performance, Im invents the cinematic-theatrical combination illusion in a two-in-one presentational setup. Im showcases the main figures of the theatrical show, the *p'ansori* narrator and the audience, like the main protagonists of the movie itself. The stylistic choice of the *p'ansori* narrative style is an effective artistic tool to emotionally influence both the theatrical young Korean audiences, shot in Chŏngdong Theater, and the actual cinemagoers (us). Im Kwŏn-t'aek succeeded in synchronizing modern Western cinematic techniques with tempo, speed, and Korean art of singing performance, hence, it became "the most ambitious project in Im's directing career, and arguably his masterpiece."[65]

By contrast, Shin's theater-cinema hybrid concept differs from Im's triangle formula, where the artistic spaces are detached and the private (non-virtual) spaces of the narrator and the audience could merely meet throughout the movie but could mainly reunite in the last minute. In Shin's design, the theatrical and the cinematic scenes are merged into one, being almost impossible to separate them. Figure 3 illustrates, the film actor and actress actually dance among theatrical sets,

Figure 4   Theater in cinema: Im Kwŏn-t'aek directly instills theatrical elements in *Ch'unhyang* (Im Kwŏn-t'aek, 2000), counting the straightforward portrayals of *p'ansori* narrator artist (top), Cho Sang-hyŏn, and the young audience (bottom), providing the impact of a special combination of traditionalism (represented by *p'ansori* performance), and modernity (represented by both, the cinema itself, and the young theatrical audience). The spaces of theater and cinema, in this adaptation, is palpably detached.

Figure 5   Intimate moments in different interpretations.

Top Left: The undressing scene in *Sarang, sarang, nae sarang* (*Love, Love, My Love*, Shin Sang-ok, 1984).

Top Middle: The gentle embrace of Mongnyong in *Love, Love, My Love* (1984), during the joy dance after the couple's togetherness as indicated by Ch'unhyang's different hairstyle and hanbok.

Top Right: Moderate depiction of romance in *Ch'unhyangjŏn* (*The Tale of Ch'unhyang*, Yun Ryong-gyu, Yu Wŏn-chun, 1980).

Bottom Left: Shin's first use of undressing in his South Korean adaptation, *Sŏng Ch'unhyang* (1961).

Bottom Right: Intimate moments of Im Kwŏn-t'aek's *Ch'unhyang* (2000), between the leading roles Ch'unhyang, acted by Lee Hyo-chŏng, and Mongnyong, performed by Cho Sŭn-gu.

thereby, the two spaces are unified into one hybrid shape, whereas the theatrical space is represented *only* by the *p'ansori* narrator and the audience in Im's work (Figure 4) but the cinematic depiction with the actual actors and actresses is implemented in a distant space. In the latter example, the two divided arenas of cinema and theater mainly meet at the concluding part, while Shin made his movie with a permanent combination of the two spaces.

Shin's *Love, Love, My Love* (1984) shocked the North Korean audiences with its brave images of courtship and the memorable undressing scene (Figure 5, top left)—recalling his South Korean version from 1961, depicted peeking behind from a transparent curtain (Figure 5, bottom left)—accompanied with Mongnyong's soft carnal breathing and Ch'unhyang's first silent moans of rejection. Notwithstanding, the tenderness of the lovers is plainly exemplified in the joy dance of the couple and gentle embrace of Mongnyong (Figure 5, top middle). Im's *Ch'unhyang* (2000) contains the most detailed and longest erotic portions of all the *Ch'unhyangjŏn* film adaptations. The sensual part starts with the characters' disrobing all the way

through to their love scene in the rain, not shying away from the protagonists' naked bodies, placing them on red and green silk blankets covers (Figure 5, bottom right) until the couple's final steamy farewell.

By contrast, *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (1980), not surprisingly, has no explicit sexual references to the first night suggested. Rather, Yu and Yun show the couple spending hours together painting, hence, direct physical interaction and mutual gaze contact between the couple is completely missing (Figure 5, top right), as commonly accepted in North Korean social terms. Shin's golden mean was planned to satisfy the conservative taste of North Korean audiences by showing something newly erotic via daring touches and direct references to the sexual moments but also was able to remain within the still tolerable political threshold. It is a matter of choice who considers either the candidly visible sensual scenes, as clear in Im's work, or solely the sexual hints and allusions without showing any straightforward carnal images, as striking in both Yu and Yun's picture (1980) and Shin's more erotic musical (1984).

Conclusion

The classic folktale of *Ch'unhyangjŏn* remains one of the most beloved Korean love stories, typifying ethno-national Korean identity (Korean-ness/Korean essence, *minjŏksŏng*), national pride and cultural heritage. It is not exclusively a simple love story, but the fable is also a social criticism of the Chosŏn dynasty's unfair class system, reflecting later Korean national development and liberation process. During the lengthy decades of Korean history, Ch'unhyang's resistance has become to symbolize the independence movement against aggressive foreign invaders. Cinema has brought the legend to life in manifold forms helped along by technical improvements. Its fame is still undiminished in cultural transformations of the early twenty-first century. The changes and details of the fable vary and are shaped by the own tastes and perspectives of filmmakers, *p'ansori* narrators, singers, theatrical, and television broadcast directors.

The paper analyzed the massive differences between North Korean and South Korean *Ch'unhyangjŏn* movie translations of the same story, specifically focusing on the films of *Ch'unhyang* (2000) produced in South Korea, and *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (1980) shot in North Korea. The most remarkable differences emerge in the illustration of Ch'unhyang. The major South Korean variants portray her as a vulnerable, shy, daydreaming kisaeng with full of sensitivity and erotic desires, who is subordinated by the male, positioning her as a passive character, being forever dependent on Mongnyong. Remarkably, Shin Sang-ok's vividly revised *Love, Love, My Love* (1984) does not share themes with its North Korean

counterpart, however, with Im Kwŏn-t'aek's redesign in terms of the portrayal of love and hybridity of assorted artistic performance styles, like theater, dance, music and cinema. Likewise, Shin could achieve a distinct perspective *in toto* into a much liberally reformist and progressive way, standing in clear contrast to Yu and Yun's moderate and purely innocent courtship illustration. Hence, Shin's remodeling demonstrates more parallels and resemblance with Im's composition but more distinctions with the earlier North Korean form.

North Korean cinema has been unfairly underrated, labeled mostly as homogeneous and simply propaganda cinema, an isolated virtual space within the global film chronicle. With a strong emphasis of the fact that North Korean cinema functions as political enlightenment for mass educational objectives *and* entertainment at the same time since its creation, Yu and Yun's *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (1980) is correspondingly a plain example of this polarity. On the one hand, the film indicates simplicity and natural purity of the hard worker heroine struggling agony from the frequent humiliation by the exploiter noble class archetype, Hakto, throughout the whole movie. The deserved cathartic resolution of the long-term torment, and the glorious revolutionary victory appears at the closing frame mainly by Ch'unhyang's self-sacrificial martyrdom (although her life is saved in the final moment on stage, she has been literally prepared for her early death), and her own independent fight against the corrupt system, and partly by the last-minute savior figure of Mongnyong. On the other hand, the film has been memorable for the North Korean audiences due to its distant, yet true depiction of romance.

Ch'unhyangjŏn contains all the necessary ingredients the North Korean regime needs to exploit their populace, such as romanticized revolution (in form of winning over the corrupt and pervert magistrate, Hakto), resistance of the exploited peasantry, and a politically active heroine who is able to accept possible martyrdom sacrificing herself for the homeland, which are in contradiction to South Korean cinema's *Ch'unhyangjŏn* film versions after the national division. The North Korean model from 1980 follows this track by portraying the strong independent female character coupled with revolutionary optimism and political consciousness. The movie downplays the power of the male figure, far weaker than his South Korean counterpart, by emasculating Mongnyong vis-à-vis Ch'unhyang's strength. Not to mention, in support of Juche consciousness, Ch'unhyang is set up as a sovereign care-taker of her aging mother, working in the kitchen and preparing her food, which have been rarely illustrated in any of the earlier forms, including the original legend. The image of the working Ch'unhyang, wielding class consciousness, is depicted as a socialist exemplar that can easily suppress the erotic emotions for greater and lofty purposes. While the central thrust of the plot revolves around the lovers in the South Korean variants (*their* story), the North

Korean adaptation emphasizes the role of Ch'unhyang (*her* story). Nevertheless, the North Korean audience has been captivated by a novel and daring approach to love rather one meant to conceal political communication.

The paper additionally aimed to include those film portions from Shin's daring North Korean composition, *Love, Love, My Love* (1984), which show palpable dissonances with Yu and Yun's, or, in particular cases, with Im's versions. At the same time, the study revealed what and how the main connections and closeness had been interwoven among the examined works. Shin's work, *Love, Love, My Love* (1984), seems to bring traits of the two other analyzed works' characterizations of Ch'unhyang as Shin's *juste milieu* Ch'unhyang-figure follows the patterns of Confucian shyness and purity at first glance (as depicted in the earlier North Korean version), whereas later she gradually accepts the advances of Mongnyong by returning and requiting his physical contact and intimate gazes (as Im portrays her in a far more daring way). Concurrently, it is the antithesis of the previous North Korean *Ch'unhyangjŏn*-cinema, made by Yu and Yun in 1980, which focused on the politicized revolutionary romanticism of Ch'unhyang rather than the couple's courtship. The success of the earlier version, shot in 1980, primarily stemming also from the love plot, indicated the North Korean leadership that the moviegoers wanted to see less-politicized but more humanized romance with *real* emotions (but not over-acted implausible imitations) coupled with fun and immediate catchy melody. Shin went farther than simply a gentle hint to love. Considering these features, he was able to transform collectivism into individuality, a rarely deemed concept in North Korean cinema. Shin's work was one of the first (but most probably, not the very first) North Korean pieces that showed open and explicit sexual reference, including the erotic male gaze, objectification of the female body, moments of undress, and direct physical contact between both genders in a reckless way. Ultimately, only a very few directors were able to experience similar cinematic impact on both sides of Korea, something achieved only by Shin Sang-ok.

The article's other heavily underlined and important movie analysis was Im Kwŏn-t'aek's transliteration, *Ch'unhyang* (2000), that is the most overtly liberal translation via open portrayals of naked bodies and figurative language in forms, or erotic metaphors (both through *p'ansori* texts and cinematography), yet the film reawakens the roots of the story's genuine performance by masterfully hybridizing genres, and adopting traditional Korean narration of *p'ansori*. The film additionally attempts to comment on the growing social exclusion and isolationism of the age. The use of explicit sexual contents aimed to depict romance in the most realistic and humanized way, attracting global audiences and reaching young generations. Aside from that, the *raison d'etre* of these brave pictures is to support social critical voices—thereby can be deemed as a rebellion (or at least,

an open judgment)—against the socially destructive and painful side of Chŏson and Confucian social and moral laws (embodied in *han* and *hwappyŏng*),[66] which not merely burdened and pressured the full contentment of the young couple's true love but also jeopardized Ch'unhyang's own life and survival. At the same time, the film thoroughly and genuinely details the positive results and traditional customs of the Chosŏn dynasty including education, poetry, and the practice of ancient religious shamanistic elements.

Im found success by using the Korean national treasure, *p'ansori*, and adapting this nearly-forgotten traditional performance into a twenty-first century treasure, a masterpiece that criticizes the modernization of the period, by mixing special ingredients of a theatrical play and a cinematic work, identical with Shin Sang-ok's *Love, Love, My Love* (1984). Yu and Yun's northern variant (1980) portrays Ch'unhyang as a revolutionary female protagonist trumpeting the North Korean socio-political values in a historical costume drama, complemented by the classic style of emotion-centered lyric songs.

As we have seen, *sagŭk* narratives coupled with their politico-ideological aspects have diversified over the decades on both sides of the Korean Peninsula. Still, one common link between the North and the South has not changed since the genre's birth during the colonial era. These national treasures, dreamed onto the silver screen, have consistently and purposefully maintained their fragrance of ethno-nationalism as the substance of traditional Korean collective identity. The timeless story of *Ch'unhyangjŏn* has been told and screened in abundant forms throughout the decades in the two Koreas and has remained one of the most leading Korean love stories, representing the heritage and pride of a shared Korean national identity.

Acknowledgments

Notes

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2. It is widely affirmed that *Ch'unhyangjŏn* film adaptations have enjoyed high reputation among Korean audiences in the two Koreas since the colonial era until our present, as Hyangjin Lee also states, "The popularity of the Ch'unhyang story among film-makers is obvious in both South and North Korea. Specific aspects of the folktale that have inspired numerous film adaptations (…)." Hyangjin Lee. *Contemporary Korean Cinema: Identity, Culture and Politics* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), p. 74. She adds that the second adaptation of the story (1935) was also "the first commercial film made in Korea," bringing about "the perception of film as a popular entertainment among the general public." Lee. *Contemporary Korean Cinema*, p. 72. Likewise, Steven Chung underscores the popularity of the famous folklore story by its "rich cultural-historical text, both in its latent presentation of problems of gender, class, and political ethics and in its enduring popularity and openness to adaptation and revision." Steven Chung. *Split Screen Korea: Shin Sang-ok and Postwar Cinema* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2014), p. 191.

3. Lee. *Contemporary Korean Cinema*, p. 69.

4. Initially, the term *kwangdae* related to a masked performer; "later, to public entertainers." Peter H. Lee. "The Road to Ch'unhyang: A Reading of the Song of the Chaste Wife Ch'unhyang," *Azalea: Journal of Korean Literature & Culture*, 3, 2010, p. 281.

5. As Hyangjin Lee also suggests, "The essence of the folk-tale embodies the popular desire of a Utopian society." Hyangjin Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema," in *New Korean Cinema*, eds. Chi-Yun Shin and Julian Stringer (New York, NY: New York University Press/Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2005), p. 63.

6. Shamanism has deeper foundations in Korean culture and identity than Chinese-originated Confucianism. Shin Sang-ok perfectly utilized these spiritual elements in his Korean folktale adaptations on both sides of the Korean Peninsula. In the South, Shin made movies based on folktale adaptations of *Ch'unhyangjŏn* entitled 성춘향 (Sŏng Chunhyang, 1961) and 심청전, *Shimch'ŏngjŏn, The Tale of Shim Cheong*, under the title of 효녀심청, *Hyonyŏ shimch'ŏng* (*Shim Ch'ŏng*, 1972). The revival period of Korean classics during the 1980s provided a unique opportunity for Shin to remake his own telling of these folk stories in the North as well, entitled *Love, Love, My Love* (1984), and *The Tale of Shim Cheong* (1985). In addition, his last North Korean movie direction (at the same time, the first and last monster movie in the DPRK), is about the legendary iron-eating monstrous creature, originally set in Songdo (now: Kaesŏng), 불가사리 *Pulgasari* (1985). With regards to his North Korean *Ch'unhyangjŏn* direction, *Love, Love, My Love* (1984), Shin depicted dream-like hallucinations, nightmare scenes and spiritual images, originated from the original story's shamanistic rituals, including the ancient ritual ceremony to expel evil spirits (儺禮 *narye*), through abstract and surrealist voice distortions, realistic female screams, coupled with slow motion. The special video effects in the scene of Ch'unhyang's nightmares and visions of the broken mirror (symbol of the bad luck), scarecrow (linked to exorcist rituals), falling mountain, and typhoon on the sea (meaning of chaotic change of nature referring to apocalypse), bringing formalist and avant-garde elements, were rarely used before due to the principle of Juche art excluding abstract and formalist contents. Hyangjin Lee also asserts this correlation in Shin's movies stating he "introduces supernatural elements into the film text (…) and Shin resorts to the indigenous folk beliefs, such as fortune-telling and dream sequences

that transcend the logic of naturalism and has a strong grip on Korean spiritual life" to resolve the potential problem of the couple, their publicly disapproved and secret marriage, including the sexual relationship at their first night, despite their social class gap. As Lee details, "Ch'unhyang's involvement with Mongnyong is presented as predestined by forces beyond her control" from the beginning of the movie, when Ch'unhyang meets the blind fortune teller. Or, we should consider Wŏlmae's strange dream in which "a blue dragon entering Ch'unhyang's room thick with smoke and then flying away in the air, holding Ch'unhyang in his mouth." In the prison-scene, these visions also haunt Ch'unhyang. As Lee finishes this argument, "The unearthly elements serve as an effective means to justify their unusual marriage: their meeting and marriage are the result of the play of inexplicable forces, and humans must obey the fate befalling them. These superstitious motifs are not non-existent in other films, but Shin utilizes them most heavily." Lee. *Contemporary Korean Cinema*, p. 78.

7.   Lee. "The Road to Ch'unhyang," p. 360.

8.   Kim Yoon Keumsil and Bruce Williams. *Two Lenses on the Korean Ethos: Key Cultural Concepts and Their Appearance in Cinema* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2015), p. 45.

9.   Hye Seung Chung. "Toward a Strategic Korean Cinephilia: A Transnational *Détournement* of Hollywood Melodrama," in *South Korean Golden Age Melodrama: Gender, Genre and National Cinema*, eds. Kathleen McHugh and Nancy Abelmann (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2005), p. 121.

10. Chung. "Toward a Strategic Korean Cinephilia."

11. Chung. "Toward a Strategic Korean Cinephilia," p. 122.

12. Soyoung Kim. "Questions on Woman's Film: *The Maid*, *Madame Freedom*, and Women," in *South Korean Golden Age Melodrama: Gender, Genre and National Cinema*, eds. Kathleen McHugh and Nancy Abelmann (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2005), p. 190. Kyung Hyun Kim. "Lethal Work: Domestic Space and Gender Troubles in *Happy End* and *The Housemaid*," in *South Korean Golden Age Melodrama: Gender, Genre and National Cinema*, eds. Kathleen McHugh and Nancy Abelmann (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2005), p. 208.

13. Dave Afshar. "What Is Mono No Aware, the Japanese Love for Impermanence?" Accessed 27 January, 2021. https://theculturetrip.com/asia/japan/articles/what-is-mono-no-aware-the -japanese-love-for-imperance/.

14. Chung. "Toward a Strategic Korean Cinephilia," p. 122.

15. Korean cinema during the Japanese colonial period is mostly labeled as 조선영화 Chosŏn cinema (or colonial Korean cinema). At the same time, North Korea also refers to its own cinema under the same title, as 조선영화 Chosŏn film.

16. Nayoung Aimee Kwon. "Conflicting Nostalgia: Performing *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (春香傳) in the Japanese Empire," *Journal of Asian Studies*, 73.1 (2014), p. 118.

17. Yoo Sungkwan (Korean Film Archive). "Korea's Classical *Chunhyangjeon* (The Story of Chunhyang) Made into Film," Accessed 12 June, 2020. https://www.google. com/culturalinstitute/beta/exhibit/wqwyhvsv.

18. Yoo Sungkwan (Korean Film Archive). "Korea's Classical *Chunhyangjeon* (The Story of Chunhyang) Made into Film."

19. As Hyangjin Lee borrows the metaphor of the female body and the suppressed image of the Korean nation in the post-Liberation era from the work of David James and Kyung Hyun Kim, "The figuration of female characters as victims of oppressive Confucian patriarchy and social change envisages the female body as a metaphor for the post-colonial status of the nation (James and Kim 2002)." David E. James and Kyung Hyun Kim (eds.). *Im Kwon-Taek: The Making of a Korean National Cinema* (Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press, 2002). Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema," p. 69. Furthermore, my hypothesis is also confirmed by Nayoung Aimee Kwon who wrote about

the Japanese theatrical interpretation of *Ch'unhyangjŏn*, directed by Tomoyoshi Murayama accomplished with his Shinkyō Theater Troupe in 1938. The scholar indicates, the figure of Ch'unhyang "had been coded as a metonym for the lost nation itself while remaining a national 'tradition' to be protected from the infiltration of the foreign, the attempt to modernize it—especially at a time when modernity was often seen as synonymous with imperial Japan and the West—was met with strong opposition as being 'inauthentic betrayal.'" Kwon. "Conflicting Nostalgia: Performing *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (春香傳) in the Japanese Empire," p. 136.

20. As Kwon also points out, "It is not without significance that such gestures of simultaneous essentialization and exoticization of colonized Korea were contested over the female body of Ch'unhyang. Paralleling the fate of the eponymous tale itself, Ch'unhyang, its heroine, was appropriated for nationalist and imperialist desires. The body of Ch'unhyang became the locus of contradictory contentions for these critics." Kwon. "Conflicting Nostalgia: Performing *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (春香傳) in the Japanese Empire," p. 136.

21. Darcy Paquet. "*Christmas in August* and Korean Melodrama," in *Seoul Searching: Culture and Identity in Contemporary Korean Cinema*, ed. Frances Gateward (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2007), p. 45.

22. Lee. *Contemporary Korean Cinema*, pp. 72–73.

23. Koreanization swiftly transforms cultural sensibilities from defending Japanese colonial politics to radical Korean nationalism.

24. According to the official North Korean propaganda, the country has always preferred to be considered as the truest and purest Korea, overtaking the Southerners in racial chastity and holding a special position in North Korean culture and arts. Brian Myers, for instance, writes about the importance of white color in clothing and painting along with the snow-covered mountains (especially the sacred spatial location, Paektu Mountain), symbolizing the chastity of the North Koreans' bloodline vis-à-vis the "contaminated" South. Brian Reynolds Myers. *The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters* (New York, NY: Melville House, 2011), pp. 60–61, 89 (pages from the e-book version). Tatiana Gabroussenko also discusses the portrayal of the southern brethren, through propagandist lenses of manifold North Korea literary works in the *northern paradise–southern hell* context, in her book *Soldiers on the Cultural Front: Developments in the Early History of North Korea Literature and Literary Policy* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawai'i Press, 2010), pp. 43–44, 96–99, 119–122.

In addition, there is a striking story demonstrating the above-mentioned North Korean notion. During the inter-Korean diplomatic talks between South and North Korean generals in 2006, the South Koreans explained to their northern counterparts that the farmers in the South were increasingly marrying women from foreign countries. A northern general declared "[o]ur nation has always considered its pure lineage to be of great importance, I am concerned that our singularity will disappear." The South Korean general named these mixed marriages as a "drop of ink in the Han River," lessening the significance of these separated cases. On the other side, the northern response affirmed that "[s]ince ancient times our land has been one of abundant natural beauty. Not even one drop of ink must be allowed." This obsession with national purity and superiority is reflected through many forms in North Korean culture and arts. The *Chosun Ilbo* and Digital *Chosun Ilbo*. "Two Koreas' Top Brass Resort to Racist Mudslinging," Accessed 31 October 2020. http://web.archive.org/web/20060528101309/http://english/chosun/com/w21data/html/news/200605/200605170016.html.

25. As Joseph Nye and Youna Kim refer to other sources and claim, "The Korean Wave has finally made its way into isolated North Korea despite tight controls set by the regime's authority (Kim 2007 and 2011). In recent years, cases of defections have continued to arise, while the means of access to the Korean Wave popular culture has expanded through the

use of digital technologies and mobile phones in North Korea (Daily NK 2011b; Washington Post 2017)." Joseph Nye and Youna Kim. "Soft power and the Korean Wave," in *South Korean Popular Culture and North Korea*, ed. Youna Kim (London: Routledge, 2019), p. 47. In the book referred to, several other authors, like Tahe Yong-ho, Weiqi Zhang, Micky Lee, Ahlam Lee, Sandra Fahy, Sunny Yoon, Elaine H. Kim, Hannah Michell, Kyong Yoon, Jahyon Park, Stephen J. Epstein, and Christopher K. Green, detail, from different aspects, how South Korean popular culture, including cinema, has attracted the North Korean population, mainly the so-called *jangmadang* (market places) generation, in recent decades.

26. In a nutshell, Juche (coming from the Japanese word *shutai*, meaning *subject/main body/main idea*—主體思想), stresses the importance to North Korea of political independence, national dignity and pride, the mastership of the people (subjectivity in thought), self-sufficiency in economics, and militaristic self-defense. It is most often (mis)translated simply as "self-reliance," however, it was far from a real concept or theoretical construct at the beginning, but rather stressed the promotion of national characteristics of Korean traditions and priorities in the cultural policies of the DPRK, as could be perceived in Kim Il Sung's first Juche speech, held on 28 December 1955. When Juche became the official doctrine of the regime, it functioned more as a pliable propaganda instrument for the successful isolation policy than a genuine, coherent ideology, which is also apparent in most of the North Korean movies through the indispensable elements of hailing Kim Il Sung himself (almost in *every* work) compared to the rare mentions of the word "Juche." The role of Juche is overestimated and overthought by most outsiders, while the constant canonization of the *suryŏng*-cult (Great Leader/Kim Il Sung-centeredness/Kimilsungism) is mistakenly considered less. The main method of Juche realism (cultural and artistic extension of Juche) is "how to best represent 'Korean essence' (*minjŏksŏng*), that was simultaneously nationalist and (socialist) realist." Minna So-Min Lee. "In Search of Lost Time: Redefining Socialist Realism in Postwar North Korea," Master's thesis (University of Toronto, 2013), ii. [Abstract], p. 57. Travis Workman observes "the most important difference between juche realism and socialist realism, however, lies in its primary concern with decolonization and, therefore, the spectacles of decolonization produced through cinema." Travis Workman. "Visual Regimes of *Juche* Ideology in North Korea's *The Country I Saw*," in *The Oxford Handbook of Communist Visual Cultures*, eds. Aga Skrodzka, Xiaoning Lu, and Katarzyna Marciniak (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 592.

27. Consider the first North Korean musical (음악영화 *ŭmak yŏnghwa*) was 금강산의 처녀 *Kŭmgangsan ŭi ch'ŏnyŏ* (*The Mount Kŭmgang Girl*, Chu Yŏng-sŏp, 1959). Yi Myŏngcha. *Puk'an yŏnghwasa* (Seoul: K'ŏmyunik'eisyŏn puksŭ, 2007), p. 206.

28. Yi. *Puk'an yŏnghwasa*, 58, 60. Mark Morris. "Chunhyang at War: Rediscovering Franco-North Korean Film *Moranbong* (1959)," in *Korean Screen Cultures: Interrogating Cinema, TV, Music and Online Games*, eds. Andrew David Jackson and Colette Balmain (New York, NY and Oxford: Peter Lang Publishers, 2016), p. 207.

29. Yi. *Puk'an yŏnghwasa*, p. 58.

30. Keith Howard. *Songs for "Great Leaders": Ideology and Creativity in North Korean Music and Dance* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020), p. 150. *Ch'anggŭk* was broadly played in the DPRK until 1964 when Kim Il Sung personally "attacked" this traditional cultural treasure. Howard. *Songs for "Great Leaders,"* pp. 149, 153.

31. Tatiana Gabroussenko. "Brothers: the banned North Korean-Soviet film ruined by Juche politics," Accessed 21 December 2020. http://www.nknews.org/2019/08/brothers-the-banned-north-korean-soviet-film-ruined-by-juche-politics/.

32. Morris. "Chunhyang at War," pp. 206–207.

33. She was in fact a mistress of Kim Jong Il, but she became romantically involved with the son of a Ch'ongryŏn-member (*General Association of Korean Residents in Japan*), which led to her public execution by firing squad in front of 6,000 people, including artists, intellectuals and

her family members, most probably in 1980 or 1981. Morris, "Chunhyang at War," p. 206.

34. Morris recalls the words of Takashi Monma, a Japanese researcher who had written a book on the history of North Korean cinema. Takashi Monma. *Chōsen minshu-shugi jinmin kyōwakoku eigashi: Kenkoku kara genzai made no zen kiroku* (Tokyo: Gendai Shokan, 2012), p. 256. Morris. "Chunhyang at War," p. 207. The first color version of *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (1959) was screened in China in 1962 also with a great success.

35. The name of Yu Wŏn-chun could be very familiar to the followers of North Korean films as he was a celebrated and honored film actor in North Korean cinema history as exemplified in 내 고향 *Nae kohyang* (*My Home Village*, Kang Hong-sik, 1949), and 신혼부부 *Shinhon pubu* (*The Newlyweds*, Yun Ryong-gyu, 1955). He performed the leading role of pastor *Ch'oe Haksin* in 최학신의 일가 *Ch'oe Haksin ŭi il'ka* (*The Family of Ch'oe Hak-sin*, Oh Pyŏng-ch'o 1966), and he also played the antagonist Hakto in the 1980-version of Ch'unhyangjŏn.

36. The premiere was in May, 1980 with a huge success at film theaters. Noh Chae-sŭng. *Puk'an yŏnghwagye: 1977–1988* (Seoul: Yŏnghwa chinhŭng kongsa, 1989), p. 57.

37. *Sobak ham* 소박함 refers to Korean child-like innocence, pure naiveté, and a "greater spontaneity." Brian R. Myers. *Han Sŏrya and North Korean Literature: The Failure of Socialist Realism in the DPRK* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1994), p. 54.

38. North Korean audiences were captivated by the open approach to love rather than clinging to hidden political anecdotes. Despite the fact that it was much more "astringently regulated in terms of sexual expressions" than Shin's version in 1984, the people felt Yu and Yun's movie closer to real romance than usual propaganda works. Romance illustrated that the female protagonist's primary role was of a lover and a war hero. Suk-Young Kim. *Illusive Utopia: Theater, Film, and Everyday Performance in North Korea* (Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 2010), p. 225. Notably, *The Tale of Ch'unhyang* (1980) is an example of the softening cinematic period of the 1980s, mainly for the reason that it depicts romance in a tender manner compared to the mainstream. As Schönherr mentions, the movie was the "first effort to broaden the scope of the North Korean cinema again (…) Finally, people could see raw emotions on screen! Fantastical images of love, life and suffering and a final happy release." Johannes Schönherr. *North Korean Cinema: A History* (Jefferson, NC: McFarland & Company, 2012), pp. 68, 70.

39. A remake of 미래를 사랑하라 *Mirae rŭl sarang hara* (*Love the future!*) was made forty years later, in 1999 (directed by Chan Baek-yŏn), leading with the *Hong Kil Dong*-star, Ri Yŏng-ho, who plays the patriot guerilla fighter of the 1920s, Pak Kil-san, who temporarily loses his sight due to dynamite thrown by a Japanese fighter, is also brutally tortured in prison, and by the end, dies a martyr in a heroic way with his two fellow freedom fighters, executed by the Japanese.

40. Chung. *Split Screen Korea*, p. 179.

41. Shin Sang-ok. *Nan, yŏnghwa yŏtta: Yŏnghwa kamdok Shin Sang-ok i namgin majimak kŭldŭl* (Seoul: Random House Korea, 2007), p. 211.

42. Chung. *Split Screen Korea*, p. 192.

43. Note there are three different actresses who use the name Kim Yŏng-suk in a number of movies. Immanuel Kim. *Laughing North Koreans: The Culture of Comedy Films* (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020), p. 118nn13.

44. 00(h):54(m):28(s)–00(h):54(m):51(s) Im Kwŏn-t'aek's *Ch'unhyang* (2000) CJ 엔터테인먼트, CJ Entertainment, Accessed 25 October 2020. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=PvG8y3bN mgg&list=PLQJRpfVI4uI5c-oW93UJYD8elbz4GVkWS&ab_channel=%ED%95%9C%EA%B5% AD%EA%B3%A0%EC%A0%84%EC%98%81%ED%99%94KoreanClassicFilm.

45. As Lee examines, *Sopyonje* (1993) contributed in "revealing Koreans' nostalgic sentiments and sense of loss." She also recalls other scholars, such as Cho Hae-joang, praising the movie for being able to search new identity and a new culture for South Korea in a good historical timing. Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema," p. 74.

46. Some other sources refer to the movie as Im's ninety-ninth work. Shin-Dong Kim. "The Creation of *Pansori* Cinema: *Sopyonje* and *Chunhyangdyun* in Creative Hybridity," in *East Asian Cinema and Cultural Heritage: From China, Hong Kong, Taiwan to Japan and South Korea*, ed. Kinnia Yau Shuk-ting (New York, NY and London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), p. 167.
47. Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema," p. 70.
48. Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema," p. 74.
49. Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema," p. 69.
50. Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema."
51. Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema," p. 74.
52. Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema," pp. 71–72.
53. Kim. "The Creation of *Pansori* Cinema," p. 152.
54. Kim. "The Creation of *Pansori* Cinema."
55. Although Im Kwŏn-t'aek's *Ch'unhyang* (2000) has not reached the expected domestic success at the box office, still, its cinematic importance is undeniable due to fact that it was the first South Korean movie to be nominated for Palme d'Or at the 53rd Cannes International Film Festival in 2000. As Lee points out, "By remaking the old tale, he attempts to entertain international as well as domestic audiences." Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema," p. 66.
56. Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema," p. 65.
57. Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema," p. 66.
58. Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema."
59. Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema."
60. Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema."
61. The classic North Korean film songs are mostly performed whether in off-screen solo, couplets (*chŏlga*) or an off-stage singing chorus (*pangch'ang*, classified in male, female and mixed types) to be easily received and understood by the masses with clear and straightforward messages, accompanied by mingled practice of traditional Korean musical instruments in company with Western orchestral ones (*paehap kwanhydnak*, combined orchestra). Howard. *Songs for "Great Leaders,"* p. 159.
62. Howard. *Songs for "Great Leaders,"* p. 161.
63. The film scholar Stephanie Donald's concept emphasizes the hero's visibility not only through his personal struggle but mainly via the leader's omnipresent gaze towards the protagonist. Donald additionally states, the leader as group ideal can complete the character of hero as the primary object of identification, therefore, referring to "an off-screen space rather than a defined diegetic object, signalling the leader's political consciousness." The filmmaker aims for these moments noted to be shared by both the characters and the audience in "ecstatic communion." Jessica Ka Yee Chan. *Chinese Revolutionary Cinema: Propaganda, Aesthetics and Internationalism 1949–1966* (London & New York, NY: I.B. Tauris, 2019), p. 110. Chan's work refers to the manuscript of Stephanie Donald. *Public Secrets, Public Spaces: Cinema and Civility in China* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers, 2000), pp. 60, 62.

Andrew David Jackson and Travis Workman also follow Donald's thesis on "socialist realist gaze" to observe the role of the positive hero guiding the masses in *hidden hero*-movies of the 1980s' North Korean cinema. Andrew David Jackson. "DPRK Film, *Order No. 27*, and the Acousmatic Voice," in *Korean Screen Cultures: Interrogating Cinema, TV, Music and Online Games*, eds. Andrew David Jackson and Colette Balmain (New York, NY and Oxford: Peter Lang Publishers, 2016), p. 165. Travis Workman. "The Partisan, the Worker and the Hidden Hero: Popular Icons in North Korean Film," in *The Korean Popular Culture Reader*, eds. Kyung Hyun Kim and Youngmin Choe (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2014), pp. 151, 156, 159, 161.

In brief, socialist realism, emanated from the Soviet Union, influenced mostly the cultural doctrines of socialist countries during their developmental period, and North Korea was no exception. The concept was determined at the *First All-Union Congress of Soviet Writers* in 1934 by the cultural ideologist, Andrei Zhdanov (first used in 1932), with the aim of "truthful, historically concrete representation of reality in its revolutionary development." Péter Kenéz. *Cinema and Soviet Society, 1917–1953* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 157.

64. Kim. *Illusive Utopia*, pp. 40–41.
65. Among others, Hyangjin Lee and Shin-Dong Kim refer to the words of Chŏng Sŏng-il (2003) in their works. Lee. "*Chunhyang*: Marketing an Old Tradition in New Korean Cinema," p. 66. Kim. "The Creation of *Pansori* Cinema," p. 167.
66. *Hwappyŏng* refers to the long-term pressures of social frustration and resentment associated with death.

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A Pawn in the Great Game: Chosŏn's Rapprochement with the Russian Empire Amidst the British Seizure of Kŏmundo, 1884–1886

DARIA GRISHINA   PhD Student, The Academy of Korean Studies

Abstract

The paper examines the Chosŏn government's rapprochement with the Russian Empire performed against the backdrop of the British seizure of Kŏmundo (1885–1887). Two attempts of Russo-Chosŏn rapprochement, carried out in the summer of 1885 and summer of 1886, are analyzed separately and against the wider geopolitical situation in Northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula of the time. To do so, the author relies on the analysis of Russian, Korean, and English primary sources to reveal the Russian and Chosŏn government's standing at that time, and the geopolitical reasons behind the failure of Russo-Chosŏn rapprochement.

Keywords: Great Game, Kŏmundo, the Russian Empire, Great Britain, Kojong, Chosŏn (Korea's) foreign policy

Introduction

In the mid to late nineteenth century, the Northeast Asian region, which throughout its history generally maintained a self-sufficient system of cross-country relations and exchanges focused on the Sinocentric diplomatic order, began to experience significant political and geopolitical changes. With the

influence of Western powers and Capital reaching this part of the globe, the old China-centered system was significantly weakened, paving the way for "modern," open foreign exchanges. For various reasons, the so-called opening of Northeast Asia for diplomacy and trade happened not simultaneously but gradually, with China and the Japanese archipelago being included in global geopolitics earlier than other countries in this region.

Squeezed between China on the continent and a modernized Meiji Japan to the east, the small kingdom known as Chosŏn (Korea) was forced to join global diplomacy only in the third quarter of the nineteenth century. Due to its geographic location and internal political situation that for many years prevented foreigners, in general, and westerners, in particular, from landing on its territory, Chosŏn was the last country in Northeast Asia to be open for international trade and included in diplomatic exchanges with Western partners.[1]

Chosŏn concluded its first modern treaty in 1876,[2] and after that found itself unable to maintain its traditional policy of isolation. However, the active phase of Chosŏn's foreign policy began only in the early 1880s. Therefore, by the mid-1880s, Chosŏn was still new to modern geopolitical exchange. Nonetheless, guided by a proactive diplomatic approach launched by its King,[3] by the spring of 1885 Chosŏn had concluded treaties with all the major powers present in Northeast Asia,[4] including Great Britain and the Russian Empire, and was a full participant in regional geopolitics. That is when the issue around Kŏmundo unfolded.

Part 1: So close and yet so far

Russo-Chosŏn (semi-)official exchanges began in 1860 after the Russian Empire had obtained large territories in northeastern Manchuria, which became Russia's Primorsky region.[5] These territories bordered the northern provinces of Chosŏn by land, thus laying the foundations for an intensification of exchange between the two countries.

The poorly controlled border between Hamgyŏng province of Chosŏn and the southern territories of the Russian Primorsky region allowed a relatively easy crossing. Since the early 1860s, these circumstances led to a steady migration of Chosŏn's citizens (mostly peasants), seeking unoccupied land further to the north in the Russian territories.[6] Therefore, in March of 1880, an official of the Russian Ussuri region approached the Hamgyŏng provincial authorities to suggest the mutual strengthening of supervision of human traffic over the Russo-Chosŏn border, but his approach failed to achieve any result.[7,8]

Despite the discouraging outcome of their first attempt at approaching Chosŏn, the dynamic development of overland trade,[9] however, assured the Russian

government of the necessity to formalize relations between the two countries. Therefore, in early June of 1882, the Russian representative in China submitted a note to the Chinese government requesting its assistance in negotiating a treaty with Chosŏn.[10] Referring to the recently concluded treaty between the United States and Chosŏn,[11] he asked for this new treaty to be of the same nature and content, but with one addition: the Russian party wanted to include a clause that would govern the overland trade between the two countries.[12] On this matter the Russian government's attempt failed again: in mid-July, the Chinese government delivered Chosŏn's reply, which stated that, since the border between the two countries is narrow and small, there is no need for a special clause about overland trade in the treaty.[13]

Although rejected again, the Russian government did not give up on the idea and, after consulting in late 1883 with the adviser to the Chosŏn government Paul Georg von Möllendorff,[14] it appointed the Russian consul in Tientsin Carl Waeber (also known as Weber or Вебер)[15] to carry out the treaty negotiations with Chosŏn officials. Relying on the favorable conditions of Kojong's active line in diplomacy and the example of Chosŏn's already concluded and ratified treaties with the United States, Great Britain, Germany, and Italy, on 20 June 1884, Waeber arrived in Chosŏn. The negotiations went smoothly, and on June 27, the Russo-Chosŏn treaty was signed in Seoul.

Amidst the news of the escalation of the Sino-French conflict over Vietnam,[16] which alarmed Chosŏn's civilians and officials,[17] the recently concluded (but not yet ratified) treaty with Russia was soon used as grounding for rapprochement between the two countries. This time, however, it was the Chosŏn party who took the initiative.

In August to September 1884, Paul Georg von Möllendorff contacted the Russian Empire's officials in China, offering them a discussion about the international status of Chosŏn. Attempting to take advantage of the geopolitical struggles of that moment, he introduced two possible options for the Russian party's consideration: a neutralization[18] of Chosŏn, ensured by protective measures offered from China, Japan, and Russia or an exclusive protection of the Korean peninsula by Great Britain.[19] Against the background of Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East, as well as the fact that the treaty between Chosŏn and the Russian Empire, entered into against China's will,[20] was not yet ratified, both afore-mentioned options appeared highly provocative. It was only natural that the Russian officials did not accept either of them. Therefore, although the Chosŏn representative's offer was duly reported to Saint Petersburg, no reaction from the Russian government followed.[21]

In December of the same year, while visiting Tokyo under Kojong's order to handle the diplomatic consequences[22] of the recent Kapsin coup,[23] Paul Georg von Möllendorff contacted the Russian officials again. This time he offered Russia the opportunity to establish its military protectorate over Chosŏn. For this purpose, von Möllendorff asked the Russian government to send military instructors and warships with two hundred sailors on board to Chosŏn. While not completely rejecting this offer, the government in Saint Petersburg, however, stated that the presence of its naval forces in the waters of the Korean peninsula would be undesirable.[24] Therefore, once again, the Chosŏn party's attempt to engage with Russia faced the latter's ambiguous attitude and a refusal to undertake responsibilities on the Korean peninsula.

Ironically, in the summer of 1885, the Russian party rushed to take up Paul Georg von Möllendorff's December 1884 offer, when, driven by the British navy's activities on Kŏmundo, it initiated an open attempt to approach Chosŏn.

Part 2: Setting the scene

Since the 1870s, Great Britain had shown interest in three islands on the southwest of the Korean peninsula, called Kŏmundo by the locals, but commonly known in the west as Port Hamilton. In July 1875, amidst increasing tension between Chosŏn and Japan (unfolding due to the Japanese government's continuous attempts to "open" Chosŏn for trade and modern diplomacy and the Chosŏn government's firm resistance to that "opening"), and amidst rumors that Japan had reached an agreement with Russia to attack Chosŏn, the British representative in Tokyo introduced the idea of occupying Kŏmundo, arguing that the possession of these islands would ensure the British presence in the region.[25] This plan was, however, rejected at that time, as Her Majesty's government concluded that it did not wish to "set other nations the example of occupying places to which Great Britain has no title."[26]

However, by the spring of 1885, amidst escalating Anglo-Russian hostilities in the Middle East, also known as the "Great Game,"[27] the British approach towards the inviolability of borders in Northeast Asia was revised.

After the Afghan army, which had allied with Great Britain, clashed with Russians in early March 1885,[28] and the government in London started its preparations for the war,[29] the Kŏmundo issue was brought out again and treated in a markedly different light. Evidently, Great Britain, the major maritime power with a relatively small land army,[30] aimed to counterbalance its potential overland campaign in the Middle East. Therefore, Britain sought to strengthen its presence in the waterways of the Northwest Pacific. In mid-March of 1885, the British

fleet deployed in Nagasaki was ordered to be ready for potential actions against Russia.[31] On April 15, a new order dictating the occupation of Kŏmundo was issued. The territory was taken the day after, on April 16, with no resistance from locals.[32]

These actions were rationalized by British politicians by a set of geopolitical and economic reasons, which, ironically, were very similar to arguments that were used against the plan of occupation of the islands back in 1875. The Admiralty Foreign Intelligence Committee justified the decision in the light of the British interests in the region: the need to protect Hong Kong, which Great Britain had leased from China in 1841, the need to ensure the safety of British trade in the region, and a complicated argument that the seizure of the islands would be useful for British potential future actions in Northern China, Japan, on the Korean peninsula, and even in eastern Siberia.[33] Meanwhile, the First Lord of the Admiralty highlighted British hostilities with Russia over Afghanistan, which determined the need to blockade Russia in the Pacific and to direct a naval offensive against Vladivostok.[34]

Despite the existence of a decade-old proposal to occupy Kŏmundo, the British seizure of the islands in April of 1885 was not a well-prepared act. Although, since February of 1885, the possibility (and necessity) of seizing this part of Chosŏn land once again become a subject of discussions between high British officials, the ultimate resolution to take such an action, influenced by escalating Anglo-Russian hostilities, was made only in early April.[35] Therefore, failing to carry out diplomatic preparations, the British government attempted to get its actions approved by the main powers in the region post-factum.

On April 17, the British representative in Beijing was officially instructed not to mention the Royal Navy's actions at Kŏmundo.[36] The same instructions were transferred to the British ambassador in Tokyo.[37] Britain spared no efforts to make sure that no rumors of its activities on Kŏmundo would spread before its new status was negotiated and, ultimately, approved by both China and Japan. Accordingly, the Chinese minister in London was informed of the seizure of the islands on April 16,[38] and a confidential telegraphic message of the same nature was delivered to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs on April 20.[39] The British government explained to both countries that this invasive action was performed "in a view of the probable occupation of these islands by another power."[40]

Having long-standing territorial disputes with Russia[41] and aiming to secure its prevailing status in the region, the Chinese party promptly responded, stating that "it was better that England should take ... [these islands] rather than the Russians."[42] This favorable response encouraged the British officials to take a

further step and to attempt to conclude a written understanding with the Qing government about Kŏmundo.[43]

However, the Japanese party's reaction was rather restrained. Technically not opposing the British navy's actions, the government in Tokyo declared that fearing the Russian response, it could not issue an official approval.[44] Thus, while voicing no disapproval, the Japanese government, however, distanced itself from the issue. Apparently, the British also came to realize that the Russian Empire's close interest in the Kŏmundo case was unavoidable. Therefore, it rushed to initiate negotiations with the Chosŏn government directly, aiming at preventing the Russians from getting involved.

On April 24, the British representative in Seoul William Carles[45] officially informed the Chosŏn government of the Royal Navy's activities on Kŏmundo. Although he specifically stressed that the occupation was temporary,[46] it was only natural the Chosŏn government did not comply. Therefore, realizing that Chosŏn's open protests would unavoidably invoke Russia's attention, the British diplomat spared no efforts to convince the country's authorities of the good nature of British intentions. To succeed with this task, Russian actions in the Anglo-Russian hostilities in Afghanistan were to be described in a certain negative way. On 7 May 1885, while briefing Chosŏn's Foreign Minister Kim Yunsik,[47] Carles revealed that "Russia had encroached on Afghanistan, with the Ruler of which country England was in intimate relations, and that England had resented the invasion of the territory of her friendly neighbor" and "then came forward to Afghanistan's protection."[48] He assured the Chosŏn official that the British fleet had to take Kŏmundo to prevent Russia from seizing it.[49,50]

Meanwhile, Russia, perhaps unintentionally was contributing to the British narrative. First, in early May, the word spread that the Russian Minister in Beijing had informed his Chinese counterpart that if China consented to the British occupation of the islands, then the Russian government would feel the need to occupy some other island or portion of the Korean peninsula.[51] Just then, the Russian vessel *Vladivostok* reached Kŏmundo.[52] Treated as an attempt to take the islands,[53] the *Vladivostok*'s arrival added to the British accusations against Russia.

Carles, however, went even further and, on May 14, informed Kim Yunsik of the on-going speculation that the Chosŏn government offered Russia the ceding of a "group of islands" in exchange for its military protection. Two days later, the same rumor was duly delivered to the Chinese minister in Seoul.[54] No specific islands were ever named, but, given the timing and circumstances that surrounded the appearance of this speculation, it can be assumed that the Chosŏn territory in question was Kŏmundo.[55]

As a result, by late May of 1885, when the peak of Anglo-Russian tensions in the Middle East had passed,[56] the British party found itself securing a moral right to continue with the occupation of the Kŏmundo islands, quite literally re-allocating the Great Game from the Middle East to the Northeast Asian region. Amidst that, a rapprochement between Chosŏn and the Russian Empire unfolded.

Part 3: Between a hammer and a hard place

On May 18, after obtaining an eyewitness report of the occupation of Kŏmundo, the Russian representative in Beijing repeated his government's protest against the British actions to the Chinese government. On the same day, Alexey Shpeyer (also known as Alexis de Speyer or Алексей Шпейер),[57] secretary of the Russian legation in Tokyo, was authorized to make his second trip to Chosŏn.[58] Visiting Chosŏn in a semi-official capacity, Shpeyer was ordered to monitor the negotiations on the Kŏmundo case and oppose the British possession of these islands. He was to stay in Chosŏn until the arrival of Carl Waeber, who was appointed as the Russian minister to serve in Seoul. Shpeyer's agenda also included negotiations with the Chosŏn government about the employment of Russian military instructors—an idea introduced by von Möllendorff in early 1885. However, to avoid a clash with China or Japan, Shpeyer was specifically commanded to proceed with the discussions about this issue only if Chosŏn stated its desire to employ Russian instructors first.[59] Therefore, no official credentials enabling Shpeyer to carry out such talks were issued for him by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

The Russian government's decision to send Speyer was taken before von Möllendorff, who reached Japan to present the Chosŏn government's official protest against the Royal Navy's actions in Korea to the Commander-in-Chief of the British China Station, had called to consult the Russian consul in Nagasaki.[60] Therefore, it would be safe to assume that Russia acted with no regard for the Chosŏn party's ongoing agenda, and that its intention to make an open diplomatic gesture towards Chosŏn was triggered by the then-current geopolitical situation that was unfolding in the region due to the Anglo-Russian tensions in the Middle East. Evidently, Russia was under the impression that the offer that von Möllendorff made back in February 1885, before the British actions on the Korean peninsula, remained active and intended to use it in its rivalry with Great Britain.

In this complicated situation, on 9 June 1885, Shpeyer reached Seoul.[61] Convinced that the offer, voiced by von Möllendorff in early 1885, was sanctioned by the King and still valid, the Russian delegate straight away attempted to deal directly with the Chosŏn government. This, however, turned out to be problematic, and for some ten days, he could only meet with von Möllendorff.[62]

Despite that, Kojong was, apparently, duly informed of the Russian delegate's agenda in Chosŏn. Therefore, the King acted accordingly. On June 14, he summoned the United States minister, George Clayton Foulk,[63] for yet another discussion about American military instructors, long-awaited in Chosŏn.[64] During this meeting, Foulk noticed Kojong's increased anxiety for the American instructors to be sent as soon as possible. He deduced that the King's conduct was with no doubt caused by the Anglo-Russian tensions.[65] It is evident that understanding the geopolitical meaning of the Great Game, which now was threatening the territorial integrity of his country,[66] Kojong was hesitant to approach either of these two countries and instead resolved to address the United States as the third party.

Amidst that, frustrated by a delay and in violation of his instructions, on June 18, Shpeyer took the initiative and directly addressed the Chosŏn government, demanding the employment of Russian military instructors instead of American specialists.[67] It is evident that the Russian delegate became aware of Kojong's further request to the American party and attempted to prevent the Chosŏn government from achieving it. However, rather than spoiling the Chosŏn-American negotiations, Shpeyer's open declamation instead alarmed the British Consul in Seoul. Understanding Shpeyer's statement as the Russian party's attempt to enforce its influence over Chosŏn and by it to not only squeeze the British out from Kŏmundo but also to strengthen its presence in the region, Britain began prompt countermeasures.

On June 19, the new British representative Willian Aston[68] informed Kim Yunsik that the occupation of Kŏmundo, in fact, had not been occasioned by the Russo-British tensions in the Middle East and that von Möllendorff's intrigues with the Russian legation in Tokyo in early 1885 were the real reason for the Royal Navy's invasive actions.[69] Evidently, this British strategy was proven to be effective. The next day Shpeyer finally met with Kim personally just to learn that the Chosŏn government was completely unaware of von Möllendorff's repeated appeals for the Russian military assistance.[70] Discouraged by such a turn of events, the Russian delegate made yet another attempt to convince the Chosŏn government to accept Russian military instructors, openly delivering a detailed report on von Möllendorff's diplomatic ventures of 1884 and 1885.[71] These drastic actions, however, had little effect on Kim Yunsik, who simply replied that no Russian instructors could be invited because the employment of the American instructors was the King's personal request, while von Möllendorff's negotiations with the Russian party were carried out at a private level.

But the Russian diplomat refused to take "no" for an answer. To counter the Chosŏn party's ultimatum, Shpeyer resorted to bluff. He stated that if the Chosŏn government keeps insisting on engaging American drill instructors, then the

Russian government will recall its minister to Chosŏn (who had not even arrived yet), and cause a rupture in the relations of the two countries.[72]

This threat, evidently, reached its goal. Three unidentified Chosŏn state officials, who referred to themselves as Kojong confidants, soon called on Shpeyer. They revealed that the King was willing to employ Russian military instructors, but he wished to keep this agreement in secret until the instructors arrived in Chosŏn. Therefore, the following plan of action to soothe the Russian delegate's interactions with the Chosŏn government was drafted: in the following days, Kojong should grant Shpeyer a formal audience during which the issue of Russian military instructors would not be discussed; the King would formally inform the United States of an issue with Russian military instructors and ask the government in Washington to cancel a dispatch of their drill instructors; finally, before Shpeyer left Chosŏn,[73] a letter from Kojong would be delivered to him. In this letter, the King would express his desire to accept Russian military instructors, undertake to enter into a written agreement with the Russian Empire upon the instructors' arrival, and reject employment of military instructors from other countries.[74]

Honoring his part of the deal, on June 21, Kojong summoned the United States minister for a discussion about demands made by the Russians. During this meeting, Foulk revealed to the King that one of the Chosŏn government ministers already informed him that the American instructors were no longer needed.[75] This statement not only indicated that the government in Washington was aware of the Kojong-Shpeyer secret agreement but also quite unambiguously implied that Chosŏn's further rapprochement with Russia might harm Chosŏn's relations with the United States. This turn of events, however, did not make the King give up on the idea to meet with the Russians. The next day, he finally met with Shpeyer. As agreed, Kojong denied any knowledge of previous negotiations on the employment of Russian military advisors. He recommended the Russian delegate to address this matter to the Foreign Minister.[76]

It is noticeable that Kojong made this suggestion while being aware of Kim Yunsik's firm opposition to the employment of the Russian instructors. On the evening of the same day yet another "confidant" from the King made a call on Shpeyer. He explained that Kojong wanted the Russian delegate to continue to press Chosŏn's Foreign Minister on this matter, but added that, if this approach failed, then the King would issue a written promise to employ the Russian military instructors, regardless of Kim's opposition.[77] This motivated the Russian delegate to further actions.

Suspecting that Kim Yunsik's resistance had taken its source from Chinese opposition and intending to overrule it, on June 23, Shpeyer called on the Qing resident in Seoul. Surprisingly, the Chinese diplomat explained that while the

Chosŏn government indeed informed him about the negotiations, he did not advise the Foreign Ministry in this regard. Moreover, the Chinese official clarified that, in his opinion, it was not a matter of concern for China to which government Chosŏn might turn for instructors.[78,79]

As the assumption of Chinese meddling was proven wrong and having no other leads to explain the Chosŏn Foreign minister's resistance, on June 24, Shpeyer once again met with Kim Yunsik and rather boldly attempted to persuade him to comply with the plan. Kim was, however, adamant. He once again brought up the existence of a previous written agreement with the United States, but as this did not discourage the Russian delegate, he ultimately pointed out that, as Shpeyer approached the Chosŏn government with no credentials, the whole discussion was of a private nature,[80] and therefore, further talks were pointless. That was a card Shpeyer could not trump. He retreated, hoping, perhaps, for another opportunity to renegotiate.

At this point, Britain struck its final blow, completely frustrating Shpeyer's efforts and by de-facto annulling his agreement with the King. On June 26, obviously aiming at forcing Kojong to denounce the rapprochement with Russia, the British minister in Seoul informed the Chosŏn government of his government's intention to release Kŏmundo when assured that von Möllendorff's consultations with Russian officials were not authorized by the King.[81] Taking up this promise, the Chosŏn government complied, issuing on July 1 an official statement that disowned von Möllendorff's agreements with Russian officials.[82]

After this announcement, it became clear to Shpeyer that Kojong's written compliance was the last opportunity for his mission to succeed. After all, even failing on the official level, the Russian delegate still had Kojong's semi-official promise. Indeed, up until his last moments in Seoul, Spheyer remained assured that the issue with the Russian instructors would be resolved after his agreement with the King. On July 12, a messenger from the palace informed him that the letter in question would be delivered that night.[83] Shpeyer waited until morning, but no deliveries from the King came.[84] With this, Shpeyer left the country on July 13, failing to achieve the goals set for him and again violating the instruction issued for him by the Russian Foreign Ministry.

Part 4: Half a loaf is better than no bread

By autumn of 1885 and amidst China tightening its grasp over Chosŏn,[85] it became clear that in the summer Kojong had backed the wrong horse. Despite him stepping down from the rapprochement with Russia, the winter of 1885 and spring of 1886 came and passed, but the British navy had shown no signs of any

intention to leave Kŏmundo. Or so it seemed. The historical irony of the situation was that just as Kojong had realized that, with the Chinese unspoken approval of the continuation of the British occupation of part of Chosŏn's land, he had no other options left but to approach the Russians again, the Chinese and the British authorities opened a discussion, seeking the appropriate way for Her Majesty's navy to finally release the islands.

In mid-March 1886, pressed by Russia, which, despite its position weakened by the failure of Shpeyer's mission on the Korean peninsula,[86] continued to make threats to "take 10 times more of Chosŏn's territory"[87] if the British navy did not retreat from Chosŏn, the Chinese party concluded that it could not get into trouble with Russia about a matter that concerned only British interests.[88] In late March, the British also realized that, amidst high maintenance costs and relatively low strategic value, further occupation of the islands was no longer desirable.[89] Thus, assuming that on a geopolitical scale the British and the Chinese interests were pursuing the same objective, and that it would be against the interest both of China and Britain if Kŏmundo were to be occupied by another European Power, the government in London produced a new strategy of joint guarantees of Chosŏn's integrity. According to it, the Chinese party was to obtain Russia's written engagement not to occupy Kŏmundo before the British navy's withdrawal from it.[90] However, contrary to what was expected of him, Lǐ Hóngzhāng,[91] the Chinese state official in charge of Chosŏn affairs, demanded a prior obligation from the British party to evacuate the islands. Only then he would undertake the task of convincing the Russians to issue the required written engagement.[92,93]

Evidently, Kojong knew nothing about changes in the Chinese and British agendas. Therefore, since the early summer of 1886, he was closely watching the activities of Carl Weaber, the Russian minister in Seoul, so as not to miss the right time for another attempt at rapprochement.

The opportunity soon appeared as Russia once again voiced a desire for an agreement on overland trade to be concluded between the two countries. This initiative was treated by Kojong as a sign of the government in Saint Petersburg's incessant interest in the Korean peninsula. The British and Germans, however, were alarmed by it. Both countries assumed that Russia would demand the same tariffs as those that were defined by Chosŏn's overland trade regulations with China (1882).[94] Therefore, they feared that, if concluded, such an agreement would negatively affect their trade in the region. For this reason and attempting to frustrate Waeber's venture, the British and German representatives in Seoul stated that in the case of the conclusion of such an agreement, their governments would insist on an adjustment of tariffs and duties defined in their applicable treaties.[95] Naturally, the Chinese party also viewed the Russian government's

initiative with worry and dissatisfaction. In early July, Lǐ Hóngzhāng even issued an open memorial to the King, in which he accused Russia of having an agenda to invade the Korean peninsula at the first opportunity and stated that it would be better for Chosŏn not to have any overland trade at all than to trade with its northern neighbor.[96]

Lǐ's concern at a possible Russo-Chosŏn rapprochement increased with a report in a local Chosŏn newspaper that in mid-July 1886 a Russian vessel was spotted near Wŏnsan (known in the West as Port Lazareff) on the east coast. As alarming as this was, the situation got even worse when the new British minister to Chosŏn, Edward Baber,[97] by a mistranslation, was informed not of one Russian ship, but of "the presence of a fleet of four Russian vessels at Port Lazareff." Apparently, before consulting with Waeber, Baber telegraphed this urgent news to Beijing and communicated it to the Chinese representative in Seoul.[98] As the tension was increasing, rumors of a Russo-Chosŏn secret rapprochement began to spread. At the end of July 1886, the British minister at Beijing reported to London that the King had asked for the protection of Russia, and that the Russian government demanded this request to be in writing. Highlighting the Chinese side's concerns in the matter, the diplomat added that Lǐ Hóngzhāng issued an urgent order to prevent the Russo-Chosŏn rapprochement at all costs.[99]

Against this background, Kojong's actual attempt to attain the protection of the Russian Empire was set in motion. On August 5, Chosŏn's high state official called on the Russian minister in Seoul, Carl Waeber. During this meeting that lasted for four hours, the Chosŏn official passionately explained to Waeber that "the King is extremely burdened by the influence that the Chinese representative has on the country," that he "is convinced that China would not be able to defend [Chosŏn]… if any serious trouble arises," and that the British seizure of Kŏmundo was a vivid proof of such Chinese disability. All this, just to convince the Russian diplomat to accept the letter that would soon be delivered to him, in which the King would seek the Russian government's "assistance for strengthening Chosŏn's independence."[100] No arguments that such action would only worsen the Chinese party's dissatisfaction with the Chosŏn government and harm Sino-Russian relations as well,[101] voiced by Waeber to persuade Kojong from submitting the letter, had any effect. On August 7, the King's emissary called on the Russian minister again and reconfirmed Kojong's intentions to ask for a Russian protectorate in writing. By that time, Waeber became aware of rumors about a secret Russo-Chosŏn rapprochement that had been going around Seoul. Thus, conscious of a looming crisis, he once again suggested not to send the letter, or at least to put its dispatch on hold until the proper moment.[102] The King, however, was deaf to the Russian diplomat's reasoning. Therefore, on August 9, a written request,

bearing the seals of the King and the Minister of Internal Affairs was delivered to the Russian legation. In the letter, Kojong largely repeated the above-mentioned arguments and requested Russian assistance to obtain Chosŏn's liberation from Chinese vassalage, additionally asking the government in Saint Petersburg to "send warships to temporarily ensure [his]… security … if tensions with the other Country arise."[103] In violation of the Foreign Ministry's instruction, which forbade any negotiations regarding establishing a Russian protectorate over Chosŏn,[104] Waeber, sympathetic toward Kojong's efforts, accepted this letter and duly transferred it to Saint Petersburg.

Amidst the sensitive situation in the country, it was only natural that soon the Chinese minister in Seoul, Yuán Shìkǎi,[105] would be informed of Kojong's actions. And so around August 12, Yuán, allegedly,[106] came into possession of a copy of the King's letter. After this, the Chinese party's prompt retaliation followed. Revealing that "he had accurate knowledge of an agreement in writing, bearing the King's seal, the effect of which was to turn Korea bodily over to Russian protection," Yuán informed Chosŏn's high officials of the Chinese intention to stop it at all costs. He threatened that 75,000 Chinese soldiers would be sent to Chosŏn under his summons[107] to punish the King for his independent actions.

Taking Yuán's threat seriously, once again, Kojong had to step back from his agreement with the Russians. Even more, attempting to appease the Chinese Minister and escape the retaliation promised by him, the King produced and delivered an explanatory note to Yuán, in which he claimed that it was not his idea to approach Russia and that the letter and his stamp on it were forged.[108]

It is hard to estimate how convincing Kojong's assurances appeared to the Qing. However, it stands as a historical fact that against the uncertainty of the Chinese minister's threats,[109] and the uncertainty of the Chosŏn explanations, it was the Russian response to the situation that released the steam from a speedily developing crisis. Implying that the letter, which Yuán allegedly had, was forged, the Russian minister in Seoul was adamant in his denial that any correspondence from the palace requesting Russian protection had ever reached him.[110]

Evidently, not willing to harm fragile Sino-Russian relations, and intending to resolve the Kŏmundo case, the Qing authorities choose not to challenge Waeber's words. Instead, Lǐ rushed to instruct the Chinese representative in Saint Petersburg that if the letter from Kojong was ever received through Waeber, then the Russian government was to be asked to resolutely treat it as not composed or authorized by the King.[111] The Russian foreign ministry complied,[112] and with this, a diplomatic crisis on the Korean peninsula was avoided.

Part 5: The bitter end

This paper shows that in 1885–1886 Chosŏn had been treated as expendable, a pawn in a bigger game unfolding between the Russian Empire and Great Britain. The British seizure of Kŏmundo was an example of how geopolitical struggle between the two Western countries could affect the balance of power inside Northeast Asia. The Royal Navy's invasion of Chosŏn's land promptly transformed into a major international crisis that not only entangled the countries directly involved (Chosŏn and Great Britain) but also the Russian Empire, China, and, to some extent, Japan, placing them in rival camps.

Ironically, however, the Kŏmundo incident benefited neither Great Britain nor Russia. The only power that capitalized on the international crisis in Chosŏn was China. Amidst the absence of direct Anglo-Russian contacts regarding Kŏmundo, the Qing stepped in as a mediator. With the islands freed of the British presence owing to its involvement,[113] China managed to generally overcome restrictions implied by the Convention of Tientsin,[114] and strengthen its standing in Chosŏn and the Northeast Asian region.

As neither of the competing parties and the mediator considered Chosŏn's standing and interests, it is possible to conclude post-factum that King Kojong had no opportunity to solve the crisis looming around his country without approaches to Russia or Great Britain. He, however, still tried to remain neutral. In the summer of 1885, when Shpeyer reached Seoul intending to transform not yet formalized relations between the two countries into a strategic partnership, the King of Chosŏn immediately realized that his official statement of any nature about the Russian party's demands would automatically be treated as an expression of support to either Russia or Great Britain. If he would choose to officially support the agreement with Russia, this would invoke not only China's disapproval, but, most importantly, provide the British with a pretext and a justification for its seizure of Chosŏn's territory. If he, however completely ignored the Russians, this would spoil the relations between the two countries even before the ratification of a Russo-Chosŏn's treaty.[115] Thus, King Kojong took a middle path of withdrawing from the official negotiations with Shpeyer but continuing semi-official discussions. It was, however, the British promise to release Kŏmundo that eventually ended the King's semi-official interactions with the Russian delegation and, ultimately, put the Russo-Chosŏn rapprochement on hold.

By the summer of 1886, Kojong had learned his lesson, realizing that Anglo-Russian rivalry, having reached Northeast Asia, left him with no chance to solve the Kŏmundo problem himself. Since the British had already tricked him once, the King of Chosŏn chose to side with Russia, rushing to reconcile with it at the

first opportunity. However, lacking knowledge about the Sino-British talks over the Kŏmundo issue, instead of protecting his country, Kojong put it in a vulnerable position. It cannot be an overstatement to conclude that the events of August 1886 negatively affected the ongoing discussion over Chosŏn's territorial integrity and thereby slowed down the withdrawal of the British navy from Kŏmundo.

As was mentioned above, since the spring of 1886, British officials pressed the Chinese party about obtaining guarantees of non-occupation of Chosŏn's territory by a third power. However, if before the incident Lǐ Hóngzhāng, aiming not to irritate the Russian party, had handled the matter cautiously, from mid-August of 1886 his approach changed. When, at the end of August, the Russo-Chinese consultations over Chosŏn, which were gradually unfolding since the spring, entered the stage of discussion of a written agreement,[116] the Chinese party, feeling insecure amidst the rumors of the secret Russo-Chosŏn rapprochement, began to insist on a clause that would ensure Russia's admittance of China's rights to suzerainty over the Korean peninsula.[117] As it would endanger its interests in the region (namely, the ongoing negotiations about the overland treaty with Chosŏn), such a clause was deemed unacceptable for the Russian government.[118] This clash of opinions, naturally, unleashed time-consuming negotiations. It was only by mid-November of 1886 that both parties, ultimately unable to reach consensus on the matter, concluded a verbal, gentleman's agreement, whereby both Russia and China guaranteed Chosŏn's status quo, i.e., its sovereign and territorial integrity.[119] Luckily, constantly updated on the Sino-Russian negotiations, the British too saw merits in the absence of a written Russo-Chinese agreement: if Britain was ever to go to war with Russia, it could easily re-occupy Kŏmundo.[120] With this, the Chinese verbal assurance that no part of Chosŏn, including Port Hamilton, will be occupied by a foreign power was deemed sufficient, and "on the faith of this guarantee [and] to comply with the wishes of the Chinese government,"[121] in mid-November of 1886, the British began their preparation to evacuate from the Chosŏn territory.[122]

Notes

1. Despite numerous attempts facilitated by several western powers active in the region (including several attempts of the United States), until 1876 (the Chosŏn-Japan "Kanghwa" treaty) the country remained uninvolved in global geopolitical processes.
2. Treaty that Japan forced on Chosŏn in 1876 copied treaties that the United States and Great Britain had forced on Japan in the mid-1850s. This treaty paved the way for the development of Asian imperialism, led by Japan.
3. *Kojong Shillok* 고종실록. 19kwŏn, kojong 19 nyŏn 8 wŏl 5 il muo 5 pŏntchae kisa, Sŏul kwa chibang e seun ch'ŏkyangbi rŭl modu ppoba pŏrirago myŏng hada (19권, 고종 19년 8월 5일 무오 5번째기사, 서울과 지방에 세운 척양비를 모두 뽑아버리라고 명하다). http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_11908005_005.

4. A treaty with the United States was concluded in May of 1882. It was followed by treaties with Great Britain (November of 1883), Germany (November of 1883), and Italy (June of 1884).

5. By the Treaty of Aigun (1858) and the Convention of Beijing (1860) with China.

6. By the end of 1869, around 7,000 Chosŏn peasants were residing in the South Ussuri territory of Russia. From Park, Boris Пак Борис. *Rossiya i Koreya* (Moscow: Institut Vostok-ovedeniya RAN, 2004), p. 86.

7. Boris Park states that reacting to the Russian authority's suggestion, the ruler of Chosŏn had forbidden any direct contact with Russian officials. For detail, see Park Boris, *Rossiya i Koreya*, p. 93.

8. Kojong's refusal to communicate with the Russian party was, apparently, influenced by the Sino-Russian crisis over the Ile river region (1871–1881) and by the existing argument, promoted by the Chinese and British parties and supported by the Japanese party, about the invasive nature of the Russian policies in Northeast Asia. In May of 1880, Great Britain began to suspect that the Russian Empire was preparing for a treaty with Chosŏn. A report of Japan's agent in Seoul, obtained by the British Legation in Tokyo, indicated such moves. It revealed that in March 1880, a Russian agent arrived on a ship of war to Seoul and delivered a letter to the government of Chosŏn, the object of which, as the Japanese official believed, was to conclude a treaty. Amidst the Anglo-Russian tensions in the Middle East region, this report focused Great Britain's attention on Chosŏn. Speculations, spread in the summer of 1880 about the Russian intention to invade Chosŏn in case of Sino-Russian military conflict, added to the British party's concerns. Therefore, by November of the same year, the British government decided on the necessity of a treaty with Chosŏn. For detail, see: Mr. Kennedy to the Marquis Salisbury, May 25, 1880, #90. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, Seoul, Korea: Sin Mun Dang Pub. Co., 1982, p. 57; Mr. Kennedy to Earl Graville, June 29, 1880, # 113. Ibid., p. 61; Mr. Kennedy to Earl Graville, November 21, 1880, #179. Ibid., p. 77.

9. With no restrictions properly applied, by the 1880s active human traffic over the Russo-Chosŏn borderline was supplemented by a flourishing, but unregulated, trade. The annual turnover of overland trade between Chosŏn and Russia in 1881 was 450,000 rubles. By 1884 it grew to be twice that. For detail, see: Simbirtseva, Tatiana Симбирцева Татьяна. "Rossiysko-koreyskiye kontakty v Pekine v kontse XVII—seredine XIX vv." *Problemy Dal'nego Vostoka* №6 (1998), pp. 91–93; Park, *Rossiya i Koreya*, p. 91.

10. Grosvenor to Earl Granville, December 14, 1882, #155, *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 139.

11. The treaty was signed on 22 May, 1882.

12. Park, *Rossiya i Koreya*, p. 117.

13. Park, *Rossiya i Koreya*, p. 118.

14. Paul Georg von Möllendorff (1847–1901) was a German linguist and diplomat. He is mostly known as the first foreign advisor of Kojong, serving in Chosŏn in this capacity from 1882 to 1885.

15. Carl Waeber (Карл Иванович Вебер, 1841–1910) was a Russian Imperial diplomat and Kojong's close acquaintance. From 1885 to 1897, he served as the Russian representative in Chosŏn. In this capacity, Waeber largely contributed to strengthening the Russian Empire's influence on the Korean peninsula.

16. The Sino-French conflict over Vietnam—rivalry over dominance of Vietnam, was unfolding between France and China from the late 1870s. By 1884, after several military clashes, the conflict developed into a full-scale war (the so-called Sino-French War), which ended with the Chinese party's loss in the spring of 1885.

17. Allen Horace Newton. *Korea the Fact and Fancy* (first printed in 1904) (Seoul: Hanbin-mun'go, 1983), p. 167.

18. By "neutralization" von Möllendorff meant international guarantees of Chosŏn's integrity with the Belgium case taken as example. For more details about Chosŏn's neutralization see, for example, Jin, Sangpil. "Korean Neutralization Attempts (1882–1907): Retracing the Struggle for Survival and Imperial Intrigues." Ph.D. dissertation, SOAS, University of London, 2016.

19. Park, *Rossiya i Koreya*, p. 144.

20. Since the early 1880s the Chinese government advised Chosŏn against engaging with Russia. This hostile attitude was influenced by the on-going Sino-Russian territorial tensions and the Qing government's intention to secure its prevailing rights in the Korean peninsula.

21. Lee, Yur-Bok. *West goes East: Paul Georg von Möllendorff and Great Power Imperialism in late Yi Korea* (Honolulu, HI: University of Hawaii Press, 1988), p. 95.

22. *Kojong Shillok*, 21, Kojong 21/10/27 musul, second entry, "서상우를 전권 대신에, 묄렌도르프를 부대신에 임명하여 일본에 파견하다," http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_12110027_002.

23. The Kapsin Coup was an attempted revolution led by Chosŏn's liberal political forces of Chosŏn—the so-called Progressive Party—which aimed to come to power through a civil and military uprising. Beginning on December 4, 1884, the coup attempt lasted only four days and was suppressed by Chinese military forces.

24. The government in Saint Petersburg sought to maintain its neutrality in the case of Sino-Japanese military conflict over the Korean peninsula. For detail, see: Park, *Rossiya i Koreya*, p. 146.

25. "Memorandum by Sir E. Hertslet on the Importance of Port Hamilton, February 5, 1885". *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 488.

26. The Secretary to Tenterden, August 3, 1875. From Stephen Royale, *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885–1887* (London: Routledge, 2017), p. 49.

27. The Anglo-Russian rivalry in the Middle East, the so-called Great Game, was one of the major global geopolitical struggles on the nineteenth century. Unfolding since the early 1870s, this rivalry was premised on the Russian government's ambitions to strengthen its presence in the Middle East and the British government's efforts to push the Russians out of the region, as their presence endangered the British hold on India.

28. Since 1882, pushed out of Afghanistan by the Afghan-British forces, the Russian army was campaigning to re-claim the region. Unavoidably, these activities were laying the foundation for another escalation of the political and diplomatic confrontation between Great Britain and the Russian Empire. These tensions peaked in March 1885 when the Russians provoked a strike by the Afghan army and used this opportunity for counter-attacking and advancing into the south of Afghanistan's territory. For detail, see: Gerald Morgan. *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1810–1895* (London: Routledge, 1981), p. 195.

29. Morgan, *Anglo-Russian Rivalry in Central Asia, 1810–1895*, p. 195.

30. In the 1880s, the British army counted only about 48,000 soldiers, while the Russian troops consisted of more than 900,000 regular soldiers and nearly 250,000 irregulars (mostly Cossacks). Numbers are taken from open sources (Wikipedia).

31. Plunkett to Granville March 21, 1885. From Royle, *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885–1887*, p. 58.

32. Royle, *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885–1887*, p. 58.

33. Royle, *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885–1887*, p. 58.

34. Royle, *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885–1887*, p. 58.

35. Admiralty to Currie (Confidential), 4 April 1885, FO 405/35 TNA. From Suzuki, Yu. "Anglo-Russian War-Scare and British Occupation of Kŏmundo, 1885–7: The Initial Phase of Globalisation of International Affairs Between Great Powers," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 47: 6 (2019), p. 1108.

36. Earl Granville to O'Conor, April 17, 1885, #79a. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 491.

37. Earl Granville to O'Conor, *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 491.
38. Earl Granville to the Marquis Tseng, April 16, 1885, #7. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 490.
39. Plunkett to Earl Granville, April 23, 1885, #11. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 491.
40. Earl Granville to the Marquis Tseng April 16, 1885, #7. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, pp. 490–491.
41. The late nineteenth century was marked by several Russo-Chinese territorial disputes. As well as Russia taking territories in northeastern Manchuria, in the 1880s, the Sino-Russian crisis over the Ili River region (1871–1881) was an active issue. Additionally, the issue of the border between the two countries, which the Chinese party was aiming to solve since 1874, was actively negotiated only in the spring-summer of 1886.
42. O'Conor to Earl Granville, April 21, 1885, #53. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 508.
43. On April 28, a draft of this agreement, prepared by the British Foreign Ministry, was delivered to the Chinese envoy in London. For detail, see: Earl Granville to the Marquis Tseng, April 28, 1885. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 493.
44. Mr. Plunkett to Earl Gravile, April 23, 1885, #11. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 491.
45. William Richard Carles (1848–1929) was a "provisionally" British Vice-Consul for Chosŏn in 1884–1885.
46. O'Conor to Carles, April 24, 1885. From Royle, *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885–1887*, p. 59. This narrative was already used on the Chinese and Japanese and since then became a part of general rhetoric that British diplomacy utilized while dealing with consequences of its actions regarding Kŏmundo. The temporary nature of its seizure was, however, not completely true. Some powerful British politicians were advocating for a permanent hold of Port Hamilton. Eventually, their suggestions were overpowered by the opinion that the permanent hold on the islands would unavoidably invoke Russia's protests and, therefore, contribute to the tensions between the two countries. Thus, the scheme of establishing a permanent British navy base at Chosŏn's Kŏmundo was soon put aside. For detail, see: Memorandum by Lord Northbrook, May 20, 1885. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, pp. 498–499.
47. Kim Yunsik (김윤식 / 金允植, 1835–1922) was an influential politician and diplomat of Chosŏn. In 1884, he served as the Foreign Minister of Chosŏn and signed a treaty with the Russian Empire. Despite that, Kim Yunsik was known as a pro-Chinese politician.
48. Vice-Consul Carles to Mr. O'Conor, May 7, 1885. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 511.
49. Carles to O'Conor, May 19, 1885. From Royle. *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885–1887*, p. 60.
50. It is important to note that despite the existence of several rumors about Russian interests in leasing Chosŏn's territories to use it as an ice-free port for its Pacific Fleet, the majority of these rumors were pointing to Wŏnsan, while Kŏmundo was out of consideration. Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the British rhetoric of accusing the Russians of having plans regarding Kŏmundo was a pretext for the British navy's hold on the islands and preventing Chosŏn from an open protest against it. For detail, see: Ian Nish, *Collected Writings of Ian Nish: Part 2: Japanese Political History—Japan and East Asia* (Collected Writings of Modern Western Scholars on Japan) (Pt. 2) (London: Routledge, 2003), pp. 120–122.
51. Earl Granville to Mr. O'Conor, May 6, 1885, #93A. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 494.

52. Vice-Admiral Sir W. Dowell to the Secretary to the Admiralty, May 14, 1885, Inclosure 1 in #68. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 519.

53. Vice-Admiral Sir W. Dowell to the Secretary to the Admiralty, May 14, 1885. From *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 519.

54. Acting Consul-General Carles to Mr. Plunkett, May 18, 1885, Inclosure 1 in #79. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 531.

55. It is difficult to trace the origins of this speculation. However, the mere fact that Carles reported it to his colleague in Tokyo as something that reached him "from Japan" lays the foundation for an assumption that this rumor was produced by Great Britain, or even by Carles himself. See: Acting Consul-General Carles to Mr. Plunkett, May 18, 1885, Inclosure 1 in #79. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 531.

56. Royle, *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885–1887*, p. 129.

57. Alexey Shpeyer (Алексей Николаевич Шпейер; 1854–1916) was a Russian diplomat. In 1885, he served as secretary of the Russian Empire's legation in Tokyo. In 1897, he was appointed as Russian consul general to the Korean Empire.

58. Shpeyer had visited Chosŏn briefly in January of 1885. He even met with Kojong, but as his appearance in Seoul was unofficial, no applied consultations, negotiations or such with the Chosŏn government took place at that time. For detail see, for example: Boris Park, *Rossiya i Koreya*, pp. 146–149.

59. Park, *Rossiya i Koreya*, p. 153.

60. Evidently, von Möllendorf reached Nagasaki on May 18, 1885. For detail, see: Kojong Shillok, 22, Kojong 22/4/6 musul, seventh entry "엄세영 등이 영국 수군 제독에게 편지를 보내다," http://sillok.history.go.kr/id/kza_12204006_007

61. Park Bella Пак Бэлла. "Rossiyskaya Diplomatiya i Koreya (1876–1898) (Российская Дипломатия и Корея (1876–1898))". Ph.D. dissertation. Moscow: Institut Vostokovedeniya Rossiyskoy Akademii Nauk, 2006, p. 208.

62. Foulk to Secretary of State, July 5, 1885, #192. *Korean-American Relations. Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial Period, 1883–1886*. Ed. by George McCune and John Harrison (Berkeley, CA: Univ. of California Press, 1963), p. 81.

63. George Clayton Foulk (1856–1893) was a United States Navy officer. From 1883 he served as Naval Attaché to Chosŏn; from 1886 to 1886 and from 1886 to 1887 he served as the United States minister in Chosŏn. Foulk maintained close relations with several influential politicians and enjoyed Kojong's confidence.

64. An agreement that the United States government will provide Chosŏn with various specialists and instructors was achieved during the Chosŏn observation delegation to the United States (보빙사 / 報聘使) in the autumn of 1883. Since that time Kojong, personally concerned with the matter, continuously pressed the US officials to make good on this promise. However, the arrival of the American specialists was constantly delayed under various pretexts.

65. Foulk to Secretary of State, June 18, 1885, #184. *Korean-American Relations. Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial Period, 1883–1886*, p. 58.

66. Foulk to Secretary of State, *Korean-American Relations. Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial Period, 1883–1886*, p. 58.

67. Allen, Horace Newton. *Allenŭi ilgi*, Translated by Kim Wŏnmo. Seoul: Tan'guktaehak-kyoch'ulp'anbu, 1994, p. 472 (June 19, 1885).

68. William George Aston (1841–1911) was a British diplomat. He first served in Japan, but in 1884 was transferred to Chosŏn as the British representative. He was transferred back to Japan in 1885.

69. Aston to O'Conor, July 10, 1885. From Lensen, George Alexander. *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884–1899, vol. 1.* (Tallahassee, FL: University Press of Florida, 1982), p. 52.

70. Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884–1899, vol. 1*, p. 38.

71. Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884–1899, vol. 1*, p. 38.

72. Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884–1899, vol. 1*, pp. 39–40.

73. Clearly, Kojong was unaware of the Russian Foreign Ministry's instruction that dictated Shpeyer to stay in Chosŏn until Waeber's arrival.

74. Park, *Rossiya i Koreya*, p. 155.

75. Allen, *Allenŭi ilgi*, p. 474 (June 21, 1885).

76. Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884–1899, vol. 1*, p. 41.

77. Park, *Rossiya i Koreya*, p. 155.

78. Spheyer to Davydov, June 15 (27), 1885. From Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884–1899, vol. 1*, p. 41.

79. It seems reasonable to treat the Chinese minister's reply as truthful. An order from Lǐ Hóngzhāng, dictating resident Chen to frustrate the treaty between Russia and Chosŏn and remove von Möllendorff from his post as the counselor of the king, came on July 2. The latter lays the foundation for the assumption that China, at least officially, was not involved in the ongoing Shpeyer-Kim negotiations. For detail, see: Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884–1899, vol. 1*, p. 45.

80. Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884–1899, vol. 1*, p. 43.

81. Foulk to Secretary of State, June 26, 1885, #187. *Korean-American Relations. Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial Period, 1883–1886*, p. 79.

82. Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884–1899, vol. 1*, p. 45.

83. Shpeyer to Davydov, June 24 (July 6), 1885. From Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884–1899, vol. 1*, p. 47.

84. Haeoesaryoch'ongsŏ 12kwŏn Rŏshia kungnip haegun sŏngmunsŏ Ⅰ (1854~1894) (해외사료총서 12권 러시아국립해군성문서 Ⅰ (1854~1894). 8. RGAVMF, f.26, op.1, d.6, ll.3ob.~5ob □03060835 (8. РГАВМФ, ф.26, *оп.1, д.6, лл.3об.~5об. □03060835)*, http://db.history.go.kr/item/level.do?sort=levelId&dir=ASC&start=1&limit=20&page=1&pre_page=1&setId=2&prevPage=0&prevLimit=&itemId=fs&types=&synonym=off&chinessChar=on&brokerPagingInfo=&levelId=fs_012_0080&position=-1. It is easy to guess that at the very last moment Kojong was persuaded from honoring his part of the deal with the Russians.

85. As the result of publication of Kojong's secret attempt to approach Russia, the Qing implemented punitive measures against its vassal state. Paul Georg von Möllendorff was ousted; the Chinese resident in Seoul replaced; and in early October of 1885, Kojong's father and ex-regent—the Taewŏn'gun—known for his anti-foreign policies, returned to Seoul.

86. The Russian minister who finally reached Seoul in early October of 1885 was specifically instructed to proceed with extreme caution, not to irritate the Chinese and other foreign representatives, and not to discuss matters of a Russian protectorate with Chosŏn's officials, even if the Chosŏn party initiated such discussions. This "wait-and-see" disposition of the Russian government lasted until the summer of 1886. For detail, see: Park, Bella Пак Белла. *Rossiyskiy Diplomat C.I. Waeber i yego Koreya* (Moscow: Izdatel'stvo Instituta Vostokovedeniya RAN, 2013), p. 51.

87. Plunkett to Earl Granville, June 23, 1885, #173. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, pp. 582–583.
88. The Earl Rosebery to Mr. O'Conor, April 1, 1886, #79. Ibid., p. 667.
89. O'Conor to Earl Rosebery, Match 27, #109, 1886. Ibid., pp. 672–673.
90. O'Conor to Earl Rosebery, Match 27, #109, 1886. Ibid., pp. 672–673.
91. Lǐ Hóngzhāng (李鴻章, 1823–1901) was an influential politician and diplomat of Qing China. Since the mid-1870s, he oversaw China's policies regarding Chosŏn. Under Li's supervision, Chosŏn signed its treaty with the United States in 1882.
92. O'Conor to Earl Rosebery, Match 27, #109. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, pp. 672–673.
93. *otnosheniya v Priamur'ye (ser. XIX-nach. XX vv.)* (Blagoveshchensk: Blagoveshchenskiy gosudarstvennyy pedagogicheskiy universitet, 2003), p. 22.
94. These new regulations basically ensured Chinese trade hegemony on the Korean peninsula. For detail, see: Park, Jung Mee. "Interpreting the Maritime and Overland Trade Regulations of 1882 between Chosŏn and the Qing: How logics of appropriateness shaped Sino–Korean relations," *International Area Studies Review* 23.1 (2020).
95. Park, *Rossiya i Koreya*, p. 174.
96. Denby to Secretary of State, July 5, 1886. *Korean-American Relations. Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial Period, 1883–1886*, pp. 145–147.
97. Edward Colborne Baber (1843–1890) was an English diplomat, who, from 1885 to 1886, acted as consul-general in Chosŏn.
98. It is easy to guess that at the very last moment Kojong was persuaded from honoring his part of the deal with the Russians. The roots of Baber's anxiety can be found in the Chosŏn government's decree of early July 1886 granting a United States schooner the right to pearl-fish near Kŏmundo. For detail, see: Vice-Admiral Hamilton to the Secretary of the Admiralty, July 19, 1886, Inclosure in #47. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 688.
99. Sir J. Walsham to the Earl of Rosebery, July 31, 1886, #53. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 689.
100. Waeber to Girs, August 6, 1886. Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Imperii, Fond №150 «Yaponskiy stol», 493, 1, K1, 1885–1887, Doneseniya poverennogo v delakh i general'nogo konsula v Seula i raznaya perepiska o polozhenii del v Koreye, ob otnosheniyakh onoy k Kitayu i o snosheniyakh Koreyey Rossii i drugikh derzhav, Delo №36, list 109.
101. Waeber to Girs, August 6, 1886. Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Imperii, Fond №150 «Yaponskiy stol», 493, 1, K1, 1885–1887, Doneseniya poverennogo v delakh i general'nogo konsula v Seula i raznaya perepiska o polozhenii del v Koreye, ob otnosheniyakh onoy k Kitayu i o snosheniyakh Koreyey Rossii i drugikh derzhav, Delo №36, list 109.
102. Waeber to Girs, August 6, 1886, Приложение (Prilozhenie), Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Imperii, *Fond* №150 «Yaponskiy stol», 493, 1, K1, 1885–1887, Doneseniya poverennogo v delakh i general'nogo konsula v Seula i raznaya perepiska o polozhenii del v Koreye, ob otnosheniyakh onoy k Kitayu i o snosheniyakh Koreyey Rossii i drugikh derzhav, Delo №36, list 115.
103. Waeber to Girs, August 6, 1886, Приложение (Prilozhenie), Arkhiv Vneshney Politiki Rossiyskoy Imperii, *Fond* №150 «Yaponskiy stol», 493, 1, K1, 1885–1887, Doneseniya poverennogo v delakh i general'nogo konsula v Seula i raznaya perepiska o polozhenii del v Koreye, ob otnosheniyakh onoy k Kitayu i o snosheniyakh Koreyey Rossii i drugikh derzhav, Delo №36, list 115; list 117.
104. Park, Rossiyskiy Diplomat C.I. Waeber i yego Koreya, p. 51.
105. Yuán Shìkǎi (袁世凱, 1859–1916) was a Qing military official and diplomat. Yuán first arrived at Chosŏn in 1882 as a military commander; in 1885 he was appointed as the Imperial Resident in Sŏul and held this post until 1895.

106. It is still not known whether or not Yuán really had a copy of the king's letter. On August 15, asked to show this letter by the foreign advisor to the king, Yuán refused to do so. For detail, see: Foulk to Secretary of State, September 8, 1886, #3. *Korean-American Relations. Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial Period, 1883–1886*, p. 150.

107. Foulk to Secretary of State, September 8, 1886, #3. *Korean-American Relations. Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial Period, 1883–1886*, p. 151.

108. Park, *Rossiya i Koreya*, p. 165.

109. New Foreign advisor to the king, Owen Nickerson Denny, was at that time convinced that Yuán had no letter in his possession and that the rumors of the secret Russo-Chosŏn rapprochement were untrue. For detail, see: Foulk to Secretary of State, September 8, 1886, #3, *Korean-American Relations. Documents Pertaining to the Far Eastern Diplomacy of the United States, volume 1, the Initial Period, 1883–1886*, p. 150; Denny to Detring, August 12, 1886, #16. *An American Adviser in Late Yi Korea: The Letters of Owen Nickerson Denny*. Edited, with an introduction, by Robert R. Swartout, Jr. (AL: The University of Alabama press, 1984), p. 39.

110. Kim Jong Hong. "Russko-Koreyskiye diplomaticheskiye otnosheniya v 1884–1904 gg" Ph.D. dissertation. Moscow: Moskovskiy Gosudarstvennyy Universitet imeni M.V. Lomonosova, 2000, pp. 141–145.

111. Lǐwénzhōng gōng quánjí, Diàn gǎo 7:32A-b, guāngxù 12 nián 7 yuè 19 rì. From Im Kyesun. Chorŏ miryakkwa kŭ huhuŭi chorŏgwan'gye (1884–1894). In Chorŏgwan'gye 100nyŏnsa (Seoul: Han'guksayŏn'guhyŏbŭihoe, 1984), p. 105.

112. Lew, Young Ick. "Yüan Shih-k'ai's Residency and the Korean Enlightenment Movement (1885–94)," *Journal of Korean Studies*, 5 (1984), p. 83.

113. Mr. Rockhill to Mr. Bayard, January 22, 1887, #50, *Index to the Executive Documents of the House of Representatives for the Second Session of the Fiftieth Congress, 1888–'90, Vol. 1*, Part 1. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1888–1889, p. 255.

114. Concluded between China and Japan on April 18 of 1885 as an aftermath of the Kapsin Coup, this treaty ordered Chinese and Japanese troops to leave the peninsula and forbade both countries from providing military instructors to Chosŏn, de-facto limiting their involvement in Chosŏn state affairs.

115. The treaty was ratified in October of 1885.

116. For a detailed account and analysis of Lǐ-Ladyzhevsky negotiations over Chosŏn see, for example: Kim, Hyunsoo. "The relationship between the British fleet's withdrawal from Port Hamilton (Kŏmundo) and British foreign policy: the Li-Ladygensky joint agreement of 1886," *European Journal of Korean Studies*, 13 (2011), pp. 43–75.

117. Lensen, *Balance of Intrigue: International Rivalry in Korea & Manchuria, 1884–1899, vol. 1*, p. 63.

118. Park, Boris Борис Пак. *Rossiyskaya diplomatiya i Koreya* (Moscow: Institut vostokovedeniya RAN, 2004), p. 166; Mr. Brenan to Sir J. Walshaw, November 3, 1886, Inclosure in #299. *Anglo-American Diplomatic Materials Relating to Korea, 1866–1886*, p. 747.

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120. Royle, *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885–1887*, p. 133.

121. Iddesleigh to Walshaw, November 19, 1886. From Royle, *Anglo-Korean Relations and the Port Hamilton Affair, 1885–1887*, p. 133.

122. Kŏmundo became free of the British navy in late February of 1887.

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RESEARCH NOTE

Soviet Koreans in Uzbekistan in the First Year after Deportation in 1937[1]

ALEXANDER KIM   Associate Professor, Vladivostok State University of Economics and Service[2]
MARIIA SURZHIK   Leading Engineer, Federal Scientific Center of the East Asia Terrestrial Biodiversity (Institute of Biology and Soil Science), Vladivostok
ALEKSEI MAMYCHEV   Professor, Moscow State University

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Koreans had lived on the southern territory of the modern Russian Far East before the arrival of Russian pathfinders in these lands. Therefore, they are an indigenous population of the modern Primorye region in the Russia, although, in the nineteenth century the number of Koreans was relatively small in the south of the Russian Far East. Russian Koreans supported the October Revolution and the fight of the Red Army against the old regime for several reasons. Bolsheviks put forward two principles of the new government—land for peasants and equality of peoples. These principles found a response in the broad mass of the Korean and Chinese populations in the Far East. After their victory, the Bolsheviks kept their promises. An area for ethnic Koreans, called Posiet, in the territory of the Primorye region was created, and Koreans resided in 28 districts in three areas of the modern Primorye region.[3] A Korean Education College was created in Nikolsk-Ussuriysk-city (modern Ussuriysk-city), as well as Korean language schools, a

national theater, Korean-Chinese printers and so on.[4] Korean families usually have many children, so the Korean population in Russia grew at a fast pace. This Korean population fell victim to the policies of deportation, which were applied to many of the non-Russian peoples of the Far East under Stalin. For many decades such deportations were denied, and then when admitted, the documentary materials surrounding them were unavailable. However, in the 1980s with the development of greater accessibility to archives held by the Russian Federation, the stories of such difficult historical moments are once again visible and reachable. This Research Note, in particular, explores the archival material that exists in the Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF, Государственный архив Российской Федерации, State Archive of the Russian Federation) relating to the deportation of Koreans of Primorye to Uzbekistan.

Clearly, mass ethnic deportations took place in the Soviet Union not only in the 1930s, but in the 1940s as well. In the 1930s, along with the Koreans, the Chinese population of Primorye was deported to Xinjiang and Central Asia.[5] The Polish and German populations of the western fringe of Russia and also the Volga Germans were deported or moved in the 1940s.[6] The Kalmyks, once a branch of the Oliat Mongols, were deported from the northern edge of the Caucuses to Siberia in 1943. There were also many other Caucasian ethnic groups such as the Crimean Tartars (deported to Uzbekistan in 1944), the Balkars (deported to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1944), and the Chechens and Ingushetians (also deported to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in 1944), all transferred against their will. These deportations sit inside a distinct category of state practices in the Soviet Union of the time, but they also sit within a wider category of deportation and population transfers in the first half of the twentieth century, such as the Armenian Genocide in the Ottoman Empire in 1915, the population exchanges between Turkey and Greece in 1923, and between Romania and Bulgaria in 1940. Moments of ethnic cleansing in the Yugoslav Wars of 1991–2001, between Croat, Bosnian, Albanian, and Serb populations and their militaries and paramilitaries continue the relevance of studying this form of state strategy and practice from a historical perspective.

In the timeframe of this research note, the authorities of the Soviet Union had thoroughly prepared for these deportations of ethnic groups in the Russian Far East. Firstly, eminent people of the NKVD (Narodnyi Komissariat Vuntrennyh Del/ Народный Комиссариат Внутренних Дел, People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs), who were highly experienced and capable of tough action, were sent from Moscow to the Far East in order to direct the bureaucracy involved and manage the process. For example, Genrikh Samoilovich Lyushkov,[7] the confidant of the People's Commissar of NKVD Yezhov, took an active part in a number of

high-profile cases of deportation and was transferred to the Far East to carry out large-scale repression, including that against Koreans. Before the deportation began, a list of Koreans, who lived in the southern part of the Far East, was confirmed. On 21 August 1937, Stalin and Molotov signed the first order regarding the deportation of the Korean population. According to this document, the eviction of Koreans was to be undertaken in three stages. The first stage was the deportation of Koreans from the border areas, and the second and the third stages were deportations from the hinterland of the region, depending on their location in relation to the border. The deportation of the Korean population from the Far East to Central Asia was planned to be finished by 1 January 1938.[8]

In September 1937, NKVD troops began the process of the eviction of the Korean population from the southern part of the Far East. According to general estimates, from the Far Eastern Region 171,781 people were transported (according to other sources, approximately 175,000 Koreans were transported to Central Asia),[9] who were in 36,442 families. Yet this did not mean that all Koreans were deported from the Far East. A few Koreans were not repressed for a number of reasons. The deportation itself was poorly organized in practical terms and led to numerous victims already on the way. Thus, as a Zinaida Yuirovna Anakhovich (maiden name Khegai) recalled:

> Me and my family were on the way from the Far East for three months, we arrived at the Golodnaya Steppe railway station in Uzbekistan. We were actually dropped off in an absolute bare steppe. My family—parents and four kids—was evicted from Primorye Region, Zarech'ye village in Mikhailovskij district, a district on the border area ... We arrived—four children and parents. We were the only family, in this echelon, to stay fully preserved, who handled the trip. Parents told us that all families lost their children, or even two or three. We, Koreans, all had families with many children back then ... There was a diversion on the way, a crash—we, Koreans, were being destroyed in the best way. On purpose.[10] At every stop someone was buried—parents, kids, the elderly. People were dying. This story is rough, dark and very sad (sighs). We were taken to a steppe and, in fact, abandoned. I was born in May, I was three to five months old, when we were taken on a train in September, and dropped off in December. The oldest child was seven years old.[11]

Another victim of the deportation, A.I. Pak, recalled, that "we were deported in November or December. Mom thought it was a mistake, and we were temporarily taken away. Parents were uneducated."[12] At the beginning of the winter in 1937–1938, groups arrived in Central Asia. The Koreans had to live in hastily built dugouts, which did not serve most well—a third of all nursing infants did not survive that winter. Many elderly people also died.[13] The same Z.Y. Anakhovich recalled, how in winter,

> we lived in a dugout and then moved to a barnyard … We were eating herbs. We ate quinoa, dandelions, chives. Parents were walking far—50 km and further, looking for herbs. The state gave us flour as supplies—we were baking flat cakes … Without herbs we would not survive. From the beginning of the New Year we began to organize a collective farm. After all, Koreans have always been engaged in agriculture … In that year, winter was short, spring was early, and thus we were looking for dandelions and spinach in the snow … It was forbidden for us to leave the settlement further than 35 km away. Thus, adults went looking for herbs outside this zone at night, so no one could see them—it was very scary.[14]

As related by A.I. Kim.

> our family was sent to a settlement by Surum station on the border between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan [now known as Kyzylarykskij rural district]. It is a hilly terrain with stony soil, swampy and overgrown lowlands. Uzbeks looked at those who arrived with surprise. Receipts for livestock and harvest abandonment in Primorye had to be thrown away. Aleksandr and his younger brother got measles.

A.I. Kim also remembers that "his sister Kim In-Su, aged 19, went missing in the steppes of Uzbekistan."[15]

As we can see, the reception of immigrants was not organized. Koreans were dumped on any territory possible. The local population was also not ready for the reception of immigrants. Hence, rumors spread about the Koreans being "cannibals." This situation occurred not only in Kazakhstan but also in Uzbekistan.[16]

During resettlement, a part of the Korean population was placed in areas where it was impossible to farm, worse than if the land had been difficult to farm. The same thing happened to Koreans who were fishermen by trade.[17] Only after a lot of human suffering and many victims did the Soviet leadership decide to move the deported population to places where farming was possible.[18] During the resettlement, a number of Korean families ended up in the Astrakhan and Rostov regions, where they could fish. In 1941–1942, due to attacks by the armies of Hitler's Third Reich on the south of the Soviet Union, Koreans were used in the construction of defensive fortifications and later were also moved to Central Asia.

The exact number of deaths of Koreans during and after the deportation from the Far East is unknown as no one kept a full track of such losses. Hypothetically, we can assume, if every family lost on average one person during the deportation, then only the transportation from one place to another on its own took no less than 30,000 human lives, mainly children and elderly people, since there were 36,442 families. In addition to these numbers there are a few thousand Koreans who died in the dungeons of the NKVD and in camps. The first winter

in Central Asia also cost the lives of many young and elderly people. Thereby, we can conclude that the losses from the Korean population were not less than 40,000 people—about every fourth Korean who was forcibly deported. Thus, in percentage terms, Soviet Koreans were one of the nations who suffered the most during Stalin's repressions. However, they were not declared "enemies of the people" by the Soviet government.

The difficulty of the situation was that the deported population was turned out in an unfamiliar region that was unprepared to support communities in making a living. That is why the Korean population was not ready to adapt to the new conditions straight away, the deported had no information at all on their new home areas. Moreover, the main element of the Korean deportees was included in collective farms, where work was planned across large areas, although, in the Far East, Korean peasants had worked in Chinese-Korean garden beds, which specialized in harvesting several multiple crops in a relatively small cropping area.[19] In Central Asia, the Koreans were settled on various collective farms, which conducted a completely different type of farming. Therefore, forced immigrants faced difficult conditions of transition into another farm system. They did not even have time to adapt in a new region.

Korean families that travelled from the Far East to Central Asia were in poor economic condition. They had owned a number of domestic goods and property prior to deportation, however, the situation changed after forced resettlement. The Soviet state allocated a large number of building materials for the resettlement of immigrants in Central Asia. In addition, on average 1,600 rubles were allocated for each family. Therefore, according to general plans, good conditions (land, cattle, building materials, financial support) were provided for those deported. However, in reality, the supply of Korean collective farms proved to be clearly insufficient. This was true when it came to the quality of land they were offered—they were only getting 0.5 to 1 hectare of irrigated land.

The process of further transportation of Korean families later continued, which caused additional confusion. The A.I. Kim mentioned previously remembers: "in 1939 the family was sent to Nizhnechirchikskij district, and later to a collective farm called after Dimitrov in Soldatskij (Golovinskij) district." In some cases, Korean collective farms were loaned property to support the deported populations in amounts that exceeded the credit-worthiness of the collective farms,[20] and this drove them into debt.

A similarly difficult situation regarding immigrants who remained in the Uzbek SSR. Initially, the plan involved 4,685 semi-detached houses for Korean collective farm workers. However, by 20 September there were only 348 houses that were 25 to 50% completed. House construction plans for Korean workers and

employees were affected just as much. The plan was to build 350 houses, but the construction was finished with only 61 houses.[21] The houses for immigrants were mostly unfinished, without floors, ceilings and interior work, and the costs of their construction was significantly high.[22] In autumn 1938, Sovnarkom[23] of Uzbek SSR reported to Moscow that 34,872,200 rubles had been spent on the resettlement of Koreans, which was equal to 85% of all the years of allocation, although, in reality, the construction plan was completed with less than 10% done.[24]

The irrigation construction plan for Korean collective farms was also not completed. The problem was not only delay in the hydrological infrastructure. There was also a lack of building materials, which local leaders simply forgot to deliver to the places of work on the farms.[25] This had a negative effect on the crop production and output of Korean collective farms. Another serious impact for them was the activity of the motor technical stations. They finished soil and crop processing on the fields of immigrants after a significant delay, and the autumn ploughing was generally thwarted.[26]

Calculations with migrants for their property left behind in the Far East (including movable and immovable property, growing crops, fresh produce, livestock) amounted to 9,416,500 rubles which was not been fully distributed.[27] In total, 41,035,000 rubles were allocated for the arrangement of migrants. By 20 September 1938, 34,872,200 rubles had been spent by the local authorities, but there was no report for a significant part of this amount,[28] and thereby part of this money had been misused.

Schools for Koreans were unfinished. Thirty-one schools for Koreans had been planned for construction in Uzbekistan. Although, by 10 September 1938, the average readiness of these schools was only 29.7%.[29] A.I. Kim also has memories about school in that period of time: "there were no school supplies, only a pencil, notes, and an eraser."[30] He found that his studies could not go on because "I was constantly hungry."

The food supply of Koreans was also unsatisfactory. In particular, a regular supply of baked bread was not provided; there was a lack of fat, fish, and vegetables. There was a special need for children's clothing and footwear, and the retail network was also unfinished. Health centres, hospitals, and obstetric clinics were not finished on time either.[31] A number of places also lacked a supply of drinking water. According to A.I. Kim: "at the Surum station there was a big problem with drinking water. Water was delivered several kilometres away. It was carried on foot. It was of very bad quality."[32]

Sovnarkom of Uzbek SSR released for other organisations over 200 wagons of wood, three wagons of nails, 56 tons of high-quality roofing iron, and so on. However, these materials had been intended for Koreans. In addition, a significant

amount of building materials were not moved from the railway stations. Out of 4,168 wagons of wood, only 1,981 were unloaded.

The situation also worsened when a part of the sawmill materials for RSFSR migrants was not delivered to the republics of Central Asia on time—6,239 wagons were brought instead of 9,652.[33] A substantial amount of the wood was rotten, affected by fungus; in some cases, the standards required were not met.[34] By 8 October 1938, around 500 wagons of wood, 120 tons of nails, 2,100 boxes of glass, 590 roofing rolls, 150 tons of linseed oil, 2.5 million bricks, 16 tons of wire, and other materials[35] still had not been moved from the base warehouses for Korean migrants. The monitoring of funds by collective farms was also not undertaken or managed. However, Korean collective farms managed to strengthen themselves economically in such distress.[36] Migrants managed to pull themselves together in these difficult conditions and start a fight for survival.

Some migrants looked for alternative ways to achieve the necessary construction. According to A.I. Kim:

> The houses were being built. Old men advised chopping reeds and knitting mats for the roof and walls. The reeds were covered with clay, then this surface was burned. Reed stalks burned out and the clay became solid as a rock. That is how they got bricks.

It was very difficult to dig dugouts. There was no equipment. The walls in a dugout were laid with clay bricks, which were made of wheatgrass and clay. Beds were made of reeds. 15 to 20 cm of reeds were stacked, then pressed with wire or rope, and tied in an interval of 10 to 15 cm in the shape of a mat. The ends of the mat were precisely cut off. Such mats were suitable for the roof, bed bases, wall insulation, and much more. The walls of the houses were made of tightly bundled brushwood; the rooves was covered with rice straw.[37] Such houses naturally were fire hazards, however, they were cheap and easily built.

During the difficult times, on the collective farm, people were eating the bark of trees, kurmak grain (weed), rice hulls (rice husks), and quinoa. There was a difficult situation with clothes. People were wearing long shirts, that is, underwear and a shirt at the same time. The shirt was sewn at the bottom so it would not ride up from the wind. There was no footwear at all. For the winter, people made something like bast shoes[38] or clogs from straw. They lasted two to three days. Worn car tires that were issued for working days were highly valued. Shoes called "torigi"[39] were made of worn car tires.

In 1938 Koreans had sown 10,000 hectares, from which there were 4,220 hectares of rice, 158 hectares of cotton, and 5,632 hectares of grain and garden crops. From 1.5 to 2 hectares of sowing accounted for one collective farm and in

Figure 1   Torigi (this picture was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018).

districts with rain-fed farming, up to 4 hectares. Koreans harvested a bumper crop of rice (from 20 to 29 centners[40] from a hectare) in 1938. In many local collective farms, where in recent years the harvest did not exceed 8 to 10 centners from a hectare, Koreans were harvesting more than 20 centners. Uzbek collective farmers thought that the reason behind this is that Koreans cultivate and process rice very well.[41]

Whereas, it must be noted, that before the deportation Koreans were not involved in rice growing in large amounts at all; moreover, the climatic and sowing conditions in Central Asia were completely unfamiliar to them. A.I. Kim recalls: "in spring 1938, we started to develop the land. We were sowing wheat and sugar beet. Rice checks were arranged. The weeds growing next to rice were being ripped out four times a season. Korean women were wearing tights and stockings to protect themselves from the insects living in the water."[42] Moreover, this did not turn out to be the limit of rice production—A.I. Kim recalls that: "in 1938 the harvest was quite good. In 1939 the harvest was even larger … Rice crop turned out to be good: in our collective farm the land was productive and 40–41 degree temperatures also contributed to this. There was no fertilizer, so the fields had to be changed."[43]

Aside from the harvest, Koreans were always looking for options to earn extra money. From his memories A.I. Kim recalled:

I remember, dad used to work a lot, he was making hats from reeds; in hot weather hats were in great demand, Uzbeks bought them with pleasure. My dad made 30 hats, and the day before the accident (his own death) he was making a lot of jokes: 'when I sell all the hats, I will feed you properly and I will die in peace.' And that is exactly what happened. The day was successful, me and

my dad went to the market; it was a 3 km walk. We had sold all the hats and bought a lot of rice candies.

Under the pressure of circumstances, the economic and cultural life of Koreans had begun to change. They began to adopt many customs from the local population or partially change their traditions under local influences. For example, they lost the culture of cultivating garden beds and all the traditions and skills associated with them. Instead, the cultivation of bakhcha[44] took on a primary cultural role. This situation also affected Korean cuisine—some dishes disappeared due to the lack of components and ingredients (for example, spicy red caviar, small shrimp in fried pig blood) or changed under the influence of local traditions (this way, instead of *kaduri*, local *kozinaki* appeared.)[45] Dishes from local cuisines, such as *plov*, also appeared in the Korean diet.

After all these changes, some customs and rules remained the same among the Koreans. For example, according to A.I. Kim a custom of the ""red passport" remained, noting the name and surname of the deceased: "There were seven words written for men and eight words written for women. If there is no passport, then the soul of the person could not be accepted in the other world." The same went for keeping holidays such as *asyandi* (асянди, the first birthday of a child), Eastern New Year, and many other customs and traditions. As we can see, despite the adversity, remnants of religious cultural components still remained.

Koreans were able to instil in the local population some of their ways of doing business. A.I. Kim recalled:

> Uzbeks were engaged in pastoral activities back then. They knew very little.[46] And when Koreans were fishing in water reservoirs, Uzbeks were surprised: what is it and what is its purpose? They did not know themselves, that fish can be eaten. Koreans appeared weird to them due to different culture and customs (Koreans were eating fish, garlic, and pork).[47]

However, afterwards, the local Uzbeks adopted the consumption of garlic and fish from Koreans.

The central authorities in (Moscow) drew attention to the arbitrariness of the SSR administrations' approach to Korean immigrants only in 1938–1939. During the organization of settlements with Koreans in Central Asia even the administrative structures of Primorye region and Khabarovsk region also got involved. As a result, all migrants who had exchange receipts for horses were given the animals.[48] Before that, they were not given horses at all, although the final settlement of such receipts was not fully carried out.

Whereas the leadership of both Central Asian republics requested a second budget from the RSFSR for the resettlement of Koreans in 1939 in their regions,

it is not exactly known why that was done, perhaps for the elimination of the negative results of their own actions or attempts to continue corrupt activities. Whatever the reasons for the request, the republics were ultimately refused by Moscow so far as this request was concerned. However, Moscow still allocated 1,835,0000 rubles by 1939 for migrants to reside in the Kazakh and Uzbek SSRs (including deported Koreans), in addition to the amount previously used for the deportation and the deportees' needs, although, the state monitored spending of this further amount. In addition, building materials were allocated for 1939,[49] in particular, more than 90,000 cubic meters of lumber.

It is necessary to note the huge number of arbitrary acts and lawlessness of the Uzbek SSR authorities towards the migrants. While the local population of both republics tried to somehow help Koreans in many cases,[50] officials robbed them. Numerous instances of materials issued to external organizations demonstrate that there had been a high level of corruption. The seizure of houses, the use of collective farm transport at will, unauthorized salary cuts for Korean collective farmers, the theft of money from the budget all show the level of lawlessness of local authorities.

For a long time in the CIS countries (including Russia) the losses of the Korean population during the deportation were considered to be the results of policies imposed by the central authorities of the USSR.[51] Undoubtedly, the death of most people during the forced move from the Far East to Central Asia lies on the consciences of the Moscow organizers of the first ethnic mass deportations. Nevertheless, as we can see, the majority of deaths among Koreans in the first year of deportation had other reasons, particularly the actions and inactions of the authorities of the republics in Central Asia regarding the migrants. However, despite numerous instances of arbitrariness undertaken by the administrations of Uzbekistan and the heavy loss of life and property, Koreans were able to survive and even thrive there. They were able to rebuild quite quickly and adapt to the new living conditions, although, it was at a great cost.

The evaluation of the archival material in this Research Note shows that, in its essence, the Korean deportation had mixed outcomes. In previously published works it was asserted that this process also had economic goals.[52] But in terms of results, this deportation mostly brought financial losses to the state. The economic benefits from the relocation of Koreans in the Far Eastern region (the confiscation of property and livestock and the transport of active peasants to Central Asia) could not cover the huge financial costs for settlers in Uzbekistan. The reasons for these losses rest in the actions of authorities in Central Asia (corruption, arbitrariness, requests for allocation of new financial investments in 1939 to compensate their actions, and other frauds) as well as in the unaccounted additional expenses

(i.e., buying a fishing fleet for the settlers, additional transportation of population, and other costs) involved in the deportation and relocation of Koreans in these new territories.

Notes

1. This publication was supported by the 2020 Korean Studies Grant Program of the Academy of Korean Studies (AKS-2020-R06).
2. Dr. Alexander Kim, Associate Professor, Vladivostok State University of Economics and Service, Institute of Law, Department of International Relations and Law (Russian Federation); Dr. Mariia Surzhik, Leading Engineer, Federal Scientific Center of the East Asia Terrestrial Biodiversity (Institute of Biology and Soil Science), Far Eastern Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Vladivostok; Dr. Aleksei Mamychev, Professor, Laboratory of Political and Legal Research, Moscow State University (Russian Federation).
3. Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF, State Archive of the Russian Federation, Moscow), Fond 1235. Opis`130. 1935. delo. 3, Lists 20–21.
4. S. G Nam. *Koreiskii natsional'nyi raion: Put' poiska* (Moscow: Nauka, Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1991); Kim Iosif, *Sovetskii koreiskii teatr* (Alma-Ata: Oner, 1992).
5. Vladimir Baturov. "Repressii protiv Kitaitsev v stalinskom Sovetskom Soiuze." *Velikaia epokha*, 27 April 2010: 1–2.
6. P Polian. *Ne po svoei vole … Istoria i geografia prinuditel`nyh migracij v SSSR* (Moscow: Memorial, 2001).
7. In future Lyushkov defected to the Japanese and actively collaborated with Japanese Secret Services in work against his homeland. He organized two Stalin assassination attempts. In 1945 he was killed in Dairen by Japanese officers as Japan was defeated by the allies, and he had knew too much about Japanese Special Services, it was dangerous to keep him alive. Since he refused to commit suicide, he was killed by the Japanese themselves in an escape attempt.
8. Arkhiv Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii (Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, Moscow). Fond 3. Opis` 58. delo 139. Lists 1–2. Protocol № 52.
9. N.F. Bugai. "Vyselenie sovetskikh koreitsev s Dal'nego Vostoka," *Voprosy istorii* 5 (1994): 141–148.
10. We assume that eyewitness meant a train wreck with Korean deported population on board. One train, heading to Central Asia with Korean migrants, on the 12th of September 1937 derailed on the stretch between the stations Dormidontovka—Khaka, as a result, more than 20 forced migrants died, around 50 were injured (Zemskov V.N. *Spetspere-selentsy v SSSR: 1930–1960* (Moscow, Nauka. 2005), pp. 164–166). Later it turned out, that this accident was likely a misadventure. It was quite possible for another reason—due to wear and tear of railway tracks at that time (Gnatovskaya, Elena and Kim, Alexander. "K voprosu ob otnoshenijah mezhdu dal'nevostochnymi zheleznodorozhnikami i Sovetskim rukovodstvom s nachala 1930-h gg. do 1945." (On the question of the relationships between far eastern railway workers and the Soviet leadership from the beginning of the 1930s to 1945) *Soviet and Post-Soviet Review*, 42.3 (2015).
11. Sergei Mukhanov. Deportatsiia koreitsev s Dal'nego Vostoka. "Ia vyzhila tol'ko blagodaria liubvi i zabote roditelei." *Smolenskaia gazeta*, 1 February 2011.
12. Conversation with A.I. Park was in October 2019.
13. Andrei Lan'kov. Koreitsy SNG: stranitsy istorii. *Seul'skii vestnik*, 13 February 2002.
14. Sergei Mukhanov. Deportatsiia koreitsev s Dal'nego Vostoka.
15. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.

16. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
17. GARF, Fond 5446 sch, Opis` 29, delo 49, Lists 29–30.
18. GARF, Fond 5446 sch, Opis` 29, delo 49, List 35.
19. More thoroughly, we are viewing this subject in the article "Chinese-Korean garden bed—specification of use in the Far East of Russia".
20. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. Lists 48–49.
21. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 73.
22. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 72.
23. Sovnarkom- Совет народных комиссаров/Council of People's Commissars. In was a Government of Soviet Republics.
24. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 54.
25. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 65–68.
26. Autumn ploughing—digging the ground in autumn—is considered an important preparatory stage before the planting in spring.
27. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 71.
28. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 70.
29. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 73.
30. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
31. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 39.
32. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
33. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 34.
34. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 16.
35. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 56. List 55.
36. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 15. List 31.
37. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
38. Braided bark shoes covering only the foot.
39. See Appendix 1.
40. A centner is a measure of weight, known in India as the Quintal, and in English as the Hundredweight. Historically a Hundredweight was equivalent to 100 Lb, but in the Soviet Union, a centner was measured as a 100 metric kilograms, so therefore one centner= 100 kg. In this case a hectare could produce between 2000 and 2900 kg of rice.
41. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 15. List 23.
42. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
43. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
44. Bakhcha—a large field, generally covered by watermelons, melons and pumpkins. Usually located far from settlements. It is usually common in Central Asia, although, after the 1950s Soviet Koreans has brought this system to the Far East. As a result, bakhcha also was also covered by cucumbers and other crops.
45. Alexander Kim. "Wŏndonnamtchoke issnŭn rŏsia koryŏinŭi ŭmsike taehan ŭimune huanghae," in: Chŏnt'ongmunhwaŭi kyesŭnggwa pojon: hyŏnsidae chosŏn(han)minjok sae walmunhwa yŏn'gu (Yanji: Yanbian University Press, 2016).
46. We assume that this was not related to all Uzbeks, but only to a group that lived in that area.
47. Information was received from Oleg Kim, son of Kim A.I. in 2018.
48. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 16. List 85.
49. GARF. Fond P-5446. Opis` 23 A. delo 15. List 1.
50. In particular, it was confirmed by Lyubov Khwan, who turned up in Kazakhstan after the deportation. The same thing is described by Tsoi Alexei Danilovich, in particular, he wrote that "the local population was convinced that the settlers were certainly not "cannibals", normal in communication, peaceful, and then began to settle Korean families in their places—some provided a separate room in a house, others provided space in their good solid sheds, helped them to install a stove they could cook on and that would keep the place

warm. In such critical conditions such real qualities of ordinary people as kindness and generosity appear." (Tsoi Alexei Danilovich. *Dvizhenie k tseli: zhizn`obychnogo sovetskogo korejtsa* (Moscow: Maks Press, 2016), p. 9).

51. German Kim. *Istoriia immigratsii koreitsev, tom 1: Vtoraia polovina xix v.-1945g* (Almaty: Daik-press, 1999); Nicolai Fedorovich Bugai. "Vyselenie sovetskikh koreitsev s Dal'nego Vostoka."
52. Alexander Kim. "The Repression of Soviet Koreans during the 1930s." *The Historian*. 74.2 (2012): 267–285.

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Main materials from it was received from Gosudarstvennyi Arkhiv Rossiiskoi Federatsii (GARF, State Archive of the Russian Federation, Moscow) Fond P-5446 contains records about deported people in Middle Asia, almost all documents from this fondy from relate to Koreans, however, among these materials we can see information about other nations.

Materials of oral history

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Special Section: Encounters and Exchanges between Korea and the Islamicate Past & Present[1]

FARRAH SHEIKH   Research Associate, Centre of Islamic Studies, SOAS, University of London

This special section brings together scholars from across a range of academic disciplines to present the first set of coordinated English-language papers engaging with the theme: "Encounters and Exchanges between Korea and the Islamicate Past & Present." In coining the groundbreaking term, Islamicate, the renowned Islamic Studies historian, Marshall Hodgson (1922–1968) has given us the space to discuss the intricacies of cultures, politics, arts, histories, and more as they relate to Muslim contexts that transcend religious lines and move into the messy space of the "social complex."[2] In reflection of these efforts, the authors included in this special section tackle a range of historical, social, and contextual issues rooting, placing, and interrogating the relationship between the Korean Peninsula, its engagements with Islam, the Islamicate, and the Muslims connected to all of these frameworks.

This special section is a concerted effort to begin the necessary intellectual legwork required to chart a long-standing blind spot in the area of Korean Studies, emphasizing that the study of the Islamicate, and especially its Muslims as a social category, are useful and necessary zones of research, pushing the boundaries of what we know and define as the history and society of Korea and by extension, East Asia. A dearth in the existing literature reflects a field that is in a process of evolution.

Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that efforts to document engagements and civilizational exchange between Korea and the Islamicate have been

made and are well-documented by historians, particularly those specializing in the study of the Silk Road, illustrating the flow of trade, goods, ideas, religions, people, and more. For example, Yang (2017), emphasizes how Arab merchants arriving during the Koryŏ dynasty period (935–1392) coined the modern, English name, "Korea."[3] Kim and Cawley (2002) attribute the flow of knowledge about Koryŏ to these Muslim merchants, who spread it far and wide across India and much of the Middle East.[4] Tsung-Sun Kim (2016) deliberates on the establishment and development of Koryŏ's Postal System (known as 站赤 or Mongolian: ǰamči; Ch. zhanchi; K. ch'amjŏk), as a way to consolidate Mongol authority, arguing that the Korean Peninsula should be acknowledged as an extended pathway that was connected to the Mongolian Postal system, forming a long belt across the Mediterranean Sea, the Eurasian Centers, and tied to the Korean Peninsula.

Hee Soo Lee (2017) brings to our attention the existence of a medieval "Korean Muslim" community, often defined as the "Hui" (回) or "Hui Hui" (回回).[5] Focusing on the period of the Mongol-Yuan (1260–1368), he describes the Muslims referred to as Hui Hui, who settled on the Korean Peninsula as traders, migrants, and even officials of the Mongol regime. The community was located close to Kaegyŏng, and was not only wealthy, but also enjoyed political privilege at the Koryŏ court. Lee further highlights that from the beginning of the Chosŏn era in 1392, this Muslim community's business acumen, technical know-how, and transnational networks were highly valued by the new dynasty, and that Muslims were even permitted to offer messages of praise to the king, to pray for his long life and for the country's prosperity in accordance with Islamic customs, rules, and rights. This all ended abruptly in 1427 when a decree was issued that outlawed Islamic practices and symbols such as traditional dress and headgear, completely assimilating the Hui Hui into Korean society.[6] Regardless, the remnants of the Hui Hui's influence can be seen today through the descendants of the Tŏksu Chang clan. According to Yang (2017), originally, a Central Asian immigrant called Samga married and settled down in Korea, and he was renamed by the king as Chang Sunnyong. Twenty-five generations later, approximately 30,000 Koreans acknowledge Chang Sunnyong as the founding father of their clan. Similarly, the Central Asian, Sŏl Son is acknowledged as the founder of the Kyŏngju Sŏl line that is linked to approximately 2,000 Koreans.

Arguably, after an enormously long period of silence, a prominent and sizeable Muslim existence in Korea reappeared through the presence of Turkish Muslim soldiers who fought to protect a newly emerged South Korea during the Korean War (1950–53). Shortly thereafter, in 1969 the Korean government provided land to build a mosque in Seoul, leading to the construction of the Seoul Central Mosque (completed in 1976) that now stands proudly in the bustling district of It'aewŏn

today.[7] The establishment of the Korea Muslim Federation as an umbrella organization that manages the majority of mosques across the country and also has the power to bestow "halal status" on restaurants and food companies interested in expanding into Muslim markets shows that the relationship between Korea and the Islamicate is becoming more complex, with a consistent Muslim presence symbolizing that efforts are being exerted to shape a "local" form of Islam, which is at ease with its Korean roots and links to global Muslim contexts.

As contemporary Korea works hard to formulate and project an open and multicultural image to the world, it is also seeing a rise in its local Muslim populations, including ethnic Korean convert Muslim communities, a strand of research that I have been working on and developing for the past three years.[8] According various, estimates, the Muslim population in Korea stands at approximately 200,000 people of which, 35,000 are ethnic Korean Muslim converts.[9]

There is also a growing body of literature examining Muslim engagements with Korean pop culture, the Korean Wave, assimilation into Korean society, and international marriages, which builds on earlier works focusing on the contemporary era that often show Korea's relationships with the Islamicate as one shaped by economic activities such as the need for oil, construction contracts, and boosts in its tourism sectors.

Inevitably, these realities give rise to several issues that urgently require our scholarly attention, especially as societal transformation brings with it new sets of challenges and community expectations. In the context of Korea and the Islamicate, it is hoped that the essays presented in this special section will offer some much-needed insights into a field of study that requires careful attention and scholarly nourishment.

This special section not only targets the general Korean Studies scholar, but also has interdisciplinary value as the themes cut across the fields of Islamic and Muslim studies, offering connections and perspectives that are often difficult to bring to the fore. In this section, we present a series of essays that problematize existing ideas about Korean citizenship, gender relations, historical interactions, and racism.

Nur Yasar presents an essay entitled "Stereotyping Halal Food and Eating Halal Food in the South Korean Context." She provides a fascinating account of the connections between perceptions, stereotypes, and identity constructions that are produced when defining, conceptualising, and of course—eating halal food. Using the notion of foodways, Yasar offers a set of rich ethnographic accounts of Muslim and non-Muslim engagements with halal food unpicking the religious, cultural, and social threads that connect halal consumption, foodways, and preconceived notions about Muslims and Islam in Korean society.

Kyungsoo Lee writes about Islamophobia in Korea in an essay entitled: "Islamophobia Discourse via Online Rumours in Korea: Focusing on the Rumour 'How Lebanon, which was a Christian Country, became an Islamic Country?' and the 'Taharrush Game.'" Using these two rumours as the foundation of her quantitative investigation, Lee presents a powerful account of the production, dissemination, and impact of fake news about Muslims and Islam in Korean society.

Jinhan Jeong offers a Research Note entitled "Islamic Studies of Korea in Medieval Scripts: Medieval Muslims' perception of Korea 'as a Muslims' Paradise' and the Influence of Ancient Civilizations' Golden Island in the Sea East of the Eastern End of the World."

In doing so, Jeong opens up much-needed dialogue about the histories, contexts, and methods of Muslim knowledge production in medieval Korea, interrogating the root and spread of the idea of Silla constructed as a "Muslim Paradise."

Finally, I present a complex and nuanced ethnographic case study on an ethnic Korean Muslim woman, documenting her struggles for identity, community, and belonging in an essay entitled: "Feminist Ethnography in South Korea: Documenting Conversion to Islam in 'Multicultural' Korea and the Gendered Struggle for Belonging." Using feminist approaches to data collection and analysis, I show how conversion to Islam and subsequent intermarriage with a Muslim migrant worker poses several challenges to static ideas of Korean identity, Islam, and multiculturalism in the Korean context.

This diverse set of proceedings share the collective aim of presenting complex, differing, and multiple narratives of Korean society as it moves into a global context of multiculturalism, demographic change, and increased complexity. By striving to de-center the notion that engagements between Korea, the Islamicate, and Muslims are miniscule or inconsequential,[10] this special section elevates the idea that research and interrogations of the various strands of this long-standing relationship between Korea and the Islamicate are vital, necessary, and offer specifically East Asian and Korean dynamics to existing and ongoing conversations about the Islamicate in global contexts. In doing so, we encourage researchers to adopt a wider conceptual lens when producing discourse that leaves communities such as Muslims at the margins of society and scholarship.

Notes

1.   This work was supported by a Korea Foundation Fieldwork fellowship in 2018.
2.   Cited by Sahar Amer, 'Cross-Dressing and Female Same-Sex Marriage in Medieval French and Arabic Literatures', in *Islamicate Sexualities: Translations Across Temporal Geographies of Desire* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2008), pp. 72–113 (pp. 104–5).

3.   Eunsook Yang, "Silk Road and Korea: Past and Present." *Cultura: International Journal of Philosophy of Culture and Axiology* 14.1 (2017): 89–100.

4.   Kim Tae-gyu and Kevin Cawley, "Goryeo: The Dynasty that Offered Korea its Name" *Korea Times*, April 4, 2012, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2016/08/367_108344.html

5.   Hee-Soo Lee explains how the term "Hui" referred to Muslims across much of Korea, Japan and China and was not necessarily related to Muslims from any specific ethnic group.

6.   *Chosŏn Wangjo Sillok*, the 7th, 8th and 9th year of King Sejong.

7.   Korea Muslim Federation. "Introduction to Islam Korea Seoul Central Masjid, http://www.koreaislam.org/en/seoul-kmf/

8.   Sheikh, Farrah. "Exploring "Korean Islam" in a Climate of Exclusion and Islamophobia" *International Journal of Diaspora & Cultural Criticism* 9.2 (2019): 196–215; Sheikh, Farrah "Korean Muslims: Shaping Islamic Discourse and Identities Online," *European Journal of Korean Studies* 19.2 (2020): 129–147; Sheikh, Farrah. "Exploring How Mobility Affects Muslim Lives: The case of Yemeni refugees on Jeju Island." *Newcomers and Global Migration in Contemporary South Korea: Across National Boundaries*, edited by Sung-Choon Park and Joong-Hwan Oh, 273–290. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2020.

9.   The Korea Muslim Federation (KMF) estimates that 30,000 Muslims in Korea are indigenous Korean Muslims on the FAQ section of their Korean website: http://www.koreaislam.org/%ec%9e%90%ec%a3%bc%ed%95%98%eb%8a%94-%ec%a7%88%eb%ac%b8/. K'wŏn Jeeyun suggests that there are 150,000 Muslims in Korea with 45,000 being indigenous Korean Muslims: Jeeyun K'wŏn, "The Rise of Korean Islam: Migration and Da'wa," (Middle East Institute, 2014) https://www.mei.edu/publications/rise-korean-islam-migration-and-dawa#_ftn1. A 2018 media report by *Korea Expose* approximates Muslims in Korea at around 200,000 with around 30,000 Korean Muslims. See Ben Jackson, "How Influential Is Islam in South Korea?" *Korea Expose*, 19 January, 2018 https://www.koreaexpose.com/how-influential-islam-south-korea/

10.   Don Baker, "Islam Struggles for a Toehold in Korea." *Harvard Asia Quarterly* 10.1 (2006): 25–30.

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Feminist Ethnography in South Korea: Documenting Conversion to Islam in "Multicultural" Korea and the Gendered Struggle for Belonging[1]

FARRAH SHEIKH   Centre of Islamic Studies, SOAS, University of London

Abstract

This paper presents a feminist ethnographic account of the gendered struggle for belonging in "multicultural" Korea through an in-depth case study of a Korean Muslim woman convert and her family. Centering the informant and her family's narratives, I explore the gendered implications linked to her conversion to Islam, her sense of belonging and how her inter-ethnic marriage challenges existing notions of labelled "multicultural families" in Korean society. This paper sheds light on the penalties associated with the case study's religious conversion and marriage choice, demonstrating how she experiences exclusion from mainstream society and her own ethnic community. Far from being an isolated case, I will further convey how it is linked to several others in the literature, highlighting the urgent need for further field research.

Keywords: Korean Muslims, Korean Women, Multiculturalism, International Marriage, Islamophobia

Introduction

What is "Multicultural" Korea and its concept of a "Multicultural Family?"

Multicultural discourse has a short history in South Korea (henceforth Korea). For over a decade, ongoing debates propose that it has been used to resolve society's social issues: labor shortages, rapid ageing, low birth rate, and a reduction in married couples. These debates frame Korean multiculturalism in several ways. For example, Lee Hye Kyung states that Korean multiculturalism is an exercise from above, pressuring immigrants to assimilate into existing systems rather than accommodating their multifaceted identities.[2] Both Chang[3] and Pirie[4] link multicultural policies to efforts to control immigration and simultaneous aspirations to become more global. Echoing similar sentiments, Ang argues that multiculturalism has been characterized as a part of Korea's efforts to secure its national boundaries in an era of globalization, therefore in Korea's case, multicultural politics ought to be viewed as part of the national project to manage ethnic diversity.[5]

Korea's framing of its multicultural vision can also be attributed to its experiences of imperialism and colonialism as ethnic nationalism played a pivotal role in its objective to build a strong nation. Naturally, this nationalism came at the expense of those outcast as Others and recent attempts to build a new multicultural discourse can be viewed as a reflection of these historical legacies. In relation to this, Ahn examines the power dynamics laying at the heart of Korean conceptions of multiculturalism, suggesting that it exacerbates and extends existing hierarchal differences between "pure" and "mixed" Koreans, the latter, who are framed as undesirable Others.[6]

As we can see, there are several approaches that attempt to define and frame multiculturalism in Korea. For this paper, the link between multiculturalism and marriage is essential for understanding how inter-ethnic families are produced and shaped in Korean society with particular burdens placed on women. As highlighted by Lee Hye Kyung, women, often from South East or Central Asia have been targeted for marriage immigration through agencies that supply foreign brides to "unmarriageable" Korean men who are often located in remote, rural areas of the country.[7] These efforts to socially engineer a more "multicultural" society coupled with ongoing discourses propagated from top-down, has led to a series of specific ideas and policies about what multiculturalism "looks like" in the public's imagination, usually through images of low-paid migrant laborers, foreign brides and "multicultural families." These families are often constructed through marriage between a Korean man and a foreign bride, and

their multi-ethnic children are supported through various integration, language, and lifestyle programmes aiming to shape these women into appropriate "Koreanized" wives. Existing literature reflects the gendered burden placed on immigrant women's role in producing Korea's "multicultural" society as they are held as the standard bearers for its global visions. As Ahn highlights, these women are viewed as mothers of the future workforce through their Korean children and as caregivers of Korea's elderly, particularly male population in the form of husbands. On the other hand, few studies have given attention to the phenomenon of Korean women choosing to marry immigrant men, particularly those from non-western countries.[8] This paper extends the sparse literature in this area, extending the work of Kwak Yoon Kyung who has highlighted the multi-layered societal penalties faced by Korean women who marry immigrant men, particularly when their husbands originate from developing countries.[9] My work will take this a step further to show how female conversion to Islam complicates the notion of a multicultural family when led by an ethnically Korean woman.

Pausing briefly to acknowledge the problematic and contentious nature of Korean multicultural politics, it is not my intention to entangle myself in a battle that pits Korean and immigrant women against each other. Instead, I am considering this complex context as a frame to explore what it *means* to be labelled a "multicultural family" led by a Korean Muslim woman, wife, and mother with an immigrant husband. Furthermore, I am interested in exploring how this situation is complicated further when the Korean woman converts to Islam in a society with little awareness or frame of understanding what it means to be a Muslim. How do racialized understandings of what it means to be Muslim and "multicultural" push her to the margins of society, and how does she negotiate her notions of identity and belonging as Korean Muslim woman, wife, and mother in her newfound minority position? I explore these themes in this ethnographic case study, based on two years of observations and interviews with Ayesha.*[10]

This research offers several important and meaningful contributions to the field. The regional focus on Korea brings new knowledge about Muslim minority lives to the fore, adding fresh ethnographic perspectives specifically through a feminist lens to the study of Muslims in non-Muslim societies that is often dominated by western narratives. Enriching the field with new categories of knowledge, this study helps to better frame the experiences and struggles of Korean converts to Islam such as Ayesha, demonstrating a societal shift away from Barker's suggestion that Islam has only made a "toehold" in Korea.[11] Thirdly, despite Korea's small ethnic Muslim population (estimated at 30,000), Korean Muslim perspectives, especially through Ayesha's case study, offer nuanced, intersectional lenses for which to examine many existing social issues operating in Korean society; particularly

highlighting the intersections between inter-ethnic marriages, women's agency, Islamophobia, colonial legacies, and racism in a society that finds itself needing to rapidly adapt existing systems, policies, and viewpoints to deal with a diversifying population. Furthermore, given the importance placed on the idea of social harmony, coupled with its history of exerting control over women's bodies and sexualities, Korean Muslim conversion, particularly women's conversion to Islam, poses an interesting and complex challenge to deeply embedded notions of what it means to be Korean in contemporary times.

As I will demonstrate through this case study, my informant faced several penalties for choosing Islam, especially as an ethnically Korean woman, in the following ways. Firstly, as a hijab-wearing Korean Muslim woman, she was racialized into existing notions of a "Foreign Other." Secondly, through my informant's negative experiences, we can see how she was framed as a "fallen women" and "cultural traitor" because of her inter-ethnic marriage. Thirdly, as a Korean Muslim woman who is also a mother to multi-ethnic, Muslim children, Ayesha actively implements complex strategies aimed at protecting the family from societal ostracization, often facing intense personal discrimination in the process of child-rearing. Drawing on these main themes emerging from the ground, my feminist-orientated analytical framework examines the intersections of my main informant's identity and experiences as a Korean Muslim woman in "multicultural" Korea.

Methodology

Employing Feminist Ethnographic Methods

Feminism and by extension "feminist" ethnography are terms which are highly contested with long histories of debate and definition. That being said, I clearly identify my work and my methodology as feminist-orientated, whilst fully acknowledging that as a researcher, I am still in process of articulating, deepening, and learning more about my position in relation to feminism and the theories and methods that go hand in hand with this approach. Feminist anthropologists, Dennis et al., highlight the importance of identifying the fundamental values that shape work as "feminist,"[12] and in that line, I state the following feminist ethics and principles for my own ethnographic explorations: first, this case study centers the life, experiences, and struggles of an ethnic Korean Muslim woman with the aim of elevating her voice in the field as a matter of equity and justice. I am mindful of Dubois's proposition that subaltern groups have a "double consciousness" where they do not or cannot fit into dominant categories of knowledge, which is

often produced by dominant groups.[13] This, given the extreme marginalization of Korean Muslim women's voices across the academy, Korean society and how they are further excluded from public discourse about "multicultural families" despite being actively involved in the creation of such families, raises the importance of contemplating issues of equity, justice, and agency and produce relevant categories of knowledge as significant factors that continue to influence, shape, and inspire my research. In doing so, we can see the connections between the attitudes shaped by Korea's colonial legacies, historical contexts, global aspirations for power and recognition, and the lives of Korean Muslim women such as Ayesha, observing and analyzing how they become entangled in processes that, in the line of Hill Collins, form specific political oppressions.[14]

Secondly, as argued by Smith, I recognize the authority of experience, especially in the case of marginalized women's voices as the experts in their own narratives, which they are choosing to share with me, the ethnographer, who should listen and observe through the principles of humility, compassion, and ethical responsibility.[15] Reflective of these values, this study has been largely collaborative, working with Ayesha over several years (2017 ~ ongoing) to confirm experiences were noted and understood correctly, giving her the opportunity to correct and rectify research materials as well as giving her the opportunity to interrogate me in my position as a researcher, British-Pakistani, and fellow Muslim woman. Through this process, my aim was to preserve the integrity of Ayesha's voice as much as possible, whilst acknowledging that there will never be a fully equal power relationship between researcher and informant.

Thirdly, this ethnography is "feminist" in that it has "real-life" value and, therefore, the potential to have "real-life" consequences, which lays a sense of ethical responsibility upon the shoulders of the ethnographer. As a feminist ethnographer, I am acutely aware of the fact that Ayesha chose to open a window into her life, her inner thoughts, and her struggles to me based on our mutual connection as Muslim women. I am acutely aware of her perception that I can deliver her story, and by extension, the stories of Korean Muslims who have been largely neglected in social and academic circles to other experts in the field. In doing so, Ayesha believes that these types of research projects will eventually generate the knowledge needed to facilitate empathy for her personal struggles as a Muslim woman in a society that is, at best, unfamiliar and, at worst, fearful of Islam. These perceptions, hopes, and expectations weigh heavily on my shoulders, and I am mindful that scholars are often perceived as holding more power than is the reality. On the other hand, these field realities continue to fire motivation to implement values of ethical responsibility, compassion, and commitment to elevating these marginalized voices to the center as much as is possible.

Using these ethical principles as the baseline for all my research interactions has meant that I am continually open and honest about my presence in the field. I have always made my position as an ethnographer clear when I have engaged in data collection, particularly when observing or interviewing. As semi-structured interviewing was an important tool for this case study, I obtained informed consent at the beginning of every interview which was voice-recorded, because I found Ayesha was uncomfortable at the thought of signing physical papers. She was far more comfortable with giving her consent as part of our overall interview recording, which I incorporated in all of my subsequent interview interactions. As part of the ethics of openness. I also offered typed versions of the final transcripts for review, copies of the original source recordings, and emphasized her right to withdraw from the project at any time.

Data Collection Processes

Firstly, this is an ongoing ethnographic project, beginning in July 2017. I travelled to Korea for the first time to carry out initial field research on the conversion narratives, identity, and gender issues shaping Korean convert Muslim lives in the context of Korea's aspirations to build an internationally recognized multicultural society. During that early phase of fieldwork of approximately two months, I focused on building relationships with gatekeepers in the field including the imam of Seoul Central Mosque and other elder Muslims in the community, who run Islam study and social groups for new Korean convert Muslims.

It was during this early period of ethnographic fieldwork where I first met Ayesha* a middle-aged Korean Muslim woman, married to a Pakistani man with three young children. Ayesha and I quickly bonded over our mutual Pakistani connections, love of travel, her desire to practice Urdu and English and her general sense of openness towards a fellow Muslim woman. Over the years, Ayesha became one of my main informants, introducing me to other Korean Muslim women, vouching for my "integrity" after her own personal experiences with me.

The ability to build up trust and rapport is essential for any field ethnographer. I learned very quickly that Korean Muslims who use Seoul Central Mosque were often wary of outsiders, because they were often approached with requests to share their stories with broadcasters, missionaries, and journalists from Muslim majority countries. Fascinated by this tiny minority, these visitors were keen to preach their version of Islam or broadcast Korean Muslim conversion stories as "inspiring" content for viewing consumption by Muslim audiences obsessed with *Hallyu* back at home. Often complaining about being targeted or exotified by other Muslims abroad and feeling frustrated by the local academic politics

shaping the domestic Islamic Studies scene, my initial entry as an outsider—a non-Korean Muslim woman researcher into the field was extremely tough. I relied on gatekeepers for the first few months as I worked hard to settle my position in the field.

Eventually, I joined a weekend study and social group, *SN*, aimed at supporting Korean Muslims in their journeys to Islam and adjusting to life in Korean society post conversion. As the group met up every Sunday afternoon at Seoul Central Mosque in Itaewon, I spent my weekends and free time volunteering, participating in events, giving free lectures in the community as part of my efforts to gain acceptance and to show that I was more than willing to give what I could to the community in exchange for their permission of my presence in their spaces and their worlds. As Ayesha was a member of this group and attended most of their events, I had ample opportunity to observe and interact with her in a variety of settings, mostly around the Itaewon area. These Sunday meetings were for eating together, catching up on news, studying Islam, planning, and hosting events through which the group aimed to foster better relations with mainstream Korean society.

Despite initial entry issues, my complex personal positionality: Muslim woman, woman, scholar, non-Korean, British-Pakistani, and fellow Muslim minority influenced my position and the depth of that position in the field. Growing up Muslim in London, a non-Muslim environment meant I had several points of connection with my participants, particularly on negotiations between religious lines when it came to everyday issues like attending after-work drinks, accessing halal food, finding time to pray and fast in a society that was not well-equipped to deal with or accept such practices. My background as a scholar was appreciated as I could lecture and provide resources to new Korean Muslims who were unable to access Islamic books in their native tongues but were comfortable in English. In the end, the fact that I was not Korean and therefore completely disconnected from any of their own internal networks helped participants to feel like they could open up about their lives and their struggles freely, away from the hierarchies of their own networks.

Ayesha and I continued to build rapport and deepen our relationship even after I temporarily returned to England. Promising I would return to continue this work, Ayesha and I kept communicating through the popular, local messaging app, Kakao Talk. This meant that once I returned to Korea for full-time research in 2018, I was able to quickly reactivate many of these early networks, especially so in the case of Ayesha. We met up often and held long hours of conversation where she inquired about my life growing up as a British Pakistani in London. Again, my background was an important point of connection between us as she

saw parallels between my family and upbringing and her own home situation. Concerned about her own Korean-Pakistani children's ability to flourish as minorities in society, I often listened to Ayesha talk about the measures she was trying to employ to ensure her children had all the tools to succeed in South Korea's incredibly competitive educational environment and her other struggles. As Ayesha is fluent in English and was keen to practice her language skills, our interviews were conducted almost exclusively in English with a Korean-English speaking research assistant present for additional translation support, which was rarely necessary. These long, fruitful, rich conversations along with extensive opportunities to observe her in the field since 2017 onwards prompted me to prepare a single ethnographic case study giving us the opportunity to deeply explore Ayesha's unique experiences and struggles as a Korean woman, Muslim, wife, and mother.

Justification for Ethnographic Case Study

As suggested by Eisenhardt, case studies are an appropriate method for research in new areas or where existing theories are lacking.[16] This is particularly relevant for my research areas as there are few opportunities for researchers, especially non-Korean researchers to access the level of deep data presented in this paper, and even fewer opportunities to work with intercultural Muslim married couples in the Korean context. Drawing on the work of Yin, the ethnographic case study method allows us to ask "how" and "why" phenomena unfolds and takes place as it happens in its own context.[17] The single case study presented in this paper reflects several ground truths that need to be explored including the intersections between multicultural and multicultural family production discourse in South Korea, ethnic Korean women's conversions to Islam, and gendered struggles for belonging that result from this major life change. A point to note is that whilst Ayesha features as the main protagonist in this exploration of conversion to Islam in South Korea, her story is interwoven with that of her husband and children, as their existence and connections to Ayesha mark her out as "Other." Additionally, the use of this method also reflects the lack of existing research and a small pool of accessible, appropriate participants in this field of research. Keeping these factors in mind, I believe sharing Ayesha's case as a stand-alone ethnographic case study is worthy of exploration, offering textured analysis that is missing in the wider field of Muslim Minority, Korean, Multiculturism, and Gender Studies.

Snapshots of Life as a Muslimah in Contemporary South Korea

Summary of Ayesha's background

Over the years, Ayesha and I have had countless hours of interview time where she has shared various fragments of her life with me. In reflection of her journey, which began well over a decade ago when Ayesha was a single woman taking her first steps towards Islam, I have arranged this case study following the milestones of her adult life as she narrated them to me: becoming a Muslim, dating and marriage, establishing a home and family, and her struggles as an ethnically Korean Muslim woman. Ayesha is now in her forties, married to a Pakistani man and together, they have three children. The family lives in a small, suburban community in the international airport city, Incheon. Despite the growing diversity within Incheon, Ayesha and her family remain the only multicultural family in their neighborhood, and as a way of finding community, she is a regular at Incheon Mosque where they hold free Islam classes, social meetings, and programs.

A Seoulite at heart, Ayesha often makes the long journey to Seoul Central Mosque, the place where she first studied Islam and took her shahādah (الشهادة).[18] Here, she meets up with friends old and new, catches up with elder Korean Muslim mentors and participates in volunteer activities aimed at fostering better relations between Korean Muslims and mainstream Korean society. As highlighted by Song, the mosque is strategically located in an area of the capital famous for all things "foreign," meaning it is a place that is home to many immigrants, foreign super-markets, and world food restaurants.[19] By coming here, Ayesha is not only keen to expose her children to Islam and other Muslim children but also wants to show them that other mixed ethnicity children like hers exist and live well in Korean society. As we will discover in the upcoming sections, this is an important part of Ayesha's parenting strategies, to instill pride and confidence in her children who are often questioned, cursed, and bullied by others for their multi-layered identities in a society which is still grappling with the idea of multiculturalism and how to foster belonging in an Islamophobic context.

Snapshot: Journey to Islam: Questions, Introspection, and Conversion

> I tried to study Islam because I had a lot of questions. Since I was Christian, we had to believe in the Trinity but according to Islam, this can be a big sin. Korean people, we never think that this can be a sin. Many of us do not even know that the Trinity is not in the Bible. I wanted to think about why this could be a big sin and studied about these kinds of things. Eventually, I was able to solve this

> issue as my first question. Then, I was curious about why Jesus was not last? I really wanted to know why someone else (Muhammad) came after Jesus! These kinds of questions sparked my curiosity about Islam. Alhumdulilah, since I got my answers, I became a Muslim.[20]

Ayesha's transition to Islam was a long and slow process as she immersed herself in contemplation across spiritual and temporal realms. The idea of living in "sin," fears for her soul, and an intense desire to please God were some of the main spiritual driving forces behind her decision to become a Muslim. Although born Christian, growing up in a nominally practicing household left her hungry for theological answers to the "big questions" that could shape the future of her eternal life. In the material world, curiosity and a desire to live a life that was different from the norm were other motivations that impacted Ayesha's choices. Young and hungry to get out of Korea to explore the world along with its colorful cultures and varying religions, Ayesha started her journey to Islam as a twenty-something backpacker. She travelled extensively, her experiences in the Middle East and North Africa being most impactful for her religious transformation.

As we talk, Ayesha smiles as she reminisces about her life on the road: a working holiday in Australia, Arabic language school in North Africa, a tour guide for Korean tourists in Egypt, and so on. Each time Ayesha ran out of money, visas or felt homesick, she returned to Korea whilst she planned her next trip. During these visits home and in the comfort of all that is familiar, she talked about how easy it would have been to forget the excitement that comes with new experiences in faraway lands but for Ayesha, Islam had already sparked something deep inside her heart. She described how she would go to Seoul Central Mosque to take advantage of the free Arabic classes on offer along with the chance to study Islam intensely with other Korean friends—all the better because the classes were available in the Korean language. This sense of adventure served Ayesha well, as once she married, she eventually moved to Pakistan to live with her husband and their extended family for several years before returning to Korea.

For now, as we lazed in the women's section of Seoul Central Mosque, a haven for Muslim mothers as they can rest in a space large enough for their children to play together, we reflect upon the Mosque's surroundings in Itaewon. A sprawling, Turkish-style building, Seoul Central Mosque is nestled between a quirky hodgepodge of gay and transgender bars, restaurants serving halal and international cuisines not found elsewhere in the city, hip-hop clubs, US army supply shops, and popular brand stores. Nostalgic, this area evokes memories of Ayesha's pre-Muslim youth, where she would come to this very same area to drink and dance the night away with her girlfriends every Friday night. Ayesha believes

it is tremendously significant that she now prays in the place where she used to play, firm in her faith, believing that this is all part of God's plan for her salvation.

Today, Ayesha is well-networked within the Korean Muslim community. She still attends and participates in events designed to train Korean Muslims in daʿwah (الدعوة)[21] skills so that she can challenge her family and friends' prejudices about Islam through negotiation rather than argument. She is also interested in continued personal development through Islamic studies classes available at the various mosques that she frequents and is a staunch friend to fellow Koreans interested in learning more about the religion or are recently converted.

Choosing a Life Partner: Dating, Love, and Marriage

> I met him (Qasim*) before I travelled to Australia. First, I travelled to Egypt, Palestine, and Jordan. Then I came back to Korea and studied Arabic at the masjid just like I do these days! At first, I just treated him as a friend. He is an honest man—a good man. During those early days, we were just friends. A few months later, I was preparing to go to Australia and whilst I was there, Qasim called me several times. He also sent letters. I thought he might have left Korea but when I returned after a year, I learned that he was still here. By this point, I thought he was a good man—should I think about him a bit more deeply?[22]

As indicated above, in-between her international adventures, Ayesha first met Qasim* on one of her visits to Seoul Central Mosque. At first, the two struck up a friendship, keeping in touch and exchanging friendly letters whilst she was abroad. This quickly changed once Ayesha eventually decided to return home. She learned that despite her long period of absence, Qasim was still in Korea, single and eager to stay in touch. Attracted by his honesty and good manners, Ayesha started to fall in love. By this point, she was already a Muslim struggling with Arabic classes for reading the *Quran*. Looking back on her former self, Ayesha bursts into fits of giggles as she recalls a time when she thought all Muslims carried the same outlook and were all fluent in Arabic, using this as a way to approach her future husband:

> I was the one to approach him about Arabic first. Qasim said he can read a bit but not speak because the Pakistani and Arabic languages are similar, so he was honest from the very beginning!

This naive encounter was also Ayesha's first proper window into the diversity that exists within Muslim cultures. Having very few Muslims in Korea coupled with her experiences of Islam that were predominantly shaped by travels in the Middle East, Ayesha was extremely surprised to learn that her future husband could only recite the Arabic *Quran* and needed to rely on translations in his native language—just like her; this helped to strengthen their bond.

Meeting the parents

> My parents said: 'if you want to marry Qasim, you have to think carefully because your baby will not be welcomed in Korea.' They were already worried about these things but at that time, I didn't worry about it. I just thought 'I like this man, he's very nice.' My parents were not against us, they were just very worried for us.[23]

As we chart Ayesha's journey through her conversion to Islam and then her marriage choice, we can quickly pinpoint the root of the troubles that still hinder Ayesha and her family's sense of identity, self, and belonging in multicultural Korea today. As indicated by the interview extract, Ayesha's parents were largely unconcerned about her choice to date and then marry an immigrant man even though he was a Muslim.

On the contrary, they felt it was fortunate that their daughter, who had now embraced a "foreign" religion with few adherents in Korean society was still able to find love and meet their expectations of marriage with someone who was religiously similar if not culturally very different to them. However, Qasim's ethnicity was a sticking point with Ayesha's parents, fearful about the negative social implications that often follow a marriage that produced mixed-heritage children in Korea. Considering Korea's recent past where mixed heritage children and inter-ethnic marriages were largely condemned or outright rejected, these concerns need further unpacking.

Historically, inter-ethnic marriages were a rare occurrence in Korean society, because it was often associated with imperialist and colonial invasions. As noted by Hye-Kyung Lee, initially, Korean women led intercultural marriage trends in contemporary Korean history. These marriages were met with intense disapproval, with women facing social stigma for choosing to marry a non-Korean, their mixed heritage children oftentimes rejected by society.[24] The Korean parent, usually the mother, faced intense scrutiny for "contaminating" the so-called "pure" Korean bloodline, reflecting desires to police female sexuality and in doing so, maintain tight control over the production of "Korean" families. Over time, these marriages have also posed key questions for the conception of Korean identity, challenging existing notions of Korean nationhood, citizenship, and the role of women in society.

The relationship between Korea's colonial legacy, views on race and ethnic identity, and women's agency shapes and embeds the underlying negative perceptions towards Ayesha and her family. Especially, her marriage to Qasim brings issues of "*Yanggongju*" (양공주) back to the contemporary fore. As explained by Kim (1998)[25] and Kwak, this derogatory term meaning "Yankee Princess" was used to describe Korean women who married US Army personnel, who were

often stationed in camps built in the center of Seoul surrounded by a thriving prostitution industry that catered to them.[26]

As Park states, these attitudes extended to Korean women who entered inter-ethnic marriages, framing them as traitors who had not only turned their backs on the nation's men but also injured its masculine pride.[27] As a way of controlling the production of families who could be considered appropriately "Korean," these unions struggled to achieve formal recognition. The children resulting from these marriages were legally and socially excluded, purposely left unrecognized by the state, with many sent to America as part of a state-sponsored adoption program.[28]

To summarize, as highlighted by Park, Korean women who married non-Korean men were viewed as an extension of the nation's failure to defend itself against invaders and drew battlegrounds for patriarchal-nationalist ideologies on the bodies of Korean women. If we now reconsider the fear that Ayesha and Qasim's baby would be "unwelcome" in Korean society, we can see that, on the surface, it may be easy to dismiss the rejection as expressions of xenophobia or even fear of the unknown. However, unlike in many western or other eastern contexts where people of differing backgrounds have found ways to live together, marry, and no matter how imperfect, generally negotiate some sense of belonging under various notions of multiculturalism, this, as a political and social concept, is yet to be widely embraced as a way of being in Korean society.

It must be acknowledged that contemporary Korea is certainly making rapid progress as societal demographics evolve and change. Despite this, the notion of multiculturalism, as it is more commonly understood in places like Europe or North America, is a long way off with older identity concepts tying Koreanness to blood, ancestry, and birthplace still very much in motion. Ayesha's parents' concerns can be viewed as a contemporary reflection of this socio-political reality, therefore, the fear that Ayesha and Qasim's baby "will not be welcome in Korea" becomes symbolic of historical burdens placed by colonial legacies on the bodies of Korean women like Ayesha, who choose to live alternate lives.

Experiencing Trials in Korean Society: Starting a Multicultural Family

> Some young kids started hitting my son in the playground in front of their grandmother. She ignored the situation until my son got angry and retaliated. Shouting, the grandmother grabbed my son's collar and hurt him. I tried to stop her, but she punched me in the stomach with her other hand; can you believe it?! As I tried to free my son, she grabbed me, too. An old man passing by reported us for attacking the old woman. Since there was no CCTV or witnesses to support our side of the story, we had to attend a court hearing where it was

decided both parties were responsible, and we paid a fine. I was incensed and tried to fight that fine three times, but they would not listen. All this just because I wear a hijab! Korean people never act like this with normal Korean neighbors. They do it to me, because they think I'm a foreigner and look down on me. Korean people think families like ours are poor and lower status compared to them, so they ignore us. That grandmother could NEVER hit me if I looked like a normal neighbor—a 'normal' Korean.[29]

The concerns expressed by Ayesha's parents quickly materialized into reality once the couple married and started to raise a family. As indicated by the extract, Ayesha's multicultural family often faces hardship as neighbors look down on them, these unfortunate struggles trickling down to her children, reminiscent of the exclusion and rejection suffered by earlier generations of inter-ethnic Korean families. Ayesha also shared their difficulties in finding a safe place to live. As the couple tried to build a home together, they often struggled to find a landlord willing to rent to an inter-ethnic couple. If they were able to overcome this hurdle, the next issue came in the form of racist and Islamophobic neighbors, vehemently against the idea of having an intercultural, particularly Muslim, couple living in their neighborhood.

The very nature of this discrimination and sometimes outright rejection itself are important to highlight, since it was often gendered, aimed at Ayesha who inadvertently highlighted her household's Muslim identity through her choice to wear a hijab. As indicated in the extract, we can see how Ayesha and her young son experienced violence not only from kids in the playground but also from elders who were supposed to watch over them. This, and many other similar incidents, feeds Ayesha's perception that she is singled out in this way because of her visibly Muslim appearance, further reflecting deep-rooted anxieties about mixed heritage families stemming from Korea's colonial legacy.

This is a particularly poignant interview session. Emotions running high, Ayesha is clearly aware of the process of racialization taking place, which casts her outside of the fold of her ethnic community, binding her to prejudices surrounding foreign nationals, Islamophobic sentiments, and racism. This process of racialization is also entwined with gender politics as her status as a "normal Korean" is challenged not only through her religious identity but also through her husband's ethnicity. This is in line with findings from research on converts to Islam in minority contexts including Britain and the United States, indicating connections between global narratives of Islamophobia that are in operation, particularly when women take on visible markers of their new religious identities.[30] To elaborate further, in the Korean context, discrimination takes on a local shape, framing Ayesha as either the "fallen" Korean woman in her neighborhood or

the woman who has transformed into someone "foreign" through her marriage choice, her mixed-heritage children, her visible headscarf, and commitment to Islam.

Ayesha is not an isolated case, echoing findings by Kwak proposing that Korean women who enter inter-ethnic marriages, particularly with men from developing countries, also recall the issue of *yanggongju.* My study takes the argument a step further, highlighting how gendered issues of *yanggongju* can go hand-in-hand with Islamophobic and racist sentiments, which targeted Ayesha as an "abnormal" Korean woman. Neighbors regularly used Ayesha's outwardly Muslim appearance as a way to exclude her family, accusing her of being a member of the terrorist group, ISIS. These unfounded accusations haunted the couple's movements, and they were forced to move from place to place as they tried to evade harassment.

Here, we can see how Korean women like Ayesha continue to be held up as reproducers of the nation with patriarchal systems attempting to regulate their bodies as "metaphors for their uncontaminated, uninterrupted homo-national identity, imposing on women the ideology of chastity and self-censorship."[31] The snapshots presented in this research clearly depict the ways in which Ayesha is continually excluded from her ethnic community. These multi-layered discriminations: sexism, Islamophobia, racism, and so on intersect to not only create a storm of challenges to Ayesha's sense of belonging to Korean society but also to her own religious identity—which she slowly begins to mediate as part of her efforts to "survive" in Korean society.

Snapshot: Mediating Muslim Life as a Way of Avoiding Exclusion—Mothering and the Hijab

> 'She is Korean, why is she wearing clothes like that? It is fine for foreigners but not for Koreans.' I feel it is an issue for Korean people when they see someone is different to them. It is not just about the abaya or hijab, even if I wear hanbok and walk around in my local area, everyone will stare. If someone does not belong to that local idea or culture, they think: 'Oh, that person is a bit different' and that there is no need to be friendly with people who are an 'exception.'[32]

This narration is of particular significance, because it indicates there may be a difference in the standards of "acceptable" behavior for Koreans versus immigrants. Ayesha, along with many other Korean Muslim women in my field often complain that their compatriots are accepting of immigrant Muslim women and their garb but display open hostility towards them for adopting similar styles, because it becomes a distinctive marker of their "foreignness."

Exhausted by constantly defending her choices and her Koreanness, Ayesha consciously implements various strategies in attempts to evade the label of

"foreigner" for herself and her children. In doing so, Ayesha experiments both with her appearance and often relaxes religious rules for her children, principally at school where they have no halal or vegetarian school lunch options. Sensitive to the fact that they are regularly excluded from friendships and extra-curricular activities, Ayesha attempts to create other opportunities for them to mix with others, particularly through food. It is a source of personal pain that she permits her children to eat non-halal meats (except pork) with school friends or on school trips. As a mother, Ayesha states she does this to minimize the risk of being "too different" on her children, deeply concerned that her family are already problematically labelled as "multicultural," and that this "stigma" places her loved ones in a weak and vulnerable position in society. To try to level out the playing field, she attempts various approaches to mediate the impact of her family's vulnerabilities, terrified that her children could become potential victims of Korea's culture of school violence and teen suicide.[33]

As indicated, Ayesha loosens some religious rules, particularly around the consumption of halal food, allowing her children to build relationships with others through eating and socializing as a key part of Korean culture that she wishes to impart to her children for their future survival. She worries that her once they grow up, her children will not be able to cope with the demands of "team building" company dinners once they start working—infamous for late nights, heavy drinking, and pork-based snacks. Ayesha runs a tightrope, attempting to manage a delicate balancing act between belonging, social acceptance—raising children secure in their Korean-Pakistani Muslim identities in an environment that is overtly exclusionary. In summary, in the pursuit of belonging, Ayesha is doing her best to minimize the social penalties attached to their Muslim identities.

> This time, when we moved to Incheon, I tried to replace my hijab with a cap and long, loose clothes to be less obvious. It did not work, people kept asking me why I was always wearing a cap! Some even went as far as to ask me about my loose clothes. At that point, I just gave up, and told them that the reason I wear these types of clothes is because I am Muslim, and I am hiding my good-looking figure!![34]

Ayesha proudly wears a hijab, believing it is a sign of her personal devotion to God and that it is an important part of her identity as a Korean and Muslim woman. This comes at a heavy price as the hijab distinguishes Ayesha as different, often soliciting unwanted scrutiny from fellow Koreans who cannot understand her choices. As noted in the snapshots above, feeling under pressure, Ayesha experiments with a range of looks, styles, and has, on particularly difficult occasions, considered removing her hijab altogether as some of her fellow Korean Muslim sisters have done.

However, having already given up on the face veil (niqab) for the safety of her children's future, she is loath to give up on the hijab too. Concerned about her children's ability to thrive in society, she tries to style herself closely to what she perceives as a "normal" Korean. This decision is directly related to her role as a mother of mixed ethnicity children who attend a local Korean school. Once again concerned about the way that her family is connected to multicultural politics, Ayesha is passionate about her children developing resilience and survival skills needed to thrive in society once they come of age. For this reason, she insisted on enrolling them into a local over international school where the children's differences would have been accepted more easily. However, unexpectedly for Ayesha, this decision came as a personal cost to her own sense of Muslim womanhood:

> I decided that if I come back to Korea and let my kids' study in a local school, in a local area, it's better to be without niqab. I will try to wear it again when my kids grow up. You do not know how difficult it is to make such a decision. I used to be very strict. Over time, little-by-little, I am going easier on myself and letting things go. Is anything left? I do not know if I am doing well or not, but I now have multicultural kids in Korea. Perhaps if I sent them to an international school, I would not have to do these types of things … But if I want to live with local Koreans, I must try and follow their local rules and customs. Otherwise, my kids are excluded. It is so hard to talk about this. It's very hard for me.[35]

The gendered expectations of mothering in Korea weigh heavily on Ayesha's shoulders and she now mediates her religious practices through the realities of her everyday life as Korean Muslim, mother, wife, and woman. Highlighting the intense load that comes with mothering, Ayesha's case reflects earlier work conducted by Ruddick who proposed mothers are required to exert considerable mental efforts and thinking practices whilst nurturing and protecting their children.[36]

The issue of protection is a serious issue for Ayesha. As Collins found that African-American mothers constantly found themselves negotiating power structures not only to foster individual and collective identities but also to instill survival instincts in their children.[37] As echoed, throughout this case study, Ayesha is constantly concerned for her children's safety, conscious that they are often bullied because of their hijab-wearing mother and dark-skinned, immigrant father. Additionally, Ayesha needs to fit into the network of local mothers who are shepherding their children through the various private academies, tutors, and activities in the hope that it will give them an edge in Korea's incredibly competitive university and work environment. These events often take place informally, and whilst they are not compulsory, Ayesha feels this is an essential part of her mothering role in Korean society, therefore, she must filter her appearance and

religious needs when taking part in these gatherings. In the face of what she perceives as essential activities for her children's future success, Ayesha struggles to balance her own desire to practice Islam. To instill value into her children for their individual and collective identities, she often feels compromised in her own faith whilst simultaneously asserting space for herself and her loved ones in Korean society.

Conclusions

This ethnographic case study centers the narratives of Ayesha and her family through a feminist ethnographer's perspective. It challenges existing discourses of Korean multiculturalism by exploring the intersections of Ayesha's religious, gender, and ethnic identities and considers how they relate to her sense of belonging to multicultural Korea. In doing so, this case study highlights many gaps in the existing discourse, particularly how Ayesha's religious identity is posed against her ethnic identity, revealing the lack of consideration for the way the two interact to produce alternate forms of Koreanness. Significantly, this work highlights the gender imbalance that continues to hold women like Ayesha responsible for the propagation of families deemed appropriately "Korean." Despite projecting a globalized image that purportedly welcomes diversity, the snapshots presented in this paper evidence how expectations for Korean women shaped by colonial legacies continue to be heaped upon the shoulders of women like Ayesha. Framed as a violator of the nation's patriarchal boundaries through her choice to live an alternate life, we can see how her journey to Islam, dress choices, marriage and family contribute to a series of racializations that eventually force her to the margins of society as Ayesha and her family are absorbed into Korea's "multicultural" landscape.

Despite the troubling snapshots discussed in this paper, Ayesha maintains her position as a Korean Muslim woman shaping that identity in her own unique ways. Far from lacking agency, through the story of her conversion, we see how Ayesha explores profound questions that felt personally significant to her spiritual and material life, taking her on a journey that eventually led to a major shift in her identity. At the same time, Ayesha found her choices and freedom of expression constantly challenged by those assuming converting to Islam was a condition of her marriage to a Pakistani man or that she was a potential terrorist threat, or a danger to her children's successful future, which eventually led her to mediate her Muslimness in public as a way to "survive."

Findings from this case study suggest that patriarchal, sexist, and racist attitudes in Korean society continue to push women like Ayesha to the fringes of society for going against the grain of established societal norms. Ayesha's

experiences of violence, discrimination, and exclusion are significant indicators of the negative consequences attached to Korean women's conversion to Islam as well as their marriage choices. Moreover, negative perceptions attached to markers of religious adherence such as the hijab contribute to the loss of mainstream positionality as Korean women are re-framed as "foreign," "fallen," or cultural "traitors." Despite being excluded by her own ethnic community, Ayesha displays fortitude and resilience as she is determined to remain in a "local" area, educate her children in a regular Korean school and take part in motherly activities that she deems appropriate for a Korean mother concerned for her children's future. Through these thoughts and actions, we can see how Ayesha holds on to her sense of Koreanness and belonging.

Furthermore, Korean women-led marriages throw up different challenges for society and demand that we consider Korean multiculturalism in more complex ways. Unlike married migrant women new to Korean society, women like Ayesha are already familiar with local customs, systems, and the language; therefore, they require very different support services for their families. However, little is available as multicultural discourses are mostly targeted at Korean male-led marriages. A clear example of this is the lack of integration and support services targeting migrant husbands married to Korean wives, Muslim or otherwise. This neglect further illuminates the burden that Korean women like Ayesha face as their bodies become metaphors for patriarchal and nationalist ideals, indicating that they continue to "carry the burden of cultural norms that provide severe penalties for marriage outside their ethnic group."

To conclude, findings from this ethnographic case study reveal how Ayesha's conversion to Islam and her choices connected to it can be linked to several deep-seated issues that lie at the core of Korean society. Its framing of multi-culturalism, Islamophobia, nationalism, and patriarchy shapes negative images of Korean women, particularly Korean Muslim women who marry immigrant men from developing countries. Through this, undesirable historical narratives of *yanggongju* and policing Korean female sexuality through the rejection of their marriage choices and children are reignited, this time manifesting through exclusion and discrimination in everyday life.

Despite facing several identity penalties Ayesha is not a passive agent who simply suffers through the trials of life. Instead, through her account of struggle, conversion, marriage, and discrimination, we can clearly see how Ayesha is actively re-working notions of Korean identity concepts, forging her own way to belong. In doing so, she carves out space for herself and her family and helps to establish Islam as a "Korean" religion not only through practice but also by her very existence in society as a Korean Muslim.

Notes

1.   This work was supported by a Korea Foundation Fieldwork fellowship in 2018.
2.   Hye-K'yung Lee. "International marriage and the state in South Korea: Focusing on Governmental Policy." *Journal of Citizenship Studies*, 12.1 (2008), p. 120.
3.   Yunschik Ch'ang *Korea in the Process of Globalisation. In Korea Confronts Globalisation* (Hoboken, NJ: Taylor & Francis, 2008).
4.   Iain Pirie. *The Korean Developmental State: From Dirigisme to Neo-Liberalism* (London: Routledge, 2008).
5.   Refer to Ien Ang, *On Not Speaking Chinese: Living Between Asia and the West* (London, New York, NY: Routledge, 2001).
6.   JiHyun Ahn. "Global Migration and the Racial Project in Transition: Institutionalizing Racial Difference in South Korea." Journal of Multicultural Discourses 8.1 (2013): 29–47.
7.   Hye-K'yung Lee. "International marriage and the state in South Korea: Focusing on Governmental Policy."
8.   See: Hyesil Jung. "P'ak'isŭt'an ijunodongjawa kyŏrhonhan han'gugyŏsŏngŭi chuch'esŏnge kwanhan yŏn'gu: p'ak'isŭt'an k'ŏp'ŭlmoimŭl chungsimŭro." Master's thesis, Seoul, Sungshin Women's University, 2007; Kim, Yiseon, Chu, Yoosun Ju, and Meihua. Fang. "The Blind Spot of the Multicultural Family Support Policy." Seoul: Korean Women's Development Institute, 2012; Yoon Kyung Kwak. "Pushing Away From Their Own nation? South Korean Women Married to Migrant Husbands from Developing Countries." *Journal of Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 42.7 (2019): 1186–1203.
9.   Yoon Kyung Kwak. "Pushing Away From Their Own nation? South Korean Women Married to Migrant Husbands from Developing Countries."
10. As a condition of participation, I have used pseudonyms throughout this paper.
11. Don Baker. "Islam Struggles for a Toehold in Korea." *Harvard Asia Quarterly* 10.1 (2006): 25–30.
12. Barbara Dennis et al. "Digital Migrating and Storyworlding with Women We Love: A Feminist Ethnography." *Journal of Contemporary Ethnography* 49.6 (2020): 745–76.
13. W.E.B Du Bois. *The Autobiography of W.E.B. Du Bois: A Soliloquy on Viewing My Life from the Last Decade of Its First Century* (New York, NY: International Publishers, 1968).
14. Patricia Hill Collins. *Black Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness and the Politics of Empowerment* (London and New York: Routledge, 1990).
15. Dorothy Smith. "From the Margins: Women's Standpoint as a Method of Inquiry in the Social Sciences." *Gender, Technology and Development* 1.1 (1997): 113–35.
16. Kathleen Eisenhardt. "Building Theories from Case Study Research." *The Academy of Management Review* 14.4 (1989): 532–50.
17. Robert Yin. *Case Study Research: Design and Method* (New York, NY: Sage Publications, 1994).
18. Shahādah is the Islamic testimony of faith: "There is no god but God, and Muḥammad is the Apostle of God." By professing shahādah, one is declaring themselves as Muslim who follows the religion of Islam.
19. Changzoo Song. "Identity Politics and The Meaning Of "Homeland" Among Korean Chinese Migrants in South Korea." *Urban Anthropology and Studies of Cultural Systems and World Economic Development* 43.4 (2014): 441–79.
20. Interview with author (July 2017).
21. Daʿwah refers to the Islamic way of inviting people to Islam or to calling on them to return to God.
22. Interview with author (July 2017).
23. Interview with author (July 2017).
24. Hye-Kyung Lee. "International marriage and the state in South Korea: Focusing on Governmental Policy."

25. Hyun Sook Kim. "Yanggongju as an Allegory of the Nation—the Representation of Working-class Women in Popular and Radical Texts." In *Dangerous Women—Gender and Korean Nationalism*, edited by Elaine Kim and Chungmoo Choi, 175–202. New York, NY: Routledge, 1998.

26. Yoon Kyung Kwak. "Pushing away from their own nation? South Korean Women Married to Migrant Husbands from Developing Countries."

27. Bongsoo Park. "Intimate Encounters, Racial Frontiers: Stateless Gi Babies in South Korea and the United States, 1953–1965,"Unpublished PhD dissertation, University of Minnesota, 2010.

28. See works by Eleana Kim. *Adopted Territory: Transnational Korean Adoptees and the Politics of Belonging* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010); Hosu Kim. *Birth Mothers and Transnational Adoption Practice in South Korea: Virtual Mothering* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016); JiHyun Ahn. *Mixed Race Politics and Neoliberal Multiculturalism in South Korean Media* (London: Palgrave, 2018).

29. Interview with author (April 2018).

30. See: Ikram Eum. "Korea's Response to Islam and Islamophobia: Focusing on Veiled Muslim Women's Experiences," *Korea Observer* 48 (2017): 825–849; Gi Yeon Koo. "Islamophobia and the Politics of Representation of Islam in Korea." *Journal of Korean Religions* 9.1 (2018): 159–192; Kate Zebiri. *British Muslim Converts: Choosing Alternative Lives* (London: OneWorld Publication, 2008); Juliette Galonnier. "The Racialization of Muslims in France and the United States: Some Insights from White Converts to Islam." *Social Compass* 62.4 (2015): 570–83; Myfanwy Franks. "Crossing the Borders of Whiteness? White Muslim Women who Wear the Hijab in Britain Today," *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 23.5 (2000): 917–929.

31. Chungmoo Choi. "Nationalism and Construction of Gender in Korea." In *Dangerous Women: Gender and Korean Nationalism*, edited by Elaine Kim and Chungmoo Choi, 9–32 (New York, NY: Routledge, 1998), p. 13.

32. Interview with author (December 2019).

33. See the work of Trent Bax. *Bullying and Violence in South Korea: From Home to School and Beyond* (London: Palgrave, 2016).

34. Interview with author (December 2019).

35. Interview with author (December 2019).

36. Sara Ruddick. *Maternal Thinking: Toward a Politics of Peace* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 1995).

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Stereotyping Halal Food and Eating Halal Food in a South Korean Context

H. NUR YASAR   PhD Candidate, Hanyang University[1]

Abstract

The paper seeks to consider the confusion around what "Halal Food" is and what "Eating Halal Food" means in South Korea; and how it causes stereotyping of halal food and Muslim foodways in a South Korean context. The findings of this paper are obtained from ethnographic fieldwork and semi-structured interviews with South Koreans and Muslim minorities living in South Korea. Findings from the ethnographic research show that halal food and foodways are stereotyped not only when it comes to misidentifying halal food concepts, but also halal food consumed by Muslims is linked to existing notions about Islam and Muslims in South Korean society.

Keywords: Stereotyping, Muslim Identities, Halal Food, Muslim Foodways, South Korea

Introduction

"You are what you eat" is a well-known phrase that embodies the idea of food as identity. As Robin Fox noted, eating is unavoidable for everyone, therefore, what we eat becomes one of the most powerful symbols of who we are.[2] Rachel Brown states that food has been understood as a potent marker of identity, as we classify others based on what they eat.[3] People position themselves among others by choosing to eat certain types of food in opposition to those who do not

eat similarly. Another point is that food and foodways[4] that make up a person's diet, the recipes used to prepare those foods, and the manners in which they are consumed are among the most visible symbols that highlight someone's belonging to a certain group (e.g., ethnic, national, regional, cultural, or religious).[5] In fact, many religious traditions have food probihitions and restrictions. For example, Muslim, Jewish, Seventh Day Adventists, and some Orthodox Christians do not eat pork. Some other religious traditions do not only have probitions and restrictions on pork consumption but also other kinds of meat, such as Hindu or Buddhist or vegetarian or vegan.

Food serves in many instances as a social-cultural symbol that communicates both an individual and a group identity. Considering the social-cultural symbolism of food, by the "you are what you eat" account, we can make judgements about people based upon what they eat. In fact, this can lead us to perceive them in stereotypical or biased ways. Walter Lippmann argues that stereotypes are "the pictures inside our heads," and people create stereotypes because they imagine things before they actually experience them.[6] As a result, Lippmann claims that such preconceptions govern the process of the way we see things.[7] Moreover, people tend to stereotype less within their own in-group. Alternatively, Edward Said suggests that one reason stereotypes occur is the fear of the unknown.[8] John Dovidio, Miles Hewstone, Peter Glick, and Victoria Esses highlight that stereo-types consistently influence how people perceive, process information about, and respond to group members.[9] They are conveyed through the media, socialization, language, and discourse. Roberta Giovine points out that a community's identity is expressed by differentiation from their neighbors' language, food, or other customs.[10] She continues to argue that people segregate among themselves who do not share the same values, do not eat similar foods, or avoid certain foods (and even how food is prepared and consumed). This can lead to define stereotypes between t "Us" and the "Others."

Halal food embodies religious dietary norms for Muslims that can be distinctive in terms of identity. In a broader context, Halal food is symbolic of the belonging to both the "Muslim individual" and a wider cultural-religious "group identity" (umma).[11] If we understand food as a symbolic representation of identity, the halal foods that Muslims consume can naturally be linked to representations of Muslim identities. In a global context, where Muslims are challenged by stereo-typical Muslim identities in the media, Islamophobic discourses see Muslims as mistrusted minorities in multicultural societies.[12] Halal food and foodways can be perceived within the frame of these representations.

This study is concerned with how notions of halal food and halal foodways are being stereotyped in South Korean society and linked to Korean perceptions

constructed by contradicting images and portrayals of Islam, the Islamic world, Islamic culture, and representations of Muslim identities in the South Korean context. Having said that, contractive perceptions are formed based on Islamophobia, ignorance and prejudice towards Islam, the South Korean notion of the Islamic world (*Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권), and perceptions that all Muslims are working class and poor. Other perceptions include confusion of halal food concepts with other ethical, religious traditions or cultural practices, such as Hinduism, Vegetarianism, or Confucian rituals. Moreover, presentation of halal foods by South Korean government projects supporting halal businesses and tourism contribute to these contradictions, such as the Halal Food Complex, halal food exports, and Muslim Friendly Tourism.

Within this context, research questions explored in this study include: How do South Koreans perceive the notion of halal food? What does "eating halal food" mean in the South Korean context? To what extent does the incomprehensibility of the notion of halal food lead to stereotyping of halal food in the South Korean context? To what extent can representations of stereotyped Muslim identities be linked to the halal food that Muslims consume and contribute to the stereotyping of halal foodways in the South Korean context?

In fact, various studies can be found in Korean literature regarding Muslim communities and halal food in South Korea. The research mainly focuses on Muslims and their acculturation and adaptation to South Korean culture, halal food preferences, consumption, or practices in South Korea. Other studies concentrate on halal food markets and certificates and halal food businesses in terms of developing strategy for South Korean exports.[13] Some recent studies are focused on preferences for South Korean food among foreign Muslims in South Korea and foreign students' dietary behaviors and adaptation to South Korean food.[14] However, there is a lack of research covering halal food or halal foodways associated with local perceptions in the South Korean context. This paper aims to contribute to scholarship on halal food and Muslim foodways studies highlighting views of Muslims residing in South Korea and reflecting the perceptions of South Koreans on the subject.

This paper presents findings obtained from ethnographic research (participant observation and field notes) and a series of semi-instructed in-depth interviews with South Koreans and foreign Muslims living in South Korea. The semi-instructed in-depth interviews were conducted from the end of May to August 2020 online and offline in English, Turkish, and Korean at different locations from one up to four hours with breaks. The online interviews were performed with five participants via Kakao Talk video call due to the Covid-19 restrictions, limitation of mobility or distance: overseas (two participants), Seoul (one participant),

Kangwŏn-do Province (one participant), and Chŏnju (one participant). Face-to face interviews were completed with nine participants at coffee shops in different parts of Seoul, at the interviewee's house or interviewer's house. The ethnographic research includes my observations on a wider period of time and field notes based on field work in South Korea. In addition, the interviewees were chosen from people with whom I had meals before at South Korean halal restaurants or their homes in different cities and provinces of South Korea; such as Seoul, Ansan, Inch'ŏn, and Kangwŏn-do Province. Questions on halal food concepts and pork prohibition were asked repeatedly, when I would meet with non-Muslim South Koreans for meals or having a conversation about food.

The interviewees (fourteen participants) included: women (nine partici-pants, of whom one wore hijab), men (five participants) of different ages (25–65), foreigners residing or who have resided in South Korea more than two years (four participants), married (six participants), single (eight participants), Syrian (one participant), Yemeni (one participant), Turkish (two participants), South Koreans (ten participants), hometowns from Chŏllado Province (three partici-pants), Kyŏngsangdo Province (three participants), Kangwŏndo Province (one participant), Seoul (one participant), Kyŏnggido Province (two participants), South Koreans who have been to Muslim majority countries (six participants) or lived in Saudi Arabia (one participant) or who had a family member who lived in Turkey (one participant), South Koreans who have met Muslims outside Korea (six participants), foreign Muslims (four participants),[15] Korean Muslim (one participant), Christian (two participants), Catholic practicing Confucian rituals (one participant), practicing Buddhist (one participant), non-practicing Buddhist (one participant), previous Christian currently with no religion (one participant), no religion (three participants), housewife (one participant), retired (one partic-ipant), graduate student (one participant), post doc (one participant), working in a company (three participants) or institution (one participant) or factory (one participant) or freelance (four participants) or non-employed (one participant).

The semi-structured interviews were performed in English, Korean, and Turkish languages and in some cases using also Korean language alongside. The interviews touched on personal food practices, halal food concepts, halal foodways, images of Muslims and understanding of Islam, the Islamic culture in South Korea, and their opinions on issues regarding halal business and tourism in South Korea. Through the in-depth interviews with people of various ethnic, religious, and cultural backgrounds, I will demonstrate how the incomprehen-sibility of the notion of halal food and representations of stereotyped Muslim identities and Islam linked to halal food(ways) has led to stereotyping in the South Korean context. There is always a limitation between languages when it comes

to translation. However, all considerations have been made to offer the most proper translation with its closest meaning. The interviewees are named with pseudonyms to maintain their confidentiality.

Islamophobia *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권, and Muslims in South Korea

The current status of the Muslim population in South Korea is not precise. The estimated population of Muslims is said to be approximately 160,000–200,000 currently residing in South Korea; including 35,000 South Korean Muslims and 7,000 second-generation Muslims.[16] The Muslim community in South Korea includes workers, students, marriage migrants from Muslim countries, and South Korean converts.[17] Although Muslims do not have a long and deep socio-economic and cultural presence in South Korea, representations of Islam in the South Korean media, fear of the South Korean multiculturalism, and rising Islamophobia are challenging Muslims who reside in the country.[18] K'i Yŏn K'oo discusses how Islamophobic discourses and misunderstandings of Islam are represented in the South Korean society.[19] She claims that the main difference of Islamophobic discourses in South Korea—compared to those in Europe or the United States— are not based on encountering Muslim immigrants but rather through the media transmitting fear and hostility towards Islam. The consciousness of South Koreans on Islam is mostly shaped through media and news rather than direct contact with Muslims.

At this point, it is essential to mention South Korean orientalism in consid- ering the difference surrounding Islamophobic discourses in the South Korean context. Orientalism, creating the "other" and a fear rooted in a long historical relationship between the West and the Islamic world,[20] corresponds to a different meaning in the South Korean context. This is connected to the "Arabian dreams" of a generation of South Koreans, sent to work in the Middle East during the "construction boom" of the 1970–80s. At that time, thousands of South Korean workers went to Saudi Arabia, a leading importer of workers among the other neighbouring states, because it had the highest spending budget in its construction sector. This generation of South Koreans have a positive outlook on Islam and Islamic culture and behave in less reserved ways towards Muslims.

> Our people (South Koreans) do not know. If you say *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권 these days, they do not favor it but for people like us *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권 is nice. We saw those people's way of living in Saudi Arabia. We also experienced living together. (Interview, 15.08.2020) (brackets added for clarity)

According to the interviewees, South Koreans have a more negative image of *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권 these days.[21] It has been ascribed a different meaning within an Islamophobic discourse that is widely known and shared by South Koreans.[22] Based on my observation and interviews, the *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권 is assumed to be the Middle East, a land controlled by Islam, and a homogenized geography of origin for all Muslims sharing the same language, food, clothing, customs, and traditions. Next to this assumption, Muslim minorities face Islamophobic discursive discriminations and are confronted by images of being untrustworthy, troublemakers, having a low socio-economic background, and poor images of multicultural families in South Korea. On the contrary, halal food and Muslims visiting South Korea are portrayed in a different context.

Halal Food Market and Muslim-Friendly South Korea

The halal market developed noticeably over the last decades. It has grown to be a massive globalised market with a high potential of growth in halal products and brands in various areas. For example, food and beverage, banking, pharmaceuticals, textiles, cosmetics, fashion, and tourism.[23] For South Korea, halal food markets and businesses are a quite recent concern that started with Muslim immigrants working to establish a halal food supply network, and within years attracted South Korean businessmen and local authorities to invest in this market.

Since the immigrant flow of the 1990s, halal food has been an important challenge for the Muslim minorities living in South Korea. Pakistani and Bangladeshi migrant workers launched a halal food supply network in the mid-1990s. They produced halal chicken, without an official market, and were actively involved in the import of halal lamb meat from Australia.[24] There are four to five domestic poultry farms where halal poultry is slaughtered and supplied to halal restaurants and halal markets throughout the country.[25] In terms of meat supply, South Korea has grown to be a significant export market for Australia, not only in beef but also lamb exports.[26] According to a report from the Korea–Australia Free Trade Agreement (KAFTA) about beef, lamb, smallgoods, and seafood, new consumption trends such as shawarma and gyros have increased in overall sheep meat consumption in South Korea.[27] According to the South Korean Trade Meat Association (KTMA) (2020),[28] during the years 2018–2019, beef imports from the U.S.A., Australia, and New Zealand increased by 9.2%; sheep meat imports from Australia and New Zealand rose by 55.1% and chicken meat imports from the U.S.A., Brazil, and Thailand increased by 13.6%.[29] Online halal food supply sites usually import halal certified beef and sheep meat from Australia and halal chicken from Brazil.[30]

Next to the halal meat supply, imported halal products from multinational companies (MNC) became valuable in the consumption patterns of Muslim immigrants residing in South Korea. In 2018 halal products research, results show that local distribution channels imported products with a halal certificate, a Kosher certificate, and a Vegetarian certificate: 474 halal certified products, 629 kosher certified products, and 102 vegetarian certified products; in total some 1,231 products. Among these products, some 310 halal certified products were found in E-mart, Lotte Mart, Homeplus, and Costco. On the other hand, local area shops, convenience stores, and foreign markets were confirmed to have a total of 164 imported halal certified products.[31]

Halal food products are not exclusively imported to South Korea but similarly produced and exported along with the Korean Hallyu promotions. The size of the halal food and beverage market was estimated as of 2015 at about $1.2 trillion in fifty-seven Organization of Islamic Cooperation (OIC) countries. The global halal market size is expected to expand to US$ 10 trillion by 2030.[32] South Korean companies seek to enter and have a share in the halal market. Following this, in 2014, 133 South Korean companies obtained KMF certifications for 197 items and by 2016,[33] 197 local companies obtained KMF certificate for 562 items.[34] Among these famous companies are CJ CheilJedang, Pulmuone, Paris Baguette, and Lotteria.[35] These and other South Korean companies have halal certifications for export and overseas supply chains.

In relation with the halal market, halal food is not only produced for export as international trade, but also for a service sector known as "Muslim friendly Tourism" for Muslim travelers visiting South Korea. South Korea expects an annual increase of Muslim travelers and has been investing in the Muslim friendly tourism sector to meet the needs of Muslim tourists.[36] The South Korea Tourism Organization (KTO) has an official online portal with a section named "Muslim friendly Korea" that guides Muslim travellers in meeting various needs during their stay.

In the light of this information and statistics, it can be assumed that halal food is becoming significant and growing its share in the South Korean export and import market, as well as in the tourism sector. Nevertheless, halal awareness is low among mainstream South Koreans.[37] Despite a rising interest in halal businesses, there are contradictory aspects in terms of the representations of Islam, Islamic culture, Muslim identities, and notions of halal food and awareness in South Korea. On this basis, positive or negative perceptions are formed that create confusion around the notion of halal food and misconceptions of consuming halal foodways that lead to stereotyping.

Understanding the Notion of Halal Food in the South Korean Context

1. Notion of Halal Food and Muslim Foodways

The word halal is often solely affiliated with the foods that Muslims are allowed to eat. In Arabic, *halal* حلال literally means permissible, allowable, or be free, and is the opposite of haram.[38] As a term, halal حلال is translated as lawful, permitted, and more generally, halal food that is lawful for Muslims to eat.[39] In fact, this term is applied as a wider notion to describe everything that is permissible for a Muslim to do, both in deed and thought. Halal, from a cultural aspect, affects a Muslim's life in general. The notion of halal ranges from the clothing that can be worn to behavior and attitudes, work related issues, relations between men, women, and children to treatment of fellow Muslims and non-Muslims. In terms of food, halal is considered as good food for physical and spiritual health.[40] Yunes Ramadan Al-Teinaz states that according to the Islamic belief, God created everything on earth for Muslim's benefit unless he has specifically stated that something is not, in which case it is prohibited and unlawful, in Arabic haram حرام. Along with this, an emphasis is made to respect life and animal welfare. A Muslim is responsible to treat other lives, such as animals, with respect. It should be emphasized that Islam is not just a religion but also a source of law and a guide to social behavior specifying a standard for how Muslims should live their lives.[41]

Coming back to food, halal food embodies dietary norms for Muslims that are applied to everyday food practices. Muslims have food rules that are defined in the *Qur'an* القرآن and by pioneering Muslim scholars (ulema العلماء) according to Hadith الحديث and Sunna السنة.[42] Food rules, in other words, religious dietary restrictions and guidelines cover the concepts halal and haram. In the *Qur'an*, the chapters or suras that provide the clearest instructions are the following: Al-Baqara (2:173), Al-Ma'ida (5:3), and An-Nahl (16:114). Sharia or Islamic law features a set of standards that unites all Muslims in obeying the will of God. Though, it is necessary to state that, owing to a difference of interpretation by Madhabs (religious schools of thought), legal systems have progressed differently in different countries. However, one fundamental principle of halal is its aim to benefit the human being unless it is prohibited as haram in the *Qur'an* or other sources. Halal, as a food rule, includes the method of slaughtering animals, the kinds of animals that can be eaten, and various other taboos and conventions related to food storage, display, and hygiene.[43]

Considering halal as a diet, it is not dissimilar to other diets that are based on ethical or religious traditions, such as the Jewish kosher diet, Buddhist diets, Hindu diets, or a vegetarian diet. Any kind of food(ways) prepared according to

Islamic dietary rules is halal food or halal foodways. In this connection, not only the food and foodways of majority Muslim cultures (such as Arabic, Indonesian, Malaysian, Pakistani, Turkish, and others), but also food and foodways of non-Islamic cultures can be halal, providing that they are prepared according to the Islamic dietary rules. The notion of halal, applied to industry, covers hygienic, healthy, and/or ethical production that would not only benefit Muslims but contribute to the health of the wider population.[44] In South Korea, according to my observations and interview results, Islam, Islamic culture, and Muslims are felt to be unfamiliar. This creates puzzles about unknown terms, their usage, and causes misconceptions of the culture and its people.

2. Unknown Terminology and Misconceptions

Islam as a religion and Muslims as a community are a minority in South Korea. Therefore, mainstream South Koreans do not have many chances to observe and experience Islamic culture. All South Korean interviewees emphasized that they do not know much about Islamic terminology, for instance, Islam, Muslim, halal, and others. Their knowledge is based on information given on South Korean news, Simple Notification Services (SNS), and the general media. Most interviewees either could not differentiate between "Islam" (religion) and "Muslim" (person believing in Islam), thinking of these as a difference in pronunciation, or they had heard "Islam" but not "Muslim." Answers to the questions about halal food and foodways were similar; such as: "heard it for the first time, not well-known, or linked to some keywords."[45] For example, answers ranged widely: "food Muslims eat, no pork, according to the rules, slaughtering with a ritual, Middle East, Arabic food, curry, kebab, and other mostly meatbased foods."

> I thought they (Islam and Muslim) have the same meaning with a different pronunciation. Halal food is meat that is slaughtered with a (religious) ritual [*ŭisik*]. I did not know that it means 'allowed' until you (interviewer) mentioned it because it is not among my interests. (Interview, 20.06.2020) (brackets added for clarity)

South Korean interviewees, who encountered Muslims inside or outside South Korea due to work, or interviewees with a Christian background, recognized the term halal food. Nevertheless, hardly any of them knew that halal was an Arabic word and referred to "permissible or lawful." An interesting common point was the emphasis on words like "Middle Eastern, Arab, non-pork, religious, ritual, and slaughtering" among the answers. It is not surprising that there is an incomprehensibility of notions around halal food. Most of the halal food definitions in South Korea are explained on halal businesses or official tourism websites.[46] The South

Korea Tourism Organization (KTO) official website "Imagine your Korea—Visit Korea" (2019), opened under the section of "Where to Eat?" a sub-section named "Dietary Restriction" with titles like "Vegetarianism," "Muslim Dietary Concerns," and "Middle Eastern Food."[47] The explanations given under these subjects are quite considerate and caring about people with specific dietary needs. Attention is paid to Muslim's dietary needs due to their beliefs, but at the same time the information is confusing with two categories named "Muslim's dietary concern" and "Middle Eastern Food." Although both include Muslims, dietary, non-pork food, a significant difference can be seen in the use of the words halal meat, slaughter, Islamic law, and Middle East.

> I heard about halal food through Korean television. I knew that you could buy this kind of food (halal food) and halal food products of the (South) Korean major companies are out in the (global) market. (Interview, 15.08.2020) (brackets for clarity)

Recently, South Korean political administrations show more interest in halal businesses and tourism to become a part of the US\$ 5.73 trillion global halal market to compensate for economic loss in the tourism sector.[48] In 2015, the term halal food became widely known to mainstream South Koreans through the South Korean news and media. It was a hot issue due to the strong objections by particularly conservative Christian groups on the construction of a Halal Food Complex in Iksan-si, Chŏllabuk-do Province.[49] The effort to explain halal food as a healthy food did not gain recognition by the majority. In fact, most of the non-Christian South Korean interviewees did not know or have not heard about halal food as a healthy food. South Korean Christian interviewees stated that they heard about the halal food complex but did not know the definition of halal food. The South Korean interviewee who worked in Saudi Arabia had learned about halal food exports and the South Korean major companies in the global halal market. Even so, he was not aware of the issue in detail nor was he informed about halal food.

> I have realized that they (South Koreans) do not understand, because they do not know. For example, I had a teacher at my language institute whom I really liked. We gathered for class dining and had to order some food. There were also other Muslims in the classroom. We told my teacher to buy halal meat and she said 'Let's buy halal pork! Where do we buy halal pork?' She tried to find halal pork online to order. (Interview, 28.05.2020) (brackets added for clarity)

South Koreans are confused by different explanations and practices of Muslims with various cultural and religious sectarian backgrounds.[50] Foreign interviewees said that South Koreans around them ask them every time if they can eat meat, beef, or chicken, which I can relate to given my observations. Foreign interviewees

stated various practices are observed, including themselves, such as Muslims who eat only halal certified meats; some eat imported Australian meat, because it is said to be halal, and some eat only chicken without halal consideration. Besides the various practices, Islamic terminology is quite unfamiliar to them. In this regard, the halal concept is understood in a partial perspective, emphazing what Muslims can or cannot eat. However, halal food is not only what Muslims can consume as a substance; in a wider context, it covers a sourcing process based on ethical and moral principles and welfare. In this matter, misconceptions seem to be formed on ignorance, or due to differences in cultural context and understandings.

3. Halal Food and the Islamic Way of Slaughtering: "Religious Food"

Halal food is referred to as foods on which Islamic food rules are applied. Considering that in a non-Muslim country, Muslims can struggle with halal food consumption, as any sort of food is virtually available but is potentially unclean.[51] Foreign Muslim interviewees complained about hardships having to check each time before buying a product or to look at a whole section of food but not being able to find even one single product to buy. They shared a common view that halal food is something they worried about in non-Muslim countries. They would not consider and buy or order it at will "back at home" (in their country of origin).

In recent years, due to an increasing interest in the global halal market, Islamic dietary, particularly halal food definitions became essential in terms of regulations. South Korean firms have shown an interest in global halal market, and the definition of halal is given on various websites related to halal exports and halal tourism. In this regard, halal discourses emphasize halal meaning food and products, that is, which are permissable to eat or use by Muslims according to Sharia law.[52] In this manner, the definition and perception of halal food becomes restricted and centered on "meat-based food" and the "Islamic way of slaughtering," which corresponds to different perceptions in the South Korean context. Firstly, within this context, being not able to eat meat is understood as a person being either a Buddhist monk or as a non-South Korean person from India, who does not consume meat. Secondly, interviewees declared that South Korean Buddhists do not practice restrictions on eating meat, and even some monks go to meat restaurants when they visit cities. Therefore, Muslims who cannot eat meat seem to be noticeably "conservative" and "religious" people.

A second perception is "religious (ritual) food, *chonggyo ŭmsik* 종교 음식." According to my observations, many South Koreans understand halal food as being "religious food, *chonggyo ŭmsik* 종교 음식" due to descriptions of halal

slaughter.[53] This creates a misconception around notions of halal food. One of the interviewees stressed that South Koreans could perceive the halal method of slaughter in terms of ŭisik, an understanding of a religious ritual; like *chesa* "the Korean Ancestor's Ritual," I performed one of the interviews with a South Korean couple at my home, where I provided lunch.[54] One of the interviewees gave me her opinion on halal food after the lunch, during the interview.

> Regarding halal, I told him (her husband) that I thought you (interviewer) did first something like a 'rite of baptism *serye ŭisik*' or any kind of ritual over the meat. The image was like that because I have a 'religious image'. Therefore, the first thought I had was, is it ok to eat this food? I felt a slight repulsion at first, because we do not eat the food from *chesa*. It is something we offer for our dead ancestors. (Interview, 20.06.2020) (brackets added for clarity)

The South Korean interviewee stated that she herself was not religious, but *chesa* was performed in her family. According to her statement, it is not good to eat *chesa* food, because it is offered to the dead people; at the same time, it is a "*chonggyo ŭmsik* 종교 음식," meaning religious food. A Christian interviewee said that South Korean Christians prefer not to eat *chesa* food and South Korean temple food, because of their religious differences. A Catholic interviewee, who also practices *chesa*, spoke of his younger experiences refusing to eat temple food, because of the notion that it is religious food. Since he became older, he realized that temple food is a surprisingly healthy and genuine cuisine.

Most of the South Korean interviewees shared a feeling and perception of halal food as being a religious food. They were confused concerning religious rules applied to food and the steps involved in the Islamic way of slaughtering. Through the interviews, I noticed that the understanding of halal food as a religious food was linked to a certain Muslim identity and narrowed to religious substance. In fact, halal food is a part of a wider halal notion that is signifying a spirit of community in ethical and moral social health, sharing healthy food and symbolizing various multi-cultural and traditional Muslim foodways.

4. Homogenized Halal Food and Foreign Authentic Foodways

Foodways are an intersection of food and culture in which we cannot separate food choice and cultural practices from one another.[55] One's food choice can be linked to cultural practices or cultural practices can determine one's food choice and practices.[56] In terms of foodways, any kind of foodways that consider Islamic diet, in terms of ingredients and preparing process, is fine to consume, for example, Arabic food, Indonesian food, Pakistani food, Turkish food, halal Korean food, or halal German food.

It is a matter of fact that foods in Muslim countries and foodways of Muslims are in general considered to be halal due to common religious dietary practices. As a result, halal food can be a general expression; at the same time, signifying various Muslim foodways or halal foodways. One of the foreign interviewees said that "South Koreans think halal food should be Arabic food;" which is what many of the South Korean interviewees implied in their answers linked to the *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권 notion.

According to my observations, an interesting aspect is an uncertainty of halal food and halal foodways that creates a view of homogenized certain types of halal food mostly connected with Middle Eastern or Arabic culture. As mentioned before, there is a section on the KTO website regarding religious dietary concerns. Under the section of "Muslim dietary concern," it explains that South Korean dishes are made with pork and that is customary in South Korea to drink alcohol during or after a meal. In the same paragraph, it states that Muslims cannot share these customs, and it continues "Fortunately, restaurants are showing increasing sensitivity to this issue and more and more restaurants are serving Middle Eastern food prepared according to Islamic law." In the next part, "Middle Eastern food" is explained in the following way:

> Due to religious beliefs, many Muslims may not partake of the blood of dead animals, pork, the meat of carnivorous animals, and/or meat not properly slaughtered in accordance with Islamic law. (...) Only halal meat (slaughtered properly in the Islamic way) is allowed. Therefore, Muslims may experience difficulties finding proper food when visiting South Korea.[57] (brackets added for clarity)

Explaining Muslim dietary concerns and Middle Eastern Food as two different elements generates a misinterpretation concerning the Muslim dietary and halal foodways concept. All Muslims refer to the same Islamic diet, with slight differences in practice. Muslims do not necessarily perceive and prefer Middle Eastern food as the only halal food. Having said that, the majority of Muslim tourists visiting South Korea are from Indonesia and Malaysia.[58] The population of Middle Eastern immigrants residing in South Korea is quite low compared to Central Asian, South Asian, and Southeast Asian immigrants.[59] These kinds of definitions and explanations narrow down, unintentionally, the wide-ranging Muslim identities and populations into a "one block entity" in connection to *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권. Another aspect of the homogenized perception of halal food is that the food consists of kebap, curry, naan bread, lamb shashlik, and similar foods. Given this, the variety of halal food and Muslim foodways is overlooked in terms of its local, traditional, and cultural context and distinctions. For Muslims, halal food

and foodways are their own traditional and cultural foods, precisely said to be a potent marker of their cultural identity.

> We do not question halal food in Turkey. Everything becomes halal or haram when you go abroad. (Interview, 13.06.2020)

> On foods 'It contains nothing related to pork' is written but this is not for all kinds of foods. For example, foods prepared in the factories have to write 'halal'. (…) Halal food is just Syrian food. All Syrian food is halal. (Interview, 13.08.2020)

Food as a commodity is related to industry and consumption.[60] Halal became a globalized market in the last decades, and it brought concerns around the branding of halal. Halal as a brand is presented to hold some definite values, customs, and practices.[61] However, a clarification is need on this matter, considering halal discourses centering on halal food as certified meat-based products or "edible" products. In non-Muslim countries, especially, where Islam, Islamic culture, and Muslims are less well-known, it can cause misunderstandings. According to the answers that came out of the interviews, mainstream South Koreans are not aware of halal food and Muslim foodways historical, cultural-religious, and traditional connections.

> Actually, these days there is a very famous falafel restaurant in Chonggak, Seoul. It is called Humus Kitchen. (…) They have lamb meat. It is a halal restaurant. South Koreans visit it a lot and like to go there. I took my brother's girlfriend and she liked it. It is not known as halal food. They think of it as trendy food. (Interview, 16.06.2020)

A popular place for some South Koreans to visit is Itaewon, an old multi-cultural area in Seoul.[62] Due to its multi-national and cultural environment, it allows visitors to experience different cultures and gives the opportunity to enjoy authentic and traditional foodways. In Itaewon, around the Seoul Grand Masjid, there are various foreign restaurants, including traditional authentic restaurants from Muslim countries, such as Arab, Pakistani, Indonesian, and Turkish. Notably, mainstream South Koreans think of the Itaewon area as a place to find or eat foreign authentic food and halal food as well. These days, it is not only the Itaewon area where halal food or foreign halal restaurants can be found. They are located in different parts of Seoul. Considering the interview results, mainstream South Koreans visit trendy cultural or well-being food restaurants that have halal food or go under halal certification without being aware of it. According to the interviews, mainstream South Koreans, especially Evangelical Christians, are careful to avoid consuming halal food in South Korea due to its connection with Muslims, *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권, and terrorism.

What "Eating Halal Food" Means in the Korean Context

1. People of Unknown Culture "Eating Halal Food"

Historically, Islam and Muslims have had both periods of encounter and disconnection to the Korean Peninsula. The present South Korean Muslim community was created after Islam was reintroduced during the Korean War (1950–53) by the Turkish troops. The encounter with Islamic culture and Muslims continued outside the peninsula. One such encounter was during the 1970s–80s, when thousands of South Koreans were sent as construction workers to the Middle East. Following the Seoul Olympics (1988), South Korea started to accept foreign workers, among whom various Muslim workers entered South Korea. An increasing flow of Muslim immigrants to South Korea continued through the 1990s into the 2000s. Among this immigrant population are not only workers but also international students and marriage migrants who married Koreans and formed multicultural families.[63]

Contemporary Islam and Islamic culture are unfamiliar for a lot of South Koreans. Muslims are seen as "*morŭ nŭn munhwa saramdŭl* 모르는 문화 사람들," meaning "people of an unknown culture." Among the interviews, two interviewees used the expression "*morŭ nŭn munhwa*" and "*morŭ nŭn munhwa saram*" (unknown culture or people of an unknown culture). A foreign interviewee stated how he was referred to as "a person of unknown culture."

> '*Morŭ nŭn munhwa saram ida* 모르는 문화 사람이다' [A person who came from an unknown culture.]. '*Uriga morŭ nŭn munhwa esŏ wattŏn saram irasŏ chosim haeya haeyo* 우리가 모르는 문화에서 왔던 사람이라서 조심해야해요' [We have to be careful because he comes from a culture we do not know].[64] This means they (South Koreans) do not know about this culture, which means it is bad, and so we (as South Koreans) have to be careful. (Interview, 13.08.2020) (brackets added for clarity)

It cannot be ignored that South Koreans do not have an extensive interaction with Islam, Islamic culture, and Muslims in comparison to Western and some non-Muslim Asian countries. On the contrary, it cannot be said that they did not encounter any Muslims or have never tasted halal food. According to the interviewees, some favorite travel destinations are Indonesia, Malaysia, Turkey, and Morocco. Almost all South Korean interviewees, except one person, had visited a Muslim majority country. I noticed that interviewees described the travel destinations to be beautiful places with nice people and good food. Nevertheless, people from *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권 or Muslims, Muslim immigrants, or multicultural families formed by marriage migrants are referred to as from "unknown" or "not well-known" cultures.

If we identify others based on what they eat, we could also make judgments about consumption of the food based upon who eats it. In other words, what Muslims "eat" is "halal food." Following that, within the frame of halal discourses and misrepresentations of Muslim identities, "eating halal food" is linked to "either crime, as a threat, or in relation to a terrorist" or a strategy of Islamization.[65] This can be observed as antithetical to a "Muslim-friendly" discourse. According to the interview results, "eating halal food" is understood as food consumed by Muslims, the *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권 people, who are a group of Islamic religious fanatics. In a non-Muslim country, for some South Koreans, consumption of halal food would support those people and Islamization. Another perception is that "eating halal food" means eating meat-based food, which is expensive and hardly affordable for Muslim immigrants and multicultural families. A contrasting perception to this, "eating halal food" is a need that should be provided to Muslim tourists during their visit to South Korea.

2. What Muslims Eat is "Halal"!

K'i Yŏn K'oo's study shows that the South Korean press presents Muslims and Islamic culture as a monolithic religious bloc.[66] Secondly, the Islamic world (*Isŭllam-kwŏn*) is described as a land controlled by Islam and equates Muslims to a group of Islamic religious fanatics. Owing to this, all Middle East related news within the South Korean press is focused on Islam.

> If you say Islam, firstly, it is the religion of people from the Middle East and *Arap-kwŏn* 아랍권 (Arab countries). I did not know back then, when I went to Saudi Arabia, but now Islam is IS (the Islamic State). It is probably not like that because Islam extremist groups seem to be people believing Islam in a weird way. This is how I understand it. (Interview, 15.08.2020) (brackets added for clarity)

Jeon Daye illustrates common stereotypes of Islam, Arabs, and Muslims that link Arab to "Islam" or "a geographic area."[67] Next to this, images of Arabs and Muslims portrayed in the South Korean media, popular culture, and society are portrayed either as oppressed and weak Muslim women, terrorists, or as enormously rich oil princes.[68] A recent negative image of Muslims is closely connected to the world-wide refugee crisis. Yemeni refugees entered South Korea in 2018 through Cheju Island causing huge discussions and protests among South Koreans. Notably, most of the South Koreans were against Yemeni refugees and argued that Muslim men cause trouble. Most of the arguments were based on Islamophobic discourses thinking of the Muslim refugees as be troublemakers and untrustworthy multicultural minorities.[69]

Foreign Muslim interviewees shared their unfortunate experiences with some South Koreans. It was situations in which they were either thought to be a terrorist

before they had been properly introduced or accused of being a terrorist by some random strangers passing by. South Korean interviewees' impressions of Islam and Muslims is formed by stereotypes transmitted through the South Korean news media and Islamophobic discourses after 9/11. Interviewees mentioned a viral video in which a South Korean man was beheaded by the IS terrorist group. Following this statement one interviewee added:

> (South) Koreans do not know what Muslim is but what they eat is 'halal'. (Interview, 20.06.2020)

> What is very amusing is that when you say halal food, it has a very negative image (but) sisters from the church go for a trip to Malaysia. It is a famous vacation spot for honeymoons. A senior at my church went to Malaysia and enjoyed the food there. (Interview, 16.06.2020)

The interviewee was told by her fellow Christians not to spend money on other religion's restaurants or food. She emphasized that she was not able to understand the idea of "you cannot spend money on halal food." Kim Nam-il provides examples that conservative Evangelical Christian groups were strongly against halal food complex projects due to the thought of Islamization.[70] In this context, "eating halal food" means to indirectly support terrorists. It is significant to indicate a difference of perception between "eating halal food" and consumption of halal food products, such as snacks or drinks. Most South Koreans, including interviewees, are not aware of a halal mark on products available in the local markets. These products are taken as imported products "made in a country" rather than halal products. Nevertheless, halal meat supply complexes or halal restaurants are visible in terms of halal discourse and its relation to Islamization.

At the same time, mainstream South Koreans, including anti-halal food supporters, like to travel to Muslim or Muslim majority destinations. Most of the South Korean interviewees who travelled to Muslim countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, Saudi Arabia, or Turkey, stated that they did not realize it was halal food they were eating until this was mentioned during the interviews. Once again, a negative image of "eating halal food" is not linked to local authentic traditional food enjoyed during a trip to a Muslim or Muslim majority country.

3. Eating Halal Food as a Social Economic Status

Halal food symbolizes belonging to an individual and a wider cultural-religious group identity. On the one hand, for Muslims, it is food that one's mother, grand-mother, father, or someone in their circle cooked for them. In other words, it is a part of a long historical and traditional foodways that includes broad local-cultural tastes and recipes, just as any other foodways. However, recently, the

halal food concept, considering consumption, has taken a new significance in terms of economic value through its growing share in the global market. Muslims seek for a halal market and industry that takes account of their ethical and moral values, customs, and practices, and contributes to a better society. In opposition, the halal discourse emphasis on meat creates a perception of halal food as mainly a meat-based commodity.

> If you say halal food, meat comes up (to mind) directly. There is such a thing, for instance, kebab just meat, meat, and meat. (South) Koreans always perceive halal food as meat. (Interview, 28.05.2020) (brackets added for clarity)

Foreign Muslim interviewees answered that halal food was their home country's food. It is a challenge to access halal food in a non-Muslim country. They argued that not only halal food but also halal ingredients are mostly expensive, difficult to find, and there are either a lack of options or a lack of taste. South Korean interviewees defined halal food as food they had tasted (kebab, curry, naan, lamb meat) that were available on halal restaurants' menus. It was affordable but expensive compared to South Korean food.

Next to accessibility, another aspect of "eating halal food" is its affordability. According to South Korean interviewees, to be able to consume meat is correlated with wealth and status by older generations. This is seen as relevant with the nation's contemporary economic development process. Another view is regarding migrant workers in South Korea. For most South Koreans, migrant workers from Islamic countries are considered to be economically inferior. South Korean TV programs about multicultural families, including marriages with Muslims, contribute to this view by displaying them with dark skin tones and poor backgrounds, having a difficult life or arguments with their mother-in-law or husbands.

The portrayal of stereotyped Muslim images being migrant workers, with dark skin tones, and poor backgrounds support the idea that Muslims cannot financially afford halal food, because they are working class or economically inferior. In fact, a major problem is insufficient halal food supply, and Muslims are challenged not by their socio-economic status but by the accessibility and variety of halal food. A contrast to this is an increase of halal K-food and halal food restaurants subject to Muslim friendly tourism in South Korea.

4. Muslim Friendly Korea and "Eating Halal K-Food"

South Korea has gained global popularity through exporting cultural content under the name South Korean Wave, Hallyu. Hallyu not only contributed to a boost in the South Korean cultural economy exporting popular culture but, simultaneously, had a positive effect on the South Korean tourism sector. The

local authorities started to focus more on different sectors in tourism, such as a Muslim Friendly Korea with attention on halal K-food. The South Korean Muslim Federation (KMF) has an instrumental role in the advancement of the halal food industry in Korea.[71]

Halal tourism is an emerging market and an estimated 5.3% of the total inbound tourism market in South Korea. The annual growth rate of Muslim travelers visiting from 2010 to 2014 was 32.7%, which indicated a steady increase. It was expected to reach approximately 1.3 million in 2020,[72] but unfortunately, the global pandemic Covid-19 hindered this growth. However, it reached almost 1 million Muslim travelers in 2019.[73] In the meantime, South Korean authorities realized that the facilities were not enough to meet the Muslim travelers' demands and needs; such as food, accommodations, and social environment. Regarding this, diverse facilities were provided in touristic sites for Muslims. On the KTO website "Imagine Korea," a Muslim friendly travel section was added under the theme travel for Muslim tourists. Information about various facilities for Muslims and halal dining places can be searched under this section. A classification of Muslim friendly restaurants is designed to enable Muslims to dine conveniently. E-books available for free download explain the classification of restaurants and guide Muslim travellers for a pleasant stay.

On the contrary, the majority of South Korean interviewees had no knowledge about Muslim friendly tourism and halal K-food. Only two of them were informed of halal K-food restaurants, because one is a tourist guide, and the other one is interested in halal food and Muslim minorities. Meanwhile, foreign interviewees were aware of the changes and E-books published by KTO. One of them talked about her Indonesian friend, who showed her a mini drama on halal food in South Korea. The interviewee was surprised to see halal food explained in a South Korean drama. She added her opinion on the emphasis of Hallyu in the drama content.

The drama she mentioned was K-Food Mini Drama, "Lunch Box," promoting halal food in South Korea and made for the K-Food Fair 2015 in Malaysia, Indonesia, and the UAE.[74] In the drama, "Nasi Goreng" an Indonesian dish is cooked using halal ingredients. Moreover, on the YouTube channel of K-Food Fair 2015, South Korean *ramyŏn* 라면 with a halal mark is promoted, which is not available in the majority of local South Korean markets.

> I do not feel the need to go to a South Korean halal restaurant. It looks like it is for tourists who come to Korea. (Interview, 25.06.2020)

In fact, the facilities and halal restaurants seem to satisfy Muslim travelers rather than Muslim minorities residing in South Korea. Foreign Muslim interviewees shared their positive outlook on the progress made with Muslim friendly Korea;

even so, it did not fulfill their needs. Most of the interviewees gave answers to the question of whether they would prefer to dine with friends in South Korean halal restaurants. A common opinion was high prices and appealing to tourists rather than locals, as well as a lack of options to choose from compared to the wide range of South Korean restaurants. A notable point is that South Korean interviewees viewed it as a good opportunity for Muslim tourists to engage and experience South Korean culture closely. On the other hand, they were indifferent and felt unconnected to the idea of South Korean halal restaurants in general.

Discussion

Taking the principle "You are what you eat" as a starting point; the paper has drawn from the approaches of Walter Lippmann and Edward Said on cultural stereotypes to demonstrate how contradictory representations of Islam, the Islamic culture, and Muslim identities in the South Korean context construct various perceptions leading to the stereotyping of halal food, Muslim foodways, and its consumption. According to the South Korean interviewees, they were mainly informed on Islam, Islamic culture, Muslims, or halal food either through South Korean news, SNS, or media, but also through meeting Muslims or traveling to Muslim countries. Negative perceptions of Islam, Islamic culture, and Muslim identities are mainly shaped through information obtained from South Korean news and media, using translated foreign media content, rather than through interaction with Muslims. The perceptions of South Koreans who experienced Islamic culture and interacted with Muslims are different to the South Koreans who rely on information trans-mitted through the news and media. Supporting this idea, an older generation of South Koreans, once construction workers in the Middle East, have a positive opinion on Islam, *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권, and Muslims. An orientalist view, as understood by Said, seems to exist among younger generations. According to the interviews, younger South Koreans view Muslims or Arabs more in terms of oil rich Arabs from the Gulf area rather than terrorists and have been influenced by online images represented in Instagram, On the contrary, interviewees are not well-informed about halal business and Muslim friendly Korea projects by local authorities. Foreign Muslims, residing in Korea, share an opinion that South Koreans lack accurate information about Islam, Muslims, Islamic culture, and notions of halal. They have an optimistic point of view in terms of Muslim Friendly Korea projects, although they feel their needs as members of the Muslim minority are not provided for within this frame. Furthermore, representations of halal food and guidance about halal restaurants for Muslim travelers portray a different view to Islamophobic and halal discourses challenged by Muslim minorities. This

dichotomy creates contradictory perceptions that lead to the stereotyping of halal food and "eating halal food" in the South Korean context.

Firstly, stereotyping comes from the incomprehensibility of the notion of halal food. Most of the interviewees agreed in thinking of halal food as being a religious food due to the ritualistic method of slaughter in its production. However, Ibrahim H.A. Abd El-Rahim (2020) argues that halal slaughter is a halal method of slaughter for Muslims, not a ritual.[75] He continues that the halal method is the best method of slaughter—according to science—because it minimizes pain, completes the drainage of liquid blood from the carcass, and increases the shelf life and meat quality, safety, and hygiene. According to my observations, halal food is also linked to "wellbeing food" in South Korea and is exhibited with well-being, healthy, or organic foods. Nevertheless, explanations of "slaughtering approved in Islamic law" give the impression of a religious ritual rather than a method used by Muslims in slaughtering.

According to my observations and interviews, many South Koreans are challenged to understand the differences between spiritual and cultural practices, because they are familiar with Confucian ritual practices, an image of ritual or religious food. There is also avoidance towards other religions' food due to differences in belief, such as temple food.

Islam is also a source of legal, ethical, and moral values, and a guide to social standards and practices for Muslims. Therefore, it is necessary to describe a wider notion of halal. Halal, as a rule, is not applied only to food but rather covers various aspects of a Muslim's life, from clothing to speech, to relationships, and all general aspects. Halal as a term that is only applied to food limits its broader frame. Having said that, halal food is not limited to a religious substance to be "edible" but also emphasizes animal welfare, and the processes of production, ranging from feed, slaughter, packaging, logistics, related manufacturing, and finance.

Notably, not sharing the same eating habits or avoiding some foods creates stereotypes in the aspect of "Us" and "Others." As a result, not only halal food but also traditional Muslim foodways are homogenized and stereotyped in this context. The influence of Islamophobic discourses shaping perceptions of Islam and Muslim identities as "a bloc entity" referring mostly as *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권, disables an understanding of multi-dimensional Muslim identities with various ethnic-cultural and religious backgrounds. The unfamiliarity with Islamic culture and Muslims gives an image of an "unknown culture" to most South Koreans. Muslims are viewed as though they are all from one place and share the same language, clothing, food, and culture.

Muslim foodways share a common dietary practice but the influences of different ethnic, national, cultural, and historical backgrounds of Muslims

cannot be generalized into a "one bloc entity" located in a specific territory. This would be similar to thinking that Indian food, Chinese food, South Korean food, Japanese food, and Thai food, among others, are the very same Asian food due to the influence of a shared Buddhist religious dietary tradition. In the same way, vegetarian foodways are relatively universal, yet we cannot ignore influences of different local contexts and cultural distinctions.

On the other hand, the stereotyping of "eating halal food" is linked to perceptions of Muslim identities. This is supported by misrepresentations of Muslim images on the South Korean TV, such as migrant workers, marriage migrants, dark skin tones, and economically inferior images. These stereotyped images contribute to a fear of Muslims, multicultural families, and their cultural influences. Another perception is that Muslims are untrustworthy and troublemakers made publicly known through the protests against refugees in South Korea.

Likewise, strong opposition by conservative Christians was shown towards the Iksan Halal Food Complex (2015) before the refugee crisis. A reason for the backlash surrounding the food complex was the linkage of halal food and the idea of supporting terrorists in the Islamization of South Korea. Refering to a study by Paul Thomas and Amina Selimovic, similar connections were made between halal food and Islamization in Norwegian national online newspapers. They argue that Halal food was reflected through a discourse of crime and other dubious frames linked to the topoi of Islamophobia.[76] According to the interviews, to some South Koreans, halal food has a more "negative" image. Interviewees share the fear of some South Koreans, that halal food consumption in Korea would support *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권 people and Islamization.

On the other side, some of the South Korean interviewees argue that this is a groundless fear based on negative perceptions of Muslims. As many South Koreans enjoy travelling to Muslim majority countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, or Turkey, they have a distinctive understanding in terms of halal food and restaurants in South Korea, and travel destinations. The halal food discourse in a non-Muslim country changes to traditional local food that is enjoyed during travel in Muslim majority countries.

In a non-Muslim country, Muslim consumers are challenged by halal food accessibility that is less of a problem in their homeland because everything is halal or certified. Nevertheless, there is a perception that Muslim immigrants are economically inferior to them and cannot afford halal food, considering its meat products. It is more a challenge of accessibility and lack of options rather than affordability. Food is culture embodying tradition and nostalgia, with a rhetorical repertoire of aesthetics, identity, and uniqueness. Halal food is not only a matter

of certain foods being allowed, but rather a broader access to hygienic, healthy, and/or ethically produced products and cultural tastes.

Finally, perceptions formed by halal business and tourism contribute to stereotyping of halal food and "eating halal foodways" in contrasting ways. The South Korean authorities show an interest in entering the halal market through exports and Muslim friendly tourism. Well-known South Korean major companies are exporting halal K-Food, made in South Korea, introduced through K-Fairs. Some of the major export countries are Indonesia, Malaysia, and the UAE. In terms of a Muslim friendly Korea, KTO's official website has a section with explanations separated into Muslim dietary concerns and Middle Eastern food. The Muslim minority population in South Korea consists mostly of immigrants from Central Asia, West Asia, or Southeast Asia. Indonesian and Malaysian tourists to South Korea are a majority in comparison to Muslims from Middle Eastern countries. The categorization of the Muslim diet and Middle Eastern food are not identical, as the Muslim diet is a broader concept compared to a certain regional-cultural food.

Depending on interview results, the Muslim friendly Korea approach gives a feeling of the inclusion of Muslim travelers but not Muslim minorities in general. Muslim interviewees see the Muslim friendly Korea project as a positive progress but do not see themselves as being a part of it. On the KTO website, E-books provide information about food, accommodation, social environment, and other facilities for Muslim travelers. Moreover, a classification of halal restaurants is made to make dining more convenient for Muslim travelers. An interesting point is that most of the facilities are located around touristic sites. I noticed that South Korean interviewees assume that Muslim friendly Korea would offer a chance to Muslim travelers to experience South Korean culture fully by eating halal K-food. However, they are indifferent to halal K-food and feel that it targets tourists visiting South Korea. Even so, they have a positive perception of halal food and visiting a halal restaurant in terms of halal K-food, business, and tourism. This leads to a stereotyping of halal food and "eating halal food" to be something for foreigners, outsiders, or businesses rather than local people. Nevertheless, halal food and Muslim foodways share a spirit of community in ethical and moral social health, and they embody a heritage from the Muslim world with various cultural tastes and practices that embraces its wider populations.

Conclusion

This study has tried to give insights on South Korean perceptions of halal food and "eating halal food," and how it leads to stereotyping in the South Korean context. The contradictory representations and portrayals of Islam, Islamic culture, and

Muslim identities that form conflicting opinions among South Koreans are learned behaviors rather than experiences. With this, South Koreans gain positive and negative perceptions through which they evaluate Islam, Islamic culture, and Muslims. Considering that people make judgements based upon what they eat, mainstream South Koreans not only judge halal food as Islamic food but also judge it through the Muslim images represented in the media. It is unjustified to degrade it to the food of a homogenized religious bloc entity, as well as specific commodities to be consumed by a target group of people. Halal food is firstly only food and additionally everyday life food prepared according to Islamic dietary needs that covers ethical and moral social health. In terms of Muslim foodways, it symbolizes an intersection of food and a cultural-religious identity both for "individual Muslims" and more widely for the wider Muslim world.

Notes

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22. *Isŭllam-kwŏn* 이슬람권 defined as 'Islamic World' but mostly used in the Korean news and media within the context of Middle East, Terror, Islam, ISIS, Arab states etc., as well as for

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Islamophobia Discourse via Online Rumors in Korea: Focusing on the Rumor "How Lebanon, which was a Christian Country, became an Islamic Country?" and the "Taharrush Game"[1]

KYUNGSOO LEE   Institute of Middle East Studies, Center for International Area Studies, Hankuk University of Foreign Studies[2]

Abstract

This paper aims to explore the current status of the phenomena of online Islamophobia in Korea and how hate rumours affect internet users. The paper analyses Islamophobic information that flows online in Korean society with two particular rumors as examples, "Taharrush Game" and "How Lebanon, which was a Christian Country, became an Islamic Country?" To identify Islamophobic fake news in Korea, the study reviewed previous cases of fake news in Korea and examined the processes of creation and dissemination of Islamophobic fake news through a review of the literature. Moreover, using the survey method and examining online postings, this paper analyzed the current situation of Islamophobic disinformation in South Korea.

Keywords: Islamophobia in Korea, Online rumor, Fake news, Image of Islam in Korea, Image of Muslims in Korea

Introduction

> "We must be alert to Islam, and we should not receive (Muslim) refugees. When they have powers, they will try to swallow (our) country."

> "When Korean traditions and laws are at odds with Islamic doctrines, what would they (Muslims in Korea) choose? They will choose religion. That is why I am against them."

These sentences were taken from blog postings displaying hateful sentiments against Muslims (Yemeni refugees specifically) in Korea.[3] In Korean society, Islamic issues are talked about in everyday life as well as in online spaces.[4] However, Korean society has embraced Islamic culture more positively in the past in comparison to our present time. For example, the historical records of the Koryŏ Dynasty (918–1392) and the Chosŏn Dynasty (1392–1897) show that Muslims' diversity was respected in ancient Korean societies.[5] However, as the Confucian culture gradually strengthened, the perception of society toward Muslims changed. Eventually, in 1427, during the reign of King Sejong, the conducting of Islamic rituals and wearing of traditional dress were prohibited by royal decree. Since that point Muslim culture in Chosŏn society began to fade.[6]

Islam was re-introduced in Korean society during the Korean War in the early 1950s, when the Turkish military joined the United Nations coalition and formed the first generation of contemporary Korean Muslims. In 1955, the Korea Islamic Society was founded. Around two decades later, the first mosque was built in Seoul in 1976.[7] Moreover, the economic relationship has been active between the two worlds since the 1970s; Korea was a primary beneficiary of oil money from Middle Eastern countries, including Saudi Arabia and Libya, especially in the 1970s and 1980s. When Korea achieved economic development in the 1990s, oil-producing Middle Eastern nations became the country's main trading partners and still are today.[8]

The Development of Islamophobic Discourse in Korea: Who and Why

Korean society started to become more aware of Islam and Muslims around the year 2000 when the concept of a multicultural society was first introduced.[9] A fully-fledged Islamophobic discourse began with the 18th presidential election in 2012, and the situation escalated during the period of the 2016 general elections when Islam-hate statements were directly expressed and demonstrated by public gatherings or marches. In the 18th presidential election in 2012, *Kidok chayu t'ongil dang* 기독자유통일당 (Christian Liberal Party) used the "anti-Islam" movement

as the party's essential slogan.[10] It also took the lead in the movement against creating a halal food complex[11] within the Korea national food cluster project.[12]

Islamophobic discourse has not diminished or weakened, but rather has been further strengthened due to the influx of more than 500 Yemeni refugees who entered Cheju-do, the southern island of Korea, in the first five months of 2018. Muslims emerged as a new social problem for Korean society. It is noteworthy that the number of signatures of the petition seeking the abolition of the refugee system and withdrawal of visa-free entry reached to 714, 875 within a month on the online petition board of Ch'ŏng'wadae.[13] This remains the highest number of signatures yet received by a government petition. In addition to that, almost 6,278 posts expressing anxiety, hatred, and fear toward (Yemeni) refugees were uploaded from June to November of 2018. These numbers indicate the explosive nature of adverse reactions against the sudden influx of Yemeni refugees. The reason for people's reactions were mainly because they were Muslims. According to Sin Yewŏn and Ma Tonghun, the main reason for Koreans being offended was not the actual status of the Yemenis as refugees, but the fact that they were from the Islamic country of Yemen.[14]

This Islamophobic reaction could not have emerged in the public discourse without sources deliberately invoking hatred or phobia. Islam-focused misinformation spread in public discourses has been effectively disseminating negative images of Islam and Muslims to the public by presenting videos or photographs of examples of the crimes of Muslim immigrants in Europe. Considering the fierce opposition from public opinion due to rumors of Yemeni refugees, it can be presumed that this is a deliberate frame formation for Muslims and Islamic culture despite its concrete existence in Korean society, all in order to provoke negative opinions against the Yemenis for specific reasons.

This research hypothesizes that there might be a producer of Islamophobic rumors in Korea for a particular reason. If there is a source, then, we are led to the question of: where is the source of such rumors in Korean online society? Various studies on Islamophobia in Korea point towards right-wing Protestantism.[15] In particular, *Hankyoreh* 한겨레, one of the major daily newspapers in Korea, reported that the Esther Prayer Movement Headquarters (EPMH), a far-right fundamental Protestant Christian group, has been a producer and a disseminator of the misinformation. The online content gave birth to the erroneous news articles or misinformation that seeks to provoke the public's hatred against specific targets,[16] including Korean social minorities such as Muslims, refugees, and LGBT persons. Fundamental Protestant Christians and far-right political groups have been sharing these rumors. Some of them were delivered in the form of formal news articles by Christian newspaper platforms, and as these were viewed as

more legitimate and trustworthy, people would accept these hate codes without any further examination.[17]

In the last five years, unsubstantiated rumors, such as the conspiracy theory of a Muslim invasion of Korean society have been shared continuously, and erroneous news has also been reported on specific news platforms—especially Protestant Christian news channels—creating anti-Islamic discourse. Recently, the Yemeni refugee issue went beyond the existing anti-Islamic discourse, such as criticizing patriarchal Muslim social practices of circumcision, early marriage, polygamy, and hijab; and some have created images of Muslim men as potential sex offenders.[18] Ultimately, for those who believe the Islamophobic rumors, Muslims have come to represent an image of invaders who threaten society and Muslim men who threaten Korean women.

This paper aims to research Korean Islamophobic misinformation transmitted in various forms to the sphere of online public discourse and its formation of fear and disgust for Islam, its culture, and Muslims in the Korean online public. To that end, this research will examine how Korean creators of online Islamophobic rumors or fake news fabricate posts with misinformation. This study focuses on two rumors, "Taharrush Game," and "How Lebanon, which was a Christian Country, became an Islamic Country?" that were fabricated to promote anti-Islamic online discourse.

To grasp the actual extent of Islamophobia online, this research surveyed 204 people who randomly used social network services to estimate the impact of two rumors. Simultaneously, using NAVER,[19] the most used search portal website in Korea, the researcher searched entire blogs and posts of the internet communities (which were open access), with the keywords "Taharrush" and "Christian Country Lebanon." To see how the delivery of rumors manipulates stories, the author reviewed the posting dates, the videos or photos shared, and the words and expressions of the posts and comments.

Islamophobia

A definition of Islamophobia as an academic concept was introduced in 1997 when the Runnymede Trust, a British think tank, published the report "Islamophobia: A Challenge For Us All."[20] The authors of the report refer to Islamophobia to as "unfounded hostility towards Islam, and practical consequences of such hostility in unfair discrimination against Muslim individuals and communities, and to the exclusion of Muslims from mainstream political and social affairs."[21]

In order to define Islamophobia in a specific country or society, the target of the phobia needs to be discussed first: whether it is against Islam as a religion or Muslims as its people or both. Korean researchers defined Islamophobia from

different point of view, either as a type of xenophobia or racism; the hatred against Muslims as others, not the religion itself.[22] However, defining Islamophobia remains as a matter of debate, especially in Korea, because the concept of Muslim and Islam is used interchangeably at times. In this research, the term Islamophobia is defined as an embraced stereotype or prejudice against Muslims or Islam and denying acceptance to them or their religion as a part of society.

Fake news and Online Rumors

The concept of fake news in the twenty-first century has broadened the definition to include false stories spreading on social media[23] or news articles that are intentionally and verifiably false and could mislead readers.[24] As Allcott and Gentzkow argue, it may be derived from conspiracy theories in the form of the news article, so that it is difficult to verify as true or false, or as a satire.[25] This type of misleading news report contains content that promotes hatred against specific individuals or groups, claiming opposite or different opinions through false incitement to aggravate the conflict between ideologies, religions, genders, and generations within society. In the end, fake news reinforces abnormal communication that lowers societal trust in general.[26]

Zhou and Zafarani tried to compare concepts related to fake news by reviewing existing research based on the three filters; a) authenticity, b) intention, and c) whether the information is news or not. When these filters are applied, information that contains false authenticity and harmful intention, but without the form of a news report, can be defined as "disinformation." However, because of the three filters' ambiguity,[27] erroneous news reports or unsubstantiated rumors[28] can be defined as "disinformation" when the contents carry a bad intention. In this research, we will consider Islamophobic online rumors and fake news in the range between misinformation and disinformation based on its intention within the context.

Fake news and rumors in Korean society

Korea has experienced several fake news or rumor cases, and some even caused mass demonstrations due to public fear. *Donga ilbo*'s 동아일보 1945 false report case is one example. The Moscow conference of foreign ministers between the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Soviet Union, held to negotiate agreements on the post-war settlement of Japanese occupied territories after World War II, occurred in December 1945. *Donga ilbo*, a right-wing daily newspaper in Korea, reported this conference under the headline, "The Soviet Union insists on trusteeship (of Korea), and the U.S. insists on immediate independence."[29] Given

that the main point of the meeting focused more on the establishment of the democratic provisional government the U.S. proposed and was then agreed by three parties,[30] this case is considered as an attempt to disseminate the anti-trusteeship[31] discourse.[32] The right-wing went on to use it consciously as a bit of anti-communist ideology rather than for its nationalistic aspect.[33] This news report brought mass demonstrations, and people went on strike four days after the report.[34] Eventually, the transmission of dichotomous ideologies became one of the catalysts that intensified the conflict between the country's anti-trusteeship and pro-trusteeship debate by the external powers.[35] This incident is an example of how politically manipulated newspaper articles form social ideology and can influence public opinion.

Secondly, the rumor related to the 5.18 Kwangju Uprising also shows how rumors can be used for domestic political ideological conflicts. There have been various arguments regarding this armed conflict between the military government and Kwangju citizens, depending on the difference of one's political ideology. Rumors of North Korean military involvement—one of the most trans-mitted stories—can be regarded as an instance of how Korea's anti-communist sentiment had been manipulated. Kim Hŭisong argued that this rumor connected a distorted North Korean content to the 5.18 incident to stimulate a "Red Complex," through concealment of facts and distortion of memory based on the politics of a divided country.[36]

At the same time, Kim Hŭisong argued that the news articles published during the incident were fake or fabricated news because media outlets removed some part of articles or fabricated false news forcibly by the government, while others even issued these kinds of articles voluntarily.[37]

Such politically distorted news reports before the development of the Internet and social media do not show significant differences from recent online erroneous news reports. The difference is that it became easier and faster to create fake news based on unsubstantiated rumors to stimulate people's anxiety about North Korea or another form of colonialism. This phenomenon appeared in a similar form in the subsequent cases such as American mad-cow disease,[38] Middle East Respiratory Syndrome (MERS), and even COVID 19, stimulating people's anxiety.

Islamophobia and Islamophobic fake news or rumors in Korea

Social issues related to discrimination, prejudice, refusal, the despised, and ridicule are deeply rooted in any society, and these issues have stood out through the expressions of hatred in public discourses with various perspectives in Korean

society.[39] Ku Kiyŏn's analysis about the change of social sentiments regarding words related to Islam from 2013 to 2016 indicated that the frequency of using the word "Hyŏmo (phobia/hatred)" had risen through the period between 2016 and 2017 in Korea. This word has been used on gender issues between men and women and minority issues such as sexual minorities, Chinese immigrants, the disabled, and Islam. The analysis indicated that negative sentiment of the word "Islam" had also increased during the same period.[40]

Similar research conducted by Kim Suwan, about Koreans' images of Arabs and Islam, showed that in the recent history of Korean society with Islam, the most vital image about "Arab and Islam" for Koreans was "Terror, War, Conflict zone" (75%), which has negative connotations.[41] Citing Boulding's theory, Kim Suwan argued that when a particular view of an object is formed, this perceived image might replace reality. Even though the second-most robust image about Islam was a positive image such as "Sincere Islamic religious life, devout faith, strong religious piety" (71%),[42] negative perceptions about Islam cannot be ignored.

After the Yemeni refugee crisis in 2018, public awareness surveys on refugees and Muslim refugees were conducted by some newspapers and institutions between 2018 and 2019. The survey results revealed that Koreans have negative sentiments against Muslim refugees more than the religion; the core of the hatred tends to lean towards the Muslims rather than Islam. For example, a survey by *Jungang Ilbo* on Islamophobia in Korea (conducted on 1 and 2 August 2018), showed that people's negative response to refugees was 44.7% in general; however toward Muslim refugees specifically, the negative response rose to 66.6%.[43] Similarly, a survey by the Asan Institute for Policy Studies Institute (conducted 4–24 December 2019) also showed that Korean people's perception about Middle Eastern immigrants was the most negative (70.9%) among five regions (Middle East, Africa, Latin America, East Asia, Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America).[44]

Ku Kiyŏn indicated that in spreading and increasing fears and negative images against Islam and Muslims, people receive it primarily through indirect methods.[45] This raises an important need that will be covered in this paper—a discussion into the leading agents creating and spreading the negative images of Islam and Muslims.

Korean far-right fundamental Protestantism and hatred

A negative perspective against Islam in Korea started from the 9/11 terror incident in the USA. However, it has not been long since Korean society started to regard Islam as part of daily life. As Muslim laborers or tourists became more visible in

the public area, Korean society began to discern them. In the labour market, some people in the field regard them as rivals for work and raised voices in opposition to accepting Muslim labourers.[46]

Meanwhile, following 9/11, Korean society experienced a few Muslim-perpetrated terror incidents against its nationals outside of the country. Kim Sŏnil,[47] a Korean employer in an American military supply contract firm in Iraq, was kidnapped at the end of May 2004 by an Iraqi militia—Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad—which later became part of ISIL. The negotiation between the Korean government and the Jihadist group failed, and ultimately, they beheaded him and spread the process of his execution scene online.[48] This incident, followed by the abduction of the short-term missionary work team of Saemmul church by the Taliban in Afghanistan in 2007, was enough reason to startle Korean society. Furthermore, it became a trigger of Islam's image to Koreans as jihadists who kidnap and kill non-Muslims.

Shortly after the Saemmul church incident, anti-Islamic sentiment started to rise in late 2008. According to Yi Chin'gu, expressions such as "Islamic Tsunami" or "domestic penetration of Islam" were used, which created an anti-Islamic sentiment that quickly picked up momentum. There were also rumors spread between 2008–2009 by Protestant Christian newsletters.[49]

Various studies on Korean Islamophobia indicate that the hate speeches are mainly formulated by Korean Protestant churches. Ku Kiyŏn (2018), Yi Chin'gu (2011), Kim Tongmun (2016), Pak Chongsu (2017), Sŏng Shinhyŏng (2020), and Pae Tŏkman (2020) all conducted research that link Islamophobia to Korean Protestant Christianity. This, of course, does not mean that all Korean Protestant denominations are responsible for producing hatred. Scholars refer to some particular Protestant churches as agents of hatred production, and some of them identified the churches' character as "conservative" or "fundamentalist."[50]

"Protestantism" is the most comprehensive expression to represent these churches' character, and a more specific expression of "conservative Christianity/Protestantism" is used sometimes, while the most frequently mentioned term is "fundamentalist."[51] Scholars pointed out that Korean Protestantism justifies its hatred using expressions such as "what is written in the Bible," "a common sense in a society," or "freedom of expression."[52] Furthermore, Kang Inch'ŏl defined specifically politicalized conservative Protestants as a "Protestant right" who utilize the politics of hatred.[53]

Historically Protestant Christianity grew along with modern Korean history since the Japanese colonization period, depending enormously on American Protestantism.[54] With Korean society's growth, the Korean Protestant churches have shown a thorough conformity to the values of nationalism, and they have

also been pursuing the absolute value of the homogenous state, which does not tolerate an "other." Eventually, some Protestants in Korea attempted to justify themselves by defining "the others" as "evil." In the past, "the others" were referred to as communists, socialists, North Koreans, and pro-North Koreans, and recently the target changed to Muslims and Islam, feminists, and members of the LGBT community.[55]

Korean society's far-right discourses have been created, distributed, and spread by far-right cable TV channels or newspapers. There also are far-right civic groups such as *Han'guk chayu ch'ongyŏnmaeng* (Korea Freedom Federation), or *Taehanmin'guk ŏbŏi yŏnhap* (Korea Parent Federation), and there are far-right online communities such as *Ilgan besŭt'ŭ* (daily best). However, Kim Chinho indicated that Korea's center of far-right politics is in the right-wing Protestant churches led by the Korean Christian Federation and Protestant far-right civic groups such as the EPMH.[56] Yi Chisŏng also pointed out that Korean far-right Protestant groups produce hate sentiments against pro-North Koreans and homosexuals[57] by using this hatred as an ethical standard of judgement.[58] Underneath the hate politics, a sense of anxiety and fear arose due to the stagnation of their religious influence, the decline in public confidence in Protestants, and the spread of anti-Protestant feelings in Korean society. Accordingly, they are trying to confirm and strengthen their presence by proposing virtual enemies.[59]

Islamophobic fake news or rumors in Korea

Now, let us investigate the anti-Islamic rumors or fake news in Korea. Who creates the Islamophobic public discourse? What kind of image has been created about Islam or Muslims in Korea recently?

The most famous anti-Islam rumor appeared around 2007 when the report, "Eight steps of Islamization strategy," which claimed to have referenced *The World Fact Book* (2007) by the CIA,[60] was spread in the domestic Protestant community in the form of video or text. The report dealt with an Islamization strategy toward the world in general. A derivative, "The Islamization Strategy of Korean Society," was spread within Korean churches. The basis of these rumors, including its main reference (CIA's *The World Fact Book*), turned out to be groundless or fabricated.[61] The "Islamic Tsunami" threat was spread in the Protestant community between 2007–2008. Both rumors firmly insist that there is a Muslim structured strategy to Islamize the world and Korea,[62] in particular. The general strategies of Islamization is based on the percentage of Muslim in a target country as follows: at stage 1, when the Muslim population in the country is around 1%, they (Muslims) stake out and disguise themselves as a peace-loving group.

At stage 2, when the Muslim population in the country increases slightly to 2~3%, the inmates in prison are intensively converted to Islam. At stage 3, when the country's Muslim population exceeds 5%, a full-fledged strategy to increase the Muslim populations begins.

At stage 4, when the Muslim population in the country is more than 20%, they start riots and disturbances and attacks on churches. At stage 5, when the country's Muslim population is more than 40%, widespread massacres are committed and frequent terrorism occurs.

At stage 6, when the Muslim population in the country is more than 60%, they oppress Christianity and other religions without any restraint. At stage 7, when the Muslim population in the country is more than 80%, state-led mass racial cleansing and massacres are committed. At stage 8, when the Muslim population in the country reaches 100%, they implement a theocratic unity system and Islamic law takes priority to the constitution.[63]

Here we can raise various questions about these rumors; who exactly are those "Muslims" who try to Islamize the world and Korea? Is there any specific group of Muslims? If so, why did the rumor sources not indicate the group's name or institutions?

Kim Tongmun posited that the real source of the CIA's *The World Fact Book* rumor is hardly identifiable, however someone who addressed this strategy primally was Pastor Yi Mansŏk.[64] Yi Chin'gu also referred to Pastor Yi as a person playing a pivotal role in spreading Islamophobia and the demonization of Islam. The pastor is the head of the Korean Iranian mission church and is leading the Islamic response movement called "Halt Islamization Movement, 4HIM." He argues that Islam and Muhammad are not peaceful as Muslims insist and that the purpose of Islamic forces is to unify the world into an Islamic world by any means necessary, such as lies, violence, murder, and terror. His main argument is that countermeasures against Islamic forces must be prepared in Korea before society regrets it as is the case with European countries[65] that accepted Muslim migrants and refugees earlier. Even though it is not possible to paint him as the main agent who created Islamophobic sentiments with academic references, his argument seems to be related to pervasive anti-Islamic rumors trying to warn of Muslims' strategy towards Korean society.

Further to this, the primary producer of Islamophobic rumors seems to have been exposed recently to the public. *Hankyoreh*, in October 2018, released articles focusing on fake news that provoke hatred against LGBT people and refugees with the title "Esther, the Name of the 'Fake News Factory' for Homosexual • Refugee hatred."[66]

According to this article, since the Yemeni refugee issue was raised, many fake news articles were transmitted through social network services, for example, "92% of sexual violence in Sweden is caused by Islamic refugees and half of the victims are children," or "The sexual crime rate of Afghan immigrants is 79 times higher than that of the nationals." The source of those pieces was EPMH, a Christian right-wing movement group founded in 2007. Under the name of their media mission, the news report says that so-called "internet warriors" work on creating online public opinions against LGBT individuals, North Korea, and certain leftist politicians. During the specific period of 1–19 September 2018, disinformation that EPMH and other creators produced was shared in more than 20 YouTube channels with more than 1.37 million views.[67]

A more severe problem regarding the fake news is that the prominent Christian newspaper or radio platforms such as *Kŭktong pangsong* (radio station), *Kungmin ilbo* (daily newspaper), or *Kidok ilbo* (Christian Daily) publish articles based on biased foreign articles without any fact checks. What makes this problem worse is that these medias have a significant influence on the Korean churches. *Nyusŭ aen choi* (News and Joy) newspaper[68] reported that this media edited foreign articles to appear differently from the original purpose, or selected biased views from the original articles. These articles are then used by conservative Christianity to provoke anti-Islam or anti-homosexuality sentiments after distortion of the facts and fabrication of the stories.[69] If these articles are created on purpose, these can be categorized as maliciously false news, which is a worse case of fake news than rumors or misinformation according the Zhou and Zafarani's comparison.

Examining two samples: "How Lebanon, a Christian Country, became an Islamic Country?" and "Taharrush Game"

In order to distinguish Islamophobic disinformation and its circulation in the Korean online world from the perspective of the receivers of these rumors, two samples—"Taharrush Game" and "How Lebanon, which was a Christian Country, became an Islamic Country?"—will be analyzed for how the online content is utilized to stimulate people's hatred or fear against Islam and Muslims.

Analysis of the internet contents

This research examined blogs and online community postings on the NAVER website, the most used online search portal during the last ten years in Korea, to analyze the rumors or fake news content. The keywords used to search were "kidokkyo kukka (a Christian country)" with "Lebanon" and "t'aharushi." The

period of the examination of NAVER was December 31, 2020 to January 6, 2021. The data collection was performed as follows: the researcher searched every accessible posting for each rumor and visited each of them to check the posting's title, text, and comments. When it came to the "Lebanon" keyword, the search was conducted manually through the NAVER search, because there were many unrelated postings on the result page. The researcher searched on the NAVER website directly and checked the results from both community postings and blog postings.

In the case of "Taharrushi" case, due to the massive data result, the researcher used TEXTOM text mining program to sort meaningful postings in the internet community and blogs. TEXTOM is a big data analysis program, and it provides data collection, morphological analysis, and data analysis such as text-mining. As a research sample, there were 167 blog and community postings of the "Lebanon" rumor, and there were 265 postings of the "Taharrush" rumor.

In order to analyze the contents of the postings and the rumors, the researcher utilized the critical discourse analysis of Fairclough and transnational perspectives from the online sphere. The two tools of the analysis recommend that media discourse be conducted not only by the text but also audio-visual content. Media texts[70] are indicators of social and cultural change. Fairclough advocates a critical discourse analysis that examines the relationship between the three dimensions of communication cases: text, discourse practice, and sociocultural practices. Among them, for text analysis, he pays attention to expressions absent in the text, the categories of participants, and the formation of the participants' identity and relationships.[71]

The perspectives from the online sphere explain that open online discourse takes the form of a web sphere, a collection of similar content defined by a common theme. It is converted into a discourse context that can be distinguished from other subjects. The creation of this web sphere is promoted in economic, social, political and cultural development that stimulates and arouses people's attention because of its unusualness. In addition, according to Nguyen, the research topic of this open online discourse is not limited to a specific type of online platform and can deal with various formats such as blogs and social media networks, and it includes not only text but also audio-visual materials.[72]

Referring to the two samples as either "rumor" or "fake news" seems unclear, because it has both forms of disinformation. In the "Taharrush Game" case, the "fact" is based on an actual news article, and it spreads as rumors in online communities. For this reason, the two samples also will be referred to as "disinformation."

"How Lebanon, which was a Christian Country, became an Islamic Country?"

The rumor "How Lebanon, which was a Christian Country, became an Islamic Country?" was chosen for two reasons. First, it is a form of testimony video, making people trust the content more effortlessly compared to images or writings. Second, the message and timing of this video's transmission coincided with the 2018 Yemeni refugee issue. According to the blog and community posting research, the women in the video pointed exactly at the Muslim refugees (outsiders), and this video was posted online during June and July of 2018.

The original video was posted on YouTube on 4 August 2016, in the *Yetchŏk kŭ sŏnhan kil* (The old pathway)[73] channel with the title "*Kidokkyo kukka rebanon ŭn ŏttŏk'e Isŭllam kukkaga toeŏnnŭn'ga?* (How Lebanon, a Christian Country became an Islam Country?)"[74] The video was also uploaded on another extreme-right YouTube channel *GMW Union*, on 8 August 2016 with the title "*Kwanyong tamunhwa p'oyong tayangsŏng i ŏttŏk'e han nara rŭl Isŭllam hwa shik'inŭn'ga?* (How tolerance, multicultural inclusion, and diversity could Islamize one country?)" The titles—especially the latter—reveals a dichotomy between Christians and Muslims. Most of the postings copied the original title of the channel, "The old pathway," however, some people shared the exact contents with more negative titles such as "The story of a country that was destroyed by receiving Islam refugees,"[75] "The end of the Christian state which hosts Islam refugees,"[76] "Cancer cells more threatening than North Korea, Muslims."[77] Superficially, this is a video of one Lebanese Christian woman's testimony about her childhood during the Lebanese civil war. However, we can watch the video from a different perspective if we know about her and the show. Her name is Brigette Gabriel, and she is the founder of ACT! for America, which is a U.S. based anti-Muslim advocacy group.[78] Even though this information is displayed in Korean on the screen briefly, without researching

Picture 1 A captured image from the YouTube channel "The old pathway."

her background, it is not easy for Korean YouTube users to acknowledge the hidden fact that she is one of the most prominent anti-Muslim activists in America, appearing on the Jim Bakkers show, a Christian show. Eventually, this video makes people perceive it as a testimony of a victim or a survivor of the war between local Christians and Muslims who destroyed her country.

The Korean subtitle on the screen played a significant role, as it makes receivers of the content able to read and understand what is written on the screen literally. The problem is that the subtitles are modified and simplified, and it does not deliver the original story fully in some sentences. The main plot of the story in the Korean subtitles is that Lebanon, the only Christian country in the Middle East accepting Palestinian refugees in the early 1970s with hospitality, saw an influx of Muslims (Palestinians), which caused a civil war. The cause of misunderstanding starts with the first sentence, "I was born in Lebanon, which used to be the only majority Christian country in the Middle East." This is different from the Korean subtitle, which states: "I was born in Lebanon, which was the only Christian country[79] of the Middle East." Similar incorrectness can be found in other translations into Korean, or they delete some content of the original sentences and made complicated sentences simple and easy to read. The misleading interpretation of this story was found in many postings in NAVER blogs and communities. In some postings, people even compose the explanation or comments adding the wrong information or exaggerating Muslims' negative images. Here are some examples of what people who deliver the postings or add comments to the online community or blogs write:

"Originally, Lebanon was a Christian state. The Muslim zombies in the Middle East have eaten Lebanon, killed Lebanese, and became refugees again, drifting across a prosperous country" (831 views, real estate community).[80]

"Lebanon was a Christian country, but Yemenis flooded into the country and slaughtered a few million people and Islamized it" (3,499 views, shopping community).[81]

"1. Lebanon, which was originally a rich and wealthy Christion country 2. Seeing this, nearby Muslim beggars flocked 3. Lebanese fed them and offered them a place to sleep because they pity them 4. Muslims shot and slaughtered Christians because they do not believe in Allah shouting out Allahu Akbar 5. Eventually, Lebanon collapsed" (4.2 k views, fashion community).[82]

"Lebanon was a beautiful and peaceful Christian country. However, the political leaders naively accepted Islam refugees in the name of practising love, and the country fell into a civil war, and Beirut has once become newsworthy in the world with terror and slaughter" (A Christian blog).[83]

Figure 1 Semiotic System of *Mythologies* by Barthes

Source: Roland Barthes, *Hyŏndae ŭi shinhwa*, p. 272.

The mythologies of Barthes may be applied to analysing this content. In Barthes' *Mythologies*, the system of semiotics is divided into two stages, showing how myths reproduce their meanings in the second semantic action. As seen in figure 1, the signification between *signifié* (image) and *significant* (meaning) in the primitive stage produces the *signe*, as Saussure defined. However, Barthes moves forward from here, making this sign as a signifier in the mythical signification. He puts this sign in the first stage as *SIGNIFIANT* (just a form for second signification) and tried to grasp the mythical meaning by condensing various concepts corresponding to the form.[84]

The Korean subtitle's storytelling with images could be applied to an external manifestation (*signe*) on the language level. It leads the readers to reach further to the meta-language level forming *SIGNIFIÉ*, emphasising themselves as Lebanese (or Lebanese Christians) and Yemeni refugees as Muslims (including Palestinian refugees) who invaded their country. As seen in the above samples, this rumor attaches fear to the Muslim refugees. It also relates to the results of the public opinion surveys by the many institutions outlined in the previous section.

It is not easy to determine whether the writers of the postings or comments intended to mislead people with provocative expressions. However, the posts or comments' timing implies that these postings might be intended, because among 57 postings on NAVER communities, for example, 26 of them were posted in the period between 16–29 June 2018, within two weeks since the Yemeni refugee issue intensified in Korean society. In this case, it could be proposed that this rumor's transmission was aimed at forming public opinion against accepting Muslim refugees.

"Taharrush Game"

This rumor could be categorized as fabricated disinformation or misinformation based on fact, specifically cases of mass sexual harassment in Egypt in 2010 and in Cologne in 2015. According to Abdelmonem, Bavelaar, Wynne-Hughes and Galán, the media coverage about the mass sexual assault in Cologne in 2015 connected the news to the Egyptian case, a collection of sexual harassment assaults and rapes

during the protest in 2010. By doing so, Middle Eastern and North African refugees were broadly held responsible for the sexual harassments in European countries. Furthermore, the term *taharrush* has been reported in the media without proper translation of its meaning into English or Korean, causing another problem. *The Daily Mail* defined *taharrush* (*gamea*) as "collective harassment," "the Arabic gang-rape phenomenon," and "the *taharrush* game."[85] Using the pronunciation of the original language without translating it affects the connection of the word with the region where the language is used. Therefore, this Arabic word might emphasize cultural links to the region and the religion there.

Abdelmonem, Bavelaar, Wynne-Hughes and Galán's research also explained the framing of sexual harassment in Europe by using *taharrush* as below, and these framed contents were also applied to the Korean Islamophobic discourse without filtering.

The media coverage aimed to distinguish European culture and society from Middle Eastern/North African/Arab/Muslim migrants and refugees. It did so by essentializing the variegated meanings encapsulated in these terms and deploying them as synonyms for collective assaults or gang rapes. In so doing, it presented those meanings as multiple references for a singular idea of collective sexual violence intrinsic to societies and cultures in the Middle East and North Africa that are now perceived as invading European society.[86]

In Korea, the issue was also published in news articles; for example, in January 2016, the *Donga ilbo* published an article with the title, "Mass sexual harassment in Cologne originated from the bad Islamic custom of 'Taharrush'."[87] Two years later, in June 2018, *Insight* published an article, "Collective sexual assault 'Taharrush' among Islam refugees," that expressed concern that Korean women might be the targets of such crimes if the government allows (Muslim) refugees into the country.[88] The number of community postings from 2011 until 2020 was 260 related to *taharrush*, and according to the TEXTOM data collection, 240 postings

Picture 2   A screenshot from one of the postings in the internet community.

Source: "Chiptan kanggan nori—t'aharushi," 27 June, 2018, https://cafe.naver.com/dieselmania/15905074.

were created between 2016–2018, 180 of which were created around the time when the Yemeni crisis occurred. The content of these postings convey the seriousness of the European countries' situation or add an expression of *kkŭmt-chik'an* (terrible) to intensify the negative meaning they want to deliver. Concern or worry about their children's safety from the *taharrush* crime also grew in the virtualcommunity of mothers/parents, so-called *mamk'ap'e* (mom café, online community of mothers in Korea). Samples are as follows:

> "'Taharrush' is a game of mass sexual assault by Muslim refugees. It is terrible!! Please take a look at the link below!" (Cosmetic community);[89]

> "This 'Taharrush' originated from Egypt, and it is said that they call it as a game ... In Islam, it is said that to rape a woman (especially a non-Muslim women) is allowed ... In their culture, where early marriage is common, are not kindergarten girls ... women who can have sex with them? A non-Muslim girl ..." (7,842 views, mom café);[90]

> "This is a scene of 'Taharrush, an Islamic gang rape game that frequently occurs in Europe. Islamic refugees move around in groups in public places, catching women passing by and gangbanging them. Muslims are not ashamed of committing terrible sins. Because their doctrine teaches that they should punish women who wander around in indecent clothes by rape." (a personal blog)[91]

As seen above, the content's wording is extreme and provocative to make people, especially women and parents of girls, fear (male) Muslim refugees. The *taharrush* rumor attempts to instill the idea that sexual harassment from Muslim men is realistic.

Effect of the online Islamophobic discourses on Korean people

A survey about Islamophobia in Korea for this research was conducted to determine the degree of Islamophobia and the impact of anti-Islam rumors in Korean online society. The survey was conducted via an online panel service in the open survey (the survey has appeared openly on the survey website), on 11 January 2021. The total number of participants was 204, 119 men and 85 women. The age group consists of 13.7% in their 20s, 30.8% in their 30s, 27% in their 40s, 21.6% in their 50s, and 3% in their 60s and older. The proportion of religions among participants was 56.4% non-religious, 17.2% Protestant, 14.7% Buddhist, 11.3% Catholic, and 0.5% others.

To the question, "How do you access the news to know about major issues in Korea or the reaction of other people about the issue online?" 77% of the

participants answered that they use the portal website such as NAVER or DAUM, and 10.8% answered that they use YouTube. Regarding Islamophobic discourse, participants thought that the degree of Islamophobic public discourse online is bad: 69.1% say that it is bad, and 28.4% say it is neither good (lower) nor bad (higher), and 2.5% say that it is good. Regarding attitudes toward the negative information about Islam or Muslims, 35.8% of participants answered that they accepted the content as it is, 38.7% answered that they had never doubted the facts, and 14.2% said that they always doubt the contents, whether it is biased to one side or not, and 11.3% said that they just read it out of curiosity.

Interestingly, a different result was found about the image of Islam and Muslims. As seen in Table 1, Muslims' negative image (55.4%) is higher than Islam's image (43.6%). However, it does not connect to the difference in the positive image of both of the concepts.

This result is consistent with the previous surveys' results by other institutions in the previous section.[92] In those surveys, in response to Islam, the negative images and the positive images coexisted; however, negative perceptions were higher in response to Muslim refugees than refugees in general. In other words, the image of Islam as a religion and Muslims as believers are divided; the image of Muslims is more negative than the image of Islam, the religion itself.

Furthermore, Islam and Muslims' images were more negative and "very negative" when participants have had a chance to closely contact Islamic culture or Muslims, as seen in Table 2 and Table 3. Regarding Islam's image, the percentage of the negative image among the participants without previous contact with Muslims or Islam was 44%, higher than 41.6% among those who have experience of Muslims or Islam. The percentage of negative image rises about Muslims, 57.7% without the experiences and 44.5% with experiences.

Among the sample, only 17.6% answered that they had experience with Islam or Muslims. If we go back to the result of the data, people who did not have experience with Islam or Muslims were probably influenced by online public perceptions and formed a negative image of Islam or Muslims. When people encounter a new concept that they have never experienced before, in other words,

Table 1   Image of Islam and Muslims (%)

	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Very Positive
Image of Islam	15.2	28.4	53.4	2.5	0.5
Image of Muslims	20.1	35.3	41.2	2.5	1

Table 2   Image of Islam and previous experience of Islam or Muslims (%)

Image of Islam	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Very Positive
With previous experiences	8.3	33.3	52.8	5.6	0
Without previous experiences	16.7	27.3	53.6	1.8	0.6

Table 3   Image of Muslims and previous experiences of Islam or Muslims (%)

Image of Muslims	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Very Positive
With previous experiences	13.9	30.6	47.2	5.6	2.8
Without previous experiences	21.4	36.3	39.9	1.8	0.6

without knowing the reality, they tend to create an image of what they have heard or learned.[93] In this respect, Lippman's "picture in the head" theory could be applied; the mass media and the actual events or objects of the world are conveyed in a simplified format, which significantly impacts on public perception and image formation.[94]

Then how do Islamophobic rumors affect personal opinions about Islam or Muslims? I will use the two sample cases here. The participant's experience of the two rumors was different; the "Taharrush" rumor seems to be spread and consumed more (44.1%) than "How Lebanon, which was a Christian Country, became an Islamic Country? (hereafter 'Lebanon)" rumor (21.1%). In the "Taharrush" rumor, the participants who had already heard about the rumor showed a higher percentage, especially negative sentiments towards the image of Muslims.

By gender, in both case samples, the result showed that the rumors had more influence on females. As Table 6 and 7 shows, 83.5% of females answered that their personal opinion on Muslims changed negatively after hearing the "Taharrush" rumor, and 56.5% in the case of the "Lebanon" rumor. Both percentages are higher than that of the males, 75.6% and 45.4% for each sample.

Regarding religion, there are few remarkable differences in religious affiliation. However, a higher percentage of Protestant or Catholic Christians had read or watched the two samples as seen in Table 8 and Table 9. 62.9% of Protestant Christians had heard the "Taharrush" rumor, and this percentage is almost opposite to the participants with other religions including non-religious people. In regards to the "Lebanon" rumor, the percentage of prior contact with the rumor

Table 4   Image of Islam and previous experience of "Taharrush" rumor (%)

Image of Islam	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Very Positive
Learnt about "Taharrush" rumor	21.1	27.8	48.9	2.2	0
Didn't learn about "Taharrush" rumor	10.5	28.9	57	2.6	0.9

Table 5   Image of Muslims and previous experience of the "Taharrush" rumor (%)

Image of Muslims	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Very Positive
Learnt about "Taharrush" rumor	25.6	36.7	37.8	0	0
Didn't learn about "Taharrush" rumor	15.8	34.2	43.9	4.4	1.8

Table 6   Change of personal opinion about Muslims after hearing the "Taharrush" rumor (%)

Change of personal opinion	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Very Positive
Male	52.9	22.7	20.2	4.2	0
Female	61.2	22.4	12.9	3.5	0
Total	**56.4**	**22.5**	**17.2**	**3.9**	**0**

Table 7   Change of personal opinion about Muslims after hearing the "Lebanon" rumor (%)

Change of personal opinion	Very Negative	Negative	Neutral	Positive	Very Positive
Male	22.7	22.7	39.5	14.3	0.8
Female	35.3	21.2	38.8	4.7	0
Total	**27.9**	**22.1**	**39.2**	**10.3**	**0.5**

Table 8   Prior experience of the "Lebanon" rumor and religion (%)

	Learnt about "Lebanon" rumor	Didn't learn about "Lebanon" rumor
Non-religious	13.9	86.1
Buddhism	16.7	83.3
Protestant	34.3	65.7
Catholic	43.5	56.5
Other	0	100

Table 9   Prior experience of the "Taharrush" rumor and religion (%)

	Learnt about "Taharrush" rumor	Didn't learn about "Taharrush" rumor
Non-religious	41.7	58.3
Buddhism	40	60
Protestant	62.9	37.1
Catholic	34.8	65.2
Other	0	100

is higher among Catholics (43.5%) and Protestants (34.3%). These results imply that this kind of rumor is transmitted among Christian communities more than the general public online spaces.

The results of the survey on Islamophobic discourse in Korea are as follows. The general image of Islam and the image of Muslims by Korean internet users are slightly different; in the case of Islam's image, the percentage of people with neutral opinions is the highest, and in the case of the image of Muslims, negative opinions are the highest. Both sides have less than 3.5% of a favourable opinion, and this result could be analyzed to conclude that the image of Muslims or Islam in Korea cannot be said to be positive, however, the perception of Muslims alone is more negative.

When it comes to the impact of previous experiences with Muslims or Islamic culture on the image of Muslim or Islam, negative opinions were higher when there was no prior experience. When people have no prior experience, the likelihood of having a negative image is higher than having a positive image.

The rumors related to *taharrush* were transmitted and consumed widely, and its influence was found to be more effective. Participants who encountered

the "Taharrush" rumor tended to have more negative perceptions about Islam or Muslims. When it comes to gender differences, both samples showed higher negative opinions from women, suggesting that women are more affected by these rumors.

Conclusion

This study examines the current status and content of two rumors related to Islam or Muslims, "Taharrush Game" and "How Lebanon, which was a Christian Country, became an Islamic Country?," and the impact of online disinformation or misinformation in the form of rumors or fake news on Korean society. Online hate speech in Korea is prevalent these days, and hatred against Islam or Muslims especially has become a significant phenomenon in Korean society.

The main findings of research showed that the general assumption about people's perception of Islam or Muslims in Korean society tends toward negativity. This negativity could be analyzed to be affected by provocative and sensational online rumors about Islam or Muslims and by disinformation published in newspaper format in some online media outlets. This disinformation, which is conveyed by connecting past incidents and claiming to be "facts," planted negative images online in the minds of Korean people who do not have many opportunities to encounter Islamic culture or Muslims in their daily life. The disinformation further stimulates their anxiety and even hatred of Islam and Muslims.

The Islamophobic discourses were produced mainly in the right-wing Protestant sects with a fundamentalist orientation, substituting their hatred against North Korea or homosexuality with Islamophobia. These rumors are transmitted via online communities and blogs in various ways to lead public discourse towards a specific direction; some were delivered without modification of the original content, and some were shared in the form of a collection of related information, and some others were shared with more provocative modifications adding groundless rumors. The "Taharrush" rumor seemed to have more impact compared to the "Lebanon" rumor; it was transmitted more than the former, considering the percentage of who was exposed to the rumor according to the survey. This Islamophobic disinformation frames Muslim men as perpetrators of crimes under Islam, the hostile religion, particularly by creating images of patriarchalism and selectively using anti-Islamist reports originating in Europe. The content of the rumors is provocative and frank, threatening that Muslims will harm the country. For example, the "Taharrush" rumor affects the Korean community, making the receivers worry that frequent sexual harassment might occur in Korea and harm Korean women, even little girls. In the case of the

"Lebanon" rumor, it had less impact compared to the other. However, both rumors affected Korean society, contributing to the spread of Islamophobia in society.

The effect of prior experience with Muslims or Islamic culture on general perception is a little less pessimistic than those who have no experience. However, it does not change the result positively due to the small percentage of the sample (17.6%) in the survey. Thus, it can be concluded that previous experience or contact with Islamic culture or Muslims does not help to lead people's perception toward an optimistic view.

This research has some limitations because the rumors' political purpose has not been analyzed. Here, I focused more on the two rumors' content. The numbers and variety of participants in the survey and the variety of the survey questions was not enough to generalize to the current situation. However, this research might be utilized as a baseline study to examine the relations between Islamophobic rumors and Korean online users' perceptions.

Notes

1. This research was supported by the Asia Research Foundation Grant funded by the Seoul National University Asia Center.
2. Email: kyungsoo0104@gmail.com
3. The author searched news and community postings and blog posts on two rumors to be addressed in this paper, using NAVER which is the most used portal search websites in Korea.
4. Tongmun Kim, "Isŭllam p'obia, chojang in'ga shilch'e in'ga?," *Chinbo p'yŏngnon* 67 (2016): 138–139.
5. Hyŏnmin Kim a, "Han'guk ŭi Isŭllamsa②… Koryŏ, haesang • yuksang t'onghae kyoryu," *At'ŭllasŭ*, 21 April, 2020, http://www.atlasnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=2018; Hyŏnmin Kim b, "Han'guk ŭi Isŭllamsa③… Chosŏn ch'ogi en kungjung chohoe ch'amsŏk," *At'ŭllasŭ*, 22 April, 2020, http://www.atlasnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=2021.
6. Hee-Soo Lee. "Islam in Korea History, Present Situation and Future Prospect," *Korea Journal of* Islamic Culture 1.1 (1997): 28.
7. Hyŏnmin Kim c. "Han'guk ŭi Isŭllamsa④… It'aewŏn e Sŏul chungang sŏngwŏn kŏllip," *At'ŭllasŭ*, 23 April, 2020, http://www.atlasnews.co.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=2026.
8. Ikran Eum, "Korea's Response to Islam and Islamophobia," *Korea Observer* (2017 October): 827.
9. Since 2000, multiculturalism in Korean society has gradually emerged as a realistic agenda when the number of rural men's marriages with foreign women started to rise. The term 'multicultural' began to be used in earnest around 2005. Since 2006, the Korean government has begun promoting various policies in preparation for a "multicultural society." (Yŏngmin Pak. "Han'guk ŭi tamunhwa chuŭi chedohwa wa tamunhwa chŏngch'aek kwaje," *Kŭllobŏl chŏngch'i yŏn'gu* 7.2 (2014), p. 68.
10. According to Pak Chongsu, in addition to the Christian Liberal Party, there are more than 13 groups related to Islamophobic protests or leading the protest. These groups are Protestant conservative groups that actively campaigned against the creation of Halal food complex by the government. Chongsu Pak, "Han'guk sahoe ŭi Isŭllam hyŏmo hyŏnsang kwa chaengjŏm," *Chonggyo munhwa yŏn'gu* 29 (2017), pp. 58–59.

11. In 2015 March, President Pak Kŭnhye signed a memorandum of understanding for halal food cooperation at a meeting with the Crown Prince of the UAE, which paved the way for Korean companies to enter the halal food market. In the cooperation, it was decided to create a 'Halal Food Theme Park' in Iksan in Jŏllabukto. (Chunhyŏng Chŏng, "Han'guk-UAE, 'hallal shikp'um' hyŏmnyŏk yanghae kakssŏ ch'egyŏl," *SBS News*, 06 March, 2015. https://news.sbs.co.kr/news/endPage.do?news_id=N1002866121&plink=COPYPASTE&cooper=SBSNWSEND).

12. Chongsu Pak. "Han'guk sahoe ŭi Isŭllam hyŏmo," pp. 57–58.

13. Ch'ŏngwadae kungmin ch'ŏngwŏn. "Chejudo pulbŏp nanmin shinch'ŏng munje e ttarŭn nanminbŏp musajŭng ipkuk, nanmin shinch'ŏnghŏ ka p'yeji/kaehŏn ch'ŏngwŏn hamnid," 13 June, 2018, https://www1.president.go.kr/petitions/269548.

14. Yewŏn Sin and Tonghun Ma. "Kungnae midiŏ e chaehyŏn toen yemen nanmin ŭi yangmyŏn. midiŏ kyŏngje wa munhwa," *Midiŏ wa kyŏngje munhwa* 17.2 (2019): 32–33.

15. Chongsu Pak. "Han'guk sahoe ŭi Isŭllam hyŏmo"; Tongmun Kim. "Isŭllamp'obia, chojang in'ga"; Ikran Eum. "Korea's Response,"; Chin'gu Yi. "Tamunhwa shidae Han'guk kaeshin'gyo ŭi Isŭllam inshik: Isŭllam p'obia rŭl chungshim ŭro," *Chonggyo munhwa pip'yŏng* 19 (2011); Gi Yeon Koo (Ku Kiyŏn), "Islamophobia and the Politics of Representation of Islam in Korea," *Journal of Korean Religions* 9.1 (2018).

16. Hankyoreh. "(Tandok) Tongsŏngae nanmin hyŏmo 'katcha nyusŭ kongjang ' ŭi irŭm, Esŭdŏ *Hankyoreh*, 27 September, 2018, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/863478.html.

17. Shinhyŏng Sŏng. "Han'guk sahoe ŭi hyŏmo hyŏnsang e taehan punsŏk kwa kidokkyo yullijŏk chŏn: yemen nanmin isyu rŭl chungshim ŭro," *Sŏn'gyo wa shinhak* 47 (2019): 248–249.

18. Hyesil Chŏng. "Urian ŭi injong chuŭi—chach'ing 'raedik'ŏl p'eminisŭt'ŭ tŭl' kwa posu kaeshin'gyo hyŏmo seryŏk ŭn ŏttŏk'e 'nanmin pandae' ŭi han moksori rŭl naege toeŏnnŭn'ga?," *Yŏsŏng iron* 39 (2018): 208.

19. During the period of 2011–2020, NAVER was marked as being the most use search engine (76.63%) (In "Search Engine" section, the period was set between 2011/01/01–2020/12/31 in http://www.internettrend.co.kr/trendForward.tsp (visit: 2021.01.09)).

20. Chin'gu Yi. "Tamunhwa shidae Han'guk," p. 167.

21. The Runnymede Trust, "Islamophobia-A Challenge for Us All 1997," 4, Last accessed 12 September, 2020, https://www.runnymedetrust.org/companies/17/74/Islamophobia-A-Challenge-for-Us-All.html. The report presented eight critical distinctions between closed-open views of Islam: Monolithic-Diverse, Separate-Interacting, Inferior-Different, Enemy-Partner, Manipulative-Sincere, Criticism of West Rejected-Considered, Discrimination Defended-Criticized, and Islamophobia Seen as Natural-Problematic (The Runnymede Trust, "Islamophobia-A Challenge for Us All 1997," pp. 14–15).

22. Yi Sŏngsu (2019) defined xenophobia; a) "xenophobia" is a concept related to emotion and consciousness based on the belief that "we are different from you" where certain races feel superior or inferior to other races. In other words, the collective cognitive formation that separates us from them forms the basis of the xenophobia phenomenon." b) the sentiment of 'difference' includes the consciousness that 'the others should be excluded' for the sake of maintaining our identity of the community or self-preservation. The exclusion of different races and peoples from us justifies discrimination against the others. (Sŏngsu Yi. "ISIS ihu Arap segye ŭi pyŏnhwa wa Isŭllamop'obia (Islamophobia) hyŏnsang e taehan koch'al," *Isŭllam hak'oe* 29.1 (2019), p. 167). Three main forms of racism are Islamophobia, Romaphobia, and the criminalization of undocumented migrants (asylum seekers). (Fabio Perocco, "Anti-Migrant Islamophobia in Europe. Social Roots, Mechanisms and Actors," REMHU 26.53 (2018), p. 26).

23. Tandoc Jr., Edson C., Zheng Wei Lim, and Richard Ling, "Defining 'Fake News'," *Digital Journalism* 6.2 (2018), p. 138.

24. Hunt Allcott and Matthew Gentzkow, "Social Media and Fake News in the 2016 Election," *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 31.2 (2017), p. 212; Gordon Pennycook, Tyrone D. Cannon, and David G. Rand, "Prior Exposure Increases Perceived Accuracy of Fake News," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: General* 147.12 (2018), p. 213.

25. Allcott and Gentzkow, "Social Media and Fake News," p. 214.

26. Sŏnhŭi Yang. "Yut'yubŭ chŏnŏllijŭm ŭi shidae, chŏnt'ongjŏk chŏnŏllijŭm ŭi taeŭng hyŏnhwang kwa kwaje," *Sahoe kwahak yŏn'gu* 31.1 (2020), p. 253; Yongsŏk Hwang and Kwŏn Osŏng. "Katcha nyusŭ ŭi kaenyŏmhwa wa kyuje sudan e kwanhan yŏn'gu -int'ŏnet sŏbisŭ saŏpcha ŭi chayul kyuje rŭl chungshim ŭro-," *Ŏllon'kwa pŏp* 16.1 (2017), p. 57.

27. Zhou and Zafarani. "Fake News: A Survey of Research," p. 3.

28. Rumors can be defined as uncertain statements which have spread among people containing stimulating content. It has the characteristic of spreading on a large scale in a short time. The scope is indiscriminate. This paper does not equate rumors and fake news, but tries to approach them with a meaning with close characteristics. Hyŏnchung Yu and Chŏng Hyŏnchu "Iyongja ŭi hwakchŭng p'yŏnhyang kwa sŏltŭk chishik sujun i katcha nyusŭ hŏgusŏng p'andan e mich'i nŭn yŏnghyang," *Han'guk kwanggo PR shirhakh'oe* 13.4 (2020): 133.

29. Hankyoreh 21. "Pant'ak undong, 'tonga' oboga ŏpsŏttamyŏn," 27 January, 2010. http://h21. hani.co.kr/arti/special/special_general/26642.html.

30. Tongmin Kim "Tonga ilbo ŭi shint'ak t'ongch'i waegok podo ŭi yŏn'gu," *Han'guk ŏllon chŏngbo hakpo* 52 (2010), p. 138.

31. Han'gungminjudang, the right-wing party at that time, had already decided to oppose the trusteeship in Korea before the Moscow conference concluded the meeting. (Tongmin Kim "Tonga ilbo ŭi shint'ak t'ongch'i waegok podo ŭi yŏn'gu," p. 145).

32. Hankyoreh 21. "Pant'ak undong,"; Tongmin Kim "Tonga ilbo ŭi shint'ak t'ongch'i waegok podo ŭ yŏn'gu," p. 136.

33. Tongmin Kim. "Tonga ilbo ŭi shint'ak t'ongch'i waegok podo ŭi yŏn'gu," p. 146.

34. Hankyoreh 21. "Pant'ak undong."

35. Han'kuk ilbo. "(Kiŏk'al onŭl) Shint'ak t'ongch'i obosagŏn (12.27)," 27 December, 2017. https://www.hankookilbo.com/News/Read/201712270493472656.

36. Hŭisong Kim. "1980 nyŏn 5 wŏl Kwangju, kŭrigo Pukhan—'Pukhan kaeipsŏl' e taehan, pip'an-jŏk koch'al," *Minju chuŭi wa in'gwŏn* 16.4 (2016), p. 70.

37. Hŭisong Kim. "5•18 kwallyŏn katcha nyusŭ ŭi kiwŏn kwa shilt'ae e kwanhan yŏn'gu," *NGO yŏn'gu* 14.2 (2019), pp. 60, 62.

38. This case occurred in 2008 when the newly established I Myŏngpak government put forward import of US beef as a prerequisite for signing FTA. A rumor about patients of mad cow disease with photos was Transmitted widely online, and people were more influenced by those stimulating rumors than opinions of scientists. This controversy was further amplified as the TV show "PD such'ŏp" produced a program about the danger of the disease, and eventually people protested with a candlelight vigil for 106 days. This incident occurred at the time of transition of the regime from the progressive to the conservative, revealing Korean dichotomous political ideology. (Chinch'ŏl No. "2008nyŏn ch'otpulchip'oerŭl t'onghae pon kwangubyŏng kongp'owa mujiŭi wihŏmsot'ong," *Kyŏngjewa sahoe* 84 (2009), pp. 163–164, 178–179).

39. Hyŏngch'an Ku. "Hyŏmo wa chonggyo munhwa: Han'guk kaeshin'gyo e kwanhan sogo," *Chonggyo munhwa pip'yŏng* 33 (2018), pp. 23–24.

40. Gi Yeon, Koo. "Islamophobia and the Politics," pp. 161–177.

41. Suwan Kim. "Han'gugin ŭi Arap, Isŭllam imiji mit kwallyŏn ŏllon podo inshik yŏn'gu" *Han'guk chungdong hakh'oe nonch'ong* 37.1 (2016), p. 205.

42. Kim. "Han'gugin ŭi Arap," pp. 195, 205.
43. Sŏngun Yu. "Nanmin padado Isŭllam ŭn antwae Han'guk tŏpch'in 'Isŭllam p'obia'," *Chungang ilbo*, 5 August, 2018, https://news.joins.com/article/22860819
44. Compared to the negative response about Middle Eastern migrants, negative responses on European and North American migrants were as low as 20%, which shows the dual racism within Korean society. The report argued that the 'Middle Eastern origin' acted as a stigma. Chihyang Chang and Kang Ch'ungku. "Han'gugin ŭi tae chungdong inshik kwa chŏngch'aek-chŏk hamŭi," *Asan chŏngch'aek yŏn'guwŏn* 20 April, 2020.
45. Gi Yeon, Koo. "Islamophobia and the Politics," pp. 161–162.
46. Ikran Eum. "Korea's Response," p. 832.
47. He became a martyr by some Christian groups (the source didn't specify which groups) and his funeral Was held as a pan-Christian funeral. According to Nyusŭ aen choi newspaper, a Christian news platform, the pan-Christian funeral was a sign that his death was closely related to Christianity. In fact, he was found to have worked as a missionary in Baghdad. (Soran Ch'oe. "2004nyŏn isyu' chungdong sŏn'gyo wa Kim Sŏnil ŭi chugŭm," *Nyusŭ aen choi*, 31 December, 2004. http://www.newsnjoy.or.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=10362).
48. Minyŏng Ch'oe. "Kim Sŏnil ssi irak'ŭ p'irap sagŏn chŏnma," *Kyŏnghyang shinmun* 21 June, 2004. http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=200406211818291; Yŏnham nyusŭ, "Yŏnhap paekkwa' Kim Sŏnil ssi napch'i p'isal sagŏn," 29 May, 2015. http://oh.yna.co.kr/publish/2015/05/29/YNO20150526117200039.html.
49. Chin'gu Yi. "Tamunhwa shidae Han'guk", p. 164.
50. In addition, they are referred to using various expressions such as far-right Protestantism, Protestant far-rightism, Protestant right-wing, Christin rights, Protestant conservatives, Evangelical rights, far-right-conservative Protestant, far-right conservative Christian power, Christian right-wing power, Protestant newrights, and far-right Protestant mass movement. Kang Inch'ŏl. "Han'guk kaeshin'gyo wa posujŏk shiminundong: kaeshin'gyo up'a wa kŭgu-hyŏmo chŏngch'I rŭl chungshim ŭro," *Inmunhak yŏn'gu* 33 (2020), p. 12.
51. Tŏkman Pae. "Hyŏmo wa Han'guk kyohoe, kŭrigo kŭnbon chuŭi," in *Hyŏmo wa Han'guk kyohoe*, Kwŏn Chisŏng et al. (Seoul: Samin, 2020), pp. 130–131.
52. At the same time, there is an opposite group of people saying that the hatred is from an ignorance and prejudice of the biblical records, and unscrupulous behaviour that violates universal human rights (Hyŏngch'an Ku. "Hyŏmo wa chonggyo munhwa," pp. 15–54.)
53. Inch'ŏl Kang. "Han'kuk kaeshin'gyo wa," p. 12.
54. According to Kang Inch'ŏl, the United States was a the "father country of faith" that brought and nurtured Protestantism, and in another sense, it was also a "saviour" to them (Inch'ŏl Kang. "Hyŏmo wa chonggyo munhwa," p. 18). As such, the influence of the U.S. in Korean Protestants could be considered significant. At the same time, the U.S. flags in the extreme rightist Protestant protest scene in Korea might be explained. See also Chinho Kim. "Han'guk sahoe wa kaeshin'gyo kŭgu chuŭi 1: Sŏron," *Che 3shidae* 85 (2016): 6–15.
55. Chongwŏn Ch'oe. "Han'guk kidokkyo, shimin chonggyo wa chŏngch'i chonggyo sai esŏ" in *Hyŏmo wa Han'guk kyohoe*, Kwŏn Chisŏng et al. (Seoul: Samin), p. 103.
56. Chinho Kim "Han'guk sahoe wa," p. 9.
57. The two concepts were combined to form "chongbukkei" (종북게이), literally meaning "pro-North Korean gay" by the far-right Protestant Christians. It is impossible to define who are "chongbukkei" or if they really exist, and why their existence became a threat to the society. However, this combination doubled the sentiment of hatred and fear against them. Chisŏng Yi. "Hyŏmo ŭi shidae, han'guk kidokkyo ŭi yŏkh'al- kŭgu kaeshin'gyo ŭi chongbukkei hyŏmo rŭl chungshim ŭro" *Kidokkyo sahoe yulli* 42 (2018), pp. 225–226.
58. Chisŏng Yi. "Hyŏmo ŭi shidae, han'guk kidokkyo ŭi yŏkh'al- kŭgu kaeshin'gyo ŭi chongbukkei hyŏmo rŭl Chungshim ŭro," p. 226.
59. Inch'ŏl Kang. "Han'guk kaeshin'gyo wa," p. 16.

60. This "Eight steps of Islamization strategy," does not refer to any contents in the CIA's *The World Fact Book* of 2007. According to Kim Tongmun's fact check article, this is disinformation and the content is Based on the book Slavery, Terrorism, and Islam: The Historical Roots and Contemporary Threat Peter Hammond, which took and used a percentage source from *The World Fact Book* (2007). (Tongmun Kim. "CIA ŭi 'Isŭllam hwa 8 tan'gye chŏllyak' ŭn ŏpta," *K'ŭrisŭch'an t'udei*, 11 December, 2008, http://www.christiantoday.us/14295).

61. Chin'gu Yi. "Tamunhwa shidae Han'guk," pp. 172–174.

62. Along with the rumors, "Korean Islamization strategy 2020" also had been spread since 2008 as form of the news (Christian newspapers), which insists that since 1988 (Seoul Olympic was held in this year), Muslims set the strategy for Islamization of Korea and in 2005 the strategy was specified by Middle Easter Islamic leader's missionary conference. (Tongmun Kim. "CIA ŭi 'Isŭllam hwa 8 tan'gye chŏllyak' ŭn ŏpta").

63. Tongmun Kim."CIA ŭi 'Isŭllam hwa 8 tan'gye chŏllyak' ŭn ŏpta."

64. Tongmun Kim."CIA ŭi 'Isŭllam hwa 8 tan'gye chŏllyak' ŭn ŏpta."

65. Chin'gu Yi. "Tamunhwa shidae Han'guk," pp. 177, 183.

66. After the article was published, EPMH filed a lawsuit against Hankyoreh claiming damages and demanding a correction. Eventually, in February 2020, the court ruled against EPMH, the plaintiff. (Hankyoreh. "<Han'gyŏre>' katcha nyusŭ ŭi ppuri rŭl ch'ajasŏ', sonbae sosong sŭngso," 19 February, 2020, http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/928795.html).

67. Hankyoreh. "(Tandok) Tongsŏngae nanmin hyŏmo."

68. It is an Internet newspaper that calls itself a Christian independent press that is not tied to the power of the church or money. This newspaper offers a fact checking section which deals with topics Korean conservative or extreme rightist Christians express hate towards, such as homosexuality, Islam, an refugees. (News and Joy, "Introduction of the media," accessed 25 February, 2021, http://www.newsnjoy.or.kr/com/com-1.html).

69. Haeoe kidokkyo saryedo 'katcha nyusŭ' chuŭibo," *Nyusŭ aen choi*, 26 October, 2018, http://www.newsnjoy.or.kr/news/articleView.html?idxno=220636.

70. Here, Fairclough refers to the traditional media such as newspaper or TV. As far as the online contents are delivering information to the public, the research will imply the analysis tool on the online media.

71. Norman Fairclough, *Taejung maech'e tamhwa punsŏk*, trans. Yi Wŏnp'yo (Seoul: Han'guk munhwasa, 2004), pp. 76–79.

72. Dennis Nguyen, "Analysing Transnational Web Spheres: The European Example During the Eurozone Crisis," in *The Digital Transformation of the Public Sphere*, ed. Athina Karatzogianni, Dennis Nguyen, Elisa Serafinelli (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), pp. 216–217.

73. It is the Protestant Christian community which follows new apostolic reformation. ("Yetchŏk kŭ sŏnhan kil" k'ap'e yoju ŭi "hoebok" chiphoe" 08 May, 2013, https://blog.naver.com/yoochinw/130167768818.)

74. Yetchŏk kŭ sŏnhan kil. "Kidokkyo kukka Rebanon ŭn ŏttŏk'e Isŭllam kukka toeŏnnŭn'ga?," 04August, 2016, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TXUtoz6UcaE.

75. "Isŭllam nanminŭl padasŏ wanjŏnhi manghage toen ŏttŏn nara iyagi," 08 July, 2018, https://cafe.naver.com/shopjirmsin/2721790.

76. "(yŏngsang) Isŭllam nanmin ŭl suyong han kidokkyo kukka ŭi ch'oehu dd," 03 July, 2018, https://cafe.naver.com/playgoer/20254.

77. "Musŭllim Pukhan poda tŏ wihyŏp-chŏk in amsep'o," 07 August, 2018, https://blog.naver.com/lupyland3/221334426525.

78. Lois Beckett, "Leader of group widely identified as anti-Muslim meets with White House," *The Guardian*, 2017.03.22, https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/mar/21/act-for-america-brigitte-gabriel-muslim-white-house-meeting.

79. Lebanon was not a Christian country, and it is not a Muslim country (https://www.britannica.com/place/Lebanon/Climate#ref23393, accessed 25 February, 2021).

80. "Rebanon ch'ugagŭl," 17 June, 2018, https://cafe.naver.com/budingsanfreedom/15019.

81. "Chungdong chiyŏk, Isŭrael ŭi kukche ch ŏngse, ch'use," 15 May, 2007, https://cafe.naver.com/mdex/1030 (visit: 2020.12.30).

82. "Kidokkyo kukka yŏttŏn Rebanon i musŭllimdŭ ŭl padadŭl igo myŏlmang hadŏn kwajŏng," 20 June, 2018, https://cafe.naver.com/dieselmania/23084142.

83. "Tongsŏng aeja ka kyohoe e onŭn kŏsŭl hwanyŏnghaeya halkkayo?," 09March, 2019, https://blog.naver.com/acoloje/221484290876.

84. Roland Barthes, *Hyŏndae ŭi shinhwa*, trans. Ihwa yŏja taehakkyo kihohak yŏn'guso (Seoul: ongmunsŏn, 1997), pp. 269–275.

85. Angie Abdelmonem, Rahma Esther Bavelaar, N Elisa Wynne-Hughes, and Susana Galán, "The 'Taharrush' Connection: Xenophobia, Islamophobia, and Sexual Violence in Germany and Beyond," *Jadaliyya*, 01 May, 2016, https://www.jadaliyya.com/Details/33036.

86. Angie Abdelmonem, Rahma Esther Bavelaar, N Elisa Wynne-Hughes, and Susana Galán, "The 'Taharrush' Connection: Xenophobia, Islamophobia, and Sexual Violence in Germany and Beyond."

87. "Inch'an Hwang. "K'oellŭn chiptan sŏngp'ok haeng ŭn Isŭllam aksŭp T'aharushi' sŏ pirot," *Tonga ilbo*, 21 January, 2016, https://www.donga.com/news/Inter/article/all/20160121/76033675/1.

88. Kihyŏn Hwang. "Isŭllam nanmin tŭl saisŏ ttŏdo nŭn chiptan sŏngp'ok haeng 'T'aharushi'," *Insight*, 27 June, 2018, https://www.insight.co.kr/news/163061.

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RESEARCH NOTE

Islamic Studies of Korea in Medieval Scripts: Medieval Muslims' perception of Korea "as a Muslims' Paradise" and the Influence of Ancient Civilizations' Golden Island in the Sea East of the Eastern End of the World

JIN HAN JEONG   GCC Institute, Dankook University

Introduction

Silla was one of two places in East Asia frequently described by medieval Muslim writers from the mid ninth-century onwards. The earliest study of Silla in antique documents can be traced back to eighteenth-century Arabists who attached a short note to the word "Sīlā" when editing or translating manuscripts.[1] From the nineteenth century, not only in quantitative terms but also qualitatively, Muslim authors' eagerness to catalogue their knowledge about Silla caught the attention of contemporary scholars in both the East and West. In addition to Europeans, Japanese academics attempted to study the definition of Silla at this time, and owing to the colonization of Korea, Silla came to be considered not only as part of Korean, but also Japanese "history." From the early twentieth century, pioneering Korean scholars were also challenged by the task of deciphering medieval Muslim knowledge of Silla, often in conjunction with Arabic researchers.[2] However, these first attempts at the study of Silla, whilst long, were mostly limited to the trans-lation of relevant paragraphs discussing the historicity of Silla or locating old

place names in contemporary geography. For instance, debates that designate Silla as part of Japan, partly as a Korean kingdom, or even both, have continued over decades.[3]

From around the third quarter of the twentieth century, several Korean scholars have attempted to answer the following questions: 1) Why did medieval Muslims have auspicious understandings of Silla? 2) Did Muslims really reside in Silla and if so, were they satisfied with their lives there at the cost of abandoning their families along with other Muslims outside of Silla?

The majority of existing scholarship attempted to understand the choices that these Muslims had to make given the realities of the environment in Silla. Conversely, other researchers proposed that the idea of Silla as a paradise came from either ignorance or absurd fantasies. In 2020 and 2021, I suggested three possible reasons for this understanding: first, they reflect the will and wishes of those Muslims disconnected from their companions, losing connection to them during the Huangchao (黃巢) and other rebellions. Second, medieval Muslim authors often considered their patron's expectations. When a ruler suffered the decentralization of his leadership, he often preferred to support texts that promoted patriotism. Exhibiting the presence of Muslims in a state of comfort and hospitality in a remote place, such as Silla, may be of benefit when a ruler wished to propagate his good governance. Third, when discussing the notion of Silla as a "Muslim Paradise," we should consider the break in the accounts of Muslims in Silla and China due to the withdrawal of Muslim communities from China.[4] Previous studies failed to outline to what extent this belief held by the writers and scholars was correct and do not explain why subsequent medieval Muslim authors went on to accept the idea of "paradise" and propagated it to various audiences.

Recently, the Iranian historian Voosoughi trisected the characteristics of texts about Silla into categories of history-myth, geography, and astronomy.[5] Taking an alternative approach, this research note and my research suggests distinguishing travel accounts from books detailing geography due to the contrasting content between both genres. Among these four sources that mainly deal with sets of Zīj tables,[6] which outline the latitudinal and longitudinal coordinates of Silla's land,[7] there is only one travel account dealing with Silla.[8] Nineteen books are about world geography and include Silla, whilst the others mainly discuss the history and myth of Silla. However, regardless of the main characteristics of each text, they often overlap each other when considering both the descriptive geography and history/myth of Silla.[9]

Scholarship infers that the first Muslim informants about Silla were marine traders to East Asia. The earliest confirmable knowledge about Silla is in the *Akhbār al-Ṣīn wa-al-Hind (The Account of India and China)*, the travel account

written in 851 by a ninth-century Muslim trader to China named Sulaymān. This account is inserted in the first half of *Silsilat al-Tawārīkh (The Chain of Histories)* in 916 by the tenth-century traveler Abū Zayd Ḥassan al-Sīrāfī. The second half of the *Silsilat* consists of al-Sīrāfī's own composition. Sulaymān himself had compiled his account based on reports about China, India, and other countries, which had been collected by his companions. Besides his name, we know very little about Sulaymān's life, although we can recognize him as a Muslim through his words. Sulaymān's account is one of the oldest Muslim trader's guides covering marine itineraries to East Asia. He introduced a variety of extensive and detailed information about China, India, and other noticeable places between them.[10] He attached the section focused on Silla at the end of his writing about Muslim trading with the east, as follows:

> In another direction (from China), that of the ocean, are the islands of al-Sīlā. They are pale-skinned people who exchange gifts with the ruler of China; they maintain that if they did not keep up this exchange, rain would cease to fall on their land. None of our circle of informants has ever made it there and brought back a reliable report. In the land of al-Sīlā, there are white hawks.[11]

As a trader, Sulaymān's book is recognized as a practical and reliable resource for those who traded to the east of the Islamic world. When it comes to Silla, it is very obvious that he observed the nation from the positionality of a Muslim trader in China.

His narrations about Silla itself describe it as a set of islands, the only place east of China across the sea, with pale-skinned inhabitants and hawks as a local fauna. This information is simple and short but very accurate. The composition of information on Silla presents the kingdom in a way that displays its value to Muslim merchants. The white hawks, a rare and lucrative commodity, would have caught the eyes of Muslim traders, drawing their attention to Silla as a lucrative prospect for trade and exchange.

Furthermore, the merchants regarded several pieces of knowledge about Silla as important enough to inform other Muslim mariners. These included the geographic location and composition of Silla and a description of its inhabitants, focusing on their skin tone. Most importantly for the mariners is Silla's peculiar relationship with China. As China was one of Silla's top trade partners, figuring out how to do business with traders from Silla in China would have been useful. As for the Muslim diaspora, Sulaymān neither commented nor denied the existence of Muslims in Silla. We can infer from this that the role of Muslims and their lives in Silla were not noteworthy enough for Sulaymān to share with his potential readers. Muslims' direct role in trading in Silla is also questionable since none of Sulaymān's companions experienced Silla firsthand. Finally, Silla was the only

known land to the east of China that involved a crossing of the sea; consequently, Silla was important for Muslim traders not to sail to or to live in, but instead, people from Silla were one of the most important foreign groups in China, and the farthest land to the east of China within the traders' sphere of activity.

The formation of medieval Muslims' perception of Korea as a Muslim "paradise"

Despite the fact that no Muslim travelers mentioned Muslims in Silla in their accounts, the authors who covered Silla's history and geography never failed to mention some Muslim's voluntary lifelong residence there. The nineteen sources that comment on Muslim residents in Silla are mainly derived from a single source, Ibn Khurdādhbih's (820–912) *Kitāb al-Masālik and al-Mamālik* (The Book of the Routes and the Kingdoms). This book introduced Silla and Muslim residents twice within its pages. The section of the itinerary from Basra (now in southern Iraq), eastwards, ends with Silla as:

> At the end of China opposite Qānṣū, there are many mountains and many kings, this is the country of al-Shīlā (al-Sīlā), it has much gold; the Muslims who entered this land settled in it. It is not known what lies beyond. These came from the Eastern Sea of China: silk, swords, ox bezoar, musk, aloe, saddles, sables, pottery, sailcloth, cinnamon, and Paeonia Officinalis.[12]

A further section describes the marvels of the earth and talks about Silla again, shedding light on the context of Muslims who live there:

> Every Muslim who entered into a country at the end of China, which is named al-Shīlā (al-Sīlā) and has much gold, settled there due to its pleasantness and never left it.[13]

Considering the general characteristics of this section, Silla's "pleasantness," which created an environment in which Muslims decided to stay for the rest of their lives, is important. In my review of the Islamic sources, including Ibn Khurdādhbih's book, I could not find another place like Silla described that provided such an ideal environment for Muslim visitors across genres and ages. All the authors from these sources who discussed Silla talked about it as a form of paradise, passing this concept down to scores of authors. When we approach the text critically, the historical period's situation in Korea was not always stable and affluent but mixed with natural and political fluctuations.[14] Instead, this notion of "paradise" is easier to understand when we interpret the history of Silla and its Muslim residents through the eyes of Muslims in China at that time.

The ninth-century history of Silla can be divided into two halves and in the second quarter, Silla dominated trading among China, Korea, and Japan. This period is peculiar in East Asian history as traditionally, these countries preferred to control trade by restricting private commerce overseas. Therefore, the majority of the extensive trade was conducted by various participants accompanied by emissary groups to act on each state's behalf.[15] However, as the governments of Silla and China could not extend their grip beyond their capital areas, they faced the loss of control over private trade.[16] Japanese travelers relied on Silla's ships and sailors.

This circuit structure of trade and relations is recorded in precise detail in the prominent Japanese Buddhist monk, Ennin's (圓仁, 793 or 794–864) diary *Nittō guhō junrei kōki* (The Record of a Pilgrim to China in Search of the Law 入唐求法巡禮行記). This Japanese monk observed the Tang Dynasty for ten years and whilst he offered little comment about the Japanese role in the Tang Dynasty, or other countries associated with it, he did devote much space in his accounts to explanations about the vast network of the Silla people and their agency.[17] According to his narrations, Silla's vessels dominated East Asian trade and passenger business, and immigrants from Silla worked powerfully and extensively in a transport network that had strong connections to commercial hubs alongside the sea, the rivers, and the Grand Canal. Particularly, the Silla people could authorize permission for travel, which was strictly controlled by the Tang dynasty government. It is likely that the autonomy of the Silla people, as described by Ennin, left a positive and lasting impression on Muslim perceptions of Silla, particularly those living in China.

Later acceptance and stabilization of the existing notions of Silla

Ibn Khurdādhbih's three concepts of Silla: the abundance of gold, Silla as an earthly heaven for all Muslim visitors, and its location at the eastern end of the world adjacent to China helped to popularize Silla amongst later medieval authors, each using Silla in their writings to suit their own purposes. It is noticeable that the dubious idea, "Silla is chosen by all Muslim visitors as the only paradise," eventually became part of Muslim writers' common knowledge about Silla.

From the late ninth century, the idea of Silla as an "earthly paradise" was shared by Muslim authors across regions all the way from Andalusia to Central Asia. It is important to highlight that five authors wrote about Silla within a century, and all of them accepted this conception of Silla.

The earliest author who took on this idea was Ibn Rusta (d. after 912), the Persian geographer and explorer, who inserted Sīlā in his *Kitāb al-Aʿlāq al-Nafīsa* (The Book of Precious Record) in 892. Despite the absence of direct referencing by Ibn Rusta, we can confirm that his knowledge of Silla consists of the selected information in the book of Ibn Khurdādhbih. Considering that *Al-Aʿlāq al-Nafīsa* was published at a similar date to Ibn Khurdādhbih's *Masālik*, Ibn Khurdādhbih's geography about Silla was quickly circulated and widely accepted by contemporary authors. The fact that several representative Muslim geographers and historians of the time reused the same idea also supports this inference. The majority of the later authors reused the same idea of Silla as an "earthly paradise" or simply abridged it when they described the kingdom.[18]

However, by attaching further concrete evidence and research findings, a significant number of authors expanded the old concepts about Silla. This expansion served to justify the choice of Muslims who had settled in Silla. These authors includes for instance, a tenth-century Persian traveller, historian, and geographer, al-Muqaddasī (c. d. 966),[19] the tenth-century Arab geographer who is also one of the most prominent historians, al-Masʿūdī (d. 956). Aside from these the most well-known Muslim geographer, al-Idrīsī relied on Ibn Khurdādhbih's *Masālik*, but he inserted extra attractions of Silla in the detail of his work.[20] Ultimately, the thirteenth to fourteenth-century geographer Al-Dimashqī (1256 or 1257–1327) reconfigured contemporary understandings of Silla by mentioning Ptolemy as the source of knowledge about the kingdom.[21]

Particularly, al-Masʿūdī added concrete ideas about the merits of nature and human environment there, to the existing single strength of Silla in Muslim writing, its abundance of gold. The way he described Silla was repeated by later authors. He illustrated Silla as:

> None of the kingdoms are known or described beyond China by sea, except for a country, al-Sīlā and its annexed islands. With the rare exceptions of some people, no strangers from Iraq[22] or anywhere else leaves here, due to the clean air, the pure water, the fertile soil, the heart-warming hospitality, and the lucid gems.[23]

The perceptions of Chinese, Persian, and Middle Easterners on "the East," "China," and on the "eastern end of the world" need to be considered, since they influenced the formation of the optimistic and positive ideas about Silla in the minds of Muslims and Muslim writers. The vast majority of the ancient world regarded the East as an auspicious and sacred direction, because the sun rises there. In connection with East Asia, the idea of Mount Penglai (蓬萊山) in the sea east of China[24] was popularized as a natural and spiritual utopia. For contemporary Muslims, Silla was the only known civilized place to the east of China and situated

in the sunrise, so Silla would have benefited from being described as an earthly paradise by al-Masʿūdī. Additionally, for this image, we have to remember al-Sīrāfī, who personally introduced Sulaymān's account of the auspicious elements of Silla, including the white hawks and the bright complexion of its inhabitants, to al-Masʿūdī.

Further the question of sources of information, Muslims relied upon secondary data when they collected information about Silla. Therefore, traditional legends in East Asia maintained Muslims' belief in an idealistic concept of Silla. As a result, this optimistic vision of Silla was not shaken through the Middle Ages. Also, the location of Silla in Islamic Kishwar geography potentially fortified the positive perception of Silla. The Seven Kishwar system, derived from the ancient Persian tradition, largely spread across the medieval Islamic world. The Seven Kishwar system categorized the world into seven zones and distributed a respective hierarchy for individual sections. According to the medieval Muslims' redistributed division of the ancient Persian Kishwar, the seventh section roughly covers the mid and southern part of modern East Asia and Central Asia, which was mainly agricultural land, and excludes the nomadic steppe. In contrast to the negative perception on the sixth sector of northern Eurasia, the seventh section, including Silla was regarded as one of the most ideal and auspicious zones. In the historic and theological aspects, the sixth section, the land of the Yājūj and Mājūj, was described as much inferior to China and Silla both in natural and human terms. One of the reasons for this difference could be the direct and frequent military conflict between Islamic and pre-Islamic West Asia and the steppe nomads in history.[25] Contrary to this, the Islamic world experienced less direct conflict with China and even less with Silla, and the lack of conflict could have contributed to the construction of positive ideas about Silla in the minds of Muslims. On top of this, the pale skin of East Asians, at this point a complexion favored in the Islamic world,[26] provided a positive image of Silla in the minds of Muslims.

By the second half of the ninth century, Silla's official trade shrank due to the Tang government's extensive crackdown,[27] and Chinese merchants took the leading role in East Asian trade, reducing the role of private local merchants in the Korean Peninsula. Two decades later, Muslims in China retreated from the Chinese coast following the rebellion of Huangchao between 875 and 884.[28] Al-Sīrāfī, the Persian seafarer who included the merchant Sulaymān's account about Silla, elaborated the damage of this revolt on the Muslim community.[29] The reconstruction of the Muslims' compound in China took decades. In the meantime, Muslims settled in southeast Asia. These events distracted authors and scholars from updating the whereabouts of missing Muslims in China and their situation in Silla.[30]

When we look back at the contemporary situation of China, it was positioned as the Islamic world's main hub for trade and exchange with East Asia, and knowledge of the historic existence of permanent Muslim compounds in large numbers along the coast spread frequently within the Islamic world, which made for quick updates both negative and positive. On the other hand, Silla probably welcomed Muslims irregularly and in lesser numbers. The even nature of exchange, and particularly the pausing of Muslims' direct activity in China through local compounds there, would have disrupted updates on the changed situation in East Asia. For different reasons, Japan is not depicted as a fantastic land in this period within Muslim writing. This situation was probably because of the temporary situation that, at the time, saw little direct exchange between Japan and China, with consequent impressions of Japan as being of little importance with no Muslims there. During this period, Japan paused its embassies to the continent, and Japanese sailors had insufficient skill and capabilities to cross the sea by themselves.[31]

The temporary disconnection of Silla from the Islamic world, due to these disruptions in China, meant that the remaining idealistic and positive impression of Silla as a "paradise" could not be later confirmed by Muslim writers and travelers. Instead, the idea of Silla as a "paradise" lasted many centuries after the kingdom had ceased to be and without regard to whether there were actually any Muslims there. Since there are few places satisfying the idealistic and legendary conditions offered by this imagined Silla in the Islamic context in history and geography writing, with historical examples of direct exchange and a complex of diverse optimistic symbolism, medieval Islamic authors failed to seek any substitutes for Silla as "a paradise for Muslims."

Notes

1.   Su-il Jeong (published name: Muhammad Kanso), *Sīlā Sŏyŏ kyoryusa* (Seoul: Danguk University Press, 1992), p. 158.
2.   Jeong, Jin Han. "Creating the Medieval Geography by using Korea". PhD dissertation, SOAS. University of London, 2020, pp. 56–60.
3.   Ginzo Uchida. *Shira no Shima Kyu Gōresu ni Tsukite* (Tokyo: Geibun, 1915), quoted in Henry Yule and Henri Cordier, *Chungguk ŭro kanŭn kil, Vol. 1*, trans. Su-il Jeong (Seoul: Sagyejeol, 2002), pp. 358–360, 360n39.
4.   Hyunhee Park, Mapping the Chinese and Islamic worlds: cross-cultural exchange in pre-modern Asia (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), p. 86.
5.   Mohammad Bagher Vosooghi, "Geographical Location of Sillā in Muslim Astronomical Literature of the Thirteenth to Sixteenth Centuries CE." *Acta Koreana* 21.1 (2018), pp. 66–69.
6.   An astronomical handbook consists of tables containing longitudinal and latitudinal coordinates which mostly derived from Persian *Zīk*, Indian *Sindhind*, Greek *Almagest*, and other

ancient civilizations' science, see David King and Samsó, J "Zīḏj," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition (Leiden: Brill, 2002).

7.   Jeong, "Creating the Medieval Geography by using Korea," Appendix, table 1.
8.   Jeong, "Creating the Medieval Geography by using Korea," pp. 77–78.
9.   Jeong, "Creating the Medieval Geography by using Korea," p. 176.
10.   Jeong, "Creating the Medieval Geography by using Korea," pp. 77–78.
11.   Abū Zayd al-Sīrāfī and Aḥmad ibn Faḍlān, Two Arabic Travel Books: Accounts of China and India and *Mission to the Volga*, trans. Mackintosh-Smith, Tim, and Montgomery, James (New York: NYU Press, 2015), p. 67.
12.   Abū Zayd al-Sīrāfī and Aḥmad ibn Faḍlān, Two Arabic Travel Books: Accounts of China and India and Mission to the Volga, p. 97.
13.   Jeong, "Creating the Medieval Geography by using Korea," p. 97.
14.   Yun, Sunok and Sangil Hwang. "*Samguk sagi* rŭl t'onghae pon Han'guk kodae ŭi chayŏn chaehae wa kamun chugi," *Taehan Chiri Hakhoeji* 44.4 (2009): 497–509; For more details, see Young Jin, Choi, "Kwŏllyŏk chipchung ŭi shinhwa- Silla hŭngmang ŭi chŏngch'i kujo-jŏk kiwŏn," *Han'guk chŏngch'ihak hoebo* 42.4 (2008): 33–57.
15.   Yun, Jaeun. "8–10 segi Tong Asia muyŏk net'ŭwŏk'ŭ" *Han'guk kodae sat'amgu* 12 (2012), pp. 127–131.
16.   Kwon, Deok-young "Kodae Tong Asia ŭi Hwanghae wa Hwanghae muyŏk: 8, 9 segi Silla rŭl chungshim ŭro." *Sahak yŏn'gu* 89 (2008), pp. 16–18, 23–50.
17.   See Tae-Gyou Ko, "9 segi Ilbonin ŭi Chungguk yŏhaeng e taehan chaedang Sillain ŭi yŏkhal: Ennin ŭi *Iptang kubŏp sullye haenggi* rŭl chungshim ŭro," *Kwan'gwang yŏn'gu chŏnŏl* 34.2 (2020); Kim, Sun-Bae. "*Iptang kubŏp sullye haenggi*, Ennin i mannan kilwi ŭi irŭmdŭl," *Taehan chiri hakhoeji* 55.3 (2020).
18.   Jeong, "Creating the Medieval Geography by using Korea," p. 185.
19.   André Miquel, "AlMuḳaddasī," in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second edition (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
20.   Al-Idrīsī, Nuzhat al-Mushtāq fī Ikhtirāq al-Afāq (The book of pleasant stroll into faraway lands) (Cairo: Maktabat al-Thaqāfa al-Dīnīya, 1992), p. 92.
21.   Al-Dimashqī, *Nukhbat Al-Dahr Fī ʿAjāʾib al-Barr Wa-al-Baḥr*, ed Abd al-Muftaqir (Saint Petersburg: Imperial Academy, 1865), p. 130.
22.   André Miquel, "ʿIrāḳ": in *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, Second Edition (Leiden: Brill, 2002).
23.   Jeong, "Creating the Medieval Geography by using Korea," p. 184.
24.   Several Chinese Classics including *Liezi* (列子), *Shanhaijing* (山海經), and *Shiji* (史记), described Mount Penglai as a legendary mountain on Penglai Island in the east of the Bohai Sea. They depicted the island and mountain as possessing abundant gold and silver. In addition to this, the island is believed to be inhabited by hermits. See Jeong, "Creating the Medieval Geography by using Korea," p. 37n87.
25.   Adam J. Silverstein, "The Medieval Islamic Worldview: Arabic Geography in Its Historical Context," in *Geography and Ethnography: Perceptions of the World in Pre-Modern Societies* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010), pp. 275–79.
26.   See Bernard Lewis, Race and slavery in the Middle East: an historical enquiry (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992).
27.   Jaeun Yun, "Shillahadae muyŏkkwallyŏn kiguwa chŏngch'ak," *Sŏnsawa kodae* 20 (2004), pp. 271–272.
28.   Park, Mapping the Chinese and Islamic worlds, pp. 69–70.
29.   Park, Mapping the Chinese and Islamic worlds, p. 70.
30.   Park, Mapping the Chinese and Islamic worlds, pp. 70–71.
31.   See Jaeun Yun, "8–10 segi Tong Asia muyŏk net'ŭwŏk'ŭ" *Han'guk kodae sat'amgu* 12 (2012).

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Book Reviews

Katherine In-Young Lee, *Dynamic Korea and Rhythmic Form*
2018, Wesleyan University Press, pages 200, ISBN: 9780819577054

Sunhong Kim, University of Michigan

Feld (2000, 146) states that due to ambivalence about musical globalization, which causes issues related to musical diversity, frictions existing in sonic heterogeneity and homogeneity as well as other frictions of musical blending and division in globalization's process are aligned. In terms of the relevance between the changing procedure of sonic characteristics and customization for global audiences, the emergence of a new musical genre appears in the tension between the globalization of itself and contemporary musical transformation. A derivative South Korean (henceforth, Korean) musical genre, Samulnori, is a suitable example of this phenomenon, in that it was a budding musical genre during the rise of Korea's popularity around the world in the late twentieth century. Lee's book interprets the neo-traditional musical formation of Samulnori and its practices in the context of Korea's cultures, identities, and politics. Her primary questions rest on how the corporeal engagement of musical shape and performance accessibility enabled this genre to gain a huge fame among practitioners worldwide.

Her claims in each chapter integrate into the argument that dynamism in the rhythmic patterns of Samulnori's musical arrangements, embodying movement, energy, change, and intensification, was the primary reason it appealed to non-musicians. She analyzes growth of this genre in tandem with detailed elements, which are Samulnori's international exercises, the audience's optimistic amiability with challenging new life-experience through this performance, the Korean administration's propaganda for this music, the accessibility of musical resources, and the didactical goal of *SamulNori Hanullim*, the premier ensemble (7). She underscores musical form by claiming that rhythm-based forms with easily acquirable performativity function as an important opportunity for participants to engage in transcending diverse cultures based on a contrast with the text-based music *pinari*, which have illegible Koreans and evokes Korean nostalgia. However, she broadens the point that motivation for Korean localists to choose *pinari* in the

2008 World SamulNori Festival was the outcome of Korea's ambitions to have a significant role in the contemporary world. Therefore, her direct connection of a specific rhythm-based repertory with the context of globalization further widens socio-political aspects surrounding the genre.

Katherine Lee is an Associate Professor of Ethnomusicology at UCLA. Her main inspiration was sonic effect's role in previous and contemporary cultural phenomena. Her academic immersion in Korean percussion genres started from *Pungmulnori*, which was associated with rural peasants and pre-modern Korea (Lee 2009, 257), and its use in the democratization movement in Korea. She then extended to an examination on Samulnori and its globalization, which became a fruitful publication and was awarded the 2019 Béla Bartók Award for Outstanding Ethnomusicology. Her book encompasses her collaborations with numerous practitioners of Korean traditional music such as her steadfast commitment to the *Samulnori Hanullim*'s global tour.

Chapter 1 explores the background of the nascent Samulnori genre among professional Korean traditional musicians as an attempt for them to bring a newfangled musical genre to prominence. Chapter 2 digs into a particular sonic and rhythmic figure from one of the Samulnori's repertories, *Yongnam nongak karak*, approached as a musical analysis, not to mention her discussion of how this rhythmic form induces dynamism. Chapter 3 looks into the Korean government's nation-branding to the outside world, calling the country "Dynamic Korea" in order to heighten the effect of creating images of a civilized and economically strong Korea. Such propaganda was suitable for the government to buttress Samulnori's active performance as a symbol of Korea. Chapter 4 is composed of extensive interviews with global amateurs who experienced a big influence in their lives because of Samulnori. Her reflection on enthusiasts' perspectives proved that *Yongnam nongak karak* was the repertory that is practiced easily, and which had prevalent distribution. Chapter 5 reviews the ethnographical work on World Samulnori festival in 2008 to compare text-based form *pinari* with *Yongnam nongak karak*.

Her ethnographical work centers on interacting with highly regarded professionals and avocationists for the development of this genre. She extensively interviews practitioners from eleven countries more than thirty times. The global encountering of this genre to non-Koreans aids in the investigation of Samulnori's attractive characteristics more objectively. Her insight into distinguishing rhythmic form not only provides a precise expression of the music, but highlights the pedagogical cornerstones of rhythmic operation, such as *hohŭp*, meaning breathing, which is a required technique for actual renditions (52), as

well as the unique concept of rhythmic performance, which is "produce, stir up, fasten, unbind" (56).

Her unrestricted ability to obtain research materials is far-reaching and necessary to comprehend the worldwide popularity of Samulnori; nonetheless, it might be more edifying to consider the following points. Musical jargon is Western-centered and not always sufficient to explain Korean traditional music or instruments. Specifically, she uses Western classical musical instruments as referents, such as naming *napal* as long trumpets, while depicting *nagak* as conches (118); *t'aep'yŏngso* as shawms (121); and four instruments of Samulnori as a quartet (8, 13). Secondly, using a generic term for items peculiar to Korean traditions erases Korea's unique attribute within Northeast Asian countries. Although the Korean zodiac admittedly originated from China, given that it has been adjusted to the Korean people's personality and their emblematic culture, to refer to it as the Chinese zodiac lessens its Korean identity (118). She makes this reference in her description of ethnic Koreans, *Zainichi*. Lastly, it might be more instructive to indicate what, exactly, the Korean traditional musical genre is. To illustrate, her understanding of *ch'wit'a* (118) can be replaced by *Taech'wit'a* as this particular genre only uses *nabal* and *nagak* among other variations of *ch'wit'a*.

Korean traditional music (*kugak*, lit., national music) has embraced ethnic identity in modern nation building, which is deemed "authentic, pure, and natural (Finchum-Sung, 402)." Globalization of Samulnori reveals how one musical genre developed musically followed by one country's modernization and imbued with a natural sense of its unity. This book offers a comprehensive account of a new genre's naissance and its symbol of cultural ambassadorship outside and inside of Korea. It is an essential book for students who study *kugak* or cultural phenomena and perform any music from Korean society. Any scholars who are interested in music or politics will also find that it provides an inclusive comprehension of the linkage between those two.

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Andreas Schirmer, ed., *Central Europeans in Korea: Alice Schalek, Alma Karlin, Fritz Hansgirg, and Many Others*

Mark Caprio, Rikkyo University

Central Europeans in Korea is the third volume of a collection that deals with the rich history that people from Central Europe have shared with Korean residents on the peninsula, as well as with those whom the Europeans met abroad, either in China or Europe.[1] The value of these volumes lies in the availability in English of Central European impressions of Korea and Koreans, many written originally in the authors' native languages.[2] This volume presents these impressions, made from the late sixteenth century to the twentieth century, in written forms (manuscripts, letters, and postcard memos) as well as in graphic forms (photographs and sketches). The editor of this volume, Andreas Schirmer, argues that attitudinal differences that Central Europeans maintained represent an important reason for focusing on these encounters. Rather than the "conceit" found in much of the writing left by Anglo-Americans, these memories tell of the "friendly individual bonds" that Central Europeans developed with Koreans (p. 1); these people, Schirmer remarks, adopted a "genuine interest and ... respect" for Koreans as "equals," as opposed to "looking down upon" them (p. 6). This may have been due to the non-hegemonic position of Central European travelers to Korea. They did not come from the Anglo-American hegemons and could identify with Korea's plight in the early twentieth century. Polish travelers, who encountered Koreans at this time, when both of their countries were plagued by foreign occupation, saw similarities in the two peoples' independence movements (p. 281). The chapters also relate not-so-pleasant impressions, such as that of the Austrian "globe-trotter," Ernst von Hesse-Wartegg, who, traveling through Korea just before the first Sino-Japanese war in 1894, described the country as a "miserable, barbaric country." Wartegg, who spent but one month in Korea, appeared most upset by the Korean government's prohibition of Christianity, a ban recently lifted that he believed led to the "common" execution of Christians. The Austrian also saw Korea as "stranded in medieval conditions as a result of laziness, corruption, and irrationality," a view that this chapter's author, Veronika Shin, believes Wartegg drew with a "sense of humor" (pp. 93–94).

The earliest encounters between these two peoples occurred by chance, a result of the brief encounters that Europeans made with Korean envoys to Beijing. Among the Westerners that Koreans met were Germans and Austrians who worked for the Chinese government. Encounters increased toward the end of the nineteenth century as more European travelers made their way to Korea, particularly after the Austro-Hungarian empire joined other Western states in negotiating diplomatic

treaties with the Chosŏn government. The increase in visitors from this time fed Europeans back home with information on Korea when the travelers published their experiences. From the early twentieth century, missionaries, led by those from Austria, began to experience longer sojourns on the peninsula (p. 30).

Travelers to Korea employed a variety of means to report on their experiences. A major attraction of *Central Europeans in Korea* is the large number of reproductions, many in color, of the graphics produced by these visitors. Many of the Europeans, visual artists in their own right, utilized their talents to produce images of the peninsula and its native residents. The collections of photos by two "hobby photographers," Ferenc Hopp and Dezxö Bozóky, offer a timely portrayal of Korea at the crossroads of tradition and modernity. Copies of photos taken by Czech photographers capture Korean village life in the Russian Far East. Chapters on Austrian and Czech sketch works depict Korean life in the early twentieth century.

Central Europeans in Korea also introduces a wide variety of characters who met with Koreans, both the more traditional traveler—missionaries and newspaper reporters, as well as the less likely character—fugitives from the law and World War I prisoners of war. The Austrian, Sigissmund Krips, is an example of the latter. In 1890 he arrived in Korea on a Chinese junk from China, in an attempt to escape from his creditors, with a $1,000 ransom reward hanging over his head. His stay, however, was curtailed when his infamous face was soon recognized by Chinese residents in Korea, who handed him over to the German authorities to be returned to Shanghai (pp. 73–76). The contacts established by World War I POWS with Koreans in the Russian Far East proved to be much more rewarding. War brought other Europeans into contact with Koreans. Zdenka Klöslova introduces a number of such Czechs who left sketches of the Korean villages that they visited after being transported to camps in the far extreme of the Russian and later Soviet state (pp. 171–75).

The volume also devotes space to the writings of adventurous women. It contains one interesting chapter on Alma Ida Willibalda Karlin who hailed from present-day Slovenia (then part of the Austro-Hungarian empire). Karlin rivaled the British explorer, Isabella Bird Bishop, in the wide range of countries to which her worldly travels took her between 1919–1927. A newspaper reporter, Karlin left both fiction and nonfiction accounts of these travels. Through she wrote mostly of her journeys through the southern hemisphere, she also left accounts of her travels through China, Japan, and of course Korea. Her experiences were partially influenced by the timing of her visit to Korea in 1923, when the peninsula was under Japanese occupation. At this time, her being hosted by a Japanese family inhibited her mobility, and perhaps also her perspectives of Korea. However, she did manage to explore Korean society enough to leave writings that compared it

with Japanese culture. The volume's final chapter is dedicated to perhaps Central Europe's most famous woman, Francesca Donner-Rhee, the longtime companion to Syngman Rhee, the Republic of Korea's first president.

A few of the European visitors arrived at an opportune time that allowed them to make the contacts that allowed them to witness Korean history from unique perspectives. The Koreans that the Austrian surgeon, Burghard Breitner, met felt his political influence strong enough to enlist (unsuccessfully) his participation in their anti-colonial independence movement. Francesca Donner-Rhee, the first First Lady of the Republic of Korea expands on the relationship that she shared with her husband from his life in exile in the United States, through his extended tenure as president, and into his life in Hawai'i after he resigned from office. While she generally supported her husband's political efforts, we also learn that on occasion she went behind his back to keep U.S. Ambassador John Muccio informed of classified information regarding matters "she thought [he] should know about" in the years leading up to the Korean War (p. 336). Austrian Frits Jensen's visit to North Korea as a correspondent for the Chinese placed him in a front row seat to view the armistice negotiations at P'anmunjŏm that ended Korean War fighting in 1953. His writing also offers descriptions of the city of P'yŏngyang in the immediate aftermath of that war (267–68).

Central Europeans in Korea is not an academic effort in the sense that it carries a common theme across its chapters. Its value, however, is in its vignettes that introduce a wide variety of encounters that peoples from Central Europe had with Koreans over the last few centuries. Through their accounts, students of Korean history gain a fresh understanding of a critical part of the country's history from a unique set of perspectives. The greater majority of these people travelled to the Korean peninsula with a specific purpose. Others, however, encountered Koreans by chance, in a different setting or during their brief visit to the peninsula. The collection adds to the already extensive collection of information to be gleaned from the experiences that Western peoples had with Korea and its people. The introduction and translation of these hitherto hidden accounts (at least to the English-speaking world) thus adds an important resource to assist in our understanding of modern and contemporary Korean history.

Notes

1. The other two volumes in the series edited by Andreas Schirmer, *Koreans and Central Europeans: Informal Contacts up to 1950* are Frank Hoffmann, *Berlin Koreans and Pictured Koreans*. Koreans and Central Europeans: Informal Contacts up to 1950, vol. 1 (Vienna: Praesens, 2015); and vol. 2 edited by Andreas Schirmer, *Koreans in Central Europe: To Yu-Ho, Hang Hung Su, and others* (Vienna: Praesens, 2018).
2. The volume thoughtfully provides the original language of the documents as well as the English translation.

European Journal of Korean Studies 2019–2020

European Journal of Korean Studies

Notes for Submission of Manuscripts to the *European Journal of Korean Studies*

The *European Journal of Korean Studies* is a fully peer-reviewed, on-line journal that has been published since 1991 (formerly the *Papers of the British Association of Korean Studies*). Volumes 1–18 are available free for BAKS members from www.ejks.org.uk or by emailing Robert Winstanley-Chesters (treasurer@baks.org.uk).

The journal accepts manuscripts for articles within any area of the arts, humanities and social sciences that examine Korea in either contemporary or historical times. Submissions that include a comparative discussion of issues in other East Asian nations are welcome.

Persons submitting manuscripts for consideration must note the following requirements:

1. Manuscripts must be submitted only in English, using American spelling conventions.

2. The body of the manuscript should normally be between 5,000 and 10,000 words in length. Endnotes, bibliography, and other additional material are excluded from this word count.

3. All style matters are determined by *The Chicago Manual of Style, 14th Edition* or later versions. The manuscript must use endnotes, carry a list of references, and follow *The Chicago Manual of Style* for endnote, reference, and other matters of writing style. For example, endnotes are placed after punctuation; all quotations must carry double quotation marks, except when a quotation contains an embedded quotation, and then the embedded quotation carries single marks; the use of single quotation marks for "figures of speech" is not acceptable. "Figures of speech" must carry double marks. Sentence endings or transitions (e.g., periods or commas) must be inside quotation marks, even when there is no punctuation in the quoted material. Authors must use the serial comma. Centuries must be spelled out. Authors must never use *ibid.*, *op. cit.*, *loc. cit.*, or any other Latin abbreviation. When citing a work initially in an endnote, a full citation is required; when citing the work again, authors must state: author's surname, first few words of the title, date of publication, and page number. If an ordinary or common noun (not a proper noun) is not found in standard reference dictionaries (e.g., *Merriam-Webster* or the

Oxford English Dictionary), it is foreign. All foreign nouns must be italicized. Note that, according to the *Chicago Manual of Style*, endnotes and references are constructed differently, and authors must adhere to these different styles. Only references actually cited in the manuscript are listed under "References." Inline citations indicating page numbers are acceptable only for book reviews.

The following offer a few examples of **Reference** styles. Note the order of the information in the entries, and note that only the romanised titles are italicised, not the translations of the titles.

- **Pre-modern book** (title is italicized)

  Yu Sŏng-yong 柳成龍, penname Sŏae 西厓. *Chingbirok* (懲毖錄) (first printed 1633). In Taedong Munhwa Yŏn'guwŏn, Sŏnggyun'gwan Taehakkyo 大東文化研究院, 成均館大學校, ed. *Sŏae munjip* (西厓文集). Seoul: Tongguk Munhwasa, 1958.

  Note no translation of premodern book titles.

- **Modern book**

  Choi, Jang-jip 최장집. *Minjuhwa ihu ŭi minju chuŭi: Han'guk minju chuŭi ŭi posu-chŏk kiwŏn kwa wigi* (민주화 이후 의 민주주의: 한국 민주주의 의 보수적 기원 과 위기 Democracy after democratization: The crisis and origin of conservative democracy in South Korea). Seoul: Humanitas, 2002.

  Yow, Valerie Raliegh. *Recording oral history: A guide for the humanities and social sciences*. Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press, 2005.

  Note translation of modern book title.

- **Electronic book**

  Nydam, Ronald J. *Adoptees come of age: Living within two families*. Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999. http://www.netlibrary.com (accessed 8 July 2005).

- **Chapter in a modern book**

  Chi, Tu-hwan 池斗煥. "Chosŏn chŏngi sahoe-kyŏngje wa Pusan (조선전기 사회 경제와부산 The social economy of early Chosŏn and Pusan)." In Pusan chikhal-si sa p'yŏnch'an wiwŏnhoe 釜山直轄市史編纂委員會, ed. *Pusan-si sa* (釜山市史 History of Pusan City), vol. 1, Pusan: Pusan Chikhal-si, pp. 606–632, 1989.

- **Journal article**

  Han, Yŏng-guk 韓榮國. "Ho-sŏ e silsi toen Taedongbŏp: Taedongbŏp yŏn'gu ŭi ilch'ŏk (湖西에 實施된 大同法 (上)—大同法研究의 一齣—Implementation of the Taedongbŏp in Ch'ungch'ŏng Province: One installment in a study of the Taedongbŏp)," *Yŏksa hakpo* (歷史學報) 13 (1960.10): 77–107.

  Banks, William. "A Secret Meeting in Boise." *Midwestern Political Review* 6 (1958): 26–31.

- **Electronic journal or newspaper article**

  Carbado, Devon W. "Black Male Racial Victimhood." *Callaloo* 21.2 (1998): 337–361. http://www.jstor.org (accessed 8 July 2005).

The following offer a few examples of **Endnote** styles. Note the order of the information in the entries.

(a) First appearance:

1. Valerie Raliegh Yow. *Recording oral history: A guide for the humanities and social sciences* (Walnut Creek, CA: Alta Mira Press, 2005), p. 32.

2. Han Yŏng-guk. "Ho-sŏ e silsi toen Taedongbŏp (part one): Taedongbŏp yŏn'gu ŭi ilch'ŏk," *Yŏksa hakpo* 13 (1960.10): 100.

3. Devon W. Carbado. "Black Male Racial Victimhood," *Callaloo* 21.2 (1998), http://www.jstor.org (accessed July 8, 2005).

4. Ronald J. Nydam. *Adoptees come of age: Living within two families* (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 1999), http://www.netlibrary.com (accessed 8 July 2005).

(b) Second appearance:

5. Yow, *Recording*, 2005, p. 33.

6. Han, "Ho-sŏ, sang," 1960, p. 101.

7. Devon, "Black male," 1998 (accessed July 8, 2005).

8. Nydam, *Adoptees*, 1999 (accessed 8 July 2005).

4. Romanization of East Asian names, place names, and terms must follow the McCune–Reischauer system for Korean, the modified Hepburn system for Japanese, and pinyin for Chinese. Words should be parsed in Korean and Japanese about every two syllables and particles should stand alone. If authors are submitting a manuscript that contains old or middle Korean script, they must submit not only a Word file (doc. or docx. file), but also a Hansoft file (hwp. file) of the manuscript.

5. Where appropriate, the use of Chinese characters and indigenous scripts following the initial occurrence of a term is encouraged. Use Batang font for Korean, MS-Mincho font for Japanese, and Malgun Gothic font for Chinese. For articles addressing pre-twentieth century topics, simplified Chinese characters must never be used, except for Japanese names and terms. Articles addressing contemporary topics may use simplified Chinese characters for Chinese names and terms. When using Chinese characters for Korean names and terms, never use simplified characters. Never put any East Asian script into italics.

6. The manuscript must be submitted as a Microsoft Word file attachment and must be written in double-spaced, Times Roman, 12-point font. This rule applies to both the text of the article and its section headings. Do not use bold font anywhere in the manuscript. All endnotes must be in Times Roman, 10-point font. All inserted East Asian characters must be in 11-point font in the text, and all East Asian characters in the notes must be in 9-point font.

7. The page format must be set for A4 size with left-hand justification only.

8. The manuscript must have a separate cover page that gives the full name of the author(s), academic affiliation(s), and full postal and email contact details of the author or the corresponding author. The cover page must also have a one-paragraph summary of the contents of the article and five (5) key words.

9. The first page of the text of the manuscript must have only the title of the article at the top. The name of the author(s) must NOT be included.

10. All materials must be submitted to the Managing Editor, Dr, Robert Winstanley-Chesters at r.winstanley-chesters@leeds.ac.uk

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